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The definition and regulation of related-party transactions (RPTs) depend mainly on the conceptual framework underlying the interpretation of such a phenomenon. While the conflict of interests hypothesis focuses on opportunistic behaviours, the efficient transaction hypothesis suggests that RPTs lead to more efficient. In such a scenario, instead of providing opposite interpretations, the contingency hypothesis considers the potential risks and benefits associated with specific RPTs, i.e. other contex- tual factors and corporate governance mechanisms. Among the latter, independent di- rectors, empowered by the majority of national legislations worldwide, should play a crucial role in spotlighting opportunistic behaviours to the detriment of minorities. However, in light of the many corporate scandals that have stressed the RPTs' issues, practitioners and academics have questioned their effectiveness, especially in contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, while leaving room for the so-called minority directors, i.e. independent directors appointed by minority shareholders. On this matter, aiming to analyse the potential impact of minority directors on the level of procedural compliance for the RPTs' implementation, this empirical study, based on a data set, shows that they represent a more effective tool for the full and strict adoption of the current RPTs regulation, while independent directors fail in their monitoring role and are ineffective in bolstering corporate transparency with regard to RPTs.

By adopting a ‘revenue/expense’ model, the matching principle has traditionally played a fundamental role in determining earnings. However, since the 1970s, standard setters have chosen to move to an ‘asset/liability’ approach to determine income. Some authors argue that these changes in accounting standards have caused a decline in the matching process, exercising a negative impact on the quality of earnings. A contrasting view, however, is that changes in the economic activity have caused the decline in matching. Moreover, according to Barth, there is no ‘matching principle’. Indeed, the matching process often leads to the recognition of assets/liabilities of questionable substance and, therefore, cannot be considered an end in itself. The purpose of this chapter is to perform an extensive and systematic literature review on the determinants and consequences of the matching process, examining a topic of major concern for standard setters.

Purpose Although the previous literature considers independent directors as an internal mechanism for good corporate governance and higher financial disclosure quality, in contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, they may lack the mandate, the incentives and the ability to be an effective monitoring mechanism. Therefore, this study aims to focus on minority directors and investigate their impact on the earnings management activities for firms with concentrated ownership structures. Design/methodology/approach As the slate voting system is a peculiar feature of Italian corporate governance regulations, which gives minority shareholders the right to appoint at least one member of the board of directors (minority directors), this paper carries out a quantitative empirical analysis based on a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange to test the role played by minority directors in increasing incentives towards higher financial reporting quality. Findings Robust to different model specifications, including the endogeneity test, empirical findings show a negative relationship between minority directors and earnings management, while no relationship holds between the latter and independent directors, suggesting that minority directors might promote greater directors’ accountability than independent directors in highly concentrated ownership structures. Originality/value Relying on the empirical findings, this paper offers new insights on a peculiar internal corporate governance mechanism related to one of the most debated issues among financial market practitioners and regulators, namely, the protection of minority shareholders. Moreover, this paper offers new insights for academics and practitioners on a peculiar governance mechanism that could soon be widely adopted.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms and the audit issues disclosed by external auditors in their report, assuming the beneficial effect related to the adoption of a sustainable corporate governance system. Design/methodology/approach This paper investigates the impact of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board’s ISA 701 in the European context as a new auditing principle supporting the key audit matters (KAMs) in reporting and disclosing auditing activities. The analysis is carried out through a quantitative methodology using a sample composed of non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. Findings Empirical findings highlight that firms having a high quality and sustainable corporate governance system tend to have fewer KAMs arising from the audit process and then disclosed in the audit report. To ensure the reliability of the empirical analysis, the authors controlled for a set of variables that could affect the audit function and for the mediating role of the overall business complexity (as proxied by the firm size). Originality/value This study is of interest to academics, practitioners and regulators, as it highlights the role of a higher quality internal corporate governance on the perceived corporate riskiness and complexity. It contributes to the recent debate on sustainable corporate governance, corporate sustainability and auditing streams.

The banking system has undergone substantial changes that boosted the relevance of transaction-lending technologies and the role of financial reporting in the bank-firm relationship. Due to the growing emphasis on accounting data, this study investigates the impact of earnings quality on the cost of debt for a sample of SMEs during the global financial crisis. Relying on a sample of Italian non-financial SMEs, empirical findings show a positive relationship between discretionary accruals and the cost of loans, highlighting the negative consequences of low-quality earnings. Further analysis reveals the different impacts that negative and positive abnormal accruals can have on the cost of debt: low values of the former can convey private information and positively affect the response variable, which shows a positive and quadratic relationship with the latter. These findings confirm the increasing importance of hard information in credit markets and point out the significant impact of the quality of the borrowers’ earnings on the cost of debts. However, the distinctiveness of the study from the previous literature relies on evidence that, even during a credit crunch period, financial institutions weigh up the expected return from lending transactions, relying on both the sign and the magnitude of discretionary abnormal accruals as a vehicle to get firms’ private information.

PurposeBy analyzing the relationship between discretionary accruals and information asymmetry throughout the latest global financial crisis, this paper deepens our understanding of the effect of managerial discretion on the informativeness of earnings in the case of a negative exogenous shock in business fundamentals.Design/methodology/approachThis paper examines the relationship between discretionary accruals and the bid–ask spread within the Italian Stock Exchange over the period of 2007–2012. The authors focus on one country in order to avoid systematic cross-country performance variation in discretionary accruals models, and they use the bid–ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry.FindingsThis paper shows the role played by discretionary accruals in unblocking private information in the case of a negative exogenous shock in business fundamentals and finds a significant negative relationship between discretionary accruals and the bid–ask spread during the global financial crisis, although only limited to firms with strong corporate governance.Research limitations/implicationsSince the paper focuses on one country, the findings might not be necessarily generalizable. Moreover, the relatively small sample size could be another limitation.Practical implicationsThis paper offers useful evidence to identify settings in which discretionary accruals increase the informativeness of earnings. Further, it suggests controlling for macroeconomic variables to mitigate the risk of an erroneous interpretation of discretionary accruals models.Originality/valueThis paper extends knowledge and collects new evidence on the information content of discretionary accruals by investigating the relationship between discretionary accruals and information asymmetry during a systemic crisis.

In contexts characterised by high ownership concentration, an important corporate governance issue is represented by the so-called “principal–principal conflict”. Indeed, the separation between control rights and cash flow rights, the widespread use of control-enhancing mechanisms, and the concentration of voting rights can generate significant costs related to the potential appropriation of private benefits of control. In such contexts, independent directors as an internal mechanism for good corporate governance practices may lack the mandate, the incentives, and the ability to be an effective monitoring mechanism. For these reasons, academics have recently started focusing on minority directors (i.e., directors directly appointed by minority shareholders) as a mechanism to promote greater directors’ accountability and ease tensions between corporate controllers and outside investors. Relying on the preliminary evidence of this research strand, the aim of this paper is to propose a systematization of determinants and consequences related to the appointment of minority directors. As for the determinants, previous literature turns out that the appointment of minority directors mainly depends on internal corporate governance and ownership structure characteristics. As for the consequences, previous studies highlight an overall positive impact of minority directors on corporate governance practices, financial performance, corporate transparency, and financial reporting quality. Therefore, this paper is of interest to academics, as well as practitioners and regulators, as it provides an academic framework related to the appointment of minority directors on which insights for future developments depend

In contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, institutional investors may lose their monitoring role and might not be effective in constraining earnings management. So, this study investigates whether directors appointed by institutional shareholders are more effective in inhibiting earnings management for companies with a high ownership concentration, rather than the mere presence of institutional investors. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, findings suggest a negative relationship between minority directors appointed by institutional shareholders and abnormal accruals, while no relationship is found between the latter and the mere presence of institutional investors. Moreover, results also highlight that the difference between strategic and no strategic institutional investors does not count in a context characterized by high ownership concentration. Overall, this study suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their characteristics, are more effective in constraining earnings management when they can count on an agent on the board of directors.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of two different financial reporting models (revenue-expense vs asset-liability) on several earnings attributes. Design/methodology/approach The analysis compares the earnings attributes of non-financial private firms using the Italian generally accepted accounting principles (Italian GAAP, based on a revenue-expense model) with those of the Italian non-financial private firms voluntarily adopting the international financial reporting standards (IFRS, based on the asset-liability model). To address major methodological concerns, the research design is based on a single-country analysis and on three different samples as follows: firms voluntarily adopting IFRS; a matched sample of Italian GAAP firms; Italian GAAP firms belonging to the Elite programme, and therefore, comparable to the IFRS adopters in terms of incentives towards financial reporting transparency. Findings The results show that firms reporting under a revenue-expense model are characterized by a stronger revenue-expense matching degree, along with higher earnings’ persistence, earnings’ predictability and conditional conservatism than firms adopting an asset-liability model. In addition, contrary to the expectations, Italian GAAP firms do not present smoother earnings and do not report greater abnormal accruals than IFRS adopters do. Overall, the findings suggest that the switch from a revenue-expense model to an asset-liability model negatively affects several earnings attributes of non-financial private companies, shedding new light on the drawbacks associated with the adoption of the IFRS accounting model. Originality/value This study addresses a theme characterized by sparse research efforts, adding new insights to the debate on the decline in the quality of earnings and on the drawbacks associated with the adoption of the IFRS accounting model.

This study focuses on a specific category of independent directors, namely the independent directors nominated by minority shareholders and analyzes the effectiveness of independent minority directors in preventing earnings management activities. In particular, this paper analyzes the Italian context as it offers an ideal setting to examine the relationship between minority directors and earnings quality

By analysing the case of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), this paper aims at assessing the role that political marketing strategies might play to increase the sustainability of private transnational organisations. This paper proposes an integrated conceptual model that draws together political branding theory and political relationship marketing. The proposed model shows how political marketing strategies may help a global standard setter, as well as other private transnational organisations, in achieving higher legitimacy and sustainability in the long-term. By relying upon such a model, an explanatory case study of the IASB is then conducted, providing anecdotal evidence about the IASB&rsquo, s current political marketing behaviour. By adopting an interdisciplinary interpretative lens, this paper contributes to literature in addressing a theme almost neglected&mdash, namely, the role of political marketing strategies in increasing legitimacy and sustainability of transnational organisations, such as global standard setters&mdash, notwithstanding the emerging effort made in this direction by private global organisations operating in complex environments, including the IASB. Implications for political marketing theory are also discussed. As to the practical implications, this paper suggests the political marketing strategies and tools that private transnational organisations should adopt to foster their sustainability in the long-term.

Several studies examined the capital market effects and the impact on accounting quality after the mandatory IAS/IFRS adoption. Two different approaches have been widely adopted: the pro-standard and the pro-incentive. According to the former, the IAS/IFRS standards have a positive impact as a result of their higher quality, compared to local GAAP. On the other hand, the pro-incentive approach emphasizes the importance of incentives, especially ones related to the institutional settings, and predicts greater effects in countries characterized by strong legal systems and effective enforcement mechanisms. The most recent empirical evidence seems to support the pro-incentive approach. This literature review underlines the evolution of this research stream, stressing the different used approaches, in order to explain their mixed results, and trying to explain the implied reasons why recent papers move to a different approach which seems to provide a finer and more dynamic interpretation of the pro-incentive hypothesis, weakening the presumed influence of the preexisting legal systems and underlining the role played by firms’ incentives per se and by changes in enforcement mechanisms.