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Evo Morales rose to power on the shoulders of Bolivia's most powerful social movements, ostracizing the neoliberal elite with a progressive-left populist discourse that swept through Latin America. After nearly 14 years in power, Morales's caudillo-style leadership shifted toward authoritarianism and a politics of division that ultimately led to his ouster as president. While many have been quick to adopt the narrative of a coup d'état, this perspective plays directly into the oversimplified binary politics used by the Morales administration, overlooking the complexity and fluidity of social forces and the changing state-society dynamics over time. Evo Morales suffered a crisis of legitimacy that was years in the making. His authoritarian tendencies, alliances with capitalists, and reliance on the extractive economy ultimately led to his downfall as he lost support from his social bases and was unwilling to give up state power. The electoral scandal in October 2019 and the subsequent departure of Evo Morales into political exile were only the tip of the iceberg. Evo Morales accedió al poder gracias a los movimientos sociales más poderosos de Bolivia, en conflicto con la élite neoliberal y utilizando un discurso populista de izquierda progresista que se extendió por América Latina. Después de casi 14 años en el poder, el liderazgo caudillista de Morales viró hacia el autoritarismo y una política divisoria que finalmente llevó a su destitución como presidente. Si bien muchos se han apresurado a adoptar la narrativa de un golpe de Estado, esta perspectiva se enfila directamente con la política binaria simplista utilizada por la administración misma de Morales, pasando por alto la complejidad y fluidez de las fuerzas sociales, así como la dinámica cambiante estado-sociedad a través del tiempo. Morales sufrió una crisis de legitimidad que se gestó durante años. Sus tendencias autoritarias, sus alianzas con las clases capitalistas y su dependencia de la economía extractiva finalmente llevaron a su caída: perdió el apoyo de sus bases sociales sin estar dispuesto a renunciar al poder estatal. El escándalo electoral de octubre de 2019 y su posterior exilio político fueron tan solo la punta del iceberg. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O artigo analisa as relações entre o suma qamaña (Buen vivir) e a política neoextrativista na Bolívia, que contribuiu com a eleição e reeleição de Evo Morales. Identifica semelhanças com o extrativismo clássico e limitações em diversificar a indústria e superar o modelo primário-exportador. A partir de uma revisão integrativa baseada em dados do governo boliviano, da estatal YPFB e literatura interdisciplinar, investiga os impactos sociais e territoriais do Neoextrativismo em um país que garantiu constitucionalmente a defesa da Pachamama (Mãe-Terra). A nacionalização se tornou uma das principais políticas públicas de Evo Morales, elevando indicadores sociais e econômicos, ao mesmo tempo que aprofundou a subordinação ao mercado internacional e os impactos socioambientais, promovendo intensos conflitos étnicos e territoriais.

In 2019, Bolivian cooperative miners, once staunch allies of MAS and Evo Morales, helped inflame the crisis that toppled the Morales government. This paper explores the roots of the confounded, often explosive relationship between cooperative miners, nationalization, and MAS. Tracing the history of cooperative mining and its relationship to ore theft since the colonial period, this article shows how cooperative mining and salaried miners’ unions emerged as twin responses to the precarity of labor and production in the twentieth century. In the 1950s and 1960s, cooperative workers emerged as a shadow on the nationalized mining economy, competing for space and political influence with salaried workers. After the closure of COMIBOL in the late 1980s, cooperatives absorbed laid-off workers as well as migrants from the countryside and expanded into claims once belonging to state and union workers. When Morales reopened Bolivia’s national mining company in 2006 and sought to increase state participation in the mineral economy, he set the stage for a direct confrontation between the interests of cooperativistas, the vast majority of mineworkers at the time, and the state itself. This underacknowledged conflict of interests between different kinds of mineworkers has haunted MAS, culminating in the crisis of 2019 that drove Morales from power and from Bolivia.

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The article reviews the backgrounds and prerequisites of the actual split into two actions within the ruling party «Movement for Socialism» (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) in Bolivia, that are the fraction of «evistas» (who supports Evo Morales) and the one of «arcistas» (who supports Luis Arce). The evolution of the party is considered since Evo Morales took presidential office in 2005, including the crucial for the ruling elites loss of power during the crisis of 2019, electoral victory in the 2020 of the candidate from MAS Luis Arce, as well as the results of the regional elections 2021, up to the present. It reveals the particular interdependence between the political apparatus, trade unions and public organizations, that predetermined the vulnerability of intra-party interrelation.

During Bolivia's 2019 political crisis, reactivated modes of political violence occurred within and alongside familiar forms of mass mobilization. In Bolivia's recent history, this period is most comparable to the 2006-2009 partisan conflict over constitutional reform and departmental autonomy known by the Gramscian term empate catastrófico, or catastrophic stalemate. Although there are many similarities between the two periods, both social movement and institutional norms limiting violence were weakened between the two, resulting in more rapid deployment of destructive tactics and deadlier violence by security forces. As Gramsci's model argues, greater deployment of force was no guarantee of political success in either crisis. This article examines three extraordinary and destructive tactics: partisan street clashes, sometimes involving firearms; arson attacks on electoral authorities, party offices, politicians' homes, and police stations; and mass shootings of demonstrators. I describe these three tactics as part of Bolivia's repertoire of contention--that is, as routinized forms of political action with commonly understood meanings--and compare their use in both the 2006-2009 stalemate and the 2019 crisis. Quantitatively, I analyze the deadly violence in 2019 by drawing on Ultimate Consequences, a comprehensive database of nearly six hundred deaths in Bolivian political conflict since 1982. In the final weeks of Morales's presidency, violence between opposed civilian groups accounted for all four deaths, whereas several incidents of partisan street clashes involved potentially lethal force. Following Morales's ouster, however, the security forces became the central violent actor, perpetrating at least twenty-nine of the thirty-four violent deaths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Bolivian Studies Journal is the property of University of Pittsburgh, University Library System and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite running for a fourth term as president and winning in the first round in October 2019's presidential elections, Evo Morales was violently overthrown in a civilian, police, and military coup. This event provided rationales for the leftist detractors of the MAS government to float the end-of-cycle theory with regard to Bolivia. Various perspectives were involved in this debate: the approach of the postextractivist/postdevelopmentalist left, the critique of the autonomist left, the approach of the doctrinaire/revolutionary left, and the perspective of the progressive left, which is sympathetic to the Morales government. Because of a lack of understanding of the reconfiguration under way of international dependency relations under neoliberalism, the end-of-cycle theory distorts reality, specifically with regard to Bolivian politics. A pesar de postularse para un cuarto mandato como presidente y ganar en la primera vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de octubre de 2019, Evo Morales fue derrocado violentamente en un golpe de estado civil, policial y militar. Este evento sirvió de base para que los detractores izquierdistas del gobierno del MAS plantearan la teoría del fin de ciclo con respecto a Bolivia. En este debate se involucraron varias perspectivas: el enfoque de la izquierda posextractivista/posdesarrollista, la crítica de la izquierda autonomista, el enfoque de la izquierda doctrinaria/revolucionaria y la perspectiva de la izquierda progresista, que de hecho simpatiza con el gobierno de Morales. Debido a la falta de comprensión en torno a la reconfiguración en curso de las relaciones de dependencia internacional bajo el neoliberalismo, la teoría del fin de ciclo distorsiona la realidad, particularmente en lo que respecta a la política boliviana. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the novel’s use of the camba identity and the vestiges of narco-violence, embodied by a contract killer and the memory of a local drug baron, Roberto Suárez Gómez, to critique both the contemporary political tensions arising between the eastern departments of Bolivia and the MAS administration, as well as the lack of collective dialogue regarding the region’s involvement in the history of the Bolivian drug trade.

November 10, 2019 was marked by another institutional break in Bolivian history. Afterwards, on October 20, Evo Morales resigned his mandate due to pressure from the Armed Forces, based on the social upheaval that impacted strongly the countryafter the first round of the presidential election. Since then, Bolivia has been suffering a deep political crisis, which increase substantially due to pandemic caused by the Sars-Cov-2 virus (COVID-19). Purpose of this article is, first, promote a brief social analysis of the Morales Government. Will we study the case from the city of El Alto and its grassroots territorial organizations, since this is considered one of the main social and political bases of the government. Aim is to observe more specifically how there has been an increasing deterioration of support provided to the government. Then, reflect on the intricacies of the process that culminates in the forced resignation of the President, seeking to identify whether there was, in fact, a coup d'état in 2019 in the Andean-Amazonian nation.Likewise, we will assess whether there was a coup d'état in 2019 in the Andean-Amazonian nation.

Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, cultural anthropologist Carwil Bjork‐James recounts the recent history of Bolivia and its struggles and ambitions to recognise grassroots ways of occupying its urban fabric. Focusing on the dyad of El Alto/La Paz, he illustrates both mistakes and progress, and shines a light on the ability and tenacity of the country's indigenous and working‐class inhabitants to take matters into their own hands through protest and urban interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper, it is analysed the industrial policies in Bolivia during the successive governments of the MAS party (2006-2019). Specifically, it is focused on the institutional dimension of industrial policies and on the hypothesis that institutional problems have been a determining factor in the inability of the new model to translate its policies into structural transformations of the productive economy. For this, an analysis is articulated in four levels of industrial policy: normative-strategic, institutional, sectoral policies, and instruments-incentives. In the analysis, it is showed that there are various design and implementation failures at the institutional level (prioritization of primary sectors, absence of public-private partnerships, regulatory overlaps, limited bureaucratic capabilities, or absence of a technological innovation system, among others), that have made it impossible to industrialization and structural change in Bolivia.

The post-electoral crisis of 2019 can be seen as a consequence of a certain interpretation of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009. A presidentialist interpretation, based on the continuities of presidential mandates, has prevailed in the understanding and application of constitutional norms, whether through the constitutional judge or the electoral organ. This presidentialist interpretation, by challenging the popular will expressed in the referendum of 2016, has led to a process of deconstitutionalization that may partly explain the institutional crisis that followed the general elections of 20 October 2019 and the de facto presidency of Jeanine Áñez.

In July 2015, the town of Potosi began the longest blockade in its history to denounce the recurrent lack of public investment. While discussions with the Morales government had been broken off, the rumour spread of the arrival in Potosi of witches hired by the authorities to temper the zeal of the dissatisfied population. Under the leadership of three women healers, a group of inhabitants decided to launch an attack from the top of the surrounding mountains and the cemetery to counter the attack by the president’s witches. They resumed their hostilities in October 2019 after the controversial presidential elections. The purpose of this article is to show that the recourse to witchcraft attributed to the Bolivian President and the ritual responses could be analysed as a political and moral commentary on the state, in the context of the erosion of Evo Morales’s popularity and legitimacy.

Este trabalho se debruça sobre os processos que se incidiram na Bolívia entre 20 de outubro e 14 de novembro de 2019 durante as eleições presidenciais e os dias que se sucederam e culminaram no Golpe de Estado que obrigou Evo Morales e Álvaro Garcia Linera, presidente e vice-presidente eleitos, a deixarem o país sob ameaças. Para isso, serão analisadas entrevistas, documentadas pela autora deste artigo durante o período, e dados oficiais relacionados com os conceitos de contrato social, racial e patriarcal de Charles W. Mills (1997), que disserta sobre a colonização latino-americana e os impactos atuais desta dinâmica racista e sexista incorporada nos países periféricos. Um marco significativo do período foi a queima da bandeira Wiphala, que carrega simbolismo dos povos originários da região da Cordilheira dos Andes.

The aim of this paper is to assess the changes in the foreign policy of Bolivia and Ecuador during the administrations of Evo Morales (2006-2019) and Rafael Correa (2007-2017), taking into account the interaction between domestic and international factors in both countries. Our working hypothesis argues that the reorientation of the foreign policy of these countries was possible due to a connection between alterations observed in the domestic and international spheres starting in the middle of the 2000s. In the internal sphere, the greater political stability resulting from the restructuring of the party system; in the foreign policy environment, an international system more open to the progressive field, allowing a change in the orientation of Bolivian and Ecuadorian foreign policy, based on that moment on the diversification of partnerships with an anti-United States bias.

A protest wave which began in 2019 has swept across many Latin American countries. The Multinational State of Bolivia, where rapid destabilization of political situation has led to a serious internal crisis, was no exception. The paper examines the prospects for conflict resolution in Bolivia through the lens of the ‘divided society’ concept. The first section identifies the key fault lines in Bolivia including ethnic, cultural, and civilizational differences, economic disproportions, and high levels of social and political polarization. The author shows how the regime of Evo Morales managed to reach an internal balance and maintain it for quite a long time through complex balancing, concessions, and compromises. The second section identifies the causes behind the 2019 crisis. These include miscalculations of the government which has revealed general instability of the country’s political system and threatened to erode democratic institutions; changes in electoral behavior of the population; the increasing role of the armed forces. The author links the possibilities to overcome these challenges faced by Bolivia with the expansion of the social protection in conjunction with the principle of consociationalism, but stresses that even so the consolidation of the Bolivian society will be a time-consuming process.

Bolivia’s political transition in 2006 represented more than just a transfer of power. It also marked the arrival of a new political, economic and social paradigm. The newly elected leader (Evo Morales Ayma) and his political party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) brought with them an ambitious agenda for social change. Most of the initial efforts were aimed at responding to electoral promises and the demands from the myriad of social movements that supported Morales’ ticket. As time progressed, the ideological components of the model were refined and transformed from an anti-neoliberal rhetoric to a comprehensive agenda of state reform. Part of the ideological components were rooted in the notion of “Vivir Bien” [Living Well], which in essence is a balanced approach for development considering human wellbeing in harmony with mother nature. The political challenge, however, has been the transformation of this holistic approach into a practical one and the policy implications that this entails ‒a particularly difficult issue in a country with weak institutional settings and limited state capacity. This article argues that although there have been many gains, particularly in reorienting the notion of the welfare state and in key economic and social areas, the model is still highly dependent on a neo-patrimonial state that relies heavily on a few commodities to support a growing social agenda. Moreover, in the past years the political emphasis and efforts have favored economic reforms over social ones, which might jeopardize the whole model in the not so near future.

Diplomatic relations between Bolivia and the United States have been difficult since Evo Morales became president in 2006. Despite these poor relations and even despite the abrogation of the ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act) in 2008, commerce between Bolivia and the United States has increased more than during governments allied with the United States. These conclusions show that the state of diplomatic relations are not necessarily indicative of the intensity of trade between countries.

This response summarizes and compares three scholars’ approaches (Marcelo Bohrt, Robert Albro and Pamela Calla) to the Morales administration’s efforts to decolonize the government of Bolivia. Seeking the common ground among them, I find that all three recognize the importance of symbolic and discursive changes, which have allowed some previously-excluded individuals to access positions of authority within the state apparatus. On the other hand, these changes have been uneven, exposing rifts between indigenous communities, exacerbating existing inequities, and establishing new or renewed hierarchies of subordination.

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No momento em que Evo Morales tenta concorrer ao seu quarto mandato presidencial, busca-se lançar luz sobre o progressivo afastamento entre seu governo e parte dos setores subalternos que contribuíram para a sua ascensão e consolidação. Apenas é possível entender a eleição de Morales em 2005 e o crescimento do Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) tendo em mente o ciclo de protestos populares contestadores do modelo político-econômico adotado pelos governos bolivianos a partir de 1985, caracterizado pelo pacto entre elites políticas e a adoção de políticas neoliberais. No primeiro mandato de Morales houve uma reorientação da economia nacional e a construção de um novo modelo de Estado. Progressivamente apareceram as contradições ligadas a dois objetivos desse projeto político: o reconhecimento da diversidade social e política existente na Bolívia e a expansão estatal. O debate acerca da consolidação de governos autônomos indígenas ilumina os embates no que tange à distribuição de poder político para setores subalternos – protagonistas do ciclo de protestos e das mudanças dele decorrentes –. e à adoção pelo governo central de um modelo econômico qualificado de neoextrativista.

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El Golpe de Estado al gobierno de Evo Morales Ayma posee trascendencia regional y mundial. Es la jugada geo-estratégica del capitalismo trasnacionalizado y el imperialismo norteamericano que pone en crisis total al eje progresista latinoamericano de los primeros dos decenios del siglo XXI. Por tanto, comprender los factores que hicieron posible un golpe de esa magnitud en contra de un gobierno que exhibía éxitos económicos y sociales consolidados, es fundamental para la reorientación y recuperación de las fuerzas progresistas, tanto en el ámbito nacional boliviano, como en el entorno regional latinoamericano y el escenario internacional.

En 2015, mientras la ciudad de Potosí iniciaba el bloqueo más largo de su historia para denunciar la falta de inversión pública, corrió la voz que el gobierno había mandado unos brujos para acallar el descontento. Un grupo de curanderas decidió entonces organizar el contrataque. Volvieron a la lucha durante las controvertidas elecciones presidenciales de octubre 2019. Este artículo propone analizar las prácticas brujas atribuidas al ex-gobierno boliviano y las respuestas rituales que suscitaron como un discurso político y moral sobre el Estado, en un contexto de debilitamiento de la popularidad de Evo Morales.

El presente trabajo describe, en formato de crónica, los principales acontecimientos sucedidos en el denominado caso de los “misiles chinos”. Es decir, la entrega, para su desmantelamiento, de los únicos misiles con los que contaba Bolivia como mecanismo de defensa antiaérea, a personal militar del gobierno de Estados Unidos. El hecho sucedió meses antes de las elecciones generales de diciembre de 2005, en las cuales Evo Morales obtuvo la presidencia, y después de un largo proceso de crisis e inestabilidad política en el país (2003-2005). Así mismo, se identifican las principales evidencias y consecuencias políticas e institucionales de la subordinación militar a una potencia extranjera, todas ellas permeadas por aspectos tales como injerencia, pérdida de soberanía e impunidad.

Resumo Este artigo apresenta uma reconstituição do último ciclo de crises políticas vividas pela Bolívia (2000-2008), a partir, notadamente, da ação de três organizações sociais: a Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), a Confederación de los Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Cidob) e o Consejo de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (Conamaq). Na primeira fase do ciclo, a forte mobilização social rompeu com as fronteiras do campo político institucional; na segunda, a crise política adquiriu novas características à medida que atores deslocados do controle do poder político nacional buscaram a desestabilização institucional. Com a superação da crise e o retorno à “conjuntura ordinária”, as fronteiras do campo foram redefinidas, excluindo parte daqueles atores indígenas que haviam atuado na construção de um novo Estado.

This article examines the rise of leftist ideology in Ecuador and Bolivia in light of their deepening economic relations with China from 2005 to 2014. First, it reveals that market trends account for trade fluctuations but fail to explain Chinese investment in, and some loan deals with, Ecuador as well as loans to Bolivia. Second, it demonstrates how these forms of funding provided alternatives to U.S.-led international institutions, enabling Rafael Correa and Evo Morales to steer away from Western influence. Third, it contends that four factors led to a cyclic reinforcement of Chinese economic interests and the rise of leftist ideology in Ecuador and Bolivia, namely: mutual complementarity between China's demand for energy/natural resource supply diversification and Pink Tide development agendas; U.S.–China geopolitical competition for influence in Latin America; China's experience in engaging with leftist governments from developing countries; and anti-Americanism shaping national identity in Ecuador and Bolivia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

. By Alessandra Pellegrini Calderón. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 2016.Deference Revisited: Andean Ritual in the Plurinational State. By Into Goudsmit. Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2016.The Five Hundred Year Rebellion: Indigenous Movements and the Decolonization of History in Bolivia. By Benjamin Dangl. AK Press, Edinburgh, 2019.Coca Yes, Cocaine No: How Bolivia's Coca Growers Reshaped Democracy. By Thomas Grisaffi. Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Coup d'état to the government of Evo Morales Ayma possesses regional and world transcendence. It is the geo-strategic play of the trasnationalized capitalism and the North American imperialism which puts in total crisis the progressist Latin American axis of the first two decades of XXI century. Therefore the understanding of the factors that made possible a blow of such magnitude against a government that exhibited consolidated economic and social successes, is fundamental for the reorientation and recovery of the progressist forces, as much in the Bolivian national environment as in the regional Latin American environment and the international scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the impact of settler colonialism by the Spanish and United States in the American continent in forming the base, development, and power of capitalism in the West. It provides a general overview of the United States' unequal economic relationships with Latin American countries since the end of the nineteenth century to the present. It highlights the role evangelist groups have in changing the way coup d'états have been taking place in the region, in particular, to countries that had democratically elected presidents who were part of the "Pink Tide" and had a program to counterbalance neoliberal policies that were contributing to unprecedented economic inequality in their societies. One of the central questions in this work is the role of coloniality within Latin American countries and between the US and Latin America in the coup d'état against Evo Morales in Bolivia on November 10, 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines revolutionary discourses of national historical transformation in Bolivia and tracks the ways those discourses are appropriated, contested, and recast by farmers in the rural agricultural province of Ayopaya. During fieldwork carried out with Quechua-speaking farmers in Ayopaya between 2011 and 2012, I learned about people's enduring concerns with a recent hacienda past. Against governmental declarations that Bolivia's colonial past was dead or had passed, farmers meditated on the duration of earlier histories of colonial land dispossession and violations of indigenous sovereignty. Talk about the region's oppressive history here allowed people to assess deficient state aid and resources but also to oppose unwelcome state interventions pushing a legal model of bounded collectivity. I trace the ways that farmers and villagers mobilized the hacienda past to address inequitable land tenure, violated sovereignty, and women's marginalization from political life, and thereby raise new questions about the critical possibilities opened up by the re-politicization of this colonial history. Rural support for Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism party government eroded nearly a decade ago, and this complicates both triumphalist and defeatist accounts of President Evo Morales' 2019 resignation, which tend to paint Morales' rural indigenous supporters as innocent and naïve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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By drawing on the theoretical framework of the second incorporation of heterogeneous social organizations by progressive governments through informal contestation and/or technocratic implementation of their demands in Latin America, this article argues that the first presidential term of Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006–2009) was marked by the incorporation of combative social movements through both a multidimensional co-optation of movements and the technocratic competition of the central movement demands for the nationalization of gas and the rewriting of the constitution through a constituent assembly. However, by 2010, this incorporation had stripped social movements of their ability to mobilize for change and the political conjuncture had shifted, making the government less dependent on its social bases to maintain political stability. This simultaneously transformed movements into defensive movements protecting the gains from the previous period and state–social-movement relations into informal contestatory regimes in which movements could only struggle against proposed political agendas. En base a un marco teórico que abarca la segunda incorporación de organizaciones sociales heterogéneas por parte de gobiernos progresistas a través de la contestación informal y/o la implementación tecnocrática de sus demandas en América Latina, un análisis del proyecto político de Evo Morales en Bolivia sostiene que su primer mandato presidencial se vio caracterizado por la incorporación de movimientos sociales combativos a través de una cooptación multidimensional de dichos movimientos y la competencia tecnocrática de las demandas del movimiento central en torno a la nacionalización del gas y la modificación de la constitución por una asamblea constituyente. Sin embargo, para 2010, esta incorporación había despojado a los movimientos sociales de su capacidad de movilizarse a favor del cambio y la coyuntura política había cambiado, haciendo que el gobierno dependiera menos de sus bases sociales para mantener la estabilidad política. Esto transformó a los movimientos en entidades defensivas dedicadas a proteger las ganancias del período anterior y las relaciones entre el estado y los movimientos sociales en regímenes informales de impugnación dentro de los cuales los movimientos mismos sólo podían luchar contra las agendas políticas propuestas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Bolivia, the year 2019 marks the end of an era: In November, after almost 14 years in power, Evo Morales was forced to prematurely leave the presidency and, shortly thereafter, also the country. This dramatic event was preceded by contentious elections, allegations of electoral fraud, massive post-electoral protests, and the switching of sides by the police and the military. Rather than pacifying the situation, Morales' resignation led to a further escalation of the conflict, involving violent clashes between protesters and security forces. In the end, however, a negotiated solution of the crisis was reached that enabled the controversial interim president Jeanine Áñez to call new elections. In an attempt to make sense of this remarkable chain of events, the article (1) summarizes key causes that have made the once invincible Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government so vulnerable and (2) analyzes the October elections as well as the sociopolitical dynamics that unfolded afterwards with a focus on key controversies surrounding the elections (electoral fraud?) and the fall of Morales (a coup?). Finally, (3) the article briefly assesses the dynamics under the current interim government and looks at the forthcoming general elections, which are scheduled for 6 September 2020. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper aims to carry out an analysis about the government experience of the Movement to Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia since Evo Morales became president in 2006 to the present, identifying the main changes and conflicts that have occurred in four areas: social policy, domestic policy, foreign policy, and economy. The methodology is based on the collection of documents from various sources (public and business institutions, researchers, and recognized research centers), and interviews with various social actors (academics, politicians). We conclude that there have been substantial advances in terms of national sovereignty and economic model (overcoming neoliberalism), despite the contradictions and conflicts with sectors of internal dissent.

From the beginning of his presidential mandate in 2006, Evo Morales has shown his loyalty towards a sumptous “indigenous religion”, very different from the “oppressed religion” of native Andean as identified by Liberation theologians during the 1970s. This paper questions the relevance of concepts such as “New-Indian religion” and “Andean religion” commonly used to name it. Instead of categorial attributions which label it as specific of Indian identity, we suggest to take into consideration its previous history (Indianism, Katarism…) as well as the political context in which it develops (State’s secularisation, conflicts with the Catholic church).

The current Bolivian President, Evo Morales, has managed to govern longer than all of his predecessors thanks to his three successful attempts to relax his term limits. In this article I argue that the high risk-taking personality of Morales, especially his social risk-taking, helps to explain why he has consistently tried to extend his time in office. To address this proposition I follow a twofold strategy. First, I show the results of a survey conducted among experts in presidents of the Americas. This survey measured different personality traits of the leaders that governed between 1945 and 2012, including their risk-taking. Second, I examine some of the most important decisions that Morales has made throughout his adult life. Both the survey and the analysis of Morales’ trajectory suggest that his attempts to cling to power are rooted in his risk-taking. El actual presidente boliviano, Evo Morales, ha logrado gobernar más que todos sus predecesores gracias a sus tres intentos exitosos de extender los límites de su mandato. En este artículo argumento que la personalidad de alta propensión al riesgo de Morales, especialmente su propensión a los riesgos sociales, ayuda a entender por qué ha tratado consistentemente de extender su mandato presidencial. Para examinar esta propuesta sigo una estrategia doble. Primero, muestro los resultados de una encuesta realizada a expertos en presidentes latinoamericanos. Esta encuesta midió diferentes rasgos de personalidad de los líderes que gobernaron entre 1945 y 2012, incluyendo su propensión al riesgo. Segundo, examino algunas de las decisiones más importantes que Morales ha tomado a lo largo de su vida adulta. Tanto la encuesta como el análisis de la trayectoria de Morales sugieren que sus intentos por conservar el poder están arraigados en su propensión al riesgo.

El régimen internacional de control de drogas vigente prohíbe el cultivo de la coca en su es­tado natural y su uso tradicional. Sin embargo, impulsado por movimientos sociales en de­fensa del uso tradicional de la coca, el Estado de Bolivia en 2011 denunció la Convención Única de Estupefacientes –principal instru­mento del régimen– y luego fue readmitido con una reserva sobre la masticación de la coca. ¿Por qué esa defensa de la coca por parte de los movimientos sociales, a través del Estado, puede entenderse como una práctica contra hegemónica en este régimen internacional des­de la llegada de Evo Morales a la Presidencia? Este análisis cualitativo mostrará que el Estado no llegó a articular un bloque hegemónico internacional, pero tiene un comportamiento contra hegemónico al visibilizar prácticas y saberes históricamente excluidos.

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