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Corporate dividend policy is a puzzle, especially when considering the effects of economic and behavioural factors. We develop a theoretical analysis of corporate dividend policy in order to analyse the effects of the complex mix of managerial moral hazard, overconfidence, and myopia on managerial incentives to increase or decrease dividends. Furthermore, we consider the effect of investor irrationality that drives corporate dividend catering behaviour. We investigate how this complex mix of economic and behavioural factors is likely to affect dividend policy. Our analysis provides a deep theoretical underpinning to understanding these effects and provides a basis for future empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joint liability aspires to improve micro‐loan performance through the support of, and pressure from, the group borrowers. This paper examines how the group composition, in terms of the mixture of kinship (Family) ties and social (Friends and Neighbours) ties among the borrowers, affects the default rates. Using binary logistics regression and three machine learning models, responses from 507 group micro‐loan borrowers from four major Moroccan cities were analysed. The results show that the stronger the family and kinship ties are within a loan group, the higher is the default rate. On the contrary, the stronger the social ties are among the group, the lower is the default rate. Other key findings include that the diversion of fund usage from investment to consumption is not found to significantly cause default. Also, loan default can be a consequence of borrowers' strategic choice rather than financial distress. As compared to the female members, male borrowers are found to be causing higher default rates. Interestingly, the gender‐related default rates are lower when more of the male borrowers are only socially related. Finally, group size is found to be positively associated with default. Our findings can help micro‐finance institutions refine their lending policies and guidance on groups' composition and size to reduce default rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral hazard—in the form of entrepreneurial effort shirking—and derive an optimum sharing ratio of a Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) contract that involves a Venture Capitalist and an Entrepreneur. The model reveals the following interesting findings. First, under complete information—where the Venture Capitalist has a bargaining power ‐ Venture Capitalist offers the entrepreneur a profit sharing ratio that is less than her capital contribution ratio. Second, in an incomplete information setting, the entrepreneur demands a profit sharing ratio higher than her capital contribution ratio when the sum of the marginal cost (from exercising a higher effort) and private benefits (from exercising a low effort) is greater than the marginal return (from exercising a high effort). In addition, the model is used to derive a span of negotiation about the profit sharing ratio. Finally, an agent based simulation (Netlogo) platform is considered to implement the model, which allows a faster numerical calculations of the profit share and helps decide on the validity of the funding contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]