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A look at distinctive variation in the language of 'Comstock' statutes to measure the birth control pill's role in the transition to a new era in US demographic history is presented. The 1960s was characterized by lower fertility rates and smaller family sizes. The analysis has provided new evidence that the pill accelerated the post-1960 drop in marital fertility.

This analysis joins the debate on how declines in marriage have shifted the composition of the unmarried and married populations in the United States, and how compositional shifts have affected nonmarital birth rates. Gray, Stockard, and Stone (2006) presented one model for compositional effects that Ermisch (2009) challenged with alternative statistical tests. I propose an alternative model for compositional shifts based not on theory but on observed marriage and fertility patterns. The results from this alternative model are consistent with Ermisch's findings yet support Gray et al.'s general case that compositional effects have had an important influence on nonmarital birth rates.

A recent article by Gray, Stockard, and Stone contended that the increase in the proportion of births to unmarried women since 1974 in the United States was not caused by any major change in underlying fertility behavior, but rather by a decrease in the proportion of women who are married, which increased both the population at risk and the birth rate of unmarried women relative to that of married women. In this comment, I argue that the statistical test of this explanation used in the article is invalid because the variables in the analysis are not stationary time series. Correct statistical tests reject the explanation. In particular; I demonstrate persistent, nonstationary deviations from the relationships predicted by the theory advanced by Gray et al. For long periods, the proportion unmarried played only, a small role in the changes in the ratio of nonmarital to marital birth rates, contrary to the theory.

High-income countries like Japan and some European countries are likely to have an increase in fertility rates in the following decades. Fertility rates in high-income countries are determined by social processes that exert effects beyond relative wages, income, and labor force participation.

Knowledge is quite limited about the extent and social correlates of marital fertility decline for the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century. Manuscripts from the New York State census of 1865 indicate a very slow decline in marital fertility during the initial decades of the nineteenth century and more rapid decline as the Civil War approached. Little evidence o f fertility control within marriage is found for the very oldest women in the sample, but analysis of parity progression ratios indicates that some control had emerged by the midpoint of the nineteenth century. Fertility decline was most evident in the urban, more economically developed areas, but our data also indicate that the limited availability of agricultural land may have affected the transition. While a marital fertility transition occurred in nineteenth-century New York, many couples in various geographic areas and social strata continued to have quite high levels of fertility, indicating difficulties that were probably faced in controlling reproduction.

The issue regarding whether cohabitors who have completed their postsecondary schooling challenge normative views of marriage are a prerequisite for childbearing is analyzed. It is seen that a few feel that marriage is necessary to have children while others do not share the same view that marriage is necessary.

The energy consumptions for the year 2025 are estimated for the European Union nations by analyzing the data from 1960-2000. Results concluded that low fertility rate is expected to limit the energy consumptions.

Value of children is studied to explain the decrease in fertility rate in Turkey and stable high fertility rate in Palestine. It is found that children are more important for parent's comfort and esteem in Palestine.

Analysis of German Family Survey is done to find out factors in fertility motivation with respect to educational level and value of children. The analysis reveals that there is no support for interrelation between educational level and birth rate of first child as promoted by opportunity cost hypothesis.

INTRODUCTION During the 1970s many developing countries experienced some transition to lower fertility (Coale, 1983). The size of fertility decline was remarkable in some countries such as those in Southeast […]

The role of natural intentions in the reproductive management based on the demographic consequences is described with the help of a study on African population. The causes of decline in fertility among the African populations are the changing fertility intentions due to the availability of contraceptives and pathological sterility.

In this article, we analyze fertility control in a rural population characterized by natural fertility, using survival analysis on a longitudinal data set at the individual level combined with food prices. Landless and semilandless families responded strongly to short-term economic stress stemming from changes in prices. The fertility response, both to moderate and large changes in food prices, was the strongest within six months after prices changed in the fall, which means that the response was deliberate. People foresaw bad times and planned their fertility accordingly. The result highlights the importance of deliberate control of the timing of childbirth before the fertility transition, not in order to achieve a certain family size but, as in this case, to reduce the negative impacts of short-term economic stress.

Fertility transition began earlier in France and the United States than in other Western countries. This article seeks to link the means couples in the two countries used to reduce [...]

Public commitment to children and their families from 1980 through 2001 in 21 advanced industrial countries is explored using time series and survey data. The findings suggest that the instruments and goals of the family benefit and service package have changed over time and that future public spending on children is increasingly likely to go toward helping families their responsibilities as workers and parents and toward enhancing the development of young children.

Methods of time series analysis, which examine the impact of tax reforms and child care tax credits on fertility rate and women labor participation in the United States during 1948-1997, are presented.

While lower fertility is commonly associated with women's reproductive autonomy, we demonstrate that the influence of men's education on reproductive decision-making increased during the first decade of rapid fertility decline in Ghana. Husband's education exerts a stronger influence on wife's fertility intentions than does her own education, and the magnitude of the effect of his education increased significantly from 1988 to 1998. Lower fertility in Ghana seems to be associated more with men's declining fertility desires than with women's increasing reproductive autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some indication that women's education may play a relatively greater role in reproductive decision-making as fertility decline progresses still further. Keywords: reproductive decisions; power; fertility intentions; fertility decline; fertility transition; education

This paper applies a two good, multi-region Ramsey-Solow model of the world economy to determine the impact that alternative world fertility rates would have on international capital markets and living standards. Notable features of the model include: relative consumption demands and relative employment efficiencies that vary by age, traded and non-traded goods, vintage technology, outward-looking reference consumption, a proportion of non-optimising rule-of-thumb consumers and imperfect capital mobility due to asymmetric information. The model suggests that projected demographic change will imply a flow of international capital from the ageing regions to the younger regions; and that the world interest rate will fall. The lower world interest rate will cause a loss in living standards for ageing regions, the lenders, and a gain for the younger regions, who are borrowers.

This research report explores some of the biocultural dimensions of maximum or near maximum fertility among Bedouin tribes in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon. The Bedouin case substantiates that very high fertility (completed family size [CFS] greater than 8.0) is found among peripheral peoples in frontier situations generated by major political-economic shifts. While the Bedouin maintained high fertility (CFS > 6.5) for approximately sixty years (1899-1960), very high fertility--linked to greater historical reliance on agriculture-was of shorter duration (1934-60). Comparisons with other very high fertility populations indicate that, at the proximate level, maximum fertility is associated with early weaning, low rates of primary sterility, and high rates of marital stability. Results also point to low subadult mortality in Bedouin society. Low mortality is best attributed to the availability of modern medical care facilities and high-quality weaning foods. [Keywords: anthropological demography, biocultural anthropology, political economy/ecology of demography, Bedouin]

While world population has continued to increase, fertility has been falling. Projections out to the year 2050 currently assume that fertility will continue to decline to, or below, replacement. 1) Past projections have been very wrong. Estimates of population growth have alternated between being far too low and far too high. 2) Similarly, public anguish has alternated between extreme fears of over- and under-population, neither supported by eventualities. 3) We do not understand the causes of the current fertility decline and so have little reason to project its continuation. 4) Many of the Asian countries, which are exemplars of the current decline, are exceptional because of coercion and/or vast infusions of Western capital. 5) The population decline may as readily plateau at 3 children as at 2 children. With an unknowable future, an emphasis on future population is misplaced. Concerns should be for the present. Poor families and a stressed environment are struggling with current population levels right now. Complacency about the future is unjustified by the facts and may derail efforts to ensure the continuation of the fertility decline. KEY WORDS: population projections; fertility; Asian economic miracle; coercion; environment.