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Existing research has found that since the late 1960s, the pathway to adulthood in Western countries has undergone complex changes, but few studies have investigated such changes and the effect of childhood family background on the transition to adulthood within the Chinese context. This study aims to examine the role of childhood family background in the transition to adulthood among Chinese youth born between 1930 and 1979. We identified four clusters of trajectories to adulthood in both the family and occupational domain. In the occupational domain, more than a quarter of respondents fall into the cluster of high studies & non-agricultural employment and in the family domain, nearly one-third of the sample follows the clusters of marriage & one child and staying single longer, reflecting the increasing diversity and delay in transition to adulthood. Parents' occupations during childhood had a significant effect on both occupational trajectory and family trajectory. Higher occupational status of parents delayed the transition to adulthood, while lower occupational status of parents promoted the transition to adulthood. Family economic status during childhood had a greater effect on occupational trajectories. Young people with worse family financial situations in childhood were more likely to enter the labour market earlier, while those with better family financial situations were more likely to receive long-term education and delay entering the workforce. The mother's religious belief had a more significant effect on the family life course. Youths with non-religious mothers were more likely to fall into the unmarried or childless cluster. In the Chinese context, the political status of the father played an important role in adult transition. A father's Communist party membership in childhood was positively correlated with the likelihood that individuals would follow the pattern of trajectory to adulthood characterised by long-term education.

Adaptation to host country behaviours encompasses both individual and social change, bringing about rising diversity issues in the host society and societal shifts in the country of origin. This study aims to detect whether Turkish immigrants and their descendants converge towards or diverge from the partnership practices of the native-born population in Western Germany. Specifically, transitions from (1) singlehood to the first partnership, (2) singlehood to the first marriage, (3) singlehood to the first cohabitation, (4) cohabitation to marriage and (5) marriage to divorce are investigated. Data from the Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics (pairfam) survey for the period of 2008-2018 are used, applying Kaplan-Meier survival estimations and Cox proportional hazard models. This is the first study that includes natives, immigrants and their descendants simultaneously in an analysis of extensive partnership transitions covering practices of cohabitation, marriage and divorce and to investigate the proportionality assumption in Cox models. We formulate four research hypotheses based on the hypotheses of socialisation, adaptation and the cultural maintenance and segmented assimilation theory. Supporting our first hypothesis, our findings indicate a difference in partnership patterns between both first- and second-generation immigrants and natives, except for the finding that second-generation immigrants resemble the native pattern in their transition to the first union (including both cohabitation and marriage). Immigrants and their descendants tend to marry directly and have lower divorce hazard ratios than their native counterparts, while consensual unions are uncommon among Turkish immigrants. As suggested by our second hypothesis, the extent of the divergence varies across partnership transitions. Finally, our results provide support for our third hypothesis rather than the fourth in that partnership transition of Turkish immigrants' descen

This study investigates factors that could explain why the association between the egalitarian gender-role attitudes and the attitudes toward the importance of marriage (marital centrality) differs across societies. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme for 24 countries in 2002 and 2012 and multilevel modeling, we explore whether the Gender Revolution and the Second Demographic Transition frameworks could explain the country-level differences in the association between gender-role attitudes and marital centrality. We find that the negative association between the egalitarian gender-role attitudes and marital centrality is stronger in countries with a higher gender equality level and a higher fertility level. This work highlights the importance of considering the progress of the gender revolution and the second demographic transition to understand the relationship between gender equality and family formation.

Easterlin's relative income hypothesis refers to the current income of young adults compared to the level of material aspirations acquired during childhood. The hypothesis implies that young individuals are expected to reduce fertility if their material aspirations grow at a higher rate than their incomes. This paper examines whether the same hypothesis holds true for marriage. A higher (lower) level of income combined with a lower (higher) level of material aspirations would increase (decrease) relative income and consequently could affect marriage rates. Thus, relative income might be one explanation for the "marriage paradox" which indicates that young adults in the United States retreat from marriage despite perceiving it as a milestone of their lives. One might also expect relative income to be a better predictor of marriage than absolute income. This is because, according to the Easterlin hypothesis, the behaviour of young adults reflects not only their response to changes in external conditions (e.g. absolute income), but also to past events they have experienced. We employ panel dynamic methods and causality tests for the United States that span the period from 1981 to 2016. Empirical analysis supports the relative income hypothesis. Causality tests indicate that the relationship runs mostly from relative income to marriage rather than the other way round. Relative income emerges as a stronger predictor than absolute income in all of the methods employed.

Recent research suggests that the fertility-education relationship may be mediated by the educational attainment of the partner, especially among the tertiary-educated. However, there are no studies focusing on the couple-education-fertility nexus among couples who achieved only basic educational attainment, even though resource pooling theory predicts differences in family formation by couples’ joint levels of socio-economic resources. We address this research gap and investigate how educational pairings among married and cohabiting partners relate to second and third birth transitions across 22 European countries, using data from the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) panel and discrete time event history models. Our findings show significantly lower second and third birth transition rates among homogamous low-educated couples compared to heterogamous couples with one low- and one medium or highly-educated partner in the Nordic countries, but not across the rest of Europe. However, couples with one or two low-educated partners have significantly lower second birth rates compared with couples with two highly-educated partners in all European regions.

In Southern Africa, marriage used to be widespread and common. However, over the past decades marriage rates have declined significantly. Julia Pauli explores the meaning of marriage when only few marry. Although marriage rates have dropped sharply, the value of weddings and marriages has not. To marry has become an indicator of upper-class status that less affluent people aspire to. Using the appropriation of marriage by a rural Namibian elite as a case study, the book tells the entwined stories of class formation and marriage decline in post-apartheid Namibia.

Nowhere in Europe is extramarital childbearing more pervasive than in Iceland. Roughly, 70% of children born in 2018 were conceived outside of marriage, thereof 83% of firstborn, which, on the surface, puts Iceland at the vanguard of a development often associated with a second demographic transition. In this study, we investigate the union formation behaviour of Icelandic women during a period of 20 years (1994–2013) with the objectives of gaining insight into the interplay of childbearing, registered cohabitation, and marriage and to enhance our understanding of the function of registered cohabitation in the family-building process. We use administrative population register data, covering the childbearing and marital history of the total female population born in Iceland during 1962–1997. The data are analysed by means of event history techniques and presented as annual indices of first-registered cohabitation and first-marriage formation, respectively. We find indications of forceful postponement of registering cohabitation over time, but a stable portion of around 80% of women registered cohabitation before any first marriage or age 46. Around 70% of women married before age 46, and the standardized marriage rates remained relatively stable during most of our study period. Our findings suggest that within a context such as the Icelandic one, most people tend to marry, regardless of the prevalence of cohabitation. We propose that registered cohabitation should be seen as providing a semi-regulated union status for prospective parents in relation to childbearing. Marriage on the other hand could be seen as providing an elevated union status to couples.

Untersuchungen zeigen, dass die Übernahme der Elternrolle - insbesondere für Frauen - schwer mit langen Pendelwegen vereinbar ist. Allerdings sind die Wirkrichtungen nach wie vor unklar. Verringert die Gründung einer Familie die Bereitschaft für größere Pendeldistanzen und werden dafür berufliche Nachteile in Kauf genommen? Oder führt Pendeln zu einem Aufschub der Familiengründung oder verhindert diese gar? Mit diesen Forschungsfragen beleuchtet das Buch einen neuen Erklärungsansatz für geringere Erwerbschancen von Müttern und leistet einen Beitrag zur Identifikation von Bestimmungsgründen der Fertilität.

Using panel data from childless respondents of the German Family Panel (pairfam, n=3,802 respondents), this paper investigates whether fertility orientations (biographical orientations with respect to fertility) influence the risk of different partnership transitions among German men and women over the age of 18 (for n=14,572 observation periods between two panel waves). Significant influences are found for both gender and partnership transition types, and are generally stronger among men than women and for the transition to a coresidential as opposed to a romantic partnership. Uncertainty about anticipated fertility has a stronger negative impact on transition risks among men than among women. Results strongly suggest that the early stages of the partnership formation process are instrumental in terms of future fertility in Germany, at least to some degree. This indicates that a more comprehensive conceptualisation and analysis of fertility within the life course paradigm (as suggested by Huinink/Kohli 2014) should consider the impacts of fertility orientations on life course events in other dimensions, especially among men. Viewed more broadly, the results also underline two factors: the role of agency in coordinating life course dimensions in time and space in order to maximise individual welfare; and the importance of considering the impacts that anticipation of future life course events will have, as suggested by different theoretical approaches.

"Co-Parenting" als Familienkonzept breitet sich aus und stellt die Versprechen des romantischen Liebesideals mitsamt seinem geschlechterungleichen Normalfamilienmodell in Frage. Doch was bedeutet das für die Liebe selbst? Wird sie zerstört oder transformiert und öffnet sie sich für neue Familien- und Beziehungsformen? Entfaltet sich in der post-romantischen Elternschaft gar ein utopisch-emanzipatives Potenzial, das Frauen und LGBTIQ*s aus patriarchalen, hetero- und paarnormativen Herrschaftsverhältnissen befreit? Neben Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsszenarien erkundet die Autorin auch die gesellschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen dieser Entwicklungen.

Regenbogenfamilie, Inseminationsfamilie, Mehrelternfamilie: Diese Begriffe versuchen das Phänomen zu fassen, dass Elternschaft und Familie in vielfältigen Konstellationen verwirklicht werden. Sie stehen dabei im Spannungsfeld zwischen empirischer Vielfalt und gesellschaftlichen Norm- und Normalitätsvorstellungen. Die Beiträge des Sonderheftes erkunden die Familienformen lesbischer Zweielternfamilien, Trans* und Co-Elternschaft, nicht-monogamer Beziehungsnetzwerke sowie queere Beziehungsnetzwerke im Kontext von Flucht. Die Autor*innen beschäftigen sich aus geschlechter-, sexualitäts- und queertheoretischen Perspektiven mit vielfältigen Familienformen jenseits heteronormativer Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen. Der empirische Fokus liegt auf den familialen Alltagspraxen: Wie gestaltet sich das doing family und doing reproduction in diesen Familien? Hier stehen die damit einhergehenden Ambivalenzen und Ungleichheiten im Zentrum. Einerseits werden die rechtlichen und politischen Öffnungen sowie die reproduktionstechnologischen Möglichkeiten in der Praxis vielfältig genutzt. Durch den Gebrauch von assistierter Reproduktion wird die Norm der zweigeschlechtlichen Fortpflanzung innerhalb der heterosexuellen Paardyade aufgebrochen. Andererseits sind neben Prozessen der Einschließung auch neue Ausschlüsse zu beobachten, scheinen doch nur solche Liebes- und Lebensformen staatliche Anerkennung zu gewinnen, die der 'Normalfamilie' ähneln.

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Verteilung partnerschaftlicher Lebensformen in den westlichen Industrieländern sowie deren Entwicklung in der Lebensverlaufsperspektive. Die Untersuchung, basiert auf den Daten des "Fertility and Family Survey". Im Ergebnis zeigt sich mit wenigen Ausnahmen eine zunehmende Etablierung außerehelicher Formen des Zusammenlebens, wobei (abgesehen von den südeuropäischen Ländern) die Ausbreitung der nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft den wohl wichtigsten Aspekt des Wandels partnerschaftlicher Lebensformen beschreibt. Aus der Perspektive des Lebensverlaufs zeigen sich dabei in den verschiedenen Ländern unterschiedliche Entwicklungen, die vor allem zwei Muster erkennen lassen: das der nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft als Vorphase der Ehe und das der nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft als dauerhafte Alternative. Als ein übergreifendes Ergebnis lässt sich zudem festhalten, dass verbindliche Formen der Partnerschaft, wie sie durch das Zusammenleben in einem gemeinsamen Haushalt zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, eine im Zuge der Individualisierungsdebatte fast erstaunlich konstante Verbreitung aufweisen, wobei der Rückgang der Ehen durch eine Zunahme nichtehelicher Lebensgemeinschaften teilweise oder ganz kompensiert wird. Man kann daher in den meisten Ländern eher von einer Strukturverschiebung in Bezug auf formale Gesichtspunkte des Zusammenlebens sprechen denn von einer Umwälzung real praktizierter Lebensformen., This article analyses the distribution of living arrangements based on partnership throughout the Western industrialised countries, as well as their development in a life course perspective. This study is based on data from the "Fertility and Family Survey". As a result, it has demonstrated with few exceptions an increasing spread of non-marital forms of co-habitation, in which (apart from the Southern European countries) the spread of consensual unions is probably the most important aspect of the change in living arrangements based on partnership. From the point of view of the life course, differing trends can be identified in the various countries, which make it possible to identify two main patterns: that of consensual unions as a preliminary to marriage, and that of consensual unions as a long-term alternative. It is also possible to come to the overall conclusion that binding forms of partnership as expressed by living together in a shared household show an occurrence that is almost astonishingly constant as the debate on increasing individualism continues, whilst the fall in the number of marriages is partly or completely compensated for by an increase in consensual unions. In most countries, therefore, it is possible to speak of a structural shift in the formal aspects of co-habitation, rather than a transformation in living arrangements as they are actually practised.

As is the case in Western countries, more Japanese are marrying later or remaining unmarried and are postponing childbearing or staying childless. Previous studies revealed that those individuals who were unable to secure regular employment due to the serious recession between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, labelled a "lost generation," had a very low marriage rate. But what about subsequent cohorts? Using a discrete-time logit model to analyse Japanese Life Course Panel Survey data, this study investigates the effects of employment on first marriages between 2007 and 2015, including cohorts after the lost generation. The results indicate that: (a) among men who are classed as non-regular employees, unemployed, or low-income regular employees, the likelihood of first marriage is low due to their weak economic position; and (b) women have a low likelihood of first marriage if they are non-regular employees or unemployed, not because of their employment status but because they have less chance of meeting a romantic partner and also because of their values regarding work and marriage. These explicit gender differences in the findings contradict observations made in contemporary Europe and North America, where a trend towards gender convergence in the effects of employment and earnings on marriage has been identified. The ambivalence towards gender equality in family and the workplace will be discussed to understand why many young Japanese remain single.

Die AutorInnen des zweiten GENDER-Sonderhefts untersuchen Paarbeziehungen als zentralen Ort, an dem Ungleichheiten zwischen den Geschlechtern (re-)produziert, kompensiert oder verringert werden. Im Sinne eines 'Doing Couple', 'Doing Gender' und 'Doing (In)Equality' spielen dabei Anforderungen der Erwerbsarbeit, sozialpolitische Rahmenbedingungen und Aushandlungsprozesse der Paare eine wesentliche Rolle.

Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit den Familienpolitiken in den Ländern Europas und deren Bedeutung für den Wandel der Familie. Angenommen wird, dass familienpolitische Maßnahmen keine direkte Wirkung auf die Muster des partnerschaftlichen und familialen Zusammenlebens haben. Auch das Geburtenniveau kann von der Politik nicht unmittelbar beeinflusst werden. Gleichwohl hat Familienpolitik durchaus ihre eigene Bedeutung. Sie determiniert kein Verhalten, setzt aber Rahmenbedingungen für individuelle Handlungsentscheidungen. Sie nimmt Einfluss auf die Konsequenzen, die mit verschiedenen Handlungsoptionen verbunden sind und macht so deren Realisierung jeweils wahrscheinlicher oder unwahrscheinlicher. Um etwas über die Relevanz familienpolitischer Rahmenbedingungen aussagen zu können, sind zunächst ihre wesentlichen Züge herauszuarbeiten und ihre vielfältigen Ausformungen zu klassifizieren. Dazu wurden in jüngerer Zeit verschiedene Typologien vorgeschlagen. Hier vorgestellt und diskutiert werden die Ansätze von Fux, Gauthier und Strohmeier, die unterschiedliche Kriterien zur Herausbildung familienpolitischer Regime verwenden und eine unterschiedliche Zuordnung einzelner Länder vornehmen. Empirische Befunde zur Wirksamkeit familienpolitischer Rahmenbedingungen bzw. zur Erklärungskraft solcher Typologien liegen bislang kaum vor. Auf der Makroebene lässt sich zwar ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem Politikprofil eines Landes und der dort vorfindbaren Struktur privater Lebensformen nachweisen. Ob ein solcher Zusammenhang aber tatsächlich eine kausale Beziehung impliziert, ist bislang nicht hinreichend belegt. Hier gilt es, eine Forschungslücke zu schließen, die nicht zuletzt aus einem Mangel an geeigneten, d.h. international vergleichbaren Individualdaten resultiert., The present article focuses on family policies in Europe and their relevance for family change. It is assumed that family policy measures have no direct impact on the spread of different kinds of living arrangements. There is also no causal link between policy and fertility. But family policy has its own meaning. Family policy does not work as a determinant of behaviour, but as a costraint of individual decision-making on action. The consequences of alternative biographic options are affected by family policy and this, in turn, stimulates or prevents their realisation. To find out something about the effects of opportunities and constraints provided by family policies, it is first necessary to point out their main characteristics and to classify their varied forms. Different typologies were suggested recently for that purpose. The approaches from Fux, Gauthier and Strohmeier will be presented and discussed here. They use different criteria to identify regime types of family policy and they make different classifications of selected countries. Up to now there are only little empirical findings on the impact of family policy respectively on the explanatory power of such typologies. A relationship between policy profile and the forms of private life can be observed on the macro level. But if such a relationship really implies causality is not proofed yet sufficient. Further research is needed here. The fail to do such research is last but not least the consequence of a lack of suitable data, which means international comparative individual-level data.

Family life courses are thought to have become more complex in Europe. This study uses SHARELIFE data from 14 European countries to analyze the family life courses of individuals born in 1924-1956 from ages 15 to 50. A new methodological approach, combining complexity metrics developed in sequence analysis with cross-classified multilevel modeling, is used to simultaneously quantify the proportions of variance attributable to birth cohort and country differences. This approach allows the direct comparison of changing levels of family trajectory differentiation across birth cohorts with cross-national variation, which provides a benchmark against which temporal change may be evaluated. The results demonstrate that family trajectories have indeed become more differentiated but that change over time is minor compared with substantial cross-national variation. Further, cross-national differences in family trajectory differentiation correspond with differences in dominant family life course patterns. With regard to debates surrounding the second demographic transition thesis and the comparative life course literature, the results indicate that the degree of change over time tends to be overstated relative to large cross-national differences. Supplementary material: s.: 13524_2017_628_MOESM1_ESM.pdf.

Was haben Kitas mit Fachkräftemangel zu tun? Sehr viel, wie die Autorin eindrucksvoll belegt. Der Ausbau von Kitas ist ein probates Mittel zur Fachkräftesicherung. Denn staatliche Investitionen in Kinderbetreuung zahlen sich mehrfach aus - auf individueller wie volkswirtschaftlicher Ebene. Kurzfristig tragen sie dazu bei, den Erwerbsumfang von Müttern und Vätern zu erhöhen - und verringern so die schon heute bestehenden Engpässe. Sie führen aber auch zu höheren Geburtenraten und einem langfristig höheren Qualifikationsstand der Bevölkerung - und damit zu einem größeren und besser qualifizierten Fachkräfteangebot in der Zukunft. Die harten Fakten indes zeigen: Deutschland tut noch immer zu wenig für den Ausbau von Kitas und die Verbesserung der Betreuungsqualität. Damit verschenken wir dringend benötigte Fachkräftepotenziale - nicht nur heute, sondern auch für die Zukunft.