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Copyright of Análisis Filosófico is the property of Sociedad Argentina de Analisis Filosofico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.

The experiential bias in modern understandings of spirituality has led to readings of the pre-modern texts of Pseudo-Dionysius as referring to "negative experiences" of faith. Denys Turner, Bernard McGinn, and others have outlined the mistaken "spiritual positivism" of such readings and their contrast with the negative dialectics of the classical apophatic tradition. Indeed, the philosophical parameters of the Christian mysticism of the Dionysian tradition would deny "mystical experience" to be "experience" as such. Nevertheless, several modern theologians have attempted to integrate interpretations of the experiential in Christian mysticism into their theology. These include Sara Coakley in the idea of spiritual sense in her theology of the body, Karl Rahner in the conception of spiritual touch within his theology of grace, and Louis Dupré's view that there is religious significance in the experience of "emptiness" in modern-day atheism. I shall contrast these attempted integrations with the critique of "mystical experience" within classical understandings of apophaticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novels and dramas belong to the four major literary genres, bearing the narrative function, just like fraternal twins of creative writing. They are separated by mountains and often go back and forth. This article is based on the teaching and learning of creative writing at Fudan University, and examines the current development of creative writing disciplines with a sense of drama. From Stanislavsky's experience view to Erving Goffman' s dramaturgy theory, creative writing education extensively draw-nutrients from the applied theories of drama to provide more paths and extensions for the practice of novels and prose. Although the focus of the work is still within the critical framework of modern and contemporary literature, as the subconscious mind of text generation, drama theory seems to require more pre-emptive attention and outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experiential bias in modern understandings of spirituality has led to readings of the pre-modern texts of Pseudo-Dionysius as referring to “negative experiences” of faith. Denys Turner, Bernard McGinn, and others have outlined the mistaken “spiritual positivism” of such readings and their contrast with the negative dialectics of the classical apophatic tradition. Indeed, the philosophical parameters of the Christian mysticism of the Dionysian tradition would deny “mystical experience” to be “experience” as such. Nevertheless, several modern theologians have attempted to integrate interpretations of the experiential in Christian mysticism into their theology. These include Sara Coakley in the idea of spiritual sense in her theology of the body, Karl Rahner in the conception of spiritual touch within his theology of grace, and Louis Dupré’s view that there is religious significance in the experience of “emptiness” in modern-day atheism. I shall contrast these attempted integrations with the critique of “mystical experience” within classical understandings of apophaticism.

Recalling the spirit of intervention and upheaval of Holbrook and Hirschman's fantasies, feelings and fun, we cast our minds back to the 1980s, contextualising the paper within a broader zeitgeist of creating marketing scholarship and practice and we assess the lasting legacy of this work in terms of the richness of what we have inherited and what has been lost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experientialism in aesthetics is the view that the artistic merit or the aesthetic value of something is determined by the final value of certain experiences of it. These are usually specified as experiences of it with understanding and appreciation. Until recently, experientialism was the dominant view. Not anymore. Experientialists are now subject to a barrage of objections, many of which they have not answered. Here I argue that all of these objections fail. I develop a new form of experientialism that is immune to them. It also has an independent rationale. It incorporates an account of the value of art appreciation that is plausible in its own right. And it endorses many of the core insights of anti‐experientialists, especially concerning the final value of good art. Those of us unconvinced by experientialism need to take this form of it seriously. I conclude by identifying some genuine problems it faces. Even these aren't clearly insoluble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Music and the Ineffable (1961), Vladimir Jankélévitch argued that music can elicit endless talk, but such talk gives nothing back to the music. The experience of music remains sui generis and ineffable; while analysis and interpretation can be beneficial, they do not change this stubborn fact. Thus, writings about music should be anchored in humility. Just as the scientist and theologian stand in awe before their subjects, hoping to learn something but accepting that mysteries lie beyond their reach, so too should music scholars recognize the limits of their craft. This paper suggests that experiential aesthetics, which centers real-time experience over after-the-fact analysis, provides a humbling corrective to intellectual approaches to aesthetics, which give priority to rational artistic assessments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yazar: James WALLMAN, İstif Çağı, (Stuffocation), (çev.) Senem Karagözoğlu, Aytaç Özgören, İstanbul: Doğan Novus, 2018, 324 s.ISBN: 9786050956771

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects' levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a person's degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do experiential poet Bruce Andrews and former Fox News pundit Bill O'Reilly have in common? On the surface, almost nothing—the former is a highly regarded, retired academic and the latter a disgraced TV host and conservative partisan. For a brief four minutes in 2006, however, the two met and discussed on national television the nature of politics and higher education, with predictable obtuseness on the part of O'Reilly. Nothing was concluded or conceded, and arguably nothing was learned. Yet both did portend a fundamental change to the operation of American political life. O'Reilly's attempt was far more public (and destructive), but Andrews's political project has remained confined to a small contingent of scholars. This article reexamines Andrews's claim that the only effective means of political resistance can come from an experimental poetic practice that challenges the ideology of American individualism at the heart of contemporary sense making. The author argues that the limitations of this political project are instructive and relevant beyond the confines of a scholarly interest in poetry, which are revealed through readings of Harryette Mullen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite this fact that epistemology has not been regarded as a science and branch in Islamic philosophy, Islamic philosophers spoke about the ontological debates on the topic of so-called modern-epistemology. Although the approach of rationalism and experientialism has several criteria, it is undeniable that this discussion and division are among the new topics of epistemology and such terms, with the approach in epistemology, have not been popular in the thinking of Islamic philosophers. Nevertheless, it is possible to think about their way of thinking: experimentation or rationalism. The fact that is well-known is that they are rational philosophers, and Ibn-e Sina does the same. In current study, four criteria for rationality or experimentation are expressed: 1. the existence and the lack of intrinsic perceptions, 2. the means of acquiring knowledge, 3. the origin of attestation, and 4. the existence and absence of a priori certifications. Then, by referring to Ibn-e-Sina's statements, the rationale or experimental nature of the epistemic instrument examined him according to each criterion which leads to strengthening the hypothesis that, not in general, but in most of its criteria, it is more inclined to experientialism than rationalism Therefore, it is possible to sum up these two views, namely, the "authenticity of reason and experience" in Ibn-e Sina's thinking.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Film Studies is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We are constantly exposed to socially conflicting situations in everyday life, and cognitive flexibility is essential for adaptively coping with such difficulties. Flexible goal choice and pursuit are not exclusively conscious, and therefore cognitive flexibility involves both explicit and implicit forms of processing. However, it is unclear how individual differences in explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility are associated with neural activity in a resting state. Here, we measured intrinsic fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (fALFF) by resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (RS-fMRI) as an indicator of regional brain spontaneous activity, together with explicit and implicit aspects of cognitive flexibility using the Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS) and Implicit Association Test (IAT). Consistent with the dual processing theory, there was a strong association between explicit aspects of flexibility (CFS score) and “rationalism” thinking style and between implicit aspects (IAT effect) and “experientialism.” The level of explicit flexibility was also correlated with fALFF values in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas the level of implicit flexibility was correlated with fALFF values in the right cerebellum. Furthermore, the fALFF values in both regions predicted individual preference for flexible decision-making strategy in a vignettes simulation task. These results add to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying flexible decision-making for solving social conflicts. More generally, our findings highlight the utility of RS-fMRI combined with both explicit and implicit psychometric measures for better understanding individual differences in social cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A productive parent-child relationship builds before the child is born. The psychological characteristics of the fetus' and baby's development, the issue of attachment, the emotional and cognitive stimulation, handling the marital relationship and the parental one, handling the relationship with the extended family are basic psychological elements which each adult should know from an early time, to contribute in a responsible and benefic way to the great and healthy development of the child. Building certain practices of communication, marital authentic interaction, parental and parental-filial ones and of certain skills to play and stimulating challenging for a great development between parent and child are fundamental objectives for the educational psychologist preoccupied with providing services of early parenting. I invite you to find together a series of strategies, methods and experiential techniques to inform and train parents in the early development period of their children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been postulated that a cognitive approach may lend itself well to the study of transferred epithets, as this traditional rhetoric device possesses all the essences of metaphor from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics. Transferred epithet metaphors are gradually cognitively cultivated upon human beings’ repetitive and recursive experiences of the real world and it has been well established that they cannot be separated from culture’s limitations or reformulation. The coupling between experientialism and culture in transferred epithet metaphors necessitates the establishment of a double paradigm to comprehensively and profoundly delve into the twofold restraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a 'social technology' that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing 'moral technology' and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the skin-ego, a theory associated with Didier Anzieu, which holds that we experience life as encapsulated by an outer shell. This insight is used to push understandings within consumer research of how we might regard the body, not as a finite entity bound in absolute time and space or as a canvas to be decorated, but as a porous and sprawling entity that bears unconscious and historically formed relationalities open to transformation. This vein of insight allows us to consider anew how music and noise is consumed in terms of containment, holding and individuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is just an instance of a larger problem for experientialist theories of perceptual justification. The challenge does not lie in explaining how cognitive penetration is able to downgrade the epistemic status of perceptual experience, the challenge lies in explaining why perceptual experience would have a special epistemic status to begin with. To answer this challenge, experientialists have to solve the distinctiveness problem: they have to explain what is so distinctive about perceptual experience that enables it to provide evidential justification without being in need of justification itself. Unfortunately, an internalist answer to this problem does not appear to be forthcoming, even though it would certainly help with explaining the problem of cognitive penetration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I examine the notion of personal experience in relation to mysticism. I observe that St. Teresa of Jesus includes both her ordinary and extraordinary experiences in her writings on prayer, and I argue that these experiences are essential to her theology. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]