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This Article uses archival research to recover the important work of John P. Davis, the Negro Industrial League (NIL), and the Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR) as they fought for a racially just New Deal and substantive equality in the Jim Crow era. Specifically, it analyzes the battle between southern industrialists mobilized against Black labor and liberation; John P. Davis and his anti-racist, labor-focused organizations; and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) in the contest over racial exclusions and wage differentials in the codes of fair competition. The Article shows how Davis exposed and challenged the racism and discrimination that shaped New Deal labor and employment law and examines an unexplored archival source to collaborate Davis' original claims. Finally, the Article reveals that Davis not only criticized the New Deal, but championed its promise in the name of democracy and underscored the constitutional necessity of federal intervention to combat oligarchy and racial inequality. It recovers Davis' alternative vision of New Deal reform and considers its significance today., I. INTRODUCTION 439 II. RACE AND RECOVERY 441 A. The Code-Making Process 442 B. Racial Wages 444 III. TAKING ON KING COTTON 446 A. Taking a Seat at the Table [...]

The use of shares in a company as security for a loan can be inhibited by the operation of the takeover provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). There have been exceptions in corporate takeover regulatory regimes for many decades to allow money lenders to take security over a company's shares. However, a number of unanswered legal questions have been raised concerning the scope of the current exceptions. This article analyses the historical development of the money lending exceptions, together with the legal and policy issues arising from their operation. The article concludes that the exceptions allow lenders to obtain equity positions in a company in addition to their security interests. It makes recommendations to respond to potential abuse of the exceptions and ensure there is proper disclosure of the lenders' interests., Contents I Introduction II Extension of Money Lending Exceptions over Time A Companies Act 1961 (NSW) B Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980 (Cth) C Corporations Law D Corporations Act [...]

As protests have become more frequent, an increasing number of journalists have been targets of harassment and violence. The long-disputed role of the First Amendment's press clause demands attention now more than ever. This Article demonstrates how a theoretical framework for a revitalized press clause can be operationalized in a particular context: journalists covering protests. Valeska first details the normative and structural justifications for an affirmative press clause right to cover protests. He then considers two proposals for deciding whom the right would protect: first, leaving the determination of who is a journalist to officers on the protest's ground level, with the decision being subject to a reasonableness standard; second, through a government credentialing process. Valeska concludes by summarizing what the right would accomplish. He argues for media exemptions from related curfew and equipment ordinances, heightened protections against arrest and detainment, and special access to spaces cleared by dispersal orders. This Article demonstrates that we are in a time of intensifying social unrest and that critical prophylactic steps must be taken to shore up protections for one of our most important democratic institutions., 'Someday, a court may need to decide whether the First Amendment protects journalists ... as distinct from the public generally, from having to comply with an otherwise lawful order to [...]

This Article reveals how five states with presumptive (binding) sentencing guidelines have implemented the right announced in Blakely v. Washington to a jury finding of aggravating facts allowing upward departures from the presumptive range. Using data provided by the sentencing commissions and courts in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington, as well as information from more than 2,200 docket sheets, the study discloses how upward departures are used in plea bargaining, sometimes undercutting policy goals; how often aggravating facts are tried and by whom; common types of aggravating facts; and the remarkably different, sometimes controversial interpretations of Blakely and Alleyne v. United States that frame each state's practice. This new information is essential for any evaluation of presumptive--sentencing guidelines systems or the appropriate scope of the doctrine established in Apprendi v. New Jersey., INTRODUCTION 1242 I. SUMMARY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, THE BLAKELY RULE, AND STUDY DATA 1245 A. Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines in the States 1245 B. Why Study the Adjudication of Aggravating [...]

In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker's lead argument to the Supreme Court was that his cakes were artworks, so antidiscrimination laws could not apply. Across the country, vendors who refuse to provide services for same-sex weddings continue making similar arguments on behalf of their floral arrangements, videos, calligraphy, and graphic design, and the Supreme Court will again be asked to consider their claims. But arguments like these--what we might call 'artistic exemption claims,' akin to the religious exemptions so much more widely discussed--are actually made throughout the law, not just in public accommodations cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop. In areas ranging from tax and tort, employment and contracting discrimination, to trademark, land use, and criminal law, litigants argue that otherwise generally applicable laws simply do not apply to artists or their artworks. This Article collects these artistic exemption claims together for the first time in order to examine what determines their occasional success--and to ask when and whether they should succeed. The surprising answer is that claims of the form 'x is protected because it is art' should never succeed. The category 'art' is constitutionally irrelevant. Contrary to widespread assertion among scholars and advocates, a work's status as art has never done any work in the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law. Instead, the Supreme Court emphasizes individual mediums of expression--categories like paintings and protest marches, books and billboards. Compared to the category 'art,' these mediums of expression are better defined, easier to administer, and more relevant to that which the law most likely and legitimately wants to regulate. Yet they have gotten far less attention from scholars and lower courts than they deserve. Understanding the constitutional irrelevance of art--and the constitutional importance of mediums--casts new light on some of the most prominent recent and looming artistic exemption claims at the Supreme Court: not just those made in same-sex wedding cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop and its kin but also those made in challenges to race discrimination in television and in criminal threat prosecutions brought against rappers. Asking whether a cake, a TV show, or a rap song is art uselessly distracts from the difficult issues actually at stake in those important cases and in First Amendment doctrine more broadly., INTRODUCTION 687 I. ARTISTIC EXEMPTION CLAIMS 692 A. Categorization Claims 696 1. Land Use 696 2. Threats and Lies 699 3. Taxes 703 B. Balancing Claims 706 1. Privacy and [...]

In a variety of ways, sex offenders in the United States find themselves in a difficult position. One of the lesser-known ways relates to the free exercise of religion. Sometimes by categorical statute, and sometimes by individualized, parole, probation, or supervised-release condition, sex offenders can find themselves legally barred from places where children are present (or likely to be present). Because children are usually present at religious services, sex offenders can find themselves unable to attend them altogether. And this hardship has a bit of irony in it too. Back in prison, sex offenders could worship freely with others; now ostensibly free, they can no longer do so. This simple problem has real scope-tens (maybe hundreds) of thousands of people barred from essentially all religious services, sometimes for decades, sometimes for life. Moreover, these prohibitions are often vague and overbroad-and so restrictive that low-level administrators (like sheriffs and probation officers) are often pushed into softening or waiving them. But this ends up creating a kind of licensing scheme, whereby low-level government officials make-on their own, without any formal criteria-ad hoc and practically unreviewabk decisions about who gets to go to church and under what conditions. Risks of selective enforcement, discrimination, and abuse are obvious. These rules have come into being as if concerns about the free exercise of religion have no weight at all. But this is not the case. In fact, a robust body of law protects the free exercise of religion, requiring exemptions from religiously burdensome laws. Now this does not mean that sex offenders should be universally exempt from any and all restrictions regarding church attendance. There are probably some people who pose such a threat to children that they should be kept away from churches. Courts will have to answer tricky questions-who should be barred, who should decide who is barred, and on what criteria?-that require nuanced and elaborate answers. Yet informed by analogies from other areas of law (like freedom, of speech) where courts have l[upsilon]restkd with similar issues, this Article offers some recommendations that are analytically rigorous, practically realizable, and judicially manageable., INTRODUCTION 1026 I. THE RULES REGARDING SEX OFFENDERS 1029 II. SEX OFFENDERS AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 1033 A. Sex Offenders and Church Attendance 1033 B. The Basic Problem [...]