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This article substantially extends the existing constitutional and legal critiques of the use of soft law public health guidance in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing upon the findings of a national survey undertaken during the first wave of the pandemic in June 2020, it shows how the perceived legal status of lockdown rules made a significant difference as to whether the UK public complied with them and that this effect is a product of the legitimacy that law itself enjoys within UK society. Based on this analysis, it argues that the problems with the government’s approach to guidance, that have been subjected to criticism in constitutional and legal terms, may also be open to critique on the basis that they risk undermining the public’s loyalty to the law itself.

In March 2020, the UK introduced a set of rules to ‘lockdown’ the country in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The lockdown constituted a key feature of governmental efforts to manage the early stages of the pandemic. Evidence suggests that the lockdown attracted high levels of compliance. Yet, a question remains about exactly why the UK public complied. Based on a major empirical study, this article explores what drove legal compliance during the UK’s first lockdown. We find that legal compliance was dominated by normative concerns with the legitimacy of law. Yet, the public’s attachment to the legitimacy of law in general was undermined by concerns about the legitimacy of lockdown law specifically. Such specific legitimacy assessments were informed by people’s rights consciousness, their sense of obligation to others, perceptions of personal health vulnerability and assessments of the rules’ effectiveness in preventing virus transmission. The prospect of peer disapproval for beaching lockdown also proved significant, with the perceived risk of sanctions imposed by the police predicting fear of peer disapproval. The article concludes by considering what lessons might be learned about the use of legal rules to rapidly shape public behaviour in times of crisis.

The Labour government aims to increase the lone parent employment rate to 70 per cent by 2010. To achieve this aim, it has introduced a state subsidy for childcare in the form of the childcare element of the Working Tax Credit. So far this has been limited to formal childcare despite evidence that lone parents are more likely to use informal childcare. This article investigates the potential of a state subsidy to be extended to support informal childcare. Utilizing evidence from a study of 78 qualitative in-depth interviews with lone parents, it explores preferences for informal care and the way that informal care is negotiated. On the one hand, we found that some lone parents held deeply embedded preferences for informal childcare based on trust, commitment, shared understandings and children's happiness. Thus it can be concluded that it is important for the government to support informal as well as formal care. On the other, we found that the way lone parents actually negotiated informal childcare involved complex notions of obligation, duty and reciprocity, suggesting that a subsidy could potentially intrude upon complex private family relationships. However, the evidence suggests that care was negotiated differently depending on whether it was provided by a grandparent or other family and friends, with lone parents tending to favour paying for childcare provided by other family and friends than grandparents. This has implications for a state subsidy, which needs further investigation.

Work history is likely to influence a decision to work beyond state pension age (SPA), since income in old age is influenced by years worked, level of earnings, occupation and timing of career. Thus, you would expect those with broken work histories to be more likely to work beyond SPA with the view to supplement their income, and build up greater pension provision for the future. However, there is evidence that having a low income does not always lead to high propensity to work beyond SPA: Those with the lowest financial resources are less likely to work longer, even controlling for other factors. This may be a reflection of careers in lower-skilled positions, with fewer labour market opportunities in old age. Thus, it may be that work life histories interact with income levels to influence extending working life. This paper attempts to examine quantitatively how work history influences the likelihood of working beyond SPA. It undertakes secondary longitudinal data analysis using retrospective work history data for the first 14 waves of the British Household Panel Survey to summarise work histories, including labour market attachment. Logistic regression is used to understand the impact of work histories on working beyond SPA, holding income and other factors constant. It finds that high personal income reduces the odds of working longer, even after controlling for other factors, but that work history is important even after income (and other factors) have been accounted for. Moreover, whilst lengthy years in employment increase the likelihood of working longer, periods of inactivity reduce the likelihood. This indicates that those with broken work histories, and seemingly in the most financial need, are less likely to undertake work beyond SPA, perhaps due to reduced negotiating power in the labour market.

Extending working life, and enabling and encouraging people to work longer, is a key policy area. That women are more likely than men to work beyond state pension age indicates that factors other than the state pension age play a role in extending working life. Financial factors are likely to be a key reason why women, and especially divorced women, are more likely than men to extend working life. It is well documented that women are less able to build a pension income due to their role as carer within the family, with their marital and fertility histories impacting upon work history. It therefore follows that gender inequalities over the life course continue into older age to influence need, capacity and desire to undertake paid work after state pension age. This paper explores how work, marital and fertility history impact upon the likelihood of working beyond state pension age, focusing upon differences between men and women. It uses the British Household Panel Survey’s retrospective data from the first 14 waves to summarise work-family histories, and logistic regression to understand the impact of work and family histories on working beyond state pension age. Findings show that, for women, family history is important for explaining a greater propensity to work beyond state pension age, with short breaks due to caring, lengthy marriages, and late divorce and remaining single with children all being important. However, lengthy dis-attachment (due to caring) from the labour market, and thus lowered negotiating power, makes working longer more difficult. For men, even short periods out of the labour market reduce their odds of working longer. This indicates that, on the one hand, policy needs to focus upon reducing the financial need to work longer by tackling gender inequalities in the labour market. On the other, to enable those most in financial need to work longer, more help needs to be given to increase their negotiating power in the labour market.