In 1993, Congress nearly unanimously passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). That bill aimed to make it easier, at least in some instances, for people to receive exemptions from laws that infringed upon their religious beliefs, even when those exemptions were not required by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Several states followed suit, passing their own RFRAs. But RFRA is uncontroversial no more. Congress and the states recently began attempting to narrow their respective RFRAs. For example, the United States House of Representatives passed a bill that would make RFRA inapplicable to certain antidiscrimination laws designed to protect LGBTQ+ individuals from discrimination. And although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has since ruled that it restricted abortions in too many cases, Oklahoma enacted a law seeking to exempt its abortion laws from the state RFRA. In short, legislative bodies are now attempting to exempt certain categories of their laws from RFRA. At the same time, the Supreme Court has pulled back on its decision in Employment Division v. Smith, thereby strengthening protections for people seeking religious exemptions pursuant to the First Amendment. In doing so, it opens a path to those seeking to challenge Congress's and states' attempts to narrow RFRA. Those challengers may argue that the narrowing of RFRA itself violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as interpreted in Smith. In other words, those challengers may argue that once a government creates broader protections for religious liberty than required by the First Amendment, it cannot undo those protections. This Article considers several arguments regarding whether Congress and state legislatures have the ability to limit RFRA's applicability under the Supreme Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence. This Article also argues that courts should look to the legislative history for evidence of neutrality or lack thereof (key to the Free Exercise analysis). The Article goes on to examine the legislative history of the Equality Act, a bill that limits RFRA and has passed one body of Congress, and an overturned Oklahoma statute that removed abortion law from the realm of the Oklahoma version of RFRA. This Article finds that, while some of the statements in the legislative history of the Equality Act are similar to the statements the Supreme Court deemed non-neutral in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court should hold that, while inquiry into legislative history is appropriate, it takes more to find non-neutrality in statements by legislators than in statements by adjudicators. This Article concludes that there are no statements in the legislative history of that RFRA-limiting legislation enacted by the Oklahoma legislature evidencing non-neutrality. Finally, this Article argues that regardless of the Free Exercise Clause analysis, legislative entrenchment doctrine and theory require that a limitation of RFRA be deemed unproblematic under the First Amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]