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An open question survey of general practitioners (GP) and hospital emergency department (ED) doctors revealed that the term 'FVU' (first void urine) used for urine chlamydia testing, is ambiguous, potentially leading to incorrect urine sample collection and barriers to effective screening. The results of this survey indicate that only 4.3% (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.5-14.5%) of GP and 6.9% (95% CI 0.9-22.8%) of ED doctors respectively, correctly interpreted the meaning of FVU. The majority of clinicians surveyed misunderstood 'FVU' to require the first urine void of the day, accounting for 68.1% (95% CI 52.9-80.9%) of GP responses and 37.9% (95% CI 20.7-57.7%) of ED doctors responses. This highlights the need for clarification and standardisation of terminology used in urine chlamydia screening for health care providers, in order to optimise strategies for diagnosis and control of the ongoing chlamydia epidemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: To describe the impact of universal screening for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on passengers on cruise ships docking in Sydney, Australia, during 2022 that experienced a significant outbreak of COVID-19. Type of program or service: Cruise ship disease surveillance Methods: Case series, based on analysis of cruise ship voyages where universal screening of passengers was requested by a NSW health authority and undertaken by the cruise ship., Results: Of 111 voyages in 2022, three fit the definition for this study. Universal screening during these voyages resulted in the detection of up to 1.8 times the number of existing COVID-19 cases, increasing attack rates of the three voyages from 14% to 24%; 13% to 28%; and 3% to 8% respectively. Case demographics showed an even gender distribution, with a majority 70 years or older. Asymptomatic case percentage ranged from 2% to 54%, with age and gender not associated with symptomatic status. Almost all cases were reported as being fully vaccinated. Genomic testing of cases showed multiple lineages of COVID-19 circulating in all three voyages., Lessons Learnt: Public health authorities, the cruise industry and passengers should be aware that a large number of unidentified cases of COVID-19 may disembark from a cruise ship that has experienced a large outbreak of the virus. These cases can seed the infection into vulnerable communities. Universal screening as part of the response to a significant outbreak will help identify cases and limit the spread of COVID-19., Competing Interests: None declared

Objective: To identify and control a source of Legionella in Sydney CBD., Methods: Clinical, epidemiological, environmental and genomic techniques were employed to identify cases and the source of Legionella., Results: Eleven legionellosis cases were linked to Sydney CBD with a median age of 69 years. All were hospitalised and had risk factors for Legionella infection. Eight of 11 cases identified as male. Genomic analysis linked three cases to a contaminated cooling water source in Sydney CBD, with a further case infected with a similar strain to that found in Sydney CBD. Another case, although epidemiologically linked to Sydney CBD, was infected with a genomically different strain to that found in Sydney CBD. Six other cases had no viable sample for genomic analysis., Conclusion/implications for Public Health: An outbreak of legionellosis is a serious public health threat that requires rapid investigation and environmental control. We were able to identify a source in Sydney CBD through the application of clinical, epidemiological, environmental and genomic techniques. Genomic analysis is a powerful tool that can be used to confirm the source location but requires close collaboration between clinicians, public health units and microbiologists to recover viable sputum cultures from cases diagnosed with legionellosis., (Crown Copyright © 2023. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Objective: To explore the factors associated with the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to patrons of a restaurant., Methods: A retrospective cohort design was undertaken, with spatial examination and genomic sequencing of cases. The cohort included all patrons who attended the restaurant on Saturday 25 July 2020. A case was identified as a person who tested positive to a validated specific Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid test. Associations were tested using chi-squared analysis of case versus non-case behaviours., Results: Twenty cases were epidemiologically linked to exposure at the restaurant on 25 July 2020. All cases dined indoors. All cases able to be genomic sequenced were found to have the same unique mutational profile. Factors tested for an association to the outcome included attentiveness by staff, drink consumption, bathroom use and payment by credit card. No significant results were found., Conclusion: Indoor dining was identified as a key factor in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and outdoor dining as a way to limit transmission. Implications for public health: This investigation provides empirical evidence to support public health policies regarding indoor dining., (© 2021 The Authors.)

Objective: To investigate an outbreak of COVID-19 in Sydney, Australia., Methods: Epidemiological linking and analysis of cases of COVID-19 across multiple outbreak sites., Results: Fifteen cases of COVID-19 and 41 contacts were identified and linked in a cluster that included one workplace and five households. The mean incubation period in the cases ranged from 4.6 to 6.4 days, while the median incubation period was shorter, ranging from 3 to 5 days. The overall range of incubation periods was 2 to 12 days. Differential attack rates were found within households (86% adults vs. 9% children) and workplace (32%) settings. Conclusions and implications for public health: Our investigation links cases between multiple households and a workplace. When exploring these links using a rapid workplace assessment, real-time cluster data along with objective measurements of exposure, such as with the Australian Government COVIDSafe app, may have allowed these links to be identified more readily and potentially reduced further spread of COVID-19. We found age as a factor for infection, with children being less likely to both acquire SARS-CoV-2 infection and to develop symptoms. This finding aids in our understanding of how the virus affects children and cautiously supports face-to-face classroom teaching., (© 2021 The Authors.)

Following the introduction of mandatory influenza vaccination for staff working in high risk clinical areas in 2018, we conducted active surveillance for adverse events following immunisation utilising an automated online survey to vaccine recipients at three and 42 days post immunisation. Most participants 2285 (92%) agreed to participate; 515 (32%) staff reported any symptom and eight (1.6%) sought medical attention. The odds of having a reaction decreased with age by approximately 2% per year. The system was acceptable to staff, and the data demonstrated rates of reported symptoms within expected rates for influenza vaccines from clinical trials. Rates of medical attendance were similar to previous surveillance. Participant centred real-time safety surveillance proved useful in this staff influenza vaccination context, providing reassurance with expected rates and profile of common adverse events following staff influenza vaccination., (Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

Background and Objectives: The Australian prevalence of hepatitis C virus (HCV) is approximately 1%, with the majority of cases acquired through injecting drug use. However, occasionally HCV infection occurs in healthcare settings. Three new HCV infections were identified amongst patients attending a general practice in Sydney, Australia, specialising in parenteral vitamin therapy., Study Design: An investigation was conducted to identify the source of infection and mechanism of transmission. Molecular analysis was conducted by sequencing the HCV NS5A, Core and NS5B regions., Results: Two sources were identified using molecular epidemiology - a genotype 3a case was the source for a case acquired in late 2004 and a genotype 1b case the source for one case acquired in late 2006 and another in early 2007. The common risk factor was parenteral vitamin C therapy., Conclusions: Inadequate infection control was apparent and likely to have resulted in blood contamination of the healthcare workers, their equipment, the clinic environment and parenteral medications. Molecular and clinical epidemiology clearly identified parenteral transmission of HCV, highlighting the risks of blood contamination of parenteral equipment and use of multi-dose flasks on more than one patient., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)