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The article "Justice and the Politics of Feminist Philosophy" by Mary Hawkesworth discusses Iris Marion Young's groundbreaking work in reconfiguring justice through insights from feminism, Black liberation, LGBTQ mobilizations, and other social movements. Young's critique of mainstream philosophy and her distinction between the politics of identity and identity politics shed light on the complexities of social hierarchies and the need for collective action to address oppression and domination. Her work challenges traditional conceptions of justice and advocates for participatory democracy and collective self-determination to combat systemic inequities and foster social transformation. [Extracted from the article]

Recently, there has been growing interest in methodological issues of non-ideal theoretical philosophy. While some explicitly commit to non-ideal theorising, others doubt that there is anything useful about the ideal/non-ideal distinction in theoretical philosophy. The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I propose a way of doing non-ideal theoretical philosophy, once we realise how limited certain idealised projects are. Since there is a big overlap between projects that are called non-ideal and applied, the second aim is to distinguish between these categories in order to show that applied theoretical philosophy is only worth pursuing if it operates in a non-ideal framework. I argue that we should be pluralistic about possible non-ideal theories and view the ideal/non-ideal differences as a matter of degree, rather than kind. As an example, I show how my version of non-ideal theory is useful to a concrete debate in philosophy of language. My proposal allows us to identify already existing non-ideal approaches to linguistic meaning and encourages us to further engage in the debate on non-ideal theoretical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminist, and other liberatory, moral and political philosophies are widely understood as nonideal theories. But if feminism is just a set of first-order normative commitments, it is unclear why it should produce action-guiding philosophy. I argue that feminist philosophy characteristically takes oppressive salience idealization (OSI) to undermine the means-end consistency of normative theories. OSI involves characterizing the world in ways that give undue weight to the interests and perspectives of the dominant. Our ability to respond to the normative problems our actual world faces us with is undermined by OSI, especially at the levels of problemframing and selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rae Langton and Caroline West famously argue that pornography operates like a language game, in that it introduces certain views about women into the common ground via presupposition accommodation. While this pragmatic model explains how pornography has the potential to change its viewers' beliefs, it leaves open how pornography changes people's desires. Our aim in this paper is to show how Langton and West's discourse-theoretic account of pornography can be refined to close this lacuna. Using tools from recent developments in discourse theory, we propose that pornography issues implicit directives, and thereby introduces bouletic components into the discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we present the results of an original study identifying the perceptions of beginning philosophy students at the start of their first introductory course. We surveyed over 1,100 students representing over 40 universities and colleges in the United States regarding their initial perceptions of gender bias, inclusivity, value, understanding, similarities, and enjoyment of philosophy. We analyzed the results based on gender, first-generation status, and student of color status. This work represents the perspectives of a more diverse range of students, reflecting far more first-generation college students (40 percent) and students who identify as people of color (43 percent) than in previous work. Additionally, this study provides novel data as we were able to collect data on the first day of classes, in most cases before students were exposed to syllabi or content that could inform their views about philosophy. Understanding what beginning students think about philosophy before formal exposure to the field might help us to identify concerns, misconceptions, and areas for improvement. Many results are striking, and our project offers insight into the initial perspectives of philosophy students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We still know little about whether and how gender informs, shapes, or influences art perception. This multidisciplinary article investigates the role that gender might play in the perception of art through historical analyses and an eye-tracking experiment. We first traced how gender identity, sexual identity, and sexual orientation have been used to theorize the existence of a gender-binary difference between viewers in traditional aesthetics and feminist art theory. To test whether such claims reflect any measurable experience, we collected eye-tracking data from 84 participants and divided them into two groups of cisgender, heterosexual individuals by self-definition. Each group participated in two experiments; the first showed digital reproductions of mixed artworks, varying in subject, style, form, and size; the second showed artworks with only one figure, either explicitly showing sex-linked traits or not. In both cases, we measured the number of fixations, average fixation duration, and saccade amplitude as well as differences in the location of fixations and entropy. Our analysis did not detect any significant difference between the groups. This proves empirically, for the first time, that in spite of having been often reiterated in history, gender binary categories are not suitable for describing the visual perception of art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories pose a serious threat to our society these days. People often dismiss conspiracy theory believers as at best gullible or, more often, unintelligent. However, there are cases in which individuals end up believing conspiracy theories out of no epistemic fault of their own. In this paper, I want to offer a diagnosis of the problem by focusing on the genealogy of the conspiracy theory beliefs. Drawing on a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of genealogies, I argue that the problem of belief in conspiracy theories is best understood as a broadly political one regarding the oppressive, dominating and exploitative world in which conspiracy theory believers find themselves in. I then draw on the work of Maria Lugones, the feminist philosopher, to offer an approach to addressing the problem of belief in conspiracy theories, which recommends radical humility and playfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between Critical Theory, non-ideal theory, and standpoint theory, emphasizing the importance of incorporating marginalized perspectives in analyzing social reality. It discusses the concept of ideology and its impact on understanding social injustices, as well as feminist standpoint theory and the challenges of achieving a critical standpoint. The article also highlights the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity of lived experiences within marginalized groups. [Extracted from the article]

This review essay critically examines Emily Jones’ Feminist Theory and International Law: Posthuman Perspectives, which develops “posthuman feminism” to diagnose the exclusionary humanism and anthropocentrism of international law. It unpacks key elements of Jones’ approach, her critique of international law’s foundations, and her attempt to move “beyond liberal legalism.” While tensions arise between Jones’ theoretical framework and reform proposals, her insistent bridging of theory and practice demonstrates posthuman feminism’s potential for inspiring creative re-imaginings of legal praxis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I provide a new solution to the “gamer’s dilemma” (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31–36, , 2009) which is an open problem at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics: the problem consists in reconciling two widespread moral intuitions about virtual actions, i.e. that virtual murder is morally permissible whereas virtual paedophilia is not. To solve the problem, I apply a well-known notion coming from the philosophy of fiction, viz. imaginative resistance, which I adapt as ludic resistance. Connecting the two bodies of literature (the philosophy of fiction and the philosophy of video games) is original and, I argue, helpful: first, it solves the problem under discussion; second, it provides a way of looking back at imaginative resistance in an interesting new light. In (video) games, as opposed to traditional, non-ludic fictions, ”resistance” is interpreted against an implicit notion of agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This interview features Andrea Reichenberger. Currently she holds a substitute professorship for history of technology at TUM Technical University of Munich. She is junior research group leader at the Department of Mathematics, University of Siegen, Germany, and leads the research project “Rethinking the History of Mathematics and Physics: Women in Focus.” Reichenberger has held several postdoctoral positions, e.g., at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists (HWPS) at Paderborn University (Germany) and in the DFG research project “Thought Experiment, Metaphor, Model” at the Institute for Philosophy I at the Ruhr University Bochum. Between 2019 and 2021, she was a fellow at the University of Paderborn and principal investigator of the research project “Foundational research in mathematical logic – relativity – quantum physics. Case studies on the integration of women philosophers.” Reichenberger has written a book on Émilie du Châtelet (Springer, 2016) and has published many articles in journals, collected editions, and encyclopedias.

It is often argued that oppression reduces freedom. I argue against the view that oppression is wrong because it reduces freedom. Conceiving oppression as wrong because it reduces freedom is at odds with recognizing structural cases of oppression, because (a) many cases of oppression, including many structural ones, do not reduce agents' freedom, and (b) the type of freedom reduction involved in many structural instances of oppression is not morally objectionable. If the mechanisms of oppression are sometimes indistinguishable from benign, or even ineluctable, processes of social shaping, arguments that oppression is objectionably freedom-reducing risk implausibly suggesting that socialization itself is objectionably freedom-reducing. I show how three strategies for explaining how oppression reduces freedom either fall into the trap of overgenerality, or end up appealing to values other than freedom to avoid it. I conclude by suggesting that oppression might be better thought of as an affront to equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Diversity is often announced as a solution to ethical problems in artificial intelligence (AI), but what exactly is meant by diversity and how it can solve those problems is seldom spelled out. This lack of clarity is one hurdle to motivating diversity in AI. Another hurdle is that while the most common perceptions about what diversity is are too weak to do the work set out for them, stronger notions of diversity are often defended on normative grounds that fail to connect to the values that are important to decision-makers in AI. However, there is a long history of research in feminist philosophy of science and a recent body of work in social epistemology that taken together provide the foundation for a notion of diversity that is both strong enough to do the work demanded of it, and can be defended on epistemic grounds that connect with the values that are important to decision-makers in AI. We clarify and defend that notion here by introducing emergent expertise as a network phenomenon wherein groups of workers with expertise of different types can gain knowledge not available to any individual alone, as long as they have ways of communicating across types of expertise. We illustrate the connected epistemic and ethical benefits of designing technology with diverse groups of workers using the examples of an infamous racist soap dispenser, and the millimeter wave scanners used in US airport security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the last decade, the importance of Simone de Beauvoir's contribution to 20th-century French philosophy has been beyond debate. However, it can be tempting to read her contributions as the dated beginnings of feminist philosophy, and to believe that her work is only interesting from the perspective of the history of philosophy. To the contrary, this article claims that contemporary philosophers can and should take Beauvoirian philosophy as a source of fruitful insights on contemporary issues in political and moral philosophy by showing the limited scope of two classic critiques of Beauvoir and by defending the relevance of her work for thinking about female submission and the importance of erotic experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leading expressivist proposals characterize the mental state expressed in the making of a normative judgment solely in terms of intrinsic, psychological dispositions. As a result, they fail to capture a subset of the normative judgments that agents can and do make; they miss the way that external factors can influence what the making of a normative judgment looks like. This problem can be seen most plainly in the context of systemic oppression. Intuitively, one can make a normative judgment that conflicts with the oppressive ideas one has previously been conditioned to endorse, but expressivism seems to deny that this is possible. The expressivist's inability to count these avowals made under oppression as genuine normative judgments makes expressivism deficient as a metaethical theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers who study care—most often, care ethicists—are involved in an ongoing discussion about the concept of care. Despite the significant progress made in this discussion, certain conflicting images of care seem to persist in the literature. On one hand, as feminist theorists across disciplines have highlighted, care is a complex social practice that is mired in inequality and injustice. The deeply gendered nature of caring and the unequal division of care-work creates and cements structural inequalities. On the other hand, care is also thought of as a moral value or an ideal. The ethics of care—a moral theory with decidedly feminist roots—is predicated on the idea that caring is somehow morally valuable. A discrepancy thus arises: care is a social practice that compounds injustices. But it is also a moral value. What is it about care that makes it malleable to such variations? To pick out this complexity and capture the conceptual nuances at play, this paper suggests that we frame the concept of care as a thick ethical concept. I will first demonstrate why this framing is helpful. Then, I will provide accounts of the descriptive and evaluative elements of the concept of care. I hope to show that it is through a thick conceptual framing that we can make sense of care—both as a complex social practice and an important moral value in the worlds that we inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminists have always been concerned with how the clothes women wear can reinforce and reproduce gender hierarchy. However, they have strongly disagreed about what to do in response: some have suggested that the key to feminist liberation is to stop caring about how one dresses; others have replied that the solution is to give women increased choices. In this paper, we argue that neither of these dominant approaches is satisfactory and that, ultimately, they have led to an impasse that pervades the contemporary feminist debate. The problem is that both sides of the debate understand women’s complicity in patriarchal subordination as a matter of what women wear and do. Instead, we propose a phenomenological analysis that understands complicity as based in our relations to our clothes. Starting from this phenomenological perspective, we sketch a new relational feminist ethics of dressing. This alternative ethical paradigm cannot yield a simple recipe for how to dress or tell us what garments are off-limits. But it can offer a way to make critical feminist judgements about clothes without veering into a stifling new prescriptivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the political prospects of linguistic innovation for gender terms. It develops and defends a model that leaves the concept of woman in place but replaces the term with a novel one that lacks the problematic social and political connotations. It is shown that linguistic innovation reaps all the political benefits of competing proposals in conceptual ethics, without any of the downsides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this chapter, I am interested in the relationship between one's moral beliefs and attitudes, on the one hand, and what one finds funny, on the other. There are some philosophers who hold that one cannot find a joke funny if one morally disagrees with it - so one's sense of humour reveals one's moral beliefs. I think this is wrong - and yet, contra others, I do think there is an important relationship between sense of humour and character. I start by noting what existing views cannot capture about the sense of humour: the phenomenon of unwilling complicity in unethical comedy. To remedy this, I propose a more developed account of sense of humour that pays attention to its emotional, perceptual and motivational aspects. This involves taking seriously the notion of a sense of humour, understood as a sensibility or taste, and I develop this account by building on Anne Eaton's work on the related phenomenon of erotic taste. Finally, I go on to argue that this comic taste develops by habituation, and that a central way in which we are habituated to find things funny is through representations (for example, sitcoms and stand-up comedy), which foreground certain aspects of something and frame them as funny. This sheds light on how one might change one's sense of humour in a more egalitarian direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction reflects on practices of telling stories about works by influential contemporary feminist philosophers, interrogating what is considered impactful feminist philosophy. I frame this edition through a particular kind of re-citational engagement with Heyes’s work—through her own previous writings and my first-personal experiences with the text and her role in my intellectual formation as my dissertation supervisor. I draw on Clare Hemmings’s (2011) work on the grammar of feminist intellectual storytelling, offering brush strokes through embodied and relational stories that help me make sense of Anaesthetics, in order to tell alternative stories to frame the work, specifically Heyes’s methods, impacts, and the relations amongst her previous works. In reflecting on the embodied realities and feminist intellectual networks that inform our framing practices, I consider how we are relationally and affectively invested in figures and thinkers, our schools of thought, our style of philosophy, and our forms of participation in the discipline. Through these reflections, I trace Heyes’s work as grasping life examples with rich opportunities to grapple with stubborn philosophical ambivalences in conceptualizing embodied freedom and agency, while developing adaptive methods that probe their transcendental conditions.

This paper formulates a response to standard accounts of Kantian sexual morality, by first clarifying why sex should be understood as a case of using a person as a thing, rather than merely as a means. The author argues that Kant's remedy to this problem is not sexual consent, but a model of setting and sharing sexual ends. Kant's account of sexual morality, read in this way, is a critical framework for contemporary moves to think beyond consent, and to grapple with concerns about sexual violation and "bad sex" that have gained uptake in the wake of the MeToo movement. The author defends an account of sex as a process of setting and sharing sexual ends in a Kantian key, which provides us with resources for thinking about the robust ongoing project of making our sexual selves in nonideal conditions, as well as for identifying the wrongs of both "bad" sex and sexual harassment. In doing so, they offer a critical middle ground between contemporary accounts of sexual morality that center questions of individual agency or autonomy, and those that foreground the intersubjective nature of sex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction reflects on practices of telling stories about works by influential contemporary feminist philosophers, interrogating what is considered impactful feminist philosophy. I frame this edition through a particular kind of recitational engagement with Heyes's work--through her own previous writings and my first-personal experiences with the text and her role in my intellectual formation as my dissertation supervisor. I draw on Clare Hemmings's (2011) work on the grammar of feminist intellectual storytelling, offering brush strokes through embodied and relational stories that help me make sense of Anaesthetics, in order to tell alternative stories to frame the work, specifically Heyes's methods, impacts, and the relations amongst her previous works. In reflecting on the embodied realities and feminist intellectual networks that inform our framing practices, I consider how we are relationally and affectively invested in figures and thinkers, our schools of thought, our style of philosophy, and our forms of participation in the discipline. Through these reflections, I trace Heyes's work as grasping life examples with rich opportunities to grapple with stubborn philosophical ambivalences in conceptualizing embodied freedom and agency, while developing adaptive methods that probe their transcendental conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eve Tuck's reflection on a "breakup with Deleuze" and her critical feminist relationship toward Deleuze's philosophical position leads to my exploration of a feminist approach to a theory of concepts. I argue that in order to be applicable and useful for feminist philosophical scholarship, concepts assume a sheltering function for experiences that have lacked adequate forms of representation in the past. Feminist thinkers like Sara Ahmed and Lauren Berlant support the idea of concepts as shelter through their methodological employment of affect as a resource of knowledge. Gayatri Spivak and bell hooks reckon with the structural necessity for sheltering concepts through their respective notions of the subaltern and homemaking. Finally, Eve Meltzer's study of the relevance of affect for conceptual art underscores the general importance of thinking through the connections between these seemingly opposed categories in order to arrive at a better understanding of what philosophical concepts can do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sexuality, Gender & Policy Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The orgasm gap is the marked difference in the frequency of orgasm between cisgender men and women in heterosexual intercourse that has been documented in research for decades. However, orgasm as a state of intense sexual excitement and gratification is physiologically uncomplicated and readily available for most people regardless of gender. This article undertakes a philosophical study of the processes by which the individual experience of orgasm is invested with meaning and embedded in social and cultural practices that collectively both produce and sustain the orgasm gap. By looking at the experience of orgasm as horizonal, I draw a distinction between the social and the cultural horizons of sexual experiences. I argue that social standards of sexual modesty make sexuality a field where the process through which we make sense of our individual experiences is especially dependent on how these experiences are depicted in cultural representation. The current socially normalised male perspective in cultural representation continues to conflict with the ways orgasm is experienced in female bodies. This is probably one reason why the orgasm gap persists even in countries where sex education and gender equality are highly advanced.