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This paper asks why mediation efforts between Fatah and Hamas have failed. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Palestinian stakeholders, guided by relevant theoretical frameworks, indicates that: first, Israel and its allies act as systemic contextual barriers to ending the Palestinian split. Second, serious obstacles to reconciliation exist because the split has lasted for nearly 16 years. Third, mediator characteristics did not affect the outcomes. Fourth, increased polarization in the region following the Arab Spring has adversely affected reconciliation. This research points to the futility of mediation efforts in the current circumstances and the need to challenge existing systemic barriers to reconciliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After years of conflict between some Palestinian currents and the occupying regime, finally, following the Oslo Accords in 1993, the parties recognized each other, and following the formation of the Palestinian state, its constitution was formed in 2002. The main question of the article is, what developments has the Palestinian constitution faced in the stages of development and what achievements has it achieved? The article is based on the descriptive and analytical method based on these findings: the Palestinian constitution around general principles, political structures, executive, legislative and judicial powers, people's rights and freedoms, rulings related to the transitional period and the extraordinary st has predicted Although this law was formed for the government of the five-year transition period included in the mentioned agreement, but after the transition period, it has continued to be valid with amendments, and as a result of differences between political parties and currents, especially Fatah and Hamas, the Palestinian constitution has not been able to achieve its goals.

The persistence of the Palestinian split is often blamed on a lack of political will and the prioritisation of personal over national interests. However, political actors do not make decisions in a vacuum; their choices are shaped and constrained by the institutions to which they belong. Guided by relevant conceptual frameworks, I employ qualitative in-depth interviews to examine different perspectives on the root causes of the split and why it persists. The analysis indicates, first, that Fatah and Hamas operate in a context where Israel, as the setter colonial state, has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo, and where dependence on foreign aid means that donors significantly impact domestic politics and public policy. This institutional context imposes oppressive constraints to reconciliation on both Fatah and Hamas. Second, analysing Fatah and Hamas from an institutionalist perspective offers a nuanced understanding of the split by focusing on the intermediate level, located between the individual and structural levels. Future attempts at reconciliation between the Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip will require understanding this reality and embracing new approaches that create the necessary conditions for reconciliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of Palestine Studies / Filistin Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Bulletin of Palestine Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The "Arab Spring" effected a substantial change in the balance of power in the Middle East between the state and its citizens. Yet despite the upheaval in the Arab world that prompted the public to demand a part in decision making within the national collective framework and toppled several regimes, the Arab Spring did not reach the Palestinian political sphere with any force. This article highlights the uniqueness of the political struggle for survival by Fatah and Hamas, two competing Palestinian political movements with different political, social, and cultural agendas that try to maintain their rule while attempting to gain political power in an ongoing struggle for governmental hegemony. The article also shows how the Palestinian Authority and Hamas work to create public legitimacy with the aim of ensuring governmental stability in a political system that is managed by virtue of emergency orders in the case of Fatah, and by force in the case of Hamas, and without legitimacy acquired through elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the possible scenarios in the event that the position of the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) becomes vacant, in light of the absence of an institutional structure of the PA, legal justifications or political solutions that can be relied on, if Palestinian parties choose to resort to the democratic path, to elect a new president, or even bring a successor to the President of the PA, who enjoys popular and regional acceptance. Due to the difficulty of predicting the post-Mahmoud Abbas era, and the absence of any signs or indicators to anticipate the next stage and considering the persistence of the internal Palestinian division including that of the Fatah movement, and the emergence of new political currents, the author applies the scenario approach by presenting a set of possible scenarios, based on the available data and information discussed in some detail in the article. The article presents a theoretical and descriptive reading of the developments of the history of the PA, focusing on legal mechanisms through which the president of the PA is chosen, analyzing, and linking these mechanisms to the current reality of the PA through discussing the most important challenges facing the succession of Abbas. This is done based on the severe divisions within the Fatah movement, and its declining popularity, as well as the influence of regional and international parties. The article relies on many Arab, English, and Hebrew academic sources. It also includes interviews with a group of experts and specialists in Palestinian affairs. With the analysis of each possible scenario for the future of the PA after Abbas, the author concludes that the fourth scenario is most possible and realistic one, which suggests that Palestinians will be able to reach a consensus on a person to lead the PA after Abbas, especially since the absence of consensus could lead to more disintegration and internal fighting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 21 March 1968, nine months after the Six-Day War, the IDF launched a military operation against the Jordanian town of Karameh, which served as the headquarters of the Fatah terrorist organisation and a springboard for attacks against Israel. Yet rather than deal Fatah a crushing blow, the operation boosted its strength and prestige. Coming in the wake of the astounding June 1967 victory, the Karameh battle underscored the operational difficulties awaiting the IDF in its prolonged low-intensity warfare against non-state terror organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mediterranea - Ricerche Storiche is the property of Mediterranea-Ricerche Storiche and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study, "Tariq bin Ziyad, Conqueror of Andalusia: A Historical and Military Study", seeks to identify important historical incidents in Islamic history (the Conquest of Andalusia), which were associated with a distinguished leader (Tariq bin Ziyad), and to identify their political and military dimensions and effects on Andalusia, the Islamic empire and southwestern Europe at the end of the first century AH/seventh century CE. It shows the importance of what Tariq bin Ziyad achieved by successive victories in a record time extending from the year 92-95 AH/711-714 CE, through which and with the help of his leader Musa bin Naseer, he succeeded in opening a wide territory, the Iberian Peninsula, which today includes Spain and Portugal. The study sheds light on the nature of Andalusia; its geographical, human and political conditions before the conquest; the political, military and religious factors; and the personal qualifications that helped Tariq bin Ziyad succeed in achieving his great achievements. This study endeavours to follow the steps of the Conquest of Andalusia, and the preparation to ensure the progress of the process of conquest according to studied steps that are guaranteed success. The importance of the study is evident in its attempt to show the various aspects of the operations of the Conquest of Andalusia on the political, religious, cultural and civilizational levels. It traces the problem of Tariq bin Ziyad's crossing; trying to explain the truth of his sermon; addressing the issue of burning ships as reported by some late sources; tracing his path in the Conquest of Andalusia in coordination with its commander Musa bin Naseer; highlighting the military systems, military mobilization and leadership characteristics that distinguished the commander Tariq bin Ziyad. The study demonstrates that the conquest process was a well-thought-out and calculated plan in all its steps and was carried out under the supervision of the Umayyad Caliph in Damascus Al-Waleed bin Abdul-Malik and in coordination and follow-up with the governor of Africa, Musa bin Naseer, with the field commanders (Tariq bin Ziyad) granted extensive field powers in making plans and the mobilization of armies in proportion to the nature and topography of the land and the circumstances surrounding the military operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Ameed Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Al-Frahids Arts is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Having played a leading role in two Palestinian uprisings, the Balata refugee camp remains a bastion of oppositional political currents in the West Bank. This article explores how competing political factions have adopted a form of arbitration called sulh, or communal conciliation, to mitigate conflicts. Based on fieldwork and interviews with leading actors from Balata and the city of Nablus, it offers an up-close account of how the local administration of customary justice has evolved from past days of anti-colonial struggle to the present era of contested state-building. Drawing on Faleh Jabar's concepts social and etatist tribalism, the article asks: Do the conciliation committees of Nablus and its refugee camps constitute a semi-autonomous legal order fostering communal resilience or an instrument of power reflecting the dominance of the political elite? The study shows that the committees' embeddedness in the proto-state structures of the Palestinian leadership has challenged their autonomy. Structurally, 'tribal law' has increasingly become synonymous with the rule of the Fatah faction – a matter that long has driven wedges between leading conciliation men. This article contributes to our understanding of how political movements take part in shaping what is considered customary and traditional and use it to further their rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship explains impediments to democratic transition in Middle Eastern countries as forms of neopatrimonialism - a combination of patrimonial tradition and cosmetic electoral procedures. However, this approach conflates two spheres of governance: firstly, the government as a sphere of appointed or elected politicians, secondly, the state's bureaucracy as a sphere of administrative staff necessary for the government to execute its planned actions. The impediments Hamas governments (2006-2007) faced highlight the difference between the two spheres. Accordingly, I conceptually differentiate between two types of government: government in office and government in power. While the Hamas government was supposed to rule, the administrative personnel refused to comply. Thus, the elected government in office faced local-institutional and external constraints which prevented its functioning, and provoked power struggles that led to internecine war and the collapse of the electoral democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the works of Russian writers, touching upon the important and now the theme of the Caucasian war, the word “Gazavat” is used to denote the resistance of Muslims, but the word “Jihad” is not used. The article deals with the emergence and correlation of the concepts of “Jihad” and “Gazavat” on the extensive material. And it is also proved, using the texts of the Koran and hadith, that under Jihad the Prophet understood not terrorist acts, not brutal execution of people, but sublime and noble deeds. The authors, arguing with the well-known concept of J. Friedman, predict, but on other grounds, the turmoil in Asia.

This article examines the history and outcomes of Hamas' involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By using published sources and conducting interviews with five incumbent Hamas officials living abroad, the article evaluates the group's achievements and failures since the onset of its active role in the military struggle against Israel and in Palestinian politics against the other main actor, Fatah. It concludes that Hamas, while achieving some success in its military struggle against Israel, has not delivered the expectations of the Palestinian people, partly because it was squeezed into to the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority, and partly because international actors have blocked aid from entering the Hamas-controlled areas. Hamas is expected to continue fighting, but may partially withdraw from politics, as the people of Gaza are not happy with its governance due to higher unemployment, as well as the Israeli blockade and attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs the monstrous body of Frankenstein to examine political factionalism in the Palestinian Occupied Territories; the West Bank and Gaza. In Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and its Iraqi twin Frankenstein in Baghdad written by Ahmad Saadawi in 2013, the unnamed monster carries rich cultural and political significations that communicate certain idiosyncrasies of both English and Iraqi societies. In both narratives, the monster projects the dangers of the scientific spirit of the late eighteenth-century English society and the constant post-war traumas in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, respectively. This article claims a third political space in which the local partisan climate has contributed to the rise of fragmentation in contemporary domestic Palestinian politics. Since 2007, Palestinian political leadership gained a new meaning after Hamas's military takeover of the Gaza Strip. The different political orientations of Fatah, Hamas, and other factions have created a new political monster that I term the Palestinian Frankenstein. The article not only suggests that the Palestinian Frankenstein is a metaphorical continuity or textual extension of Shelley's and Saadawi's conceptualisations of monstrosity but also investigates other definitions of Palestinian political monstrosity which is embodied in violent sectarianism and document-based wars between many political factions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to analyse the relations between the discursive Islamic tradition and the national policy implemented in various forms by the Palestinians. I will use in this analysis the notion of the Islamic discursive tradition of Talal Asad, which emphasizes the importance of the relationship between power and knowledge. I will show how the Palestinian nationalist movement influenced the perception of the role and significance of religious tradition, and how it is experienced and practiced in different ways. Works by John O. Voll, Daniel M. Varisco, Dale F. Eickelman, James P. Piscatori and Armand Salvatore show how the current understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics is dependent on Western, top-down assumptions and political projects, and how these have distorted understanding of the processes taking place in the so-called Muslim world. My aim is to go beyond these erroneous assumptions and to reinterpret the Palestinian experience of shaping the relationship between religion and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The years 1987-2000, from the start of the first intifada to just before the second intifada, were the formative period that shaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as we know it today - a dispute over borders rather than an existential conflict, with a significant religious but not necessarily hegemonic dimension. An analysis of relations between Fatah and Hamas during those years reveals a struggle that challenged Hamas and sometimes even forced it to accept a status inferior to that of Fatah. An examination of their discourse and how each side dealt with mutual allegations shows a link between the friction within the Palestinian arena and the processes of pragmatism, and even a kind of acceptance of the reality. In the context of this internal Palestinian friction, Israel was and remains a central player, with influence on the outcome of the competition between these two organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Actors in Palestine position themselves with respect to the developments in historical process, and also change their strategies based on this new position. Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) is one of actors evolving like that. Considering HAMAS' position in Palestinian society, determining its role in the developments in Palestine, and analyzing the transformation process of HAMAS is the key to understand Palestinian issue. This paper elaborates the factors influencing transformation process of HAMAS, the winner of 2016 elections, from an organization rejecting the participation to the elections, the contribution to Palestinian national unity, and the negotiation process into an organization joining 2006 elections, reflecting a political will for Palestinian national unity and requesting an unconditional seat at the negotiation table, and it also elaborates how it is transformed in organizational level. When the transformation process of HAMAS is analyzed, its decision to participate in 2006 elections is an important turning point. In this paper, HAMAS' decision to participate in 2006 elections as a political party, its performance in power within first four years and impacts of this on its position in Palestine after 2006 election triumph are elaborated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of a political opportunity structure contributes to the analysis of the behaviour of political actors and is one of the current central topics that has importance for political systems at the regional and international levels, as well as for political and social scientific research centres. This study falls within the range of studies on ideological movements and political parties, and the political variables that affect the political system and these movements which lead them to adapt their ideology, by changing their position – from one of rejection to one of acceptance – with regard to participation in parliamentary elections. To achieve their aim of getting into power, ideological movements and political parties can adapt to political changes, influence the structure of political opportunities and exploit ones available to them. This study focuses on the analysis of factors that led to the change in the position of Hamas with regard to democratic practice, from boycotting the first parliamentary elections in 1996 to actively participating in the 2006 elections. It discusses a number of factors: first, the internal organizational factors of the movement; second, the political variables in the Palestinian arena; and third, the internal factors related to the ruling party (Fatah). In light of this, the study principally aims at providing an objective view on the position of Hamas with regard to its political and democratic practice prior to its participation in the Palestinian political system and beyond, using the concept of political opportunities structure. Given that the movement was restricted by its ideology and governed by the political changes that had taken place in the Palestinian political system, it was forced to adapt to the new circumstances that followed the Oslo Treaty by changing its position from opposition and rejection to political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Hamas's "Document of General Principles and Policies," issued in May 2017, outlines the organization's current ideology. The document intends to resolve tensions between Hamas's traditional philosophy, as put forth in its 1988 Covenant of the Resistance Movement, and the array of practical challenges facing the organization that has ruled the Gaza Strip over the past decade. The document emphasizes the organization's national orientation over its Islamic bent, and aims both to position Hamas as legitimate leadership in the Palestinian and international arena and to pave the way for mending relations with Egypt. However, leaders in Ramallah and Cairo have not rushed to change their attitude toward Hamas, and demand additional concessions from the organization, accompanied by concrete measures. Likewise, the document does not reflect real change vis-à-vis Israel: Hamas refuses to recognize Israel, lay aside its "resistance" weapon, and become a full partner in a two-state solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Palestine, an extremely important region for the ambitions of both states of assuming preeminence in the Middle East. Iran, a perpheral regional actor and a Persian Shiite state, approaches the Palestinian cause as a means of legitimizing its policies and regional ambitions, thus becoming one of the main sponsors of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) groups. This prompted a proxy war since Saudi Arabia has chosen to support the rival group Fatah. The Arab Spring showed the limits of the relation between Iran and Palestinian groups which did not support the Assad regime and the Shiite rebelion in Yemen. However, despite all the tensions with Iran, both Hamas and PIJ maintained links with Tehran showing that military and financial access and support are a foremost strategic consideration. Iran is inclined to support the other nonstate actors in Palestine for the maintenance of its power projection capacity. From the other side, Saudi Arabia, in the context of the relations with the US and Western countries, will try to limit the Iranian influence by mediating the Palestinian conflict and, at the same time, trying to marginalize the Iranian allies in the Arab world. The Saudi-Iranian relation functions in a realist paradigm both in the Middle East and in Palestine, with the two countries struggling to reach the coveted hegemon status concurrently with the marginalization of the oponent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the vast resources poured by the international community into the construction of Palestinian institutions, the PA has failed to build and maintain the infrastructures required for the establishment of a vital, democratic and functioning state. By most common parameters, the PA is a failed entity. Taking into account this experience and the consequences of the last six years of Arab upheavals, characterized by the increasing phenomenon of failed states, there is a need for a paradigm shift that will increase the likelihood of a functioning Palestinian state after a peace agreement with Israel is signed and reduce the risk of its being a failed state that would pose a complex, dangerous challenge for Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From the very beginning of the Middle East conflict the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as the problem of establishing a Palestinian state have gone far beyond the region to become an issue of the international political agenda. The internationalization of the Palestinian statehood problem was a gradual process of more and more regional and international actors getting involved. Undoubtedly, the UN has played one of the major roles in the Middle East settlement. The European, Russian, Arab and American participation has been of a certain importance as well.