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Most concurrent blockchain systems rely heavily on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms for decentralized consensus and security assurance. However, the substantial energy expenditure stemming from computationally intensive yet meaningless tasks has raised considerable concerns surrounding traditional PoW approaches, The PoS mechanism, while free of energy consumption, is subject to security and economic issues. Addressing these issues, the paradigm of Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) seeks to employ challenges of practical significance as PoW, thereby imbuing energy consumption with tangible value. While previous efforts in Proof of Learning (PoL) explored the utilization of deep learning model training SGD tasks as PoUW challenges, recent research has revealed its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks and the theoretical hardness in crafting a byzantine-secure PoL mechanism. In this paper, we introduce the concept of incentive-security that incentivizes rational provers to behave honestly for their best interest, bypassing the existing hardness to design a PoL mechanism with computational efficiency, a provable incentive-security guarantee and controllable difficulty. Particularly, our work is secure against two attacks to the recent work of Jia et al. [2021], and also improves the computational overhead from $\Theta(1)$ to $O(\frac{\log E}{E})$. Furthermore, while most recent research assumes trusted problem providers and verifiers, our design also guarantees frontend incentive-security even when problem providers are untrusted, and verifier incentive-security that bypasses the Verifier's Dilemma. By incorporating ML training into blockchain consensus mechanisms with provable guarantees, our research not only proposes an eco-friendly solution to blockchain systems, but also provides a proposal for a completely decentralized computing power market in the new AI age., Comment: 17 pages

Effective action abstraction is crucial in tackling challenges associated with large action spaces in Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). However, due to the vast state space and computational complexity in IIEFGs, existing methods often rely on fixed abstractions, resulting in sub-optimal performance. In response, we introduce RL-CFR, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) approach for dynamic action abstraction. RL-CFR builds upon our innovative Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation, with states corresponding to public information and actions represented as feature vectors indicating specific action abstractions. The reward is defined as the expected payoff difference between the selected and default action abstractions. RL-CFR constructs a game tree with RL-guided action abstractions and utilizes counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) for strategy derivation. Impressively, it can be trained from scratch, achieving higher expected payoff without increased CFR solving time. In experiments on Heads-up No-limit Texas Hold'em, RL-CFR outperforms ReBeL's replication and Slumbot, demonstrating significant win-rate margins of $64\pm 11$ and $84\pm 17$ mbb/hand, respectively.

Cloud deep learning platforms provide cost-effective deep neural network (DNN) training for customers who lack computation resources. However, cloud systems are often untrustworthy and vulnerable to attackers, leading to growing concerns about model privacy. Recently, researchers have sought to protect data privacy in deep learning by leveraging CPU trusted execution environments (TEEs), which minimize the use of cryptography, but existing works failed to simultaneously utilize the computational resources of GPUs to assist in training and prevent model leakage. This paper presents Tempo, the first cloud-based deep learning system that cooperates with TEE and distributed GPUs for efficient DNN training with model confidentiality preserved. To tackle the challenge of preserving privacy while offloading linear algebraic operations from TEE to GPUs for efficient batch computation, we introduce a customized permutation-based obfuscation algorithm to blind both inputs and model parameters. An optimization mechanism that reduces encryption operations is proposed for faster weight updates during backpropagation to speed up training. We implement Tempo and evaluate it with both training and inference for two prevalent DNNs. Empirical results indicate that Tempo outperforms baselines and offers sufficient privacy protection.

Large language models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies., Comment: Accepted to ACL'24 (Main). Camera-ready version

Sharing systems have facilitated the redistribution of underused resources by providing convenient online marketplaces for individual sellers and buyers. However, sellers in these systems may not fully disclose the information of their shared commodities, due to strategic behaviors or privacy concerns. Sellers' strategic information disclosure significantly affects buyers' user experiences and systems' reputation. This paper presents the first analytical study on information disclosure and pricing of competing sellers in sharing systems. In particular, we propose a two-stage game framework to capture sellers' strategic behaviors and buyers' decisions. Although the optimization problem is challenging due to sellers' non-convex and non-monotonic objectives, we completely characterize the complex market equilibria by decomposing it into several tractable subproblems. We demonstrate that full disclosure by all sellers or non-disclosure by all sellers will both lead to intense price competition. The former all-disclosure case is never an equilibrium even when all sellers have good commodity qualities and low privacy costs, while the latter non-disclosure case can be an equilibrium under which all sellers get zero profit. We also reveal several critical factors that affect sellers' information disclosure. Interestingly, sellers' sharing capacity limitation and buyers' estimation biases encourage information disclosure as they mitigate sellers' competition.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer)., Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures

Single sign-on (SSO) allows users to authenticate to third-party applications through a central identity provider. Despite their wide adoption, deployed SSO systems suffer from privacy problems such as user tracking by the identity provider. While numerous solutions have been proposed by academic papers, none were adopted because they require modifying identity providers, a significant adoption barrier in practice. Solutions do get deployed, however, fail to eliminate major privacy issues. Leveraging Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), we propose MISO, the first privacy-preserving SSO system that is completely compatible with existing identity providers (such as Google and Facebook). This means MISO can be easily integrated into existing SSO ecosystem today and benefit end users. MISO also enables new functionality that standard SSO cannot offer: MISO allows users to leverage multiple identity providers in a single SSO workflow, potentially in a threshold fashion, to better protect user accounts. We fully implemented MISO based on Intel SGX. Our evaluation shows that MISO can handle high user concurrency with practical performance., Comment: Accepted to IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro S&P 2023)

This paper introduces a novel crowdsourcing worker selection algorithm, enhancing annotation quality and reducing costs. Unlike previous studies targeting simpler tasks, this study contends with the complexities of label interdependencies in sequence labeling. The proposed algorithm utilizes a Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit (CMAB) approach for worker selection, and a cost-effective human feedback mechanism. The challenge of dealing with imbalanced and small-scale datasets, which hinders offline simulation of worker selection, is tackled using an innovative data augmentation method termed shifting, expanding, and shrinking (SES). Rigorous testing on CoNLL 2003 NER and Chinese OEI datasets showcased the algorithm's efficiency, with an increase in F1 score up to 100.04% of the expert-only baseline, alongside cost savings up to 65.97%. The paper also encompasses a dataset-independent test emulating annotation evaluation through a Bernoulli distribution, which still led to an impressive 97.56% F1 score of the expert baseline and 59.88% cost savings. Furthermore, our approach can be seamlessly integrated into Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) systems, offering a cost-effective solution for obtaining human feedback., Comment: Camera-ready version for CCL 2024

Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism is popular among current blockchain systems, which leads to an increasing concern about the tremendous waste of energy due to massive meaningless computation. To address this issue, we propose a novel and energy-efficient blockchain system, CrowdMine, which exploits useful crowdsourcing computation to achieve decentralized consensus. CrowdMine solves user-proposed computing tasks and utilizes the computation committed to the task solving process to secure decentralized on-chain storage. With our designed ``Proof of Crowdsourcing Work'' (PoCW) protocol, our system provides an efficient paradigm for computation and storage in a trustless and decentralized environment. We further show that the system can defend against potential attacks on blockchain, including the short-term 51\% attack, the problem-constructing attack, and the solution-stealing attack. We also implement the system with 40 distributed nodes to demonstrate its performance and robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first system that enables decentralized Proof of Useful Work (PoUW) with general user-proposed tasks posted in a permissionless and trustless network.

Play-to-earn is one of the prospective categories of decentralized applications. The play-to-earn projects combine blockchain technology with entertaining games and finance, attracting various participants. While huge amounts of capital have been poured into these projects, the new crypto niche is considered controversial, and the traditional gaming industry is hesitant to embrace blockchain technology. In addition, there is little systematic research on these projects. In this paper, we delineate play-to-earn projects in terms of economic & governance models and implementation and analyze how blockchain technology can benefit these projects by providing system robustness, transparency, composability, and decentralized governance. We begin by identifying the participants and characterizing the tokens, which are products of composability. We then summarize the roadmap and governance model to exposit there is a transition from centralized governance to decentralized governance. We also classify the implementation of the play-to-earn projects with different extents of robustness and transparency. Finally, we discuss the security & societal challenges for future research in terms of possible attacks, the economics of tokens, and governance.

Multi-user delay constrained scheduling is important in many real-world applications including wireless communication, live streaming, and cloud computing. Yet, it poses a critical challenge since the scheduler needs to make real-time decisions to guarantee the delay and resource constraints simultaneously without prior information of system dynamics, which can be time-varying and hard to estimate. Moreover, many practical scenarios suffer from partial observability issues, e.g., due to sensing noise or hidden correlation. To tackle these challenges, we propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm, named Recurrent Softmax Delayed Deep Double Deterministic Policy Gradient ($\mathtt{RSD4}$), which is a data-driven method based on a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP) formulation. $\mathtt{RSD4}$ guarantees resource and delay constraints by Lagrangian dual and delay-sensitive queues, respectively. It also efficiently tackles partial observability with a memory mechanism enabled by the recurrent neural network (RNN) and introduces user-level decomposition and node-level merging to ensure scalability. Extensive experiments on simulated/real-world datasets demonstrate that $\mathtt{RSD4}$ is robust to system dynamics and partially observable environments, and achieves superior performances over existing DRL and non-DRL-based methods., Comment: Accepted by MobiHoc 2022

Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) is a popular approach to achieve scalability of blockchain networks. Due to its high efficiency in data communication and great scalability, DAG has been widely adopted in many applications such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Decentralized Finance (DeFi). DAG-based blockchain, nevertheless, faces the key challenge of transaction inclusion collision due to the high concurrency and the network delay. Particularly, the transaction inclusion collision in DAG-based blockchain leads to the revenue and throughput dilemmas, which would greatly degrade the system performance. In this paper, we propose "TIPS", the Transaction Inclusion Protocol with Signaling, which broadcasts a signal indicating the transactions in the block. We show that with the prompt broadcast of a signal, TIPS substantially reduces the transaction collision and thus resolves these dilemmas. Moreover, we show that TIPS can defend against both the denial-of-service and the delay-of-service attacks. We also conduct intensive experiments to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed protocol.

In this paper, we develop a novel virtual-queue-based online algorithm for online convex optimization (OCO) problems with long-term and time-varying constraints and conduct a performance analysis with respect to the dynamic regret and constraint violations. We design a new update rule of dual variables and a new way of incorporating time-varying constraint functions into the dual variables. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first parameter-free algorithm to simultaneously achieve sublinear dynamic regret and constraint violations. Our proposed algorithm also outperforms the state-of-the-art results in many aspects, e.g., our algorithm does not require the Slater condition. Meanwhile, for a group of practical and widely-studied constrained OCO problems in which the variation of consecutive constraints is smooth enough across time, our algorithm achieves $O(1)$ constraint violations. Furthermore, we extend our algorithm and analysis to the case when the time horizon $T$ is unknown. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to validate the theoretical guarantees of our algorithm, and some applications of our proposed framework will be outlined., Comment: 31 pages, it has been accepted at Performance 2021

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize the blockchain security. We propose to mitigate this blockchain insufficient fee issue through a Fee and Waiting Tax (FWT) mechanism, which explicitly considers the two types of negative externalities in the system. Specifically, we model the interactions between the protocol designer, users, and miners as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we find that miners neglecting the negative externality in transaction selection cause they are willing to accept insufficient-fee transactions. This leads to the insufficient storage fee issue in the existing protocol. Moreover, our proposed optimal FWT mechanism can motivate users to pay sufficient transaction fees to cover the storage costs and achieve the unconstrained social optimum. Numerical results show that the optimal FWT mechanism guarantees sufficient transaction fees and achieves an average social welfare improvement of 33.73\% or more over the existing protocol. Furthermore, the optimal FWT mechanism achieves the maximum fairness index and performs well even under heterogeneous-storage-cost miners.

Existing risk-aware multi-armed bandit models typically focus on risk measures of individual options such as variance. As a result, they cannot be directly applied to important real-world online decision making problems with correlated options. In this paper, we propose a novel Continuous Mean-Covariance Bandit (CMCB) model to explicitly take into account option correlation. Specifically, in CMCB, there is a learner who sequentially chooses weight vectors on given options and observes random feedback according to the decisions. The agent's objective is to achieve the best trade-off between reward and risk, measured with option covariance. To capture different reward observation scenarios in practice, we consider three feedback settings, i.e., full-information, semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback. We propose novel algorithms with optimal regrets (within logarithmic factors), and provide matching lower bounds to validate their optimalities. The experimental results also demonstrate the superiority of our algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers option correlation in risk-aware bandits and explicitly quantifies how arbitrary covariance structures impact the learning performance. The novel analytical techniques we developed for exploiting the estimated covariance to build concentration and bounding the risk of selected actions based on sampling strategy properties can likely find applications in other bandit analysis and be of independent interests.

A distributed machine learning platform needs to recruit many heterogeneous worker nodes to finish computation simultaneously. As a result, the overall performance may be degraded due to straggling workers. By introducing redundancy into computation, coded machine learning can effectively improve the runtime performance by recovering the final computation result through the first $k$ (out of the total $n$) workers who finish computation. While existing studies focus on designing efficient coding schemes, the issue of designing proper incentives to encourage worker participation is still under-explored. This paper studies the platform's optimal incentive mechanism for motivating proper workers' participation in coded machine learning, despite the incomplete information about heterogeneous workers' computation performances and costs. A key contribution of this work is to summarize workers' multi-dimensional heterogeneity as a one-dimensional metric, which guides the platform's efficient selection of workers under incomplete information with a linear computation complexity. Moreover, we prove that the optimal recovery threshold $k$ is linearly proportional to the participator number $n$ if we use the widely adopted MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) codes for data encoding. We also show that the platform's increased cost due to incomplete information disappears when worker number is sufficiently large, but it does not monotonically decrease in worker number., Comment: IEEE INFOCOM 2021

Loyalty programs are important tools for sharing platforms seeking to grow supply. Online sharing platforms use loyalty programs to heavily subsidize resource providers, encouraging participation and boosting supply. As the sharing economy has evolved and competition has increased, the design of loyalty programs has begun to play a crucial role in the pursuit of maximal revenue. In this paper, we first characterize the optimal loyalty program for a platform with homogeneous users. We then show that optimal revenue in a heterogeneous market can be achieved by a class of multi-threshold loyalty program (MTLP) which admits a simple implementation-friendly structure. We also study the performance of loyalty programs in a setting with two competing sharing platforms, showing that the degree of heterogeneity is a crucial factor for both loyalty programs and pricing strategies. Our results show that sophisticated loyalty programs that reward suppliers via stepwise linear functions outperform simple sign-up bonuses, which give them a one time reward for participating.

Bike sharing provides an environment-friendly way for traveling and is booming all over the world. Yet, due to the high similarity of user travel patterns, the bike imbalance problem constantly occurs, especially for dockless bike sharing systems, causing significant impact on service quality and company revenue. Thus, it has become a critical task for bike sharing systems to resolve such imbalance efficiently. In this paper, we propose a novel deep reinforcement learning framework for incentivizing users to rebalance such systems. We model the problem as a Markov decision process and take both spatial and temporal features into consideration. We develop a novel deep reinforcement learning algorithm called Hierarchical Reinforcement Pricing (HRP), which builds upon the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient algorithm. Different from existing methods that often ignore spatial information and rely heavily on accurate prediction, HRP captures both spatial and temporal dependencies using a divide-and-conquer structure with an embedded localized module. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate HRP, based on a dataset from Mobike, a major Chinese dockless bike sharing company. Results show that HRP performs close to the 24-timeslot look-ahead optimization, and outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both service level and bike distribution. It also transfers well when applied to unseen areas.

In this paper, we investigate the effect of brand in market competition. Specifically, we propose a variant Hotelling model where companies and customers are represented by points in an Euclidean space, with axes being product features. $N$ companies compete to maximize their own profits by optimally choosing their prices, while each customer in the market, when choosing sellers, considers the sum of product price, discrepancy between product feature and his preference, and a company's brand name, which is modeled by a function of its market area of the form $-\beta\cdot\text{(Market Area)}^q$, where $\beta$ captures the brand influence and $q$ captures how market share affects the brand. By varying the parameters $\beta$ and $q$, we derive existence results of Nash equilibrium and equilibrium market prices and shares. In particular, we prove that pure Nash equilibrium always exists when $q=0$ for markets with either one and two dominating features, and it always exists in a single dominating feature market when market affects brand name linearly, i.e., $q=1$. Moreover, we show that at equilibrium, a company's price is proportional to its market area over the competition intensity with its neighbors, a result that quantitatively reconciles the common belief of a company's pricing power. We also study an interesting "wipe out" phenomenon that only appears when $q>0$, which is similar to the "undercut" phenomenon in the Hotelling model, where companies may suddenly lose the entire market area with a small price increment. Our results offer novel insight into market pricing and positioning under competition with brand effect.

The growth of the sharing economy is driven by the emergence of sharing platforms, e.g., Uber and Lyft, that match owners looking to share their resources with customers looking to rent them. The design of such platforms is a complex mixture of economics and engineering, and how to "optimally" design such platforms is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus on the design of prices and subsidies in sharing platforms. Our results provide insights into the tradeoff between revenue maximizing prices and social welfare maximizing prices. Specifically, we introduce a novel model of sharing platforms and characterize the profit and social welfare maximizing prices in this model. Further, we bound the efficiency loss under profit maximizing prices, showing that there is a strong alignment between profit and efficiency in practical settings. Our results highlight that the revenue of platforms may be limited in practice due to supply shortages; thus platforms have a strong incentive to encourage sharing via subsidies. We provide an analytic characterization of when such subsidies are valuable and show how to optimize the size of the subsidy provided. Finally, we validate the insights from our analysis using data from Didi Chuxing, the largest ridesharing platform in China.