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The digital revolution has evolved the act of writing; its forms have changed. From this phenomenon, new Graphomotor oriented research opportunities have emerged. The knowledge gathered by this research introduces a new angle for setting up a new writing system. Until today, no writing system has been able to transcribe the multidimensional nature of sign languages (SL). For that reason, sign languages offer the perfect opportunity for this kind of research. In this study we try to understand the link between gestures and meaning for the speaker and discover what features and how much of signing (gestures, body language) can be kept in the act of writing. Our objective is to maintain the integral meaning of gestures for the signer/writer. To do so, we offer the creation of a technologically advanced scriptural environment in which meaningful gestures can be put into perspective. First, this multidisciplinary research focuses on what can be transferred from the former gestural act (signing) to the latter (writing). Then, we consider the tool that will enable this transfer. To do so, we follow a phenomenological approach, or in other terms, a descriptive methodology from the firstperson point of view. This methodology is built upon signers’ feedback gathered of the experience lived during interviews. Shaping this method to fit the French SL offers precise gestural descriptions from signers themselves. This database is then compared with alinguistic and kinesiological analysis from the third-person point of view. These gestural meaning results enable us to reflect on how to create a guided experience tool enabling the assimilation of SL’s gestural matter and the creation of scriptural forms. To do that, we follow a UX design, an enaction design, and a tool based approach in order to offer immersion and interaction. This kind of device offers a new perspective to signers on their own language and more generally, offers the possibility for any user to form a new relationship with her or his own gestures.; L’avènement du numérique a déplacé et découplé l’acte d’écriture de sa forme graphique et ainsi ouvert des possibilités de recherche au sujet des performances graphomotrices. Ces dernières peuvent, en particulier, prendre une autre dimension dans le contexte de création d’une écriture. Les langues des signes (LS) n’ont pas trouvé à ce jour de système d’écriture à même de rendre compte de leur spatialité et multidimensionnalité. Elles offrent ainsi des circonstances propices à cette recherche. Notre étude cherche à savoir jusqu’à quel point une part de l’activité du langage oral (gestuelle, corporelle) peut être maintenue dans l’activité du langage écrit et vise à comprendre le lien, en première personne, entre gestes et sens. L’objectif est de préserver une signification profonde pour le locuteur/scripteur. Pour répondre à cette question, nous proposons de réinvestir une gestuelle porteuse de sens dans le cadre de la conception d’un environnement technique favorisant la création scripturale. Dans un premier temps, cette étude pluridisciplinaire explore ce qui peut être transférable d’une sphère gestuelle à l’autre. En d’autres termes, quels éléments de l’oral peuvent être rapportés à l’écriture. Dans un second temps, elle envisage l’instrument permettant ce transfert. Pour cela, nous employons une démarche phénoménologique entendue comme méthodologie descriptive du point de vue en première personne. Cette méthode s’appuie sur des techniques de verbalisation de l’expérience vécue lors d’entretiens. La construction de la méthode adaptée à la LS française permet d’accéder à des descriptions fines des locuteurs sourds sur leur gestuelle. Le corpus de données est ensuite mis en dialogue avec une analyse en troisième personne établie à l’aide d’études linguistiques et kinésiologiques. Les résultats sur les dimensions du geste sémiotique nous amènent à penser les conditions d’une expérience habilitée, dans une perspective d’appropriation et de création scripturale des LS. Nous suivons pour cela la démarche de conception du design d’expérience utilisateur, du design d’énaction et de l’approche instrumentale pour l’immersion et l’interaction. La conception d’un tel dispositif vient non seulement changer le regard des personnes sourdes sur leur langue, mais également de manière plus générale, changer la relation que tout utilisateur a avec sa production gestuelle.

Having a storyteller is a vital element for any story: a narrative voice, real or implied, that presents the story to the reader. When we talk about narrative voice we are talking about point of view, the method of narration that determines the position, or angle of vision, from which the story is told. The nature of relationship between the narrator and story, the teller and the tale, is always crucial to the art of fiction. It colors and shapes the way in which everything else is presented and perceived, including plot, character, and setting. Alter or change the point of view, and you alter and change the story. The choice of point of view is the choice of who is to tell the story, who talks to the reader. It may be a narrator outside the work (omniscient point of view); a narrator inside the work, telling the story from a limited omniscient or first-person point of view; or apparently no one (dramatic point of view). These basic points of view, and their variations, involve at the extreme a choice between omniscient point of view and a dramatic point of view – a choice that involves, among other things the distance that the author wishes to maintain between the reader and the story and the extent to which the author is willing to involve the reader in its interpretation. However, the question of point of view is as complex and complicated as it is important. A narrative is a form of communication. According to G. Genette, every text discloses traces of narration; all narrative is necessarily telling and showing by making the story real and alive. A story-teller or narrator that is called point of view is present in all verbally told stories. The present paper is based on different pieces of fiction like The Lagoon by J. Joseph Conrad, The Last Tea by D. Parker.

1. IntroductionIn this paper I raise some worries about the place of naturalism within a pragmatist philosophical outlook. More precisely, I want to discuss what pragmatism in general, and Roity's pragmatism in particular, have to say about the status of theories, and theoretical talk, of human rationality, particularly as applied to what we take to be rational action and rational decision.What is at stake here is the legitimacy of certain language games, or a certain kind of theorizing, which deals with first person rationality - with rationality as understood, and as experienced, by the first person point of view. I think this language game should be preserved, and moreover, I think it can, and should, be preserved within the quarters of a pragmatist philosophy.Of course, naturalism is understood in many different ways, so we have some clarification to do. As is well known, Roily vindicated some senses of naturalism, and rejected others. Indeed, Roity's position on naturalism is rich and complex, and not easy to pin down. Among the senses of naturalism he endorsed we can mention, in the first place,(1) naturalism as anti-essentialism, or 'anti-transcendentalism', in Dewey's and Quine's sense: the methods of natural science have no need of external grounding or validation, and hence there is no such tiling as a first philosophy; and second.(2) naturalism as Darwinism: the idea that Darwin's theory of natural selection should guide our philosophical thinking about human beings; thus we have no privileged status among other natural creatures, and hence there is no privileged vocabulary for our various descriptive practices.1We also could discuss to what extent he was committed as well to:(3) naturalism as physicalism, under some possible understanding of 'physicalism', such as Donald Davidson's; and of(4) what Alessandra Tanesini dubbed 'disenchanted naturalism', the view that there is no place for the normative as such in the natural world (Tanesini 2010).Unlike (1) and (2), however, how to interpret (3) and (4), or whether they really capture Rorty's intentions, is somewhat controversial. (3) would include, at the veiy least, the idea that everything there is, is physical. Rorty describes a physicalist as. someone who is prepared to say that eveiy event can be described in micro-structural terms, a description which mentions only elementary particles, and can be explained by reference to other events so described. "Here we should remember, however, that talk of particle physics is valuable only for its utility, for its consequences, and not because of any hopes that physical theories will eventually lead us to a true description of the world - so Ins physicalism is, at best, sui generis. Consider, for example:To us antiessentialists, descriptions of objects in tenus of elementary particles are useful in many different ways - as many ways as particle physics can contribute to either technological advances or imaginative, astrophysical, redescriptions of the universe as a whole. But that sort of utility is their only virtue. - [The essentialist philosophers] share a sense that particle physics - and more generally, whatever scientific vocabulary could, in principle, serve to redescribe any phenomenon whatever - is an example of a land of truth which pragmatism does not recognize. . Particle physics has, so to speak, become the last refuge of the Greek sense of wonder - the sense of an encounter with the almost Whole Other.3Point (4) is also problematic, I think, in the sense that Rorty made it clear in many places that it is not so much that there are no such tilings as nouns within the realm of the physical world, but rather that the question of how to conciliate the normative and physical dimensions is not, say, politically compelling, in a broad sense. We read, for instance, that:[Q]uestions about the place of values in a world of fact are no more unreal than questions about how the Eucharistic blood and wine can embody the divine substance, or about how many sacraments Christ instituted. …

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...

Attention : Between Phenomenology and Experimental Sciences. A Comparison. This article compares two approaches to attention. The first is phenomenological ; it takes into account the point of view of the subject. The second, characteristic of experimental science, adopts a third person point of view, thus ignoring the point of view of the subject. The difference in status granted to attention is what the first section of this article is about. After that, we turn to static aspects having to do with the structure of attention, and then to dynamic aspects as related to attentional movements and their micro-temporality. In the conclusion, we discuss the limits of each of these approaches as well as their complementarity., Cet article compare deux approches de l'attention. La première est phénoménologique, elle prend en compte le point de vue du sujet. La seconde qui caractérise les sciences expérimentales adopte un point de vue en troisième personne ignorant le point de vue du sujet. La différence de statut accordé à l'attention fait l'objet de la première partie. Nous traitons ensuite des aspects statiques portant sur la structure de l'attention, puis des aspects dynamiques relatifs aux mouvements attentionnels et à leur micro temporalité. En conclusion, nous revenons sur les limites de chacune de ces démarches ainsi que sur leur complémentarité., Vermersch Pierre. L 'attention entre phénoménologie et sciences expérimentales, éléments de rapprochement. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°38, 2004/1. Raisonnement causal, sous la direction de Philippe Dague, Daniel Kayser, François Lévy et Adeline Nazarenko. pp. 325-362.