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485 results on '"Fischbacher, Urs"'

1. Social Learning with Intrinsic Preferences

Author

Dvorak, Fabian and Fischbacher, Urs

Subjects
Economics - General Economics
Abstract

Despite strong evidence for peer effects, little is known about how individuals balance intrinsic preferences and social learning in different choice environments. Using a combination of experiments and discrete choice modeling, we show that intrinsic preferences and social learning jointly influence participants' decisions, but their relative importance varies across choice tasks and environments. Intrinsic preferences guide participants' decisions in a subjective choice task, while social learning determines participants' decisions in a task with an objectively correct solution. A choice environment in which people expect to be rewarded for their choices reinforces the influence of intrinsic preferences, whereas an environment in which people expect to be punished for their choices reinforces conformist social learning. We use simulations to discuss the implications of these findings for the polarization of behavior.

Published
2024

2. Generative AI Triggers Welfare-Reducing Decisions in Humans

Author

Dvorak, Fabian, Stumpf, Regina, Fehrler, Sebastian, and Fischbacher, Urs

Subjects
Economics - General Economics
Abstract

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is poised to reshape the way individuals communicate and interact. While this form of AI has the potential to efficiently make numerous human decisions, there is limited understanding of how individuals respond to its use in social interaction. In particular, it remains unclear how individuals engage with algorithms when the interaction entails consequences for other people. Here, we report the results of a large-scale pre-registered online experiment (N = 3,552) indicating diminished fairness, trust, trustworthiness, cooperation, and coordination by human players in economic twoplayer games, when the decision of the interaction partner is taken over by ChatGPT. On the contrary, we observe no adverse welfare effects when individuals are uncertain about whether they are interacting with a human or generative AI. Therefore, the promotion of AI transparency, often suggested as a solution to mitigate the negative impacts of generative AI on society, shows a detrimental effect on welfare in our study. Concurrently, participants frequently delegate decisions to ChatGPT, particularly when the AI's involvement is undisclosed, and individuals struggle to discern between AI and human decisions., Comment: 19 pages, 2 figures

Published
2024

9. Betting on Diversity—Occupational Segregation and Gender Stereotypes.

Author

Fischbacher, Urs, Kübler, Dorothea, and Stüber, Robert

Subjects
GENDER differences (Sociology), SEX discrimination, GENDER stereotypes, HUMAN resource directors, INGROUPS (Social groups)
Abstract

Gender segregation of occupations and entire industries is widespread. The segregation could be the result of perceived job-specific productivity differences between men and women. It could also result from the belief that homogeneous teams perform better or from in-group bias of male or female recruiters. We investigate these explanations in two samples: students and personnel managers. The subjects bet on the productivity of teams that are homogeneous with respect to gender at the outset and then either remain homogeneous or become diverse. The teams work on tasks that differ with respect to gender stereotypes. We obtain similar results in both samples. Women are picked more often for the stereotypically female task, and men are picked more often for the stereotypically male task. Subjects believe that gender-diverse teams perform better, especially in the task with complementarities, and they display an own-gender bias. Elicited expectations about the bets of others reveal that subjects expect the gender stereotypes of tasks but underestimate others' bets on diversity. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Excellence Cluster EXC 2035/1 "The Politics of Inequality" (to U. Fischbacher), CRC TRR 190 "Rationality and Competition" (to D. Kübler), and the Excellence Cluster EXC 2055 "Contestations of the Liberal Script" (to D. Kübler)] and from Tamkeen [NYU Abu Dhabi Research Institute Award CG005 (to R. Stüber)]. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4943. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2024
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12. Super-additive cooperation

Author

Efferson, Charles; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8244-4497, Bernhard, Helen, Fischbacher, Urs; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5115-8815, Fehr, Ernst; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6325-7821, Efferson, Charles; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8244-4497, Bernhard, Helen, Fischbacher, Urs; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5115-8815, and Fehr, Ernst; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6325-7821

Abstract

Repeated interactions provide an evolutionary explanation for one-shot human cooperation that is counterintuitive but orthodox. Intergroup competition provides an explanation that is intuitive but heterodox. Here, using models and a behavioural experiment, we show that neither mechanism reliably supports cooperation. Ambiguous reciprocity, a class of strategies that is generally ignored in models of reciprocal altruism, undermines cooperation under repeated interactions. This finding challenges repeated interactions as an evolutionary explanation for cooperation in general, which further challenges the claim that repeated interactions in the past can explain one-shot cooperation in the present. Intergroup competitions also do not reliably support cooperation because groups quickly become extremely similar, which limits scope for group selection. Moreover, even if groups vary, group competitions may generate little group selection for multiple reasons. Cooperative groups, for example, may tend to compete against each other. Whereas repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them triggers powerful synergies because group competitions constrain the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus suggest neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Instead, our results suggest social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms.

Published
2024

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