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International audience; In federal unions, how many weights should be given to each state in a two-tier voting system, given that the majority rule is used at each level? We apply a majority criterion to evaluate these voting rules: An apportionment of the seats among the states is majority efficient if it minimizes the probability of electing the candidate who receives less than 50% of the votes in a two candidate competition over the whole union. Depending on the assumptions that we use to describe the electoral process, either the proportional or the square root rule can emerge as an optimal solution.

There is a growing body of research on the impact of the electoral system ‘ballot structure’ on the behaviour of politicians. We offer a clear, ordinal and rules-based three-way coding (closed, flexible, open) of the electoral systems used in European Parliament elections, taking into account both the ballot type and the intra-party seat-allocation rules. For the notoriously difficult group of flexible list-systems, we show how these operated in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, and introduce an additional behavioural distinction between ‘weakly flexible’ and ‘strongly flexible’ subtypes at the party-list-level. We then illustrate how the type of ballot used in an election can influence individual policy representation by looking at the vote-splits between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European People’s Party in a vote on tackling homophobia.

We examine the tendency for complex ballots to undermine the ability of voters to cast valid votes. Specifically, we investigate the role of ballot design plays in explaining the high rate of invalid votes in Colombia observed in 2007. We address this question first by looking at data from a study observing the use of alternate ballot designs in a controlled environment, varying the information voters have when attempting to cast the ballot. Our results show that there is an effect of the ballot design on the amount of invalid votes and that this effect varies with socio-demographic characteristics, such as education. We then examine the observed pattern of invalid votes in Colombia before and after the implementation of the ballot redesign. Our results suggest that the introduction of a ballot with improved usability was associated with a significant decline in the number of invalid votes and that a rural-urban difference observed before the new ballot was no longer present. © 2017 Elsevier Ltd

This article related to the use of signs and symbols as a protest vote beyond the invalid votes of the presidential election 2014 in Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY). This paper will interpret the hidden messages conveyed by voters through a ballot. This article contributes to solve two problems at once, the conceptual and practical. Conceptually, there is a gap in the study of protest voting. Protest voting describes that voting as not only used to support candidates or parties but can be used as a form of protest. However, in this paper the protest was not conveyed through voting but using signs, symbols, or messages in ballot. Practically, there are problems in the electoral system on viewing people votes. The current electoral system generalizes the approach on viewing invalid votes. Whereas, there some hidden messages of people votes and the essence of the election itself beyond the invalid ballot papers. This paper shows that these messages can not be accommodated by the current electoral system. Those include an indication of post-election money politics, expressions of blissful voters delivered on the ballot, the expletives and insults expressed by voters, a rejection of the candidates, and also a rejection for the current electoral system.

Although a growing number of countries have implemented electronic voting, few scholars have considered the unintended consequences of such reforms. We argue that changes in ballot structure imposed by electronic voting, implemented under the exact same electoral rules, can facilitate ballot splitting. Exploiting data from three elections and a novel ballot reform in Salta, Argentina—electronic voting was incrementally introduced over multiple elections—we provide an empirical analysis of how ballot structure influences ballot splitting. We use the Geographic Information System to reconstruct precinct demographics and matching to address threats to random assignment. This empirical strategy allows us to treat our data as a quasi-experiment. We find that precincts casting electronic ballots under an Australian ballot, rather than the ballot-and-envelope system, have significantly higher rates of ballot splitting. Our findings imply that less complicated voting procedures can affect the composition of legis...

While it has been suggested that the original Australian ballot reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have had a detrimental effect on later third-party success in US elections, others have observed that many ballot laws ‘explain very little of the variance in either the number of minor party candidacies or the vote for them’. While there is much debate about the effects of these laws on electoral outcomes, a limitation of past research is an emphasis on statewide and federal elections, where many third-party candidacies are ‘agenda-setting’ rather than ‘office-seeking’ efforts. This research examines the effects of the original Australian ballot laws on state legislative elections, where office-seeking third-party candidates had a proven record of electoral success. The effects of initial reform adoption, straight ticket provisions, ballot form, prohibitions against ballot fusion, and the inclusion of write-in options on the ballot are tested in time-series Tobit models of the ...

Many political practitioners believe that voters are more likely to approve propositions listed at the top than the bottom of the ballot, potentially distorting democratic decision making, and this belief influences election laws across the United States. Numerous studies have investigated ballot order effects in candidate elections, but there is little evidence for direct democracy elections, and identification of causal effects is challenging. This paper offers two strategies for identifying the effect of ballot order in proposition elections, using data from California during 1958–2014 and Texas during 1986–2015. The evidence suggests that propositions are not advantaged by being listed at the top compared to the bottom of the ballot. Approval rates are lower with more propositions on the ballot.

The secret ballot is considered a central feature of democratic elections, but its practical implications may be contested when Internet voting (and remote voting in general) is introduced. How do citizens understand the principle of the secret ballot in practice? The issue was brought to the fore in a trial with Internet voting that was conducted in 12 Norwegian municipalities for the 2013 parliamentary election. Based on a representative population survey, we explore how Norwegian voters approached the principle of the secret ballot in the context of Internet voting. A large majority supported the general principle, but the picture became more nuanced when it was put to the test of concrete situations. Unless the situation involved coercion or undue influence, many people were willing to accept that voting can be observed by others – even if this was a breach of legal regulations.

This article deals with ballot order effect in preferential voting in general elections in Slovakia. Previous research in this field has primarily focused on countries whose elections are based either on single-member districts or on lists with fewer candidates. This article aims to analyze a case of a different nature. Slovakia uses a proportional representation list system with a single nationwide constituency where all 150 members of parliament are elected. Hence, most of the political parties create lists with a high number of candidates, which according to theory should enhance the influence of ballot ranking. Using data from Slovak general elections between 2006 and 2012 with a sample of 7,587 candidates, this study provides strong evidence of the impact of ballot order on the results of preferential voting. The analysis in this article shows the existence of both the primacy and recency effects, that is, a positive bias of voters towards candidates listed at both top and bottom positions on a list. What is more, the multilevel models used in this article demonstrate that support for top-ranked candidates significantly increases as the size of the list increases. For the bottom-listed candidates, this trend is rather the opposite. These findings represent a valuable contribution to the debate in this area as they provide insight into the role of ballot order in electoral systems that use lists composed of numerous candidates.

The overriding principle of ballot design is that it should not confer any a priori advantage to one candidate over another. Ballot format should not determine or condition an election outcome. Yet, there is a sizeable body of evidence which demonstrates that in many circumstances the design of ballot papers and voting machines contravenes the normative assumption of electoral neutrality. In this article, we look at the impact of ballot paper design at local elections in the Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland). The article uses data from an experimental election study conducted at the local elections in Ireland in 2009. Overall the study finds some evidence of a primacy effect and it also demonstrates that candidates located in the middle of the ballot face a challenge as they receive the lowest vote shares of all candidates across the four replica ballots. This mid-table obscurity remains even when party affiliation is known. Thus, it can be argued that candidates placed in such positions incur a disadvantage. To neutralise this effect, the article concludes with a recommendation that a system of random ordering of ballot positions across ballot papers should be implemented so as to ensure that each candidate appears at each ballot position on an equal number of times.

Recently, many U.S. states that allow citizen initiatives have passed laws designed to make it more difficult for an initiative to qualify for the ballot (e.g., by increasing the number of signatures required to get on the ballot), thereby making it harder for citizens to bypass the legislature and make direct changes to public policy. Such laws have reduced both the number of measures that make the ballot and the number that pass on Election Day. I show that laws governing access of initiatives to the ballot also shape the policy agenda; provisions making it harder for proposals to get on the ballot decrease the complexity of the initiatives on the ballot. As less complex initiatives are more likely to be understood by voters and voters are reluctant to vote for measures they do not understand, more restrictive laws actually increase the likelihood that an initiative will pass.

How do voters in preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR) systems make their candidate choices after selecting their party? We study this question in Poland and the Czech Republic, which use PLPR with different rules to elect the lower house of their national parliaments. In Poland, the system obligates voters to select one candidate from their preferred party, while in the Czech Republic voters have the option of casting up to four preference votes for candidates on the party list. Drawing on the ballot cues literature, we test for ballot position and rank effects in candidate preference vote shares. Further, we exploit the difference in voting rules to test whether ballot position effects are stronger in Poland where voters must cast a preference vote compared to the Czech Republic where preference voting is optional. We find that while being listed first or last has a disproportionately positive effect on preference vote shares compared to what would be expected based on ballot ranking in both countries, the ballot position and rank effects are much more powerful in Poland than the Czech Republic.

Kuwait is a democratic country that has used paper ballots for its parliament elections for many years. Although many people are content with the paper ballot, a survey shows that it has drawbacks, which have made some people lose confidence in the system and would prefer a replacement electronic system. However, the survey also shows that voters are cautious about electronic voting and are not ready for a full internet-enabled system. The aim of this paper is to propose a step-by-step approach for introducing electronic voting system and to define a set of requirements that an e-voting system, which is planned to be used instead of paper-based voting system in Kuwait, should satisfy.

From gay marriage to taxation to environmental issues, many of our nation’s most important policy issues are decided by voters through ballot questions. Conventional wisdom holds that information provided on the ballot about the ballot questions heavily influences voters’ choices in those elections, but there is little empirical evidence of this. We apply theories of framing to voters’ choices on ballot questions and design an experiment to test the hypothesis that ballot title wording influences voters’ decisions. Even on a matter that is hotly contested and where the policy is relatively noncomplex and relatively well understood by voters, we find strong framing effects for changes in ballot title wording, though the effects are driven primarily by influencing whether individuals who previously supported the measure abstained from participation.

Few studies have examined the impact that the adoption of the secret ballot had on party system fragmentation outside the United States. This article tests arguments maintaining that the adoption o...

Hypothetically, in the open list PR system, all contestants, independently of their ballot position, have the same chance of winning a mandate. In practice, candidates placed at the top of the ballot enjoy a large surplus of votes. Their success can be explained by the primacy effect, in which the first ballot position acts as a focal point. The analysis of 6187 candidates running for the Polish Sejm in 2007 finds not only significant gains for top candidates, but that proximity to the upper end of the ballot likewise matters. It correspondingly discovers a weak benefit for candidates placed last on the list. Other sources of candidate advantage such as incumbency, capital city effect, age and gender are also investigated.

The secret ballot is considered a central feature of free and fair elections all over the world. While the reasons to uphold it seem to be overwhelming, we argue that the secret ballot is only second-best at best and that a modified version of open voting might prove to be more democratic. Instead of denying the various problems and difficulties that an open system might encounter, we want to offer a genuine proposal that can avoid these numerous pitfalls. After rehearsing the various arguments pro and contra open voting, we draw attention to the role of shame, which has been neglected by both sides in the debate. While shame plays a pivotal role in the democratic argument pro open voting, it also brings out new problems that tell against opening up the vote. This means that, if we want to draw on the democratic potential of open voting, we will have to find a system that minimizes the undesirable effects of shame. In the third and final section, we will formulate a concrete proposal of open voting that we believe is more democratic than the current secret ballot and is able to avoid potential worries. Even if this proves to be highly speculative, it serves as an invitation for further empirical research.

For generations, some candidates have argued that first-listed candidates gain “extra” votes due to primacy effect, recommending ballot rotation to solve the problem. These votes, however, are generally intentional votes, accurately cast, and rotation is controversial. This article argues that rotation is appropriate because it mitigates the electoral impact of not only primacy effect, but also of two categories of miscast votes. First, rotation mitigates the impact of proximity-mistake votes, which can occur even on well-designed ballots when voters mis-vote for a candidate in proximity to their chosen candidate. Second, rotation mitigates the impact of mis-votes caused by flawed ballot designs, providing a fail-safe that can prevent some electoral meltdowns. Ballot rotation represents a last-best-chance to avoid the electoral impact of foreseeable and unforeseeable voter error and ballot design issues. Although the impact is small for each of these kinds of voter behavior, some elections are wo...

We consider the following decision-making scenario: a society of voters has to find an agreement on a set of proposals, and every single proposal is to be accepted or rejected. Each voter supports a certain subset of the proposals—the favorite ballot of this voter—and opposes the remaining ones. He accepts a ballot if he supports more than half of the proposals in this ballot. The task is to decide whether there exists a ballot approving a specified number of selected proposals (agenda) such that all voters (or a strict majority of them) accept this ballot. We show that, on the negative side, both problems are NP-complete, and on the positive side, they are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the total number of proposals or with respect to the total number of voters. We look into further natural parameters and study their influence on the computational complexity of both problems, thereby providing both tractability and intractability results. Furthermore, we provide tight combinatorial bounds on the worst-case size of an accepted ballot in terms of the number of voters.

Candidates listed first on the ballot paper regularly receive more votes than other candidates, but what role does ballot layout play in this connection? Experimental studies from first-past-the-post systems show that the ballot position effect is causal as the order of names functions as a cue to voters. Does this also hold for PR systems where voters may vote for a party instead of a specific candidate? We identify a natural experiment in Danish local and regional elections involving more than 10,000 candidates on 103 different ballot papers using ballot layout to study ballot position effects. We find indeed, the ballot position/layout has a causal effect on election results in PR systems. Our findings indicate that the empirical domain of ballot position and layout effects is much wider than suggested by previous research.

Randomized ballot order of electoral candidates prevents unfair advantages for candidates with favorable positions on a ballot, but it also places additional cognitive strain on voters who need to search for their preferred candidates without clues. This strain could increase voters' probability of making errors. Using more than 68,000 polling-place level data from Australian House of Representatives elections, we show that the stronger the candidate at the top of a ballot, the smaller the percentage of informal (i.e., invalid and unrecorded) votes. This is because, for a larger number of voters, the most favorable candidate appears at the easiest-to-find position. The magnitude of this effect is particularly large when the number of candidates is large. Our finding implies that designing a ballot to maximize fairness among candidates could bring about an unintended consequence that is inconsistent with another important normative principle -- maximized (valid) voter participation.

Primary and runoff elections in Texas provide an ideal test of the ballot order hypothesis, because ballot order is randomized within each county and the state offers many counties and contests to analyze. Doing so for all statewide offices contested in the 2014 Democratic and Republican primaries and runoffs yields precise estimates of the ballot order effect across 24 different contests, including several not studied previously. Except for a few high-profile, high-information races, the ballot order effect is large, especially in down-ballot races for judicial positions. There, the empirical results indicate that going from last to first on the ballot raises a candidate’s vote share by nearly ten percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is not sensitive to demographic and economic factors.

There are many allegations about whether FIFA world cup host countries were chosen honestly or not. We analyse the results of the FIFA Executive Committee voting and reconstruct the set of possible voting situations compatible with the results of each stage. In both elections, we identify strategic behaviour and then analyse the results for honest voting under all compatible voting situations. For the 2018 FIFA world cup election Russia is chosen for all profiles. For the 2022 elections the result depends on the preferences of the FIFA president Sepp Blatter who served as a tie-breaker. If Sepp Blatter prefers Qatar over South Korea and Japan, then Qatar would have been chosen for all profiles. Otherwise there are the possibility that South Korea or Japan would have been chosen as the 2022 host country. Another fact is that if we consider possible vote buying, then it is shown, that the bribery of at least 2 committee members would have been required to guarantee winning of Russia bid and at least 1 member for Qatar.

Institutional barriers frustrate third-party challenges to major-party dominance in American politics. Conventional wisdom claims that the ballot access petitioning requirement hurts minor parties. This claim, however, conflates two dimensions of third-party success: (a) ability to get on the ballot and (b) ability of actual candidates to win votes. The requirement is hypothesized to have a negative effect on the first dimension but a positive effect on the second. Modeling these two dimensions separately gives evidence of cross-cutting effects. The first equation is a probit model of entry that shows third-party candidates are more likely to enter when the requirement is low. The second equation is an OLS regression, which only includes the subsample of districts where at least one third-party candidate gained ballot access, that shows third-party candidates win more votes in districts with a higher requirement.

This paper analyzes sequential voting in binary elections when voters are motivated by a desire both to elect their preferred candidate and to avoid a long and costly election. I find a unique equilibrium in which a voter's action depends both on the intensity of the voter's preferences as well as how well the candidates have done in earlier voting rounds. This equilibrium results in momentum in which voters are more likely to vote for the candidate currently in the lead. Furthermore, the probability a voter votes for a candidate is increasing in the size of the candidate's lead. As a consequence, a candidate is more likely to win the election if the candidate's stronger supporters vote earlier in the election.

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

How much does a candidate's ballot position matter for electoral success? In the Swiss open ballot PR system, voters can cast up to 34 preference votes—depending on the district magnitude—for candidates from different parties. The ballot position has a clear and robust effect on the candidates' number of preference votes. Candidates listed first attract more preference votes from their own party voters as well as from voters from other parties. Being last on a ballot is penalised because voters strike out candidates at the bottom when giving preference votes to some candidates. The effect becomes smaller, but remains significant, once we include alphabetically ordered ballots only.

Direct democracy is extraordinarily popular and has become a pervasive policymaking tool at the state and local level. Repeated surveys have demonstrated that Americans strongly approve of allowing people to vote on citizen-proposed laws, a method currently allowed in about half of all states and in many municipalities across the country. This paper examines both the extent of this support and its implications. Using a battery of questions about the institution as an independent variable, we model the extent to which institutional evaluations of direct democracy influence voting behavior in ballot measure elections. Using data from California in 2005 and 2006, as well as Washington in 2006, we find support for the notion that process evaluations influence choice in ballot initiative elections, regardless of policy content. Those who favor direct democracy are more likely to vote yes, while those who are apprehensive about voting on ballot measures are more likely to vote no.

This paper examines conflicting ballot proposals—two or more measures that run contrary to one another and that citizens vote on in the same election. Sometimes a majority votes in favor of more than one conflicting proposal, generating a legal impasse that courts resolve by applying the “highest vote rule.” The rule upholds the proposal that received the greatest number of affirmative votes and invalidates all competing proposals, even though they also garnered majority support. Using spatial models, we show that the proposal receiving the most votes is not systematically closest to the median voter’s ideal point, and consequently the rule can generate antimajoritarian outcomes. We discuss the implications of our finding, analyze and reject existing alternatives to the highest vote rule, and propose an original solution to the problem.

THE CALIFORNIA Journal of Politics & Policy Volume 1, Issue 1 The Continuing Growth of Mail Ballot Voting in California in 2008 Mark DiCamillo The Field Poll Abstract This paper summarizes trends in mail ballot voting and permanent mail ballot reg- istrants in California. It also examines the demographic characteristics of mail bal- lot voters and permanent mail ballot registrants in 2008. KEYWORDS: voter turnout, early voting, voting by mail www.bepress.com/cjpp

Objective. Past research on ballot order effects has typically focused on the average benefit a candidate receives if placed at the top of the ballot. This study addresses a gap in the literature by examining the possibility that a simple average may mask systematic differences in how the ballot order effect varies across candidates and voters. Methods. Using data from all Australian federal elections between 1984 and 2004, a sample that covers 1,187 separate electoral contests and 7,113 candidate × election observations, this study estimates the effect of ballot order on a candidate's share of the primary vote. To determine whether ballot order effects differ across voters as well as candidates, the study also makes use of electorate-level demographic data from the 1996 and 2001 Australian censuses. Results. The results of these estimations indicate that being placed first on the ballot increases a candidate's vote share by about 1 percentage point. As a proportion of their total vote, this effect is much larger for independents and minor parties than for major parties. The ballot order effect appears to be similar for male and female candidates, and does not show strong trends upward or downward over the 20-year period covered by our study. Across electorates, the ballot order effect is higher in places where voters are younger and fluency in English is lower. Conclusions. A statistically significant ballot order effect was a consistent feature of Australian federal elections between 1984 and 2004. Moreover, this study challenges the assumption that ballot order effects are homogenous, and finds that the effect of being placed atop the ballot varies across both candidates and voters.

The May 2007 Scottish Parliament election used a different ballot format from the one used in the previous elections, one that combined the regional and constituency votes onto one ballot paper (two separate papers were used before). Because there were many more invalid votes in 2007, the problem was blamed on the two-vote ballot paper, which was recommended by the Arbuthnott Commission to prevent misunderstandings about what the two votes were for. Other places that use the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system tend to use a two-vote ballot paper, with Germany and New Zealand seeing low levels of invalid votes. While the decision to revert to two separate papers in future Scottish Parliament elections might reduce the number of invalid votes, the price could be more confusion about the proportional nature of the electoral system unless public education improves significantly.

Research on preference voting systems seems to indicate that where voters are allowed to choose among a party's candidates, the order in which candidates are listed on the ballot has an effect on the number of nominative votes they receive. This study of the 16 Maltese elections of 1947–2008 shows that being listed first on the ballot is a distinct electoral advantage. The analysis implies that complex voting systems are particularly vulnerable to position effects, even when there is a high degree of intra-party competition in small-size electoral districts. It also suggests that policy makers should pay more attention to ballot format design in order to mitigate order effects, even in a small country like Malta.

An increasing number of public policy issues are decided by ballot measures in the United States. We examine residual votes (the difference between the total ballots cast and the votes cast in a particular contest) on ballot issues and the presidential contest in 34 states that had issues on the ballot in the 2004 election. Residual vote levels for ballot issues are substantially higher and more varied than for the presidential contest. Residual votes in both types of contests are a function of ballot features, voting technology, campaign context, and demographic measures. However, some factors, especially voting machinery, have different effects on residual votes for president than on residual votes for ballot issues. A case study further indicates that full-face electronic voting machines sharply increase the number of residual votes on ballot measures. The results have implications for direct democracy and election reform in the United States.

In May 2007, Scotland went to the polls to elect both local constituency and regional members to the Scottish Parliament. Astonishingly, 100000 votes were rejected as “spoiled”. Voters had misunderstood the new form of ballot paper—3% had marked a single cross despite having two votes. Parties contesting the election described it as “a debacle”, “a shambles”, “totally unsatisfactory”. One American called it more flawed than Florida's notorious “hanging chad” ballot that gave the 2000 Presidential election to George Bush. What went wrong? Sheila Bird looks into the Scottish ballot paper.

Katz and Sala linked the development of committee property rights in the late-nineteenth-century U.S. House of Representatives to the introduction of the Australian ballot. If, as they posited, members sought personal reputations to carry them to reelection in the new electoral environment, the current article argues that behaviors with more immediate political payoffs also should have changed in ways their theory would predict. The article examines whether committee assignments, floor voting behavior, and the distribution of pork barrel projects changed in predicted ways and finds supportive outcomes, but usually only when the office bloc ballot, and not the party bloc ballot, was in use.

In an attempt to facilitate greater voting participation in the Republic of Ireland, photographs of candidates have been placed on the ballot paper for local, national and European elections. Limited research undertaken in advance of the implementation of the photograph policy advised that the measure would assist people with literacy problems. However, social psychology research has long demonstrated that people are willing to make considerable judgements about a person when shown a photograph. The advent of ballot paper photographs allows candidates to be evaluated on the basis of their appearance. This article will explore how photographs could have become a factor in voter decision-making. Providing additional knowledge to encourage greater participation and engagement has introduced a possible new level of superficiality into the voter decision-making process.

A person may vote for a candidate to please citizens who prefer the same candidate, and to anger citizens who dislike the candidate. Such behavior is consistent with high turnout (though any one vote is unlikely to be decisive), with strategic voting, and with candidates adopting divergent positions.

This paper proposed a reliable cost effective secure electronic voting system that can be used in cost effectively way in many development countries like Egypt. The important obstacle in any e-voting system across the world is the security issue. Election's results may be modified when delivered to the Higher Elections Committee, unauthorized voter may vote instead of the eligible voter, a vote may not be calculated; also the voter has to ensure that nobody has the possibility to know his ballot data. The proposed Voting Model System overcomes these obstacles. Security evaluation experiments are performed successfully to the proposed system proving that it satisfies privacy, accuracy, reusability, eligibility and integrity.

In this paper, we propose an E-voting procedure which, by utilizing the multi-part ballot mode, provides voters an enhanced way to cast and audit their own votes with great anonymity. The proposed scheme, the Multi-part ballot based Name and vOte separaTed E-voting system (M-NOTE), is partially based on our previous works, which have achieved the goal of keeping candidates confidential and voters anonymous, as well as reducing the risk of leaking both candidates' and voters' identities during the ballot distribution phase. In addition, M-NOTE can prevent the possible clash attack in which either malicious authority or hackers could partially manipulate voting results by tampering voters' original ballots. Meanwhile, our performance analysis shows that M-NOTE provides an outstanding secured level, as the possibility of ballot reconstruction and voting result manipulation has been reduced to closer to zero. This E-voting system also illustrates to readers an applicable framework of designing a fair election in the future.

Cast-as-intended verification seeks to prove to a voter that their vote was cast according to their intent. In case ballot casting is made remotely through a voting client, one of the most important dangers a designer faces are malicious voting clients e.g. infected by a malware, which may change the voter's selections. A previous approach for achieving cast-as-intended verification in this setting uses the so-called Return Codes. These allow a voter to check whether their voting options were correctly received by the ballot server, while keeping these choices private. An essential ingredient of this approach is a mechanism that allows a voter to discard a vote that does not represent their intent. This is usually solved using multiple voting, namely, if the return codes received by the voter do not match their choices, they cast a new vote. However, what happens if voters are not allowed to cast more than one ballot aka single vote casting? In this paper we propose a simple ballot casting protocol, using return codes, for allowing a voter to verify votes in a single vote casting election. We do so without significantly impacting the number of operations in the client side. This voting protocol has been implemented in a binding election in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel in March 2015, and will be the canton's new voting platform.

There has been limited research into the impact of some aspects of voting procedure but very little research into ballot paper design and the act of voting in itself. This article gives a historical overview of the evolution of voting procedures from ancient times to the modern day, describes the results of a survey of 134 paper ballots used over the last decade for national legislative, executive and referenda elections in 107 countries, and gives the findings of a laboratory experiment testing the impact of ballot paper design. The evidence suggests three things: first, elaborate ballots (incorporating colors, symbols and photographs) are more likely to be found where literacy is lower and competitive multi party elections are a new phenomenon. But elaborate ballots are not significantly related to the level of democracy, the effective number of parties, or the type of electoral system. Second, there is little evidence to suggest that elaborate and costly ballots reduce spoilt ballot rates or are essential tools for illiterate voters. Rather, the negative correlation between ballot design and spoilt ballots, combined with the weight of historical evidence which shows that ballots are often a highly manipulative tools of political symbolism, implies that ballot papers symbols, photographs, layout, and color are of most interest as political cues (for both literate and illiterate voters). This intuition is confirmed by the results of a vote simulation experiment conducted on 401 students in which ballot design had a pronounced effect on voting behavior.

This paper examines the incentives that the combination of proportional representation (PR) and first-past-the-post realized in single ballot mixed systems provides to voters and parties. In single ballot mixed systems, voters only cast one ballot by which they select (1) a candidate running in a single-member district (SMD) and (2) a party competing for the distribution of PR seats. Through the analysis of district level data of the Italian Senate elections (1994–2001), I investigate the impact of ballot structure and the mechanism by which the interaction of the PR and SMD components of the election affects strategic voting and strategic entry. I find single ballot mixed systems work quite differently from both the SMD and the PR elections held under dual-ballot mixed system, where voters and parties make distinct strategic decisions for each tier.

Australian historical and political science academic accounts of the ‘secret ballot’ often describe it as being designed in Australia and first applied in Victoria in 1856. Narratives often focus on Chartists and radicals finding fertile ground in the New World for ideas that had met insurmountable resistance in the Mother Country. But this concentration on the ‘British story’ has led to a misconception in this country: that the secret ballot was first tried in Australia. This comes from conflating the ‘Australian ballot’ with the ‘secret ballot’. Voting by ballot, in ‘secret’—that is, not by a show of hands, on the voices or signed voting paper—was in use in America and Europe well before being implemented in Australia. This was the secret ballot many demanded for Australia, but they got something else: the Australian ballot, wholly original, with identifying features—such as the government printed ballot paper—previously unimagined. The Australian ballot was not the world's first secret ballot; it was m...

The 2000 presidential election focused attention on the problem of unrecorded votes, in which a person casts a ballot but fails to record a valid vote for a particular contest. Although much recent research has evaluated voting technologies and their effects on unre- corded votes, there has been little research on the effects of ballot design. We argue that the same theories used to design and evaluate self-administered surveys can be used to analyze ballot features. We collect and code paper-based ballots used in the 2002 general election from 250 counties in 5 states. We code the ballots in terms of several graphic design elements, including the content and location of ballot instructions and the layout of candidate names and office titles. Our analysis suggests that several ballot features are associated with unre- corded votes (both overvotes and undervotes) in the gubernatorial con- tests. We also find that ballot design features exacerbate the racial disparity in unrecorded votes. Ballot design can be an important factor in determining whether voters are able to cast a ballot accurately, which can influence the legitimacy of elections. The 2000 presidential election and the Florida recount controversy illumi- nated the phenomenon of unrecorded votes (in which some voters come to polling places but fail to cast a valid vote for a particular contest). Roughly 2 million voters (almost 1 out of every 50 to cast a ballot) failed to cast a valid vote for president in the 2000 election (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001). The Florida imbroglio prompted a new wave of research on election administration and a flurry of election reform laws in Congress and

A voting function is a rule that determines the outcome of an election: taking the voters' votes as input, a voting function selects the winning candidate from the set of candidates receiving some vote. A voting function is immune to vote selling when, given that neither voter i nor voter j votes for the winning candidate, a change ceteris paribus in i's vote cannot make the candidate for which j votes the winner. It is shown that voting functions immune to vote selling have either a dictator (a voter who always determines the winning candidate) or a dictated candidate (a candidate who becomes the winner by just receiving some vote).

Do salient ballot initiatives stimulate voting? Recent studies have shown that initiatives increase voter turnout, but some methodological concerns still linger. These studies have either relied solely on aggregate data to make inferences about individual-level behavior or used a flawed measure of initiative salience. Using individual-level data from the National Election Studies, I find that ballot question salience indeed stimulated voting in the midterm elections of 1990 and 1994. In an election with moderately salient ballot questions, a person's likelihood of voting can increase by as much as 30 percent in a midterm election. On the other hand, consistent with most prior research, I find no statistically significant relationship between ballot question salience and voting in presidential elections.

The success of any election ultimately depends on the voters' ability to accurately cast a vote using the given technology. If the user interface is confusing, the system may fail to record the intent of the voter, and essentially disenfranchise citizens in the process. In the extreme case of the fiasco surrounding the presidential election of 2000, it became exceedingly clear that the study of human factors for voting design was a necessary, yet neglected, area of research. This study presents an analysis of current electronic voting systems with regard to machine type (touchscreen versus touchscreen + keypad), ballot design (full ballot interface versus one office per page interface), and effects of age. Fifty participants ages 18–26 (M = 20.52) and fifty participants ages 64–77 (M = 68.27) were recruited from the community and asked to complete a hypothetical ballot given a list of candidates to choose, in each of four experimental conditions. Results revealed lowest error rates for both groups using the touchscreen system, and lowest errors for both groups using the one office per page interface. Touchscreen systems also revealed faster completion times than touchscreen + keypad designs for both age groups, with fastest completion times occurring in the full ballot interface. Implications are discussed.

This article presents evidence of name-order effects in balloting from a study of the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City, in which the order of candidates' names was rotated by precinct. In 71 of 79 individual nominating contests, candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed first than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71 contests the advantage to first position exceeded the winner's margin of victory, suggesting that ballot position would have determined the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all precincts.