Search

In this paper, we consider a real-world retailer-led three-echelon CLSC with substitutable products in a beverage industry consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer. The manufacturer produces the same product in two different types of packaging, one being a returnable glass bottle (RGB) and the other being a disposable bottle (OW) and the consumer chooses depending on their preference. The RGB is then returned via the specialized distributor, who must ensure the sorting of the returned bottles and their reverse logistics back to the manufacturer. We analyse the CLSC with the dominant role of the retailer and compare the Stackelberg equilibrium with the Nash equilibrium where all CLSC members are equally strong. We prove that the CLSC can make higher profits if the product mix is skewed towards the RGB product. Our analysis also shows that a retailer-led CLSC can be coordinated with an RS contract to achieve a fair share of a double increase in total profits for all partners if the retailer manages its leadership position and maximises its bargaining power. From a game theoretic perspective, we show that our Stackelberg equilibrium is also acceptable in the pure vertical Nash game. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis explains why it is so difficult to negotiate and coordinate a real CLSC in a Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector, because it is unlikely that the dominant retailer would participate in the coordination negotiations and give up its margins for the benefit of all CLSCs, which is necessary to ensure the effect of reducing prices for the final consumer. This is all set in the real beverage CLSC using actual cost parameters thus providing valuable managerial insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Project management is the discipline of planning, organizing, securing and managing resources to bring about the successful completion of specific project objectives. Project opportunities come in time and it is necessary to decide which will be accepted for creating a dynamic portfolio of projects and which will be rejected. The use of project portfolio management is increasingly becoming a tool for promoting the strategy of the organization, which is a very important role. Using of standard methods or trying to design and apply sophisticated methods based on quantitative analysis is possible for portfolio management. Selection of project portfolio is a dynamic multi-criteria decision-making problem under risk. The paper presents an approach for dynamic project portfolio management based on the Analytic Network Process (ANP) model. The ANP model consists of four basic clusters (projects, resources, criteria, and time) with their elements and influences. An important factor of the proposed ANP model is time. A hybrid procedure for dynamics of the project portfolio management is proposed. Project management is associated with a significant level of risk in project implementation because each project is unique. The paper proposes the use of decision trees and multi-criteria decision making methods for modelling and solving this problem.

Revenue management (RM) deals with selling the right product to the right customer at the right time at the right price through the right channel to maximise revenue. The innovation of RM lies in the way decisions are made. The performance of revenue management approaches can be evaluated against several criteria. Both discrete and continuous multicriteria models can be used to analyse RM. The performance pyramid is a comprehensive, fully integrated perperformance system that captures multiple perspectives such as internal, financial, customer and innovation. The assessment is based on a combination of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. Customer behavior modeling is gaining increasing attention in revenue management. Customer choice models can be extended with more inputs and more outputs. Evaluation of alternatives can be performed using DEAbased evaluation methods. The search for an efficient frontier in a DEA model can be formulated as a multiobjective linear programming problem. We propose to use an Aspiration Level Oriented Procedure (ALOP) to solve the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]