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While veto threats have a long history, presidents have come to be more reliant on this bargaining tool in the last few decades. Veto Rhetoric therefore serves as a nice companion to Sam Kernell′s classic study, Going Public, which documented a similar trend with regards to presidential public appeals. Kernell′s current study will no doubt once again lead presidential scholars to rethink how they understand and conceptualizing presidential-congressional relations. - Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University In Veto Rhetoric, Samuel Kernell offers a fresh, more sanguine perspective to understanding national policy making in this era of divided government. Contrary to the standard'separation of powers'representation of the veto which deals presidents a weak'take it or leave it'hand, Kernell shows that veto rhetoric forces Congress to pay careful heed of the president's objections early in deliberations as legislation is forming. Moreover, the book introduces original statistical analysis to test the argument and extends previously reported analyses to include the Biden presidency. Veto Rhetoric will change the way students of Congress and the presidency assess their respective roles in making national policy.

Civics textbooks focus on how Congress makes policy through the legislative process, but the reality is that members of Congress have limited opportunities to advance their policy priorities. In fact, less than five percent of the bills that are introduced in Congress become law. Even the most tenacious legislators are confronted by bicameralism, partisan gridlock, chamber procedures, leadership's control of the agenda, and the diverse interests of 534 other members of Congress. What strategies do lawmakers have for navigating these challenges? In this book, Melinda N. Ritchie reveals how members of Congress use the federal bureaucracy as a backdoor for policymaking. Today, more law in the United States is made by unelected bureaucrats through federal agency regulations than with congressional statute. Ritchie argues that the bureaucracy's growing role in policymaking offers lawmakers a discreet way to represent controversial interests outside of the formal constraints of Congress. Lawmakers overcome obstacles in the legislative process by substituting agency regulations for legislation and pressuring agencies to make policy changes that would not pass Congress. Drawing on an original dataset constructed from records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Ritchie traces the interactions between members of Congress and federal agencies to illustrate how these communications function as part of a lawmaker's overarching strategy for policymaking. Original and timely, Backdoor Lawmaking explains how members of Congress exploit the separation of powers and evade the lawmaking process established in the US Constitution.

Now in its seventh edition, Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations brings together the knowledge of leading scholars and scholar-practitioners alike to explain the complex political dynamic between the president and Congress. Contributors analyze the structural, political, and behavioral factors that shape this relationship, while showing how and why rivalry has tended to intensify when different parties control the two branches. Intended for students, scholars, public officials, and the general public, Rivals for Power offers an accessible and engaging analysis of executive and legislative rivalry across a span of eras, with particular attention to developments from the Obama, Trump, and Biden presidencies.

How access to resources and policymaking powers determines the balance of power between the legislative and executive branchesThe specter of unbridled executive power looms large in the American political imagination. Are checks and balances enough to constrain ambitious executives? Checks in the Balance presents a new theory of separation of powers that brings legislative capacity to the fore, explaining why Congress and state legislatures must possess both the opportunities and the means to constrain presidents and governors—and why, without these tools, executive power will prevail.Alexander Bolton and Sharece Thrower reveal how legislative capacity—which they conceive of as the combination of a legislature's resources and policymaking powers—is the key to preventing the accumulation of power in the hands of an encroaching executive. They show how low-capacity legislatures face difficulties checking the executive through mechanisms such as discretion and oversight, and how presidents and governors unilaterally bypass such legislative adversaries to impose their will. When legislative capacity is high, however, the legislative branch can effectively stifle executives. Bolton and Thrower draw on a wealth of historical evidence on congressional capacity, oversight, discretion, and presidential unilateralism. They also examine thousands of gubernatorial executive orders, demonstrating how varying capacity in the states affects governors'power.Checks in the Balance affirms the centrality of legislatures in tempering executive power—and sheds vital new light on how and why they fail.

The US Constitution recognizes the president as the sole legal head of the executive branch. Despite this constitutional authority, the president's actual control over administration varies significantly in practice from one president to the next. Presidential Control over Administration provides a new approach for studying the presidency and policymaking that centers on this critical and often overlooked historical variable.To explain the different configurations of presidential control over administration that recur throughout history—collapse, innovation, stabilization, and constraint—O'Brien develops a new theory that incorporates historical variation in a combination of key restrictions such as time, knowledge, and the structure of government as well as key incentives such as providing acceptable performance and implementing preferred policies. O'Brien then tests the argument by tracing the policymaking process in the domain of public finance across nearly a century of history, beginning with President Herbert Hoover during the Great Depression and ending with the first two years of the Trump presidency. Although the book focuses on historical variation in presidential control, especially during the New Deal era and the Reagan era, the theory and empirical analysis are highly relevant for recent incumbents. In particular, O'Brien shows that during the Great Recession and beyond the initial efforts of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to change the established course during a period of unified party control of the government were largely undercut by each president's limited control over administration.Presidential Control over Administration is a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of the presidency and policymaking.

Landmark political confrontations between sitting presidents and powerful senators have occurred throughout American history--some have shaped the nation. This book takes an in-depth look at seven of those major'Washington wars,'including the personal rivalries that spawned each one, the strategies and events that transpired as a result, and the aftermaths and impacts on the country. Neither compromise nor surrender were considered in these intense debates, which left scars on the national psyche. Each episode could be worthy of a historical narrative all its own but considered together they illustrate the long and bitter history of democratic warfare between the leaders and branches of government at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Despite popular perceptions, presidents rarely succeed in persuading either the public or members of Congress to change their minds and move from opposition to particular policies to support of them. As a result, the White House is not able to alter the political landscape and create opportunities for change. Instead, successful presidents recognize and skillfully exploit the opportunities already found in their political environments. If they fail to understand their strategic positions, they are likely to overreach and experience political disaster. Donald Trump has been a distinctive president, and his arrival in the Oval Office brought new questions. Could someone with his decades of experience as a self-promoter connect with the public and win its support? Could a president who is an experienced negotiator obtain the support in Congress needed to pass his legislative programs? Would we need to adjust the theory of presidential leadership to accommodate a president with unique persuasive skills? Building on decades of research and employing extensive new data, George C. Edwards III addresses these questions. He finds that President Trump has been no different than other presidents in being constrained by his environment. He moved neither the public nor Congress. Even for an experienced salesman and dealmaker, presidential power is still not the power to persuade. Equally important was the fact that, as Edwards shows, Trump was not able to exploit the opportunities he had. In fact, we learn here that the patterns of the president's rhetoric and communications and his approach to dealing with Congress ultimately lessened his chances of success. President Trump, it turns out, was often his own agenda's undoing.

In an original assessment of all three branches, Jasmine Farrier reveals a new way in which the American federal system is broken. Turning away from the partisan narratives of everyday politics, Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial diagnoses the deeper and bipartisan nature of imbalance of power that undermines public deliberation and accountability, especially on war powers. By focusing on the lawsuits brought by Congressional members that challenge presidential unilateralism, Farrier provides a new diagnostic lens on the permanent institutional problems that have undermined the separation of powers system in the last five decades, across a diverse array of partisan and policy landscapes.As each chapter demonstrates, member lawsuits are an outlet for frustrated members of both parties who cannot get their House and Senate colleagues to confront overweening presidential action through normal legislative processes. But these lawsuits often backfire – leaving Congress as an institution even more disadvantaged. Jasmine Farrier argues these suits are more symptoms of constitutional dysfunction than the cure. Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial shows federal judges will not and cannot restore the separation of powers system alone. Fifty years of congressional atrophy cannot be reversed in court.

Can presidents influence whether Congress enacts their agenda? Most research on presidential-congressional relations suggests that presidents have little if any influence on Congress. Instead, structural factors like party control largely determine the fate of the president's legislative agenda. In The President on Capitol Hill, Jeffrey E. Cohen challenges this conventional view, arguing that existing research has underestimated the president's power to sway Congress and developing a new theory of presidential influence.Cohen demonstrates that by taking a position, the president converts an issue from a nonpresidential into a presidential one, which leads members of Congress to consider the president's views when deciding how to vote. Presidential position taking also converts the factors that normally affect roll call voting—such as party, public opinion, and policy type—into resources that presidents can leverage to influence the vote. By testing all House roll calls from 1877 to 2012, Cohen finds that not only do presidents have more influence than previously thought, but through their influence, they can affect the substance of public policy. The President on Capitol Hill offers a new perspective on presidential-congressional relations, showing that presidents are not simply captives of larger political forces but rather major players in the legislative process.

The Office of the President of the U.S. isn't what it used to be—it has morphed into an overgrown beast. So says presidential scholar Ivan Eland in his landmark new book War and the Rogue Presidency: Restoring the Republic after Congressional Failure.The presidency no longer simply enforces the laws passed by Congress but literally dominates American political life. Its vast bureaucracy is flush with cash and wields powers never authorized by the Framers. But who do we have to thank for this distortion of the Constitution? Congress.The presidency, says Eland, isn't inherently imperial. It's contingently imperial. Particularly when wars loom and Congress refuses to forestall our engagement in them—with inevitable consequences.But wars also lead to massive domestic government interference.In sum, liberals, conservatives, independents—anybody concerned for personal liberties and good governance—should read this pathbreaking book and grapple with its implications.

Providing a unique resource for readers seeking to understand the relationship between presidents, parties, and Congress, this book offers a new explanation of the motivations, strategies, and impacts of presidential midterm campaigns.Congress has been shaped by an unlikely force—presidential involvement in midterm campaigning. This book argues that midterm campaigning is a presidential Trojan horse and that in undertaking it, presidents have brought their parties to heel; indebted individual representatives and senators to them; and broken the ability of Congress to effectively check the executive office. Midterm Campaigning and the Modern Presidency looks at why presidential midterm campaigning emerged during the post-war period and why it did not emerge sooner; it then describes how presidents have shrewdly coordinated their midterm actions to not only shore up their immediate needs but also to remake in their own image both their party and Congress as a whole. Not merely about any particular election or candidate, the book shows that presidential midterm campaigning has a lasting impact on the behavior of Congress and on the future course of American political affairs.

Millions of Americans—including many experienced politicians—viewed Barack Obama through a prism of high expectations, based on a belief in the power of presidential persuasion. Yet many who were inspired by candidate Obama were disappointed in what he was able to accomplish once in the White House. They could not understand why he often was unable to leverage his position and political skills to move the public and Congress to support his initiatives. Predicting the Presidency explains why Obama had such difficulty bringing about the change he promised, and challenges the conventional wisdom about presidential leadership.In this incisive book, George Edwards shows how we can ask a few fundamental questions about the context of a presidency—the president's strategic position or opportunity structure—and use the answers to predict a president's success in winning support for his initiatives. If presidential success is largely determined by a president's strategic position, what role does persuasion play? Almost every president finds that a significant segment of the public and his fellow partisans in Congress are predisposed to follow his lead. Others may support the White House out of self-interest. Edwards explores the possibilities of the president exploiting such support, providing a more realistic view of the potential of presidential persuasion.Written by a leading presidential scholar, Predicting the Presidency sheds new light on the limitations and opportunities of presidential leadership.

The Iraq War of March 19, 2003 was an implausible war at the outset. We now understand that it could have been averted and never should have been waged. How and why did it begin? Who was responsible? This book offers a new perspective on the Iraq War and explains the dynamic relationships between the George W. Bush administration, the United States Congress, and the national news media. It is based on the “multiple streams model of political change” by John Kingdon, which says that if a unique combination of political, policy, and problem streams collide, under the right circumstances, they can create a window of opportunity for a shift in policy. It was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which set the stage for the emergence of three dynamic streams in the country. Fear, power, and a contentious political climate converged to produce not only a dramatic new foreign policy, but also a war with Iraq, a country which had not provoked or threatened the United States. Fear, power, and a tense political climate also influenced institutional behavior and exposed the failures of 1) The executive branch in the administration of George W. Bush, 2) The United States Congress and, 3) the national news media. All are designed and are differently responsible to protect the interests of the American people.Errors in judgment have happened throughout history with other administrations, with other Congresses, and with the news media. However, with regard to the Iraq War, it was a matter of degree and extent, especially for the President of the United States. Both the Congress and the news media were also experiencing colossal institutional changes, which influenced and hindered their performances. However, all were culpable in helping to create the Iraq war, which today stands as one of the longest military conflicts in United States history.

Legislative oversight is most commonly conducted through congressional budget, authorization, appropriations, confirmation, and investigative processes, and, in rare instances, through impeachment. But the adversarial, often confrontational, and sometimes high profile nature of congressional investigations sets it apart from the more routine, accommodative facets of the oversight process experienced in authorization, appropriations, or confirmation exercises. While all aspects of legislative oversight share the common goals of informing Congress so as to best accomplish its tasks of developing legislation, monitoring the implementation of public policy, and disclosing to the public how its government is performing, the inquisitorial process also sustains and vindicates Congress's role in our constitutional scheme of separated powers and checks and balances. The rich history of congressional investigations from the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792 through Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater, and the current ongoing inquiries into Operation Fast and Furious, has established, in law and practice, the nature and contours of congressional prerogatives necessary to maintain the integrity of the legislative role in that constitutional scheme. This book reviews the legal basis for investigative oversight, followed by several prominent examples of congressional oversight that reflects the significant breadth and reach of the legislative investigative prerogative vis-a-vis the Department.

After sweeping environmental legislation passed in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s ushered in an era when new legislation and reforms to existing laws were consistently caught up in a gridlock. In response, environmental groups became more specialized and professional, learning how to effect policy change through the courts, states, and federal agencies rather than through grassroots movements. Without a significantly mobilized public and with a generally uncooperative Congress, presidents since the 1990s have been forced to step into a new role of increasing presidential dominance over environmental policies. Rather than working with Congress, presidents instead have employed unilateral actions and administrative strategies to further their environmental goals.Presidential Administration and the Environment offers a detailed examination of the strategies and tools used by U.S. presidents. Using primary sources from presidential libraries such as speeches and staff communications, David M. Shafie analyzes how presidents such as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have used alternative executive approaches to pass environmental policies. From there, Shafie presents case studies in land management, water policy, toxics, and climate change. He analyzes the role that executive leadership has played in passing policies within these four areas, explains how this role has changed over time, and concludes by investigating how Obama's policies compare thus far with those of his predecessors.Shafie's combination of qualitative content analysis and topical case studies offers scholars and researchers alike important insights for understanding the interactions between environmental groups and the executive branch and the implications for future policymaking in the United States.

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated.In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration's handling of the Soviet Union's surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community.Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational.The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened.Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.

How partisan balance between the U.S. presidency and Congress is essential to successful governmentWith three independent branches, a legislature divided into two houses, and many diverse constituencies, it is remarkable that the federal government does not collapse in permanent deadlock. Yet, this system of government has functioned for well over two centuries, even through such heated partisan conflicts as the national health-care showdown and Supreme Court nominations. In Partisan Balance, noted political scholar David Mayhew examines the unique electoral foundations of the presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives in order to provide a fresh understanding for the government's success and longstanding vitality.Focusing on the period after World War II, and the fate of legislative proposals offered by presidents from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Mayhew reveals that the presidency, Senate, and House rest on surprisingly similar electoral bases, with little difference in their partisan textures as indexed by the presidential popular vote cast in the various constituencies. Both congressional chambers have tilted a bit Republican, and while White House legislative initiatives have fared accordingly, Mayhew shows that presidents have done relatively well in getting their major proposals enacted. Over the long haul, the Senate has not proven much more of a stumbling block than the House. Arguing that the system has developed a self-correcting impulse that leads each branch to pull back when it deviates too much from other branches, Mayhew contends that majoritarianism largely characterizes the American system. The wishes of the majority tend to nudge institutions back toward the median voter, as in the instances of legislative districting, House procedural reforms, and term limits for presidents and legislators.

During his first term in office, Pres. George W. Bush made reference to the'unitary executive'ninety-five times, as part of signing statements, proclamations, and executive orders. Pres. Barack Obama's actions continue to make issues of executive power as timely as ever.Unitary executive theory stems from interpretation of the constitutional assertion that the president is vested with the'executive power'of the United States. In this groundbreaking collection of studies, eleven presidential scholars examine for the first time the origins, development, use, and future of this theory.The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency examines how the unitary executive theory became a recognized constitutional theory of presidential authority, how it has evolved, how it has been employed by presidents of both parties, and how its use has affected and been affected by U.S. politics. This book also examines the constitutional, political, and even psychological impact of the last thirty years of turmoil in the executive branch and the ways that controversy has altered both the exercise and the public's view of presidential power.

When the United States goes to war, the nation's attention focuses on the president. As commander in chief, a president reaches the zenith of power, while Congress is supposedly shunted to the sidelines once troops have been deployed abroad. Because of Congress's repeated failure to exercise its legislative powers to rein in presidents, many have proclaimed its irrelevance in military matters. After the Rubicon challenges this conventional wisdom by illuminating the diverse ways in which legislators influence the conduct of military affairs. Douglas L. Kriner reveals that even in politically sensitive wartime environments, individual members of Congress frequently propose legislation, hold investigative hearings, and engage in national policy debates in the public sphere. These actions influence the president's strategic decisions as he weighs the political costs of pursuing his preferred military course. Marshalling a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence, Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions and sheds new light on the timely issue of interbranch relations.

The Bush years have given rise to fears of a resurgent Imperial Presidency. Those fears are justified, but the problem cannot be solved simply by bringing a new administration to power. In his provocative new book, The Cult of the Presidency, Gene Healy argues that the fault lies not in our leaders but in ourselves. When our scholars lionize presidents who break free from constitutional restraints, when our columnists and talking heads repeatedly call upon the “commander in chief ” to dream great dreams and seek the power to achieve them—when voters look to the president for salvation from all problems great and small—should we really be surprised that the presidency has burst its constitutional bonds and grown powerful enough to threaten American liberty?Interweaving historical scholarship, legal analysis, and trenchant cultural commentary, The Cult of the Presidency traces America's decades-long drift from the Framers'vision for the presidency: a constitutionally constrained chief magistrate charged with faithful execution of the laws. Restoring that vision will require a Congress and a Court willing to check executive power, but Healy emphasizes that there is no simple legislative or judicial “fix” to the problems of the presidency. Unless Americans change what we ask of the office—no longer demanding what we should not want and cannot have—we'll get what, in a sense, we deserve.

The Bush years justifiably gave rise to fears of a new imperial presidency. Yet despite the controversy surrounding the administration's expansive claims of executive power, both Left and Right agree on the boundless nature of presidential responsibility. The imperial presidency is the price we seem to be willingly and dangerously agreeable to pay in order to make the office the focus of our national hopes and dreams. Interweaving historical scholarship, legal analysis, and cultural commentary, author Healy argues that the Presidency needs to be reined in, its powers checked and supervised, and its wartime authority put back under the oversight of the Congress and the courts. Only then will we begin to return the Presidency to its proper, constitutionally limited role.--From publisher description.