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Experiment results on exclusive contracts, that show discrimination increases the likelihood of exclusion when buyers can communicate, are presented. The communication cuts the likelihood of exclusion when current seller is unable to discriminate and need to make the same offer to buyers. Payoff endogeneity raises the likelihood of exclusion when communication is allowed.

The channel literature has paid little attention to issues related to exclusive dealing governance arrangements. Consequently, there is only limited knowledge about how exclusive dealing impacts various channel processes and outcomes. This gap is especially regrettable since exclusive dealing, in addition to being one of the most common-place governance formats within the distribution channels, is also one of the best exemplars of viable unilateral governance formats. In this initial investigation, the authors explore the linkages among the constructs of exclusive dealing, relationalism, communication, and performance. Empirical data for the study were drawn from the photocopier industry. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

A theory of product distribution is presented by examining a manufacturer's choice between resale price maintenance (RPM) and dealer exclusive territories to solve the standard retail free riding problem. The choice depends critically on the life cycle of the product being distributed: manufacturers of products with long life cycles are more likely to distribute their products with exclusive territories, with RPM becoming more probable as the life cycle of the product shrinks. These results provide a link between a product's characteristics and the likely manner in which it is offered at retail., I. Introduction Despite the Supreme Court's narrowing during the last decade of the scope of illegal activity, vertical price restraints, including minimum resale price maintenance (RPM), remain per se violations [...]

It is determined whether loyalty contracts in ocean shipping can inhibit lower cost capacity-constrained entrants. The competitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts with three players, namely, an incumbent, an entrant who is more efficient but capacity-constrained and a buyer are examined. It is shown that loyalty contracts could be an effective entry barrier and that the result is not socially efficient. Exclusive dealing contracts in the ocean shipping market are examined and are found to give linear conferences an unfair edge.

An equilibrium analysis is made of exclusive dealing contracts, in which counter-contracting at the contract and production stages is allowed. Whether upward or downward exclusive dealing contract is undertaken, results show that the upstream contracting firm will optimally transfer inputs to the downstream partner at marginal costs, thus ultimately benefiting consumers with lower equilibrium prices.