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Performance measurement systems are rarely used as fully as predicated in theory but we know little about the factors that support effective utilization. Using interviews of government officials in two very different settings, the Utah state government in the United States and the Campeche state government in Mexico, this article identifies themes in the observed patterns of adoption and implementation of performance measurement. The general finding is that differing paths to adoption lead, nonetheless, to similar issues in implementation. For example, although adoption was initiated by the state legislature in Utah but by the federal government in Campeche, actual implementation was dependent on the governors in both cases. Similary, whereas development of the performance measurement system was participatory in Utah but top-down in Mexico, agency managers in both states were still threatened by these systems. These results confirm previous conceptual work and have implications for practice; however, Utah and Campeche both have traditions of strong governors, and thus research in other contexts is required. KEYWORDS: adoption, implementation, performance measurement

This article examines the interaction between federalism and electoral systems in designing democratic institutions. Issues include single-member plurality electoral rules, proportional representation as an electoral system, intermediate and mixed systems, patterns of federalism such as subnational legislatures, the implications for governability of electoral rules and the lessons they provide for new democracies.

Federations employ a large variety of mechanisms for conducting relations between central, regional, and local levels of government. These mechanisms span the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government within each level. Executive involvement ranges widely in degree of formality, from the making of formal intergovernmental agreements to informal liaison between governmental officers. Executive mechanisms have also evolved for correcting vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in federal systems. Legislatures play an important role in giving the force of law to cooperative policies initiated by the executive. These legislative mechanisms include reciprocal schemes, complementary schemes, mirror legislation, and the reference or delegation of powers from one level of government to another. The judiciary, though often undervalued, is significant for its role in establishing the legal framework within which other branches of government conduct their intergovernmental relations, through articulation of powers and competencies. The article concludes that policy makers should exercise care in selecting mechanisms that are appropriate to their task. In particular, regard should be had to the efficiency of each mechanism, and its conformity with federal values and the rule of law.

The Adyge Republic of the Russian Federation has declared its independence but the Russian leadership has been inconsistant and slow in dealing with this issue. The Supreme Soviet has yet to make changes in the constitution in line with the new status of the Adygne Republic. Meanwhile, the leader of the Adyge-Khase national movement wants the region to merge with other Islamic areas and become a single mountain republic. In order to foster good relations, representatives from the Russian Federation should work with the new government of Adyge Supreme Soviet in drafting constitutional reforms.

N. Medvedev, Chairman of the Commission on the National State Structure and Nationalities presented a report to the Russian Parliament on the progress towards a federal treaty. Fourteen of the 20 republics refused to sign the Agreement on the Division of Powers that were sent to them. Their refusals stem from their desire to manage their own resources. Although republic representives in parliament said they would not secede, apprehensions continue. Medvedev recommended that work on the draft agreement continue.