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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to illustrate threefold how hawala banking poses a problem for Swiss banks implementing anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) policies as a fulfilment of Switzerland's UN commitment. Design/methodology/approach: The first author interviewed compliance officers and suspected criminals on hawala banking mechanisms. The authors formally recorded interviews with compliance officers, but interviews with suspected criminals were not recorded to maximize their potential forthrightness. In total, the authors conducted 70 formal interviews and developed a questionnaire based on this, which was sent to 200 compliance officers. The authors subjected the interviews to qualitative analysis and developed a system of categories that the authors assessed by means of triangulation. By substantiating proposed theoretical challenges with empirical findings, future recommendations for regulatory procedures are based on analytical evidence. Findings: This study finds that hawala presents significant challenges for AML and ATF policies. Whilst it is possible to mediate the first two challenges laid out herein, it is the third hurdle that proves insurmountable. Ultimately, tolerating hawala banking passively counteracts any active effort made by implementing AML and ATF policies. Originality/value: Whilst the existing literature sufficiently connects hawala banking to terrorist financing, this study details how existing compliance measures are circumvented and the implications on the perceived commitment of Switzerland against financial crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Virtual assets present unique Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) risks that have been overlooked by global regulation in the past. This article considers virtual assets' potential as a new way to exchange value and the need for effective AML/CTF regulation. It analyses the emerging issues that will elevate the risks and considers the current global regulatory response including the reliance on centralized intermediaries. This article recommends extending the regulatory framework to include regulation that is native to the peer-to-peer nature of virtual assets to address the risks. This article argues this new regulatory model will ultimately be more effective in achieving the goal of AML/CTF regulation than the current regulation has been in the traditional financial system. Despite the inherently global nature of virtual assets, where the domestic perspective is required this will be considered in the context of Australia, drawing upon other jurisdictions where applicable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Artificial intelligence has had a major impact on organisations from Banking through to Law Firms. The rate at which technology has developed in terms of tasks that are complex, technical and time-consuming has been astounding. The purpose of this paper is to explore the solutions that AI, RegTech and CharityTech provide to charities in navigating the vast amount of anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance legislation in the UK; so that they comply with the requirements and mitigate the potential risk they face but also develop a more coherent and streamlined set of actions. Design/methodology/approach: The subject is approached through the analysis of data, literature and, domestic and international regulation. The first part of the paper explores the current obligations and risks charities face, these are then, in the second part, set against the examination of potential technological solutions as of August 2020. Findings: It is suggested that charities underestimate the importance of the nature and size of the threat posed to them, this is significant, as demonstrated, given the growing size and impact of the sector. Technological solutions are suggested to combat the issues charities face. Originality/value: The study is original because it is the first to create the notion of CharityTech and to specifically explore what technological advances can assist charities in meeting the regulatory compliance challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to examine how important the countering terrorism financing is in the fight against terrorism and to what extent does financial intelligence contribute into this field. Design/methodology/approach: To this end, to collect data, semi-structured interview method was conducted for 15 experts, including academicians, judges, security and intelligence officers who have specialised and been practising in the field of terrorism. Then, the data were analysed with the descriptive and systematic method. Findings: The findings highlight that countering terrorism financing is indispensable in the scope of the combating terrorism; however, there are still much to be done in practice to achieve more success in this field. The results also suggest that the process requires more flexible and proactive approach with the help of an autonomous financial intelligence unit to be more efficient. Moreover, there must be better cooperation and coordination at both national and international levels. Furthermore, training more professionals from multidisciplinary backgrounds and raising awareness among the public and private sectors are found to be other key factors for effective combating of the system. Originality/value: The research has been conducted on participants who mostly have been in fight against terrorism over 20 years who are aware of the early methods, as well as the recent ones both in theory and in practice. Their view is significant to understand the situation in combating financing of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: There is a significant focus today on the deficiencies of the financial system as the sector continues to boom while facing the growing pains of financial scandals, money laundering and the financing of terrorism around the world. Here, this study aims to investigate past research and the development of knowledge and practice in the area of countering money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, we draw attention to the gaps in the preventive mechanisms adopted by countries to fight against anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorism financing (ATF) and to highlight areas for possible future research. Design/methodology/approach: This study was carried out through a systematic literature review of the existing work on AML and ATF. Findings: The general findings of the reviewed papers show the deficiencies in the laws, acts and preventive measures meant to fight money laundering and terrorism financing and support the need for more research in this area in terms of law, regulations and technological matters. Originality/value: Providing a concrete understanding of the concept of AML and terrorist financing and contributing the theoretical development in the area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need for the U.S. Congress to amend the purpose language of the Counter-ISIS Tran and Equip Fund (CTEF) to allow funding to groups with stability operation missions in Iraq. Other topics include why the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) should broadly interpret the term "counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)" to include stability operations to prevent the resurgence of the terrorist group.

In this article, Tom Keatinge, Florence Keen and Kayla Izenman look at how right-wing terrorist and extremist movements raise funds, and how this should be reflected in counter-extremism and counterterrorism financing strategies. They highlight the importance of acknowledging the growing threat posed by right-wing terrorism and extremism, and thus the need to develop: an increased understanding of related fundraising strategies (including the relevance of significant numbers); the articulation of a more robust legal definition of extremism and greater willingness of the UK government to engage – at a strategic and political level – with the threats posed by right-wing extremism; and finally, greater collaboration between public and private sectors to enable the identification and disruption of related, enabling funding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of social media has created a terrorist finance vulnerability due to the ease with which propaganda can be spread, promoting fund-raising for a certain cause. Social media companies recognize the importance of preventing violent extremist and terrorist content, but less attention is paid to their fund-raising role. As well as presenting a threat, the movement of terrorist fund-raising activities online creates a disruption opportunity. This article argues that social media companies need to display greater awareness of their vulnerability to supporting terrorist financing and greater collaboration with law enforcement and financial institutions to strengthen the integrity of the system against abuse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2018 the Law Commission published a Consultation Paper on proposed reforms to the United Kingdom (UK) suspicious activity reporting (SARs) regimes relating to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF). This article argues that, notwithstanding the proposed retention of an "all-crimes" approach to AML, the SARs regime may still be streamlined by way of the proposed amendments to the scope of reporting. The proposals to elevate the thresholds for reporting suspicions of money laundering, whilst conceptually appealing, present operational challenges for those within the reporting sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article critically considers the effectiveness of the European Union's (EU) counter-terrorist financing (CTF) strategies. In particular, it concentrates on the use of financial intelligence gathered from the submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs) by reporting entities to Member States Financial Intelligence Units (FIU). The Article identifies a series of weaknesses in the United Kingdom's (UK) reporting regime: Defensive reporting, increased compliance costs, and the definition of suspicion. It concludes by making a series of recommendations that are aimed at improving the effectiveness of the EU and UK CTF reporting obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between Thailand’s human rights crisis during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s leadership (2001–2006) and the USA-led post-9/11 war on terror? Why did the human rights situation dramatically deteriorate after the Thaksin regime publicly supported the Bush administration’s war on terror and consequently received US counterterror assistance? This article offers two conceptual arguments that jointly demonstrate a constitutive theoretical explanation, which shows that counterterror and militaristic transnational and national discursive structures enabled the strategy of state repression in Thailand under Thaksin. The first concept refers to strategic localization, which refers to how the Bush administration’s global war on terror—and its consequent overarching emphasis on military security—provided an opportunity for the Thaksin administration to strategically localize the global threat of terrorism in ways that could seem relevant to the local Thai context. The second concept pertains to resource mobilization, which shows how converging US and Thai discourses on military security facilitated Thaksin’s strategy of increased state repression that led to the proliferation of state-led human rights abuses. This research article contributes to the human rights literature in two ways: (1) by highlighting how foreign aid programs and its constitutive political discourses shape recipient countries’ domestic human rights situation (2) and by tracing the macro-political factors that lead to the eventual democratic decay of contemporary Thailand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, regulators have placed increased expectations on financial product manufacturers to better understand and control their distribution network. The focus is to ensure financial products are sold in compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) regulations, and in a manner that is suitable to and in the end client's best interest. This requires financial product manufacturers to perform thorough distributor due diligence (KYD) over the intermediaries distributing their products. As a result, the former have had to implement and continuously adapt their distribution oversight function, as both the regulations and the expected outcomes thereof have become clearer, and the scope continues to evolve. With distribution networks becoming increasingly intermediated, the due diligence programme needs to be robust and, to really be successful in its mission, combined with efforts to build and maintain strong partnerships with distributors. In an environment where the financial industry is coming under increased pressure on its revenues, as well as costs to the end client, financial product manufacturers and distributors share a common need to rationalise this process. New emerging technologies and innovative approaches offer opportunities to create such a robust and efficient due diligence process. This paper focuses on describing the main regulations at play, highlighting the key challenges specifically for Luxembourg domiciled investment fund asset managers and the cross-border distribution of their products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article examines increase in large-scale bank account closures of remittance service providers called de-risking in Australia, as of July 2017. Topics discussed include ways in which money laundering and terrorist financing laws shifted national security-related financial risk control to banks; and importance of recognizing a right to a payment account.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine – using crime script analysis – the practical effectiveness of internationally endorsed and universally recognised counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards in preventing the movement of money for the purposes of terrorism. The paper does not seek to examine the originating circumstances of terrorist finances or how laundered value is assigned.Design/methodology/approach Preliminary evaluation focuses on the discrepancies between the practices of money laundering and terrorist financing. Following an introduction to crime scripts, internationally endorsed anti money laundering (AML)/CTF practices are discussed to identify the process used to trace, prevent and limit money laundering and terrorist financing. Several terrorist financing case studies are then aligned to the process of crime script analysis to determine whether existing AML/CTF practices are effective in preventing terrorist financing.Findings The AML model “Placement, layering, integration” is only relevant to CTF in the comparatively rare cases when the origin of the money is crime. This creates a false sense of security through over reliance on AML/CTF for CTF purposes. A crime script approach can be applied to terrorist finance, but it is currently hindered by insufficient reporting of low level financing of terrorists, their addresses and associates. Law enforcement make insufficient use of financial intelligence – as a routine practice – in their crime and terrorist investigations; they have not adopted parallel investigation as a routine approach and consequently remain largely unconnected with the AML/CTF regime.Practical implications Utilising terrorist financing case studies, this paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards and practices are not adequate for controlling the movement of funds for financing terrorism because of the lack of focus on a specific script that aligns to known terrorist finance methodologies. While the paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards are thorough, the process underpinning the financing of terrorism is too dissimilar to the process of money laundering, namely, placement, layering, and integration, to support practices associated with terrorism prevention and detection.Originality/value This paper provides an examination of the practicalities behind the countering of terrorist financing from a compliance and investigative perspective. The paper is of interest to those involved in policy, compliance and investigations associated with terrorist financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine some of the recent changes to the old anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing law, which is now known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The paper will highlight the newly consolidated money laundering offences and the newly created offences including structuring of transactions or “smurfing”. Also, the transgression of cross-border movement of cash and negotiable instruments and tipping off about a money laundering disclosure will be assessed.Design/methodology/approach The paper uses a doctrinal legal research and secondary data, with the new AML/CFT legislation as the primary source. For comparative analysis, legislations in the UK, Australia and New Zealand are also examined. Secondary sources include case law, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.Findings The review of the AML/CFT law is timely and indicates the Malaysian government’s efforts to adhere to international standards set by the financial action task force. However, it is imperative that the Malaysian government addresses the remaining instrumental and normative deficiencies in the AML/CFT law to ensure that the recent legal changes are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent and regulate money laundering and terrorist financing within Malaysia.Originality/value This paper is a useful source of information for legal practitioners, academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, researchers and students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessments are an important instrument in shaping global counterterrorist financing (CTF) policy. However, while CTF policies had an impact on terrorist activity, it is not clear which CTF measures are useful and which are not. Past assessments have had a bias toward expanding the scope and intensity of CTF regulations and implementation because of their focus on output and outcome of measures, rather than on their impact on terrorist activity. The article discusses major features of CTF evaluations and places them into wider frameworks of assessments in high-risk politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU directives on AML (anti-money laundering)/CTF (counter-terrorism financing) entail involuntary public policy-making by for-profit professionals on politically sensitive issues. This raises fundamental questions on the role of private actors in public policy-making apart from their roles as lobbyists and contractors. From a democratic perspective, the involuntary public policy-making by European lawyers is particularly problematic as it involves guardians of the rule of law who, we argue, are simultaneously forced to act as agents of the state. In the case of AML/CTF, lawyers are within the political system rather than outside it. We show that expectations concerning how lawyers are to work closely with the state in the United Kingdom and Sweden differ, and that the policy-making styles lawyers apply in practice were either 'pragmatic' (UK) or 'evasive' (Sweden). Our findings provide a first step in understanding the new role of for-profit professionals as involuntary public policy-makers, and its possible effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its roots in the 'war on drugs' and the criminalization of money laundering, the global initiative to combat the financing of terrorism ( CFT) provides one strategy for preventing and preempting terrorist attacks. In public pronouncements, terrorist finance was named the 'lifeblood' and 'oxygen' for terrorism itself, thus displaying an analogy suggesting that its mere removal could bring an end to terrorism. Following the theoretical perspective of the Copenhagen School of security studies, this paper argues that national and international measures against terrorist finance constitute the 'securitization' of money. By situating money as the essential component to an existential threat, it was possible to justify extraordinary measures to monitor financial transactions. These measures produced unintended consequences prompting resistance and an evolution of procedures to reduce those consequences. This paper considers two affected areas (migrant remittances and financial inclusion) and points to the potential use of financial surveillance against grand corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These purposes include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria's civil war. The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to $500 million could be transferred from the newlyestablished Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to train and equip such Syrian forces. Additional funding could be provided from other sources for the Syrian Train and Equip Program, including from foreign contributions, subject to the approval of the congressional defense committees. As of June 2015, the defense committees have approved the transfer of $500 million in FY2015 CTPF funds for the program and an additional $80 million in Defense Working Capital Funds for related U.S. government operations. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the program. According to Administration officials, the intention is for the program to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. The authority provided in the FY2015 NDAA expires after December 31, 2016. In FY2016, the Administration is requesting $600 million in a new, separate Syria Train and Equip account that, if authorized and appropriated as requested, would not require advance notification and approval by the four defense committees. Current debate over the program-as expressed in congressional consideration of proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376) centers on: • The amounts, alignment, and terms associated with FY2016 funding for the program. • The extent and type of U.S. support or protection, if any, that may be provided to Syrian trainees upon their return to Syria, especially in the event of attack by pro- Asad or other forces in Syria. • The size, scope, and effectiveness of the Syria Train and Equip Program as currently implemented; its purposes relative to overarching U.S. strategy toward Syria; and its integration with U.S.-led coalition efforts to combat the Islamic State organization. • The content and scope of requested strategy and reporting requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the provisions under the Export Administration Act to provide sanctions from state sponsors of terrorism support for acts of international terrorism. An overview on the three laws which aimed to diminish support for terrorism through imposing sanctions is noted. It cites the goals of the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on local and international terrorism.

While regional and international human rights institutions claim that the definition of a terrorist act under the Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 is overly broad as a result of which citizens not involved in a genuinely terrorist act are prosecuted and jailed, the Ethiopian government defends the law pointing that it is borrowed from jurisdictions with advanced legal system and rule of law. This article is concerned with this debate and suggests how to deal with it. The article employs definitions under relevant regional and international counterterrorism legal instruments as standard to examine the scope of the domestic definition. With regard to some of its elements, the proclamation's definition is broader than the standard definitions; in other aspects it is narrower. The regional and international instruments simply indicate what states should proscribe as a terrorist act without further prohibiting them from including other conduct with in domestic definitions. As such, being broader per se does not render the definition incompatible with regional and international definitions. On areas where the definition is narrower, its strict application would mean non-prosecution or, in the event of prosecution, acquittal of persons who would have been treated as terrorist under regional and international law. This has a direct bearing on Ethiopia's counterterrorism obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of the paper was to examine the challenges inherent in harnessing the UN and other AML counter-measures, paying particular attention to the United Nations Resolutions on countering financing of terrorism and why the UN Security Resolutions have not been easy to invoke. As regards other AML counter-measures, the paper examined the legal status of soft law instruments, articulating the possible reasons why they are easy to implement. Design/methodology/approach – The paper was written by the analysis of UN and other AML counter-measures – which were evaluated in the gaze of how they have been implemented across states. While states are under an obligation to implement UN AML counter-measures such as international treaties and soft law instruments, private banks as non-state actors have exploited some loopholes in the law to flaunt them. This has undermined the efficacy of global AML counter-measures. Many banks have been fined for violating UN sanctions on countries like Iran and Sudan. These examples were utilized in appraising the current UN and other AML counter-measures across states. Findings – The findings of the paper were compelling in demonstrating that global anti-money laundering laws are often emasculated by the fact that they are implemented in the realm of international law. International law manifests itself within independent member states' vested strategic self-interests. In the event of conflicts, national self-interests will prevail. But again, money laundering is an opportunistic crime because it generates both synergies and externalities and the response of individual states often depends on how it is affected by it. It is wrong to assume as doing things in the realm of international law is not as easy as it is presumed to be. Research limitations/implications – It would have been better to carry out interviews so as to corroborate secondary data sources used in writing this paper. But due to some constraints, this option was not possible. It would also have been better to undertake the analysis of data based on a large sample of countries rather than cherry picking. While implementing AML counter-measures in the realm of international law is necessary to foster international co-operation, there are still some loopholes that need to be paid more attention. Originality/value – The paper was written, analysed and evaluated based on the most recent literature on implementation of UN and other AML counter-measures across countries. It also utilized the recent cases involving violations of UN AML counter-measures by banks on sanctioned countries such as Iran and Sudan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain the incompatibility of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures as a hasty over-reaction after 9/11, focusing on the compliance burdens that this imposes on the regulated sector, most notably financial institutions. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explains the fundamental differences between money laundering and terrorist financing. It follows the evolution of the marriage between AML and CTF measures in the USA and the UK, comparing the pre and post-9/11 phases. Consequently, the specific legal burdens placed on financial institutions as a result of this marriage are discussed. Findings – The paper, while recognising the importance of targeting terrorist money, contends that inherent differences exist between money laundering and terrorist financing, and fusing them together is a hasty reaction to the 9/11 attacks. It argues that the need of the hour is to focus on terrorist profiling, rather than attempting to target terrorist financing through the AML regime. It also concludes that financial institutions are unfairly burdened with the task of "suspecting" terrorist funds, while receiving little or no guidance in this respect. Originality/value – This paper is of value to governments, regulators, and financial institutions considering the effective implementation of the AML-CTF regime in the UK and the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to measure the size of the money laundering and terrorism financing problem, identify threats and trends, the techniques employed and the amount of funds involved to determine whether the information obtained about money laundering and terrorism financing in real-world environments can be transferred to virtual environments such as Second Life and World of Warcraft. Design/methodology/approach – Analysis of 184 Typologies obtained from a number of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) bodies to: determine whether trends and/or patterns can be identified in the different phases of money laundering or terrorism financing, namely, the placement, layering and integration phases; and to establish whether trends and/or behaviours are ubiquitous to a particular money laundering or terrorism financing Type. Findings – Money launderers and terrorism financers appeared to have slightly different preferences for the placement, layering and integration techniques. The more techniques that are used, the more cash can be successfully laundered or concealed. Although terrorism financers use similar channels to money launderers, they do not utilise as many of the placement, layering and integration techniques. Rather, they prefer to use a few techniques which maintain high levels of anonymity and appear innocuous. The sums of monies involved in money laundering and terrorism financing vary significantly. For example, the average maximum sum involved in money laundering cases was AUD 68.5M, as compared to AUD 4.8 for terrorism financing cases. Originality/value – This paper provides some insight into the relationship between predicate offence, the predominant techniques utilised in carrying out that offence and the sums of money involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effects of increasing anti-terrorism expenditure on economic growth rate and social welfare. It is shown that: (i) spending the least amount possible on anti-terrorism expenditure will lead to a maximum economic growth rate; and (ii) to achieve maximum social welfare, the government should allocate its budget to anti-terrorism expenditure. The results shed light on why the US government has chosen to uphold and pursue its anti-terrorism policies in recent years to present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that most terrorist attacks, including those undertaken on September 11, 2001, represent relatively low-cost endeavors, the price for maintaining a global terror network runs in the billions of dollars annually. These funds are required for recruitment, operating training bases and camps, providing food and housing, purchasing explosives and weapons, forging identity papers and travel documents, gathering intelligence, communications, bribery, and maintaining the daily expenses of operatives awaiting their assignments. Because of these great expenses, a global terrorism operation must fund itself through illicit activities (narcotics, vice crimes, etc.), state support, and various legitimate businesses. Stopping this funding requires not only aggressive counterterrorism actions, but infringing upon the legitimate practices of front corporations which may or may not understand their role in global destruction and death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the attempted bombing of an American passenger jet on Christmas Day 2009 was traced to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, the Yemeni government has been trying to convince foreign donors that it requires financial assistance to function in light of the threat from the terrorist organization. The article validates the Western world's worry about Yemen's ability to contain the conflict within its borders and discusses policies developed to help stabilise the regime. It argues that this approach may actually aggravate Yemen's problems because it seeks to strengthen existing power hierarchies rather than find incentives to make the power elite more responsive to the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents research on international cooperation on counterterrorism initiated by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Arrest information and information on use of Interpol counterterrorism resources by member countries of the organization are examined to determine counter factual benefit measurements used to compute cost-benefit ratios of Interpol counterterrorism spending. It is found that Interpol generates a return of approximately $200 for each dollar spent on counterterrorism. The return from Interpol's Stolen & Lost Travel Document database is considered.

Domestic terrorism continues to be a major concern for the United States. Despite the fact that County Sheriffs will have a critical role in dealing with public safety during and after a terrorist event, little is known regarding their confidence levels. The three main components that were identified as contributors to confidence of county law enforcement when dealing with terrorist events were satisfaction with funding for training, adequacy of equipment and funding for prevention and reaction. The results of this quantitative and descriptive study may become an important factor for law enforcement preparedness and for funding distribution in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates authorities’ relative counterterrorism effectiveness focusing on its behavior over time, its impact on casualties and property losses. Using data on transnational terrorism from the ITERATE database (1973–2003) and discrete choice models, relative counterterrorism effectiveness is evaluated controlling for a variety of terrorists’ and authorities’ effort attributes. The probability of a terrorist incident being stopped by the authorities has increased in the examined period. Furthermore, a negative relationship between authorities’ ability to stop an incident and the probabilities of casualties and damages is identified. However, the “ability to stop” exerts higher impact on the probability of property losses compared to casualties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the cost of terrorism to societies. Small amounts of monies are able to create large amounts of damage to societies, the authors state. Topics of discussion include the costs of production for terrorist groups, monies spent defending against terrorist groups, and the quantification of defender disadvantage related to terrorism.

Efforts to prevent and preempt further terrorist attacks in the United States and other developed countries have intruded into many spheres of public and private life. This article provides a short assessment of the redeployment of anti-money laundering regimes to combat the financing of terrorism. This expansion of financial surveillance is directed by international organizations and domestic legislation in the belief that terrorists and their financiers may be found, identified and detained. After providing background to the anti-money laundering regime, the article looks at the domestic and extraterritorial application of the USA PATRIOT Act. One conclusion of this analysis finds that a financial panopticon has coalesced out of the wide range of financial and non-financial businesses now required to report “suspicious financial activity.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004, the Government Accountability Office reported that in the context of homeland security and disaster management, regional organization is an effective way to improve intergovernmental cooperation and preparedness at the local level. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security began including risk (vulnerability) calculations in its funding formulas and adopted a regional approach to the distribution of funds to major metropolitan areas. Despite regionalism's theoretical appeal and its popularity as an organizational structure, what makes regionalism work in the context of emergency management/homeland security has not been methodically examined at the first responder level. Our study of local governments in Florida empirically tests the relationship between perceived vulnerabilities (risks) and the effectiveness of regional emergency management organizational structures. We find that certain types of local vulnerabilities, such as population attributes and infrastructure, are more powerful promoters of proregionalism sentiments than others, most notably financial condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Australia's anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism financing (CTF) regime has been the subject of a series of legislative enhancements resulting from recent amendments to the foundational AML legislation, the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (FTR Act), and the introduction of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) that presents new compliance challenges for the financial services industry and poses questions about its impact on privacy and other rights of consumers of financial and related services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we address a question fundamental to understanding the potential effectiveness of homeland security policy across the U.S. federal system: what explains homeland security preparedness efforts at the municipal government level? Using data gathered from a nationwide survey of municipal officials, we examine the effects of city governments' financial and administrative resources, along with measures of broader policy context, on several attitudinal and behavioral indicators of homeland security preparedness. We find that administrative resources have consistent and relatively robust explanatory power and we lay out several policy implications from the analyses presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Homeland security functions are a new and costly responsibility for local governments. What complicates this new function is that it must be implemented in the context of the federal system, where appropriate funding burdens and roles are still being worked out. Both papers in this symposium address these tensions and uncertainties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Homeland security preparedness is largely a local government activity. A fall 2005 survey of Florida city and county finance/budget officials evaluates the fairness and adequacy of available federal and state homeland security funding from a local government perspective. Local officials were asked to evaluate federal and state funding allocations, competing approaches to the distribution of homeland security grant funding, the balance between response and prevention funding, and various approaches to intergovernmental organization for emergency management activities. We find that finance officials from small counties and cities are more likely than their larger counterparts to indicate a need for greater access to federal funding; but city officials from all sizes of jurisdictions are more likely than their county counterparts to report an interest in greater state funding. There is general consensus among small and large cities and counties that both population and risk-based factors should guide federal funding decisions, but city officials are more divided regarding this issue. Most of Florida's finance officials report satisfaction with the balance of prevention versus response grant offerings, but many would like to see more monies earmarked specifically for response activities. As to the best intergovernmental approach to emergency management, Florida's local officials are divided. Many see value in an approach that emphasizes either a predominantly local or state organizational structure, but they are in agreement that they do not want a centralized topdown federal structure. We find that the intergovernmental dynamics present in homeland security grant funding are the same as in previous grants-in-aid--even in the state ranked as the most prepared in the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comparative study of ten nations in Southeast Asia demonstrates how terrorist groups in the region finance their activities and how governments combat terrorism financing. It demonstrates that area countries converge on norm acceptance measured as the spread of the international norms and practices and their transformation into national law. Norm acceptance, however, does not cause adherence and application of norms. Differences in scope, pace, and success of implementation and effectiveness of new rules between countries are related to the preferences and calculations of policymakers; the institutional capacity of political systems to produce policy changes; administrative and law enforcement capacities, and characteristics of the financial systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]