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This report outlines a variety of challenges associated with joint military training and education. It begins by detailing gaps in collective (live) training and discussing limitations associated with online learning. These limitations were uncovered through reviews of the literature, as well as interviews with military stakeholders and reactions surveys from military online learners. Next, it outlines a phased approach to address the gaps and limitations of individual, team, and collective training through a Joint Event Life Cycle (JELC) optimized blended learning approach. This approach, called the Continuum of eLearning (CoL), represents both a training capability and a systematic methodology for enhancing military online learning. The report describes the CoL approach and features, highlighting those functions that were implemented in 2012 as part of Version 1.0, as well as describing future plans for V2.0 and V3.0. Finally, the report also documents the results of the beta test of CoL V1.0, which was tested during the PANAMAX 2012 joint and multinational training event. The beta test revealed that demographic variables, such as rank and service, affected overall knowledge levels; however, when these were controlled for, the CoL courses had a positive impact on personnel's knowledge and joint attitudes. The surveys that asked about participants' past and present experiences with online learning also provide a set of requirements for future versions of the CoL ., The original document contains color images.

Since the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986, critics have raised the dangers of forming too close a bond among the services. Their fear is that doing so will subvert institutional traditions and culture, thereby stifling important but diverse perspectives. The friction of ideas was considered to be natural and necessary for joint warfighting. Being too joint, the argument goes, will breed collusion. Yet while some operators and theorists have outlined the pitfalls of restricting servicespecific legacies, they have charged that not doing so impedes true jointness. The absence of joint culture, moreover, has also meant that purple-minded members of the Armed Forces have found an absence of shared values in which to ground strategic thinking apart from priorities set by the services. Joint nonculture has triumphed. Indeed, articles published under the rubric of Out of Joint in JFQ have been largely devoted to the topic; thus a rereading of these contributions may explain the cognitive dissonance surrounding joint culture in the minds of joint warfighters., The original document contains color images.