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We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The G20's financial regulatory reform programme, underway since 2008, was designed as an integrated set of strengthened regulatory measures to make the global financial system more robust and less crisis‐prone. However, in practice the G20's stricter regulation of internationally active banks has not been matched by firmer oversight of other financial system participants that also take on large risks. The present article addresses the implications of this situation. Section  1 outlines the role of the banking sector within the broader market‐based financial system. Section  2 considers the dynamics of a crisis in such a system. The measures that the G20 has agreed thus far to strengthen the G‐SIBs, and regulators’ intentions with regard to strengthening other sectors of the financial system are summarized in Section  3. Section  4 describes how stricter bank regulation may affect the resilience of market‐based financial systems in conditions of stress. Section  5 discusses how the focus on strengthening bank regulation, combined with slow progress in extending regulation to other sectors, has accelerated structural change in the financial system and offers some conjectures on how this may alter financial risks, the way the financial system may respond to stress, and the implications for macroprudential regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Although recent forms of neoliberalism have been associated with everyday forms of ‘investment’, this paper argues that the financial conduct of everyday populations has long been an intense site of intervention. Drawing on the history of nineteenth and twentieth‐century Canadian government savings, annuities and tax deferral programs, this paper argues that everyday financial conduct has long been a key site of experimentation and innovation in practices of the self. These programs experiment with a language and practice of investment which emphasizes everyday conduct as a space of individual responsibility attached to diverse political goals. This suggests that enterprise as a mode of self and citizenship has a diverse and longer trajectory that predates neoliberalism. By extension, this paper conclude with a case for more diversified, complicated and historically‐situated analyses of ‘neoliberalism’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For nearly three decades scholars have studied issues of EU risk regulation, first presented as regulation of safety of products and persons,1 later on as true issues of risk regulation. This short comment will give brief, and at times personal, insights into the development on scholarly thinking on EU risk regulation and sketch a few challenges for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Entrepreneurial activities and thus also investments are connected with two kinds of risks, namely with the operational and financial risk. Both of them are dependent especially on the corporate life cycle and on the sector sensitivity to the economic cycle. The main aim of this article is to propose a methodology supporting managers and investors when estimating the shares of operational and financial risks in the entrepreneurial risk with taking into account the corporate life cycle and the sector sensitivity to the economic cycle. This methodology is subsequently applied in a selected company in the form of a case study and thus their results prove its practical applicability for both financial managers and potential investors as decision makers. This study relies on both secondary and primary data that were collected using databases and a semi-structured questionnaire. The data were processed by using descriptive statistical methods and a case study. The proposed methodology considers the actual phase of the corporate life cycle and the degree of sector sensitivity to the economic cycle. Determining the risk structure should simplify the risk management and subsequently raise the capital access. The methodology also contributes to investment decision-making, because the investors can assess investments with regard to their risk profile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new paradigm is afoot in banking regulation--and it involves a turn toward the more speculative. Previous regulatory instruments have included geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, capital requirements, and risk management oversight to ensure the safety of the banking system. This Article describes and contextualizes these regulatory tools and shows how and why they were formed to deal with industry change. The financial crisis of 2008 exposed the shortcomings in each of these regimes. In important ways, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") departs from these past regimes and proposes something new: Call it "Regulation by Hypothetical." Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules duly promulgated under appropriate statutory and regulatory mechanisms that require banks and their regulators today to make predictions about sources of crisis and weakness tomorrow. Those predictions--which, by their very definition, are conjectural and speculative, even hypothetical--then become the basis of the use of the state's regulatory power. This Article discusses two prominent instances of regulation by hypothetical: stress tests and living wills. It then discusses the strengths and weaknesses of such a regime and describes how the reliance on regulation by hypothetical can exacerbate the practice of government sponsorship of private financial risk taking. The Article then provides a solution that would strengthen this regime: using financial war games to increase the predictive value of the hypothetical scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the laws made for consumer protection and need of reforms in the financial laws of China. Topics discussed include laws made for the regulation of financial risks and losses in the Chinese financial markets, role of fair pricing in the regulation of the financial laws in China and role of financial institutions in reducing the transaction costs. It further discusses the role of financial organizations in cost management.

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The article focuses on the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), which gave the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve the authority to issue regulations that address lax underwriting and deceptive sales practices. It says that then Fed chairman Alan Greenspan did not implement this provision to cease abusive lending practices. It says that in January 1998, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) issued a memorandum declaring that it would not execute consumer-initiated examinations. It mentions that only in September 2009 that the Fed finally changed its examination policy, following a severe financial crisis in 2008. It concludes that the Fed's hesitation to withdraw its January 1998 policy can be considered an example of the risks of not considering contrarian views.