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COVID-19 is the latest zoonotic RNA virus epidemic of concern. Learning how it began and spread will help to determine how to reduce the risk of future events. We review major RNA virus outbreaks since 1967 to identify common features and opportunities to prevent emergence, including ancestral viral origins in birds, bats, and other mammals; animal reservoirs and intermediate hosts; and pathways for zoonotic spillover and community spread, leading to local, regional, or international outbreaks. The increasing scientific evidence concerning the origins of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) is most consistent with a zoonotic origin and a spillover pathway from wildlife to people via wildlife farming and the wildlife trade. We apply what we know about these outbreaks to identify relevant, feasible, and implementable interventions. We identify three primary targets for pandemic prevention and preparedness: first, smart surveillance coupled with epidemiological risk assessment across wildlife-livestock-human (One Health) spillover interfaces; second, research to enhance pandemic preparedness and expedite development of vaccines and therapeutics; and third, strategies to reduce underlying drivers of spillover risk and spread and reduce the influence of misinformation. For all three, continued efforts to improve and integrate biosafety and biosecurity with the implementation of a One Health approach are essential. We discuss new models to address the challenges of creating an inclusive and effective governance structure, with the necessary stable funding for cross-disciplinary collaborative research. Finally, we offer recommendations for feasible actions to close the knowledge gaps across the One Health continuum and improve preparedness and response in the future.

Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV) was first described in 1996 and has been regularly detected in Australian bats since that time. While the virus does not cause population level impacts in bats and has minimal impacts on domestic animals, it does pose a public health risk. For this reason, bats are monitored for ABLV and a national dataset is collated and maintained by Wildlife Health Australia. The 2010-2016 dataset was analysed using logistic regression and time-series analysis to identify predictors of infection status in bats and the factors associated with human exposure to bats. In common with previous passive surveillance studies, we found that little red flying-foxes (Pteropus scapulatus) are more likely than other species to be infected with ABLV. In the four Australian mainland species of flying-fox, there are seasonal differences in infection risk that may be associated with reproductive cycles, with summer and autumn the seasons of greatest risk. The risk of human contact was also seasonal, with lower risk in winter. In line with other studies, we found that the circumstances in which the bat is encountered, such as exhibiting abnormal behaviour or being grounded, are risk factors for ABLV infection and human contact and should continue be key components of public health messaging. We also found evidence of biased recording of some types of information, which made interpretation of some findings more challenging. Strengthening of "One Health" linkages between public health and animal health services at the operational level could help overcome these biases in future, and greater harmonisation nationally would increase the value of the dataset.