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Introduction: Previous research has found beliefs about oneself and one's own abilities may have the potential to affect subsequent performance on a particular task. Additionally, providing false feedback about a particular characteristic or even about overall cognitive abilities may also affect performance on later tasks. However, it is unclear to what extent false positive or negative feedback about cognition will affect subsequent executive function task performance. In the present series of studies, we examined whether receiving negative false feedback about cognition would affect subsequent decision making and other executive function task performance. Method: In Study 1, the participants (n = 115) received false feedback that they were either high or low in creative intelligence before completing a series of decision making tasks. In Study 2, the participants (n = 146) completed a similar false feedback paradigm before completing assessments of a range of executive functions. Results: Across studies, we found limited evidence of a consistent pattern of how false feedback affects subsequent cognitive task performance, although receiving positive and negative feedback affected specific tasks. Conclusions: Our results indicate that the influence of false feedback on task performance is variable and may depend on factors such as the specific task or executive function assessed. In clinical work, it is important to consider how patients may internalize feedback about their cognitive abilities, as the feedback, coupled with other factors such as level of insight, apathy, disinhibition, or prior perceptions regarding a diagnosis, may influence interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study examined how mood affects the impact of false feedback on belief and recollection. In a three-session experiment, participants first watched 40 neutral mini videos, which were accompanied by music to induce either a positive or negative mood, or no music. Following a recognition test, they received false feedback to reduce belief in the occurrence of the events displayed in some of the videos (Session 2). This was followed by an immediate memory test and a delayed memory assessment one week later (Session 3). The results revealed that participants in negative mood reported higher belief scores compared to those in positive moods, despite an overall decline in belief scores for all groups following the false feedback. Notably, individuals in negative moods exhibited less reduction in their belief scores after encountering challenges, thereby maintaining a higher accuracy in their testimonies. Over time, a reduction in the clarity of participants' memory recall was observed, which correspondingly reduced their testimony accuracy. This study thus indicates that mood states play a role in shaping belief and memory recall under the influence of false feedback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shuanghong Chen,1,2 Todd Jackson,3 Ying He1 1Xinqiao Hospital and the Second Affiliated Hospital, Army Medical University, Chongqing, People’s Republic of China; 2Faculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing, People’s Republic of China; 3Department of Psychology, University of Macau, Taipa, Macau, People’s Republic of ChinaCorrespondence: Ying He, Xinqiao Hospital and the Second Affiliated Hospital, Army Medical University, Chongqing, 400715, People’s Republic of China, Email hy1996jw@163.comPurpose: Expectations and modification gained through critical learning influence pain perception. We tested how pain tolerability was influenced by the effects of orally delivered false feedback and participant status immediately prior to performing tasks.Patients and Methods: A total of 125 healthy college students (69 females and 56 males) were randomly assigned to 3 groups (positive, negative, and control) to participate in two formal cold pressor tests (CPTs). Participants completed the same series of task-related questionnaires (perceived importance, intended effort, current affect, and self-efficacy) before each CPT. False performance feedback was delivered after completion of the baseline level CPT. After completion of each CPT, both pain intensity and pain tolerability (duration in ice water) were recorded.Results: The results of linear mixed models revealed significant condition × time interactions on pain tolerability and task self-efficacy after controlling for individual variance as a random effect. Participants who received negative feedback exhibited increased pain tolerability without decreasing their self-efficacy, whereas participants who received positive feedback showed increased self-efficacy with no change in pain tolerability. A longer pain tolerance duration was also predicted by a more intentional investment of effort and a lower intensity of experienced pain as well as the effect of false feedback.Conclusion: The research highlights the effect of powerful situational influences on laboratory-induced pain tolerance.Keywords: cold pressor test, pain, false feedback, effort, self-efficacy, social norms

Recent decision‐making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed "on the fly" during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision‐making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision‐making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological tool that measures people's shift in preferences. Specifically, in our experiment (240 participants, registered UK users of an online survey panel), we developed and employed a two‐stage risk elicitation experimental method. The results from the experiment revealed that providing participants with false feedback on their initial decisions (stage 1) changes their risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment in the direction of the false feedback. Moreover, participants' final decisions (stage 2) were influenced by the type of feedback (correct or false) and informed by their altered risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment. In conclusion, our work provides experimental evidence that human preferences are constructed "on the fly," influenced by the decision‐making context and recent decision‐making experience (e.g., Kusev et al., 2020; Slovic, 1995). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people's memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people's memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants' beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people’s memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people’s memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants’ beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning.

Postural threat elicits a robust emotional response (e.g., fear and anxiety about falling), with concomitant modifications in balance. Recent theoretical accounts propose that emotional responses to postural threats are manifested, in part, from the conscious monitoring and appraisal of bodily signals ('interoception'). Here, we empirically probe the role of interoception in shaping emotional responses to a postural threat by experimentally manipulating interoceptive cardiac feedback. Sixty young adults completed a single 60-s trial under the following conditions: Ground (no threat) without heart rate (HR) feedback, followed by Threat (standing on the edge of a raised surface), during which participants received either false heart rate feedback (either slow [n = 20] or fast [n = 20] HR feedback) or no feedback (n = 20). Participants provided with false fast HR feedback during postural threat felt more fearful, reported feeling less stable, and rated the task more difficult than participants who did not receive HR feedback, or those who received false slow HR feedback (Cohen's d effect size = 0.79 – 1.78). However, behavioural responses did not significantly differ across the three groups. When compared to the no HR feedback group, false slow HR feedback did not significantly affect emotional or behavioural responses to the postural threat. These observations provide the first experimental evidence for emerging theoretical accounts describing the role of interoception in the generation of emotional responses to postural threats. • We investigated false interoceptive feedback on responses to a postural threat. • False fast cardiac feedback during a threat elicited stronger fear responses. • False slow cardiac feedback had no effect on assessed threat responses. • Interoception plays a key role in emotional responses to postural threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dual Control Model of sexual response has been mostly tested with men. As such, there is a lack of evidence on how such model applies to women's experience of sexual arousal, particularly when they face a threatening situation such as the threat of sexual performance failure. The aim of the current study was to test whether the Dual Control Model dimensions predict women's sexual responses to a bogus negative feedback about their sexual performance. In addition, 22 women were exposed to a sexually explicit film clip, while their genital arousal was being measured. During this presentation, a bogus negative feedback, aimed at increasing women's anxiety about their sexual performance, was provided. Vaginal photopletismography and self-report questions were used as means to evaluate women's genital and subjective sexual arousal, respectively. The Sexual Excitation/Sexual Inhibition Inventory for Women was further used to capture women's sexual dynamics. Regression analysis on the high-order factors revealed that sexual excitation proneness was the only predictor of the subjective sexual responses, while none of the factors has predicted genital arousal. "Arousability" and "Concerns about sexual function" dimensions predicted subjective sexual arousal. Sexual arousability may prevent women of lowering their subjective sexual responses in a sexually demanding situation, while "Concerns about sexual function" may have the opposite role, thus being a target of clinical interest. This work provides new data on the Dual Control Model of sexual response, and particularly on its role in women's sexual functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoception-the perception of internal bodily signals-has emerged as an area of interest due to its implications in emotion and the prevalence of dysfunctional interoceptive processes across psychopathological conditions. Despite the importance of interoception in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry, its experimental manipulation remains technically challenging. This is due to the invasive nature of existing methods, the limitation of self-report and unimodal measures of interoception, and the absence of standardized approaches across disparate fields. This article integrates diverse research efforts from psychology, physiology, psychiatry, and engineering to address this oversight. Following a general introduction to the neurophysiology of interoception as hierarchical predictive processing, we review the existing paradigms for manipulating interoception (e.g., interoceptive modulation), their underlying mechanisms (e.g., interoceptive conditioning), and clinical applications (e.g., interoceptive exposure). We suggest a classification for interoceptive technologies and discuss their potential for diagnosing and treating mental health disorders. Despite promising results, considerable work is still needed to develop standardized, validated measures of interoceptive function across domains and before these technologies can translate safely and effectively to clinical settings., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Highlights • We have examined the role of memory associations in a reinforced decision-making task. • False feedback can undermine participants' memory associations. • False feedback on memory associations reduces decision bias. Abstract Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most existing feedback or recommendation-based peer-to-peer trust models are implemented based on credible and sufficient feedbacks. However, there exist too many malicious nodes which provide false feedbacks, and what is more they do not even provide feedbacks. Also, since indirect trust is usually used to calculate a node's trust in most feedback-based trust models, the high communication complexity is required for getting feedbacks in the network. Aiming at solving these problems, this paper presents an implicit feedback mechanism in peer-to-peer trust models. Any node owns its proxy nodes, and the node's trust and feedbacks are both calculated by its chief proxy node implicitly and automatically without human intervention, thus reducing the impact of false or insufficient feedbacks on the trust calculations. Meanwhile, all the feedbacks and evaluations on a node are managed by the node's proxy nodes implicitly, rather by itself, reducing both the possibility that they are falsified by the malicious nodes and the communication complexity. The simulation results show that our implicit feedback mechanism could both improve the performance of peer-to-peer trust models and reduce the communication complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much is known about musical preferences, they are still hard to explain and predict. Over the last two decades, scholars have suggested that the functions served by music should be considered when interpreting musical preferences. It is known that the degree of functionality and the strength of musical preferences are correlated. However, as correlation does not equal causation, the present study sought to clarify experimentally whether the degree of functionality really determines the strength of musical preferences. The potential of music to foster social relatedness was selected as one of the most basic functions of music and was at the basis of an experimental study. Participants indicated their favorite musical style and a favorite piece of music which they deemed capable of creating a strong social bond among devotees of that style. They were told that other devotees of the same style would subsequently be asked to rate – based on that piece – how much they would like to get to know the person who had named that piece and their degree of affinity for that person. False feedback was manipulated in two randomized groups: one group received very positive feedback from the other fans (suggesting high functionality of the piece) and the other received rather negative feedback (suggesting low functionality). At the end of the study, participants indicated how much they liked the piece they had named. As expected, participants in the high-functionality group gave higher preference ratings for their selected piece than participants in the low-functionality group. The results suggest that the degree of music’s functionality in everyday life is a determinant of musical preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of 'morbid fascination' which is an urge to approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful; participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated differential activity within regions in the 'neural reference space for discrete emotion' depending on the type of feedback. We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimentally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Current social phobia models (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Leary & Kowalski, 1995) postulate that socially anxious individuals negatively appraise their anxiety sensations (e.g., sweating, heart racing, blushing) as evidence of poor social performance, and thus fear these anxiety symptoms will be noticed and judged negatively by others. Consequently, they become self-focused and hypervigilant of these sensations and use them to judge how they appear to others. To test this model, high (N =41) and low (N =38) socially anxious participants were shown false physiological feedback regarding an increase or decrease in heart rate prior to and during an impromptu speech task. Relative to participants who observed a false heart rate decrease, those in the increase condition reported higher levels of negative affect, more negative performance appraisals, and more frequent negative ruminative thoughts, and these effects were mediated by an increase in self-focused attention. The unhelpful effects of the physiological feedback were not specific to high socially anxious participants. The results have implications for current cognitive models as well as the treatment of social phobia. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

People tend to slow down after mistakes. This posterror slowing (PES) has commonly been explained by a change to a more conservative response threshold to avoid future errors. Alternatively, the attention-orienting account posits that all infrequent, surprising events (including errors) elicit an orienting response followed by a time-consuming process of task reorientation, explaining PES without increased response caution. In the present study, we employed both behavioral and electrophysiological measures to compare the predictions of these accounts using a flanker paradigm in which accurate or false external response feedback was provided. Participants demonstrated typical posterror adjustments, responding more slowly and accurately in posterror than in postcorrect trials. This finding provides initial evidence suggesting that posterror adjustments are motivated by the avoidance of subsequent mistakes. Most importantly, PES and an event-related potential relating to the attentional processing of feedback, the feedback-related P300 (f-P300), were modulated by feedback type. More specifically, the f-P300 was larger after false than after accurate feedback, suggesting that participants oriented their attention toward (i.e., were surprised by) inaccurate feedback signals. Interestingly, false feedback differentially modulated reaction times: Participants were slower after correct responses when feedback falsely informed of an error rather than confirmed the correct response. In contrast, faster responses were made after errors when feedback falsely indicated correct rather than incorrect performance. When these patterns of results are regarded together, they are best explained by theories of cognitive control in which posterror adjustments in choice reaction time tasks are assumed to reflect control processes leading to more conservative performance after error signals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The identification of individual differences variables and environmental conditions that may be associated with poor psychophysiological recovery from stress or may serve as protective factors may be relevant in the context of physical and psychological health maintenance. In the present study, heart rate recovery from a mental arithmetic task was examined after participants received bogus performance-related feedback that could be consistent or inconsistent with their specific self-concept about their mental arithmetic skills. That way, the participants'' beliefs about their own performance in the task were experimentally manipulated. Recovery of heart rate was examined in two time windows: (1) shortly after the participants had completed the task and had received positive or negative performance feedback and (2) 10min after the task. In order to evaluate the dynamic of changes in more detail, speed of recovery (linear slope of the continuous beat-to-beat data) was analysed in addition to the degree of recovery (average heart rate decline during the five-minute observation periods). The results indicate that negative performance-related feedback may prolong psychophysiological responses to stressful conditions, in particular when the feedback is inconsistent with the domain-specific self-concept. In conjunction with other evidence these results support the assumption that positive emotional states in the context of stressful events may contribute to poor post-stress recovery. Overall, the findings are supportive of the “perseverative cognition hypothesis” according to which psychophysiological recovery may be delayed through continued cognitive representation of a negative experience. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In the present study, we applied Valins’ (1966) bogus bodily feedback paradigm to investigate the roles of cognitive appraisal (tele)presence, and emotion in the context of media usage. Participants (N=30) viewed short sequences of a TV show, whereby false heart rate feedback was provided. In line with Valins’ paradigm, the manipulation we used in this study included two levels: high vs. low false heart rate feedback. We assessed presence, enjoyment, and the real heart rate. Participants reported stronger experiences of presence and enjoyed the clips more when they wrongly believed that they had been aroused. Since bogus feedback increases the sensation of presence, the results indicate that presence—like emotions—can be influenced by cognitive appraisals. It is likely that the false heart rate feedback was attributed to the stimulus, which in turn enhanced the sensation of presence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A false feedback paradigm was used to produce a discrepancy between expected and “actual” tumescence among 57 sexually dysfunctional and 58 sexually functional men randomly assigned to one of four false tumescence feedback conditions: negative (NEG), neutral (NEU), positive (POS), or no (NO) feedback. Participants predicted an erection score before viewing an erotic film and then received false tumescence feedback based on this score. Tumescence and cognitive ratings were obtained before and after the feedback. It was predicted that discrepancies would differ between dysfunctional and functional participants such that functional participants would have the ability to overcome discrepancies, whereas dysfunctional participants would not. As expected, POS decreased tumescence for dysfunctional participants and NO did not influence tumescence for either group. Unexpectedly, NEU decreased tumescence for dysfunctional participants and NEG decreased tumescence for functional participants. Despite tumescence changes, cognitive ratings generally followed the feedback that was given. These results only partially support current models of sexual dysfunction and behavioral regulation. Anxiety, self-focused attention, cognitive interference, and unexpectedness of the feedback could not account for the partial support. However, most feedback that was outside of the realm of the status quo for both functional and dysfunctional participants did decrease tumescence, despite outcome expectancies. These results suggest that both functional and dysfunctional men may be at risk for erectile failure should feedback about their performance be discrepant from what they expect. Prevention and treatment should focus on preparing men for occasional erectile failure and on helping them overcome discrepant feedback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Participants with elevated anxiety sensitivity and a history of panic attacks were compared to a low anxiety comparison group with respect to physiological and subjective reactivity to false heart-rate feedback and reactivity to a priming procedure. Whereas accurate heart-rate feedback elicited minimal responses, participants across groups showed significant physiological and subjective responses to false feedback. High risk and low risk participants did not differ in heart-rate responses to false feedback, though panic attack frequency did predict physiological and subjective reactions to false feedback in the high risk group. Self-reported nonspecific anxiety was significantly higher in high risk female participants than in low risk female participants, while males did not different in general subjective anxiety. However, high risk participants reported more panic-specific symptoms during the false feedback task than low risk participants, regardless of the sex of the participant. Therefore, although the experimental paradigm appeared to trigger nonspecific anxiety in high risk female participants, panic attack symptoms in reaction to the task were specific to risk group, not sex, and consistent with hypotheses. Surprisingly, the priming procedure did not influence physiological or subjective responses to false feedback in either group. These results raise additional questions regarding the process and impact of interoception in individuals with panic attacks, and suggest that false perception of internal changes may contribute to risk for panic disorder when exposed to believable cues. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Cognitive models suggest that during social interactions, socially anxious individuals direct their attention to internal cues of arousal and use this information to erroneously infer how they appear to others. High (N=36) and low (N=36) socially anxious adults had a conversation with a stooge, and were led to believe by false feedback that they were experiencing either an increase or decrease in arousal, or evaluating the comfort level of the feedback equipment. Compared to the other groups, participants who believed their arousal had increased, reported greater anxiety, poorer perceived performance, more physical cues of anxiety, and greater underestimation of their performance and overestimation of the visibility of their anxiety. The effects were not specific to participants with high social anxiety. Observers rated the behaviour of participants who believed that their arousal had decreased most favourably. The results have implications for the treatment of social phobia. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The effects of false positive and false negative physiological feedback (vaginal photoplethymograph response print-out) on women's sexual arousal were examined. Participants included women without sexual dysfunction ( n=16) and women with Sexual Arousal Disorder (SAD; n=15). Measures of subjective sexual arousal, physiological sexual arousal (vaginal pulse amplitude), expectancies, affect, and anxiety were obtained in response to viewing an erotic film. Results indicated that false positive feedback significantly increased subjective levels of sexual arousal, whereas false negative feedback significantly decreased subjective levels of sexual arousal in both groups. Sexually functional women had overall higher expectancies for sexual arousal than women with SAD. Unexpectedly, false positive feedback did not significantly impact physiological sexual arousal in sexually functional women; however, it resulted in significantly decreased responses in physiological sexual arousal in women with SAD. False negative feedback had no significant effect on physiological sexual response in sexually functional women or women with SAD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A classic study conducted by revealed a perseverance effect wherein people who received positive performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than those who received negative feedback despite the fact that they had received standard outcome debriefing (i.e., been informed about the false, predetermined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research by revealing that (a) there is a form of outcome debriefing (i.e., informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well as the bogus nature of the feedback) that effectively eliminates the perseverance effect, (b) the perseverance effect that occurs after standard outcome debriefing is limited to perceptions of specific task-relevant skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) affective reactions do not underlie the perseverance effect that occurs in the false feedback paradigm. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Participants' usage of informational variables in learning visual relative-mass discrimination in collisions was tracked by means of PROBIT correlations. Four groups received feedback that was true or accorded with either of three nonspecificational cue variables. A majority in each group adopted the feedback, but several participants defied the false feedback. Unlike in previous research, the fit to data of the relative-mass invariant could not be bettered by post hoc linear combinations of the cues. Discriminability was lower in the use of the invariant. Analytic complexity was rejected as an explanation for discriminability differences. A "smart mechanism" for pickup of the relative-mass invariant was developed as an extension of G. Johansson's (1950/1994) vector model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]