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An n-person cooperative oligopoly is considered without product differentiation. It is assumed that the firms know the unit price function but have no access to the cost functions of the competitors. From market data, they have information about the industry output. The firms want to find the output levels that guarantee maximum industry profit. First, the existence of a unique maximizer is proven, which the firms cannot determine directly because of the lack of the knowledge of the cost functions. Instead, a dynamic model is constructed, which is asymptotically stable under realistic conditions, and the state trajectories converge to the optimum output levels of the firms. Three models are constructed: first, no time delay is assumed; second, information delay is considered for the firms on the industry output; and third, in addition, information delay is also assumed about the firms’ own output levels. The stability of the resulting no-delay, one-delay, and two-delay dynamics is examined.

The asymptotical properties of a special dynamic two-person game are examined under best-response dynamics in both discrete and continuos time scales. The direction of strategy changes by the players depend on the best responses to the strategies of the competitors and on their own strategies. Conditions are given first for the local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium if instantaneous data are available to the players concerning all current strategies. Next, it is assumed that only delayed information is available about one or more strategies. In the discrete case, the presence of delays has an effect on only the order of the governing difference equations. Under continuous scales, several possibilities are considered: each player has a delay in the strategy of its competitor; player 1 has identical delays in both strategies; the players have identical delays in their own strategies; player 1 has different delays in both strategies; and the players have different delays in their own strategies. In all cases, it is assumed that the equilibrium is asymptotically stable without delays, and we examine how delays can make the equilibrium unstable. For small delays, the stability is preserved. In the cases of one-delay models, the critical value of the delay is determined when stability changes to instability. In the cases of two and three delays, the stability-switching curves are determined in the two-dimensional space of the delays, where stability becomes lost if the delay pair crosses this curve. The methodology is different for the one-, two-, and three-delay cases outlined in this paper.

This paper investigates the asymptotical behavior of the equilibrium of linear classical duopolies by reconsidering the two-delay model with two different positive delays. In a two-dimensional analysis, the stability switching curves were first analytically determined. Numerical studies verified and illustrated the theoretical results. In the sensitivity analysis it was demonstrated that the inertia coefficient has a twofold effect: enlarges the stability region as well as simplifies the complicated dynamics with period-halving cascade. In contrary, the adjustment speed contracts the stability region and complicates simple dynamics with period-doubling bifurcation. In addition, for various values of τ1 and τ2, a wide variety of dynamics appears ranging from simple cycle via a Hopf bifurcation to chaotic oscillations.

The dynamic behavior of n-firm oligopolies is examined without product differentiation and with linear price and cost functions. Continuous time scales are assumed with best response dynamics, in which case the equilibrium is asymptotically stable without delays. The firms are assumed to face both implementation and information delays. If the delays are equal, then the model is a single delay case, and the equilibrium is oscillatory stable if the delay is small, at the threshold stability is lost by Hopf bifurcation with cyclic behavior, and for larger delays, the trajectories show expanding cycles. In the case of the non-equal delays, the stability switching curves are constructed and the directions of stability switches are determined. In the case of growth rate dynamics, the local behavior of the trajectories is similar to that of the best response dynamics. Simulation studies verify and illustrate the theoretical findings.

We investigate love dynamics of two individuals in a delay love affair model in which both are assumed to be cautious, the most natural romantic style. The local stability analysis proves first that the steady state is fairly stable when there are no delays and second that solving the characteristic equation generates a set of positive delays for which the steady state loses stability. Through numerical analysis, we confirm the following three main results: (1) cyclic oscillations of love feeling emerge via Hopf bifurcation; (2) multiple delays cause the double edge effect implying that alternation of stability and instability repeatedly occurs; (3) complicated dynamics involving chaotic oscillations emerges and then merges to a limit cycle as the length of one delay increases with fixed values of the other delay.

The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of the applicability of an analytical solution to the N−person social dilemma game. Such solution has been earlier developed for Pavlovian agents in a cellular automaton environment with linear payoff functions and also been verified using agent based simulation. However, no discussion has been offered for the applicability of this result in all Prisoners' Dilemma game scenarios or in other N−person social dilemma games such as Chicken or Stag Hunt. In this paper it is shown that the analytical solution works in all social games where the linear payoff functions are such that each agent's cooperating probability fluctuates around the analytical solution without cooperating or defecting with certainty. The social game regions where this determination holds are explored by varying payoff function parameters. It is found by both simulation and a special method that the analytical solution applies best in Chicken when the payoff parameter S is slightly negative and then the analytical solution slowly degrades as S becomes more negative. It turns out that the analytical solution is only a good estimate for Prisoners' Dilemma games and again becomes worse as S becomes more negative. A sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the impact of different initial cooperating probabilities, learning factors, and neighborhood size.

An extended n-firm oligopoly with product differentiation is considered. It is assumed that the government selects an emission standard for the industry and based on the output and technology of each firm it selects a maximum allowed amount of emission for each firm. If the actual amount is higher than the allowed maximum, then the firm has to pay a constant multiple of the excess to the government; otherwise it is rewarded similarly based on the saved emission amount. The existence of the unique interior equilibrium is first proved, and then the effect of the level of penalty or reward and that of the emission standard on the industry output and therefore on the total emission level is also examined. Time delay is introduced into the penalties the firms have to pay and into the rewards the firms receive. In analyzing the stability of the equilibrium both discrete and continuous time scales are considered. For mathematical simplicity the case of symmetric firms is analyzed. In the discrete case the various values of the delay length are examined. The equilibrium is stable if either the total industry output is sufficiently large or the common speed of adjustment of the firms is sufficiently small. In the continuous case, either the equilibrium is always stable or stability occurs if the delay is sufficiently small and at the critical value Hopf bifurcation occurs.

Single-product oligopolies without product differentiation are examined with linear production, production adjustment, flexible workforce and investment costs. The price function is assumed to be hyperbolic which makes the nonlinearity of the model much stronger than in the case of linear price function examined earlier in the literature. The best responses of the firms are determined which are not monotonic in contrast to the linear case. The set of all steady states is then characterized and in the case of a duopoly it is illustrated. The asymptotical behavior of the steady states is examined by using simulation. We analyze the effects of such costs on the industry dynamics and compare them to the prediction by the well known model with hyperbolic price function and no product adjustment and investments costs.

This paper considers a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model ofa ...nancial market with one risky asset, two types of agents (i.e., thefundamentalists and the chartists), and three time delays. The chartistdemand is determined through a nonlinear function of the di¤erence be-tween the current price and a weighted moving average of the delayedprices whereas the fundamentalist demand is governed by the di¤erencebetween the current price and the fundamental value. The asset price dy-namics is described by a nonlinear delay di¤erential equation. Two mainresults are analytically and numerically shown:(i) the delay destabilizes the market price and generates cyclic oscillationsaround the equilibrium;(ii) under multiple delays, stability loss and gain repeatedly occurs as alength of the delay increases.

An elementary analysis is developed to determine the stability region of a certain class of ordinary differential equations with two delays. Our analysis is based on determining stability switches first where an eigenvalue is pure complex, and then checking the conditions for stability loss or stability gain. In the case of both stability losses and stability gains Hopf bifurcation occurs giving the possibility of the birth of limit cycles.Se realiza un análisis básico para determinar la estabilidad de la región de una cierta clase de ecuaciones diferenciales ordinaras con dos retrasos. Nuestro análisis se basa en la determinación de switches de estabilidad, en primer lugar cuando un autovalor es complejo puro, y luego revisando las condiciones para la pérdida o ganancia de estabilidad. En el caso de ambas pérdidas de estabilidad y ganancias de estabilidad, se obtiene la bifurcación de Hopf dando la posibilidad del nacimiento de ciclos límites.

We study the effects of production delays on the local as well as global dynamics of nonlinear cobweb models in a continuous-time framework. After reviewing a single delay model, we proceed to two models with two delays. When the two delays are used to form an expected price or feedback for price adjustment, we have a winding stability switching curve and in consequence obtain repetition of stability losses and gains via Hopf bifurcation. When the two delays are involved in two interrelated markets, we find that the stability switching occurs on straight lines and complicated dynamics can arise in unstable markets.

An N-firm production game known as oligopoly will be examined with isoelastic price function and linear cost under al Cournot competition. After the best responses of the firms are determined, a dynamic system with adaptive expectations is introduced. It is first shown that the local asymptotic behavior of the system is identical with that of the adaptive adjustment process in which the firms cautiously determine their outputs. Dynamic analysis is confined to two special cases, one in which N is divided into two groups and the other in which N is divided into three groups. Then stability conditions will be derived and the global behavior of the equilibria will be illustrated including chaos control. Lastly the two- and three-group models are compared with two-firm (duopoly) and three-firm (triopoly) models to shed light on roles of the number of the firms.

In this paper we suggest a method for the quasi-optimal selection of the relaxation constant in the Jacobi overrelaxation (JOR) method. It is assumed that the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix belong to a rectangular region. Our estimates may lead to better parameter choices than earlier results on circular regions.