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Moral evidentialism is the view that one ought morally to believe only what is suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. As announced in the title, an argument for (a slightly restricted version of) this view is presented. The argument crucially relies on two specific links between belief and assertion, namely that one should not believe what one must not assert, and that one must not assert what is not suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. In both cases, the normativity involved is moral. The links are established, and it is shown how to deal with seemingly apparent counterexamples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical Bayes-based Methods (EBM) is an increasingly popular form of Objective Bayesianism (OB). It is identified in particular with the statistician Bradley Efron. The main aims of this paper are, first, to describe and illustrate its main features and, second, to locate its role by comparing it with two other statistical paradigms, Subjective Bayesianism (SB) and Evidentialism. EBM's main formal features are illustrated in some detail by schematic examples. The comparison between what Efron calls their underlying "philosophies" is by way of a distinction made between confirmation and evidence. Although this distinction is sometimes made in the statistical literature, it is relatively rare and never to the same point as here. That is, the distinction is invariably spelled out intra- and not inter-paradigmatically solely in terms of one or the other accounts. The distinction made in this paper between confirmation and evidence is illustrated by two well-known statistical paradoxes: the base-rate fallacy and Popper's paradox of ideal evidence. The general conclusion reached is that each of the paradigms has a basic role to play and all are required by an adequate account of statistical inference from a technically informed and fine-grained philosophical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemological role of emotions and other affective states by defending two claims. First, affective states might do more than position us to receive evidence or function as evidence. Affective states might be thought to appraise evidence, in the sense that affective states influence what doxastic state is rational for someone given a body of evidence. The second claim is that affective evidentialism, the view that affective states function rationally in this way, is not just possible but plausible and fruitful. We offer two arguments in favor of affective evidentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a commentary on Neil Van Leeuwen's Religion as make‐believe focusing on the normative aspects of this book. According to Van Leeuwen, religious credences are not factual beliefs, and they are held to different standards of rationality than factual beliefs. Hence, religious believers are able to track and represent those states of affairs that govern their practical lives while also holding views that deviate significantly from it, such as divine omnipotence. Here, I examine whether this reasonable compartmentalization in religious believers holds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the book "Normative Reasons: Between Reasons and Explanation" by Artūrs Logins, which seeks to reconcile views about the nature of reasons that seem to be in opposition. Topics discussed include the reconciling projects in the book, factor that makes something normative reason for Logins, and desiderata/constraints that Logins articulated for a theory of normative reasons.

Ateizmin gerekçelendirilmesi gereken bir tutum olup olmadığı ve hangi koşulların sağlanması durumunda rasyonel bir gerekçelendirmeden bahsedilebileceği sorunu, en az teizmin gerekçelendirilmesi sorunu kadar önemlidir. Bu makalede ateizmin inançsızlık veya Tanrı inancının bulunmaması şeklinde negatif yolla tanımlanması durumunda nasıl bir gerekçelendirmenin öngörüldüğü ele alınmaktadır. Ateizm, inançsızlık olarak ele alınırsa, bu durum onun gerekçelendirmeden muaf olduğu sonucuna götürebilir mi? Ateistin “Tanrı vardır” önermesinin yanlış, “Tanrı yoktur” önermesinin doğru olduğunu gösterme amaçlı bir ispat yükümlülüğü bulunmamakta mıdır? Ateistik gerekçelendirme söz konusu olduğunda karşımıza delilin yokluğu yaklaşımı ve yokluğun delili yaklaşımı olmak üzere iki farklı seçenek çıkar. Bu makalenin konusu olan delilin yokluğu yaklaşımının değerlendirilebilmesi için öncelikle “Tanrı vardır” önermesinin doğruluğuna dair yeterli delil bulunmaması durumunda bu önermenin inkârının zorunlu olup olamayacağı ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra ise yeterli delil bulunmaması durumunun negatif ateizmden pozitif ateizme geçişi meşru kılıp kılamayacağı irdelenmiştir. Makalede ateizmin gerekçelendirilebilmesinin, delilin yokluğunun yokluğun delili için yeterli görüldüğü bir savunmadan ziyade pozitif deliller ile mümkün olabileceği savunulmaktadır. Ateizm, önermesel bir tutumdan ziyade bir tür psikolojik inançsızlık hâli olarak değerlendirilirse bu durum, onun epistemik boyutunun göz ardı edilmesine neden olacaktır. Bu çalışmada ateizmin Tanrı’nın varlığına dair inançsızlık veya bir tür kayıtsızlık hâli olarak görülmesinin imkânı irdelenmekte ve bu durumun ateistik savunuya bir katkı sağlayamayacağının gösterilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Delilci bir bakış açısından herhangi bir delil sunmadan ateizmin doğru olduğu sonucuna ulaşılması, kendi kendisine referansla tutarsız görünmektedir.

In this paper, we put forth an analysis of sensitivity which aims to discern individual from merely statistical evidence. We argue that sensitivity is not to be understood as a factive concept, but as a purely epistemic one. Our resulting analysis of epistemic sensitivity gives rise to an account of legal proof on which a defendant is only found liable based on epistemically sensitive evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contains a new argument for evidentialism as an ethical rather than an epistemic doctrine. The argument relies on new developments in consequentialist thinking. The insights of the proponents of the moral encroachment thesis are used to show that we need higher standards of evidence, and to develop the concept of ethically sufficient evidence. It is demonstrated that prospectivism (subjective consequentialism) supports the contentions that we should not believe without ethically sufficient evidence, that we are permitted to believe when we have it, and that we are obligated to investigate to acquire it. It is argued that we do not have any obligations to believe. The ethical evidentialism argued for here is distinguishable from Clifford's ethics of belief. Developing the doctrine clarifies some of our moral obligations, makes a positive contribution to prospectivism, and shows that evidentialism is better construed as an ethical doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to many philosophers there are only pro tanto oughts to believe relative to a standard of assessment: there are epistemic oughts to believe, moral oughts to believe, prudential oughts to believe etc. But there are no oughts to believe simpliciter. Many of the same philosophers who hold this view, also hold that ought to believe is to be understood deontologically – such that if S violates such an ought without excuse, S is blameworthy for doing so. I here argue that on a deontological understanding of ought to believe there must be ought to believe simpliciter and that it is the violation of this ought that determines whether we are to blame for our beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Currently popular theories of epistemic responsibility rest on the (perhaps implicit) assumption that justification and excuse exhaust the relevant normative categories. One gets the sense that, once we've laid down the conditions for justified belief, and once we've laid down the conditions of excusably unjustified belief, the work is done; all that's left is to clock out. Against this backdrop, one is naturally led to think that if an agent's doxastic state—her various beliefs and belief-like attitudes, or a subset thereof—fails to be justified, it is thereby unjustified, perhaps excusably so. The aim of this paper is to argue that that natural thought is mistaken; some agents are epistemically incompetent, and in virtue of their incompetence, their doxastic states are neither justified nor unjustified (even excusably). Instead, the doxastic states of such agents are exempt from epistemic evaluation altogether. I argue that what underlies this point about exemptions is that epistemic competences or abilities play an important and typically overlooked role in epistemology, especially in theories of epistemic responsibility. Here, I am interested in uncovering that role and explaining what it is, and also in explaining how one could accommodate it within various epistemological frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are cases in which epistemic rationality seems to conflict with practical rationality. Evidentialists such as Parfit, Shah, Skorupski and Way deny that there are practical reasons for belief. On their view, the only genuine normative reasons for belief are epistemic reasons, and so the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. But I argue in this paper that the evidentialists can still face a genuine dilemma between epistemic and practical rationality which cannot be resolved on the grounds that the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief.

In this article, I consider how the epistemic problem of religious disagreement has been viewed within the Islamic tradition. Specifically, I consider two religious epistemological trends within the tradition: Islamic Rationalism and Islamic Traditionalism. In examining the approaches of both trends toward addressing the epistemic problem, I suggest that neither is wholly adequate. Nonetheless, I argue that both approaches offer insights that might be relevant to building a more adequate response. So, I attempt to combine insights from both by drawing a distinction between inferential and noninferential reflective responsibility. Given this distinction, I argue that it may be possible for a theist to remain steadfast in upholding their tradition-specific theistic belief, without having to hold that belief by way of inference; but nevertheless, having to be sufficiently reflectively responsible in forming their theistic belief noninferentially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William James argued that certain beliefs require a leap of faith before sufficient evidence becomes available—and his paradigm example of such beliefs is taken from science. Scientific knowledge often begins with a weakly supported and underdeveloped proposal, laden with contrary evidence, and plagued by internal inconsistencies. Consequently, the proposal often garners limited interest. Initially, a novel scientific proposal only appeals to a small group of scientists who instinctually find something in the proposal that strikes them as profoundly right. Motivated by faith, they are convinced that once the hypothesis has been further developed, revised, and its full promise made good on over the course of years or decades of hard work, that their early belief will ultimately be vindicated. The present paper contends that James' "The Will to Believe" justifies religious faith on precisely the same grounds. James' defense of faith is an attempt to apply his views about belief ahead of sufficient evidence in scientific knowledge formation to defend a religious believer's faith. The relationship between belief and evidence when it comes to the religious hypotheses is—as James puts it—analogous to California's gold. California is where one travels to bring gold back from, carrying gold to California is to get matters backwards; likewise, belief is the means of discovering scientific and religious truth, to demand evidence before belief is the wrong way around. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment "propagates" from the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reading W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” in evidentialist terms is standard. However, evidentialist accounts face several longstanding interpretive issues over the Shipowner Story and Clifford’s Motto. This article defends an evidentialist reading. But what distinguishes it from others is that it interprets “The Ethics of Belief” according to Clifford’s “first principle of natural ethics”, a principle he articulates in prior writings, and which comes down to social trust. I reorient Clifford’s evidentialism by returning to his core moral principle and argue that doing so can establish coherence across Clifford’s writings on ethics and can help resolve the relevant interpretive issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the concept of epistemic akrasia, which refers to situations where individuals hold beliefs that they acknowledge to be irrational. The author presents cases that challenge the assumption that akratic beliefs are always irrational, including instances where akratic beliefs can be rational from the individual's perspective. The article also explores different arguments and principles related to the rationality of akrasia, ultimately concluding that akratic beliefs may not necessarily be problematic and that individuals should not be criticized for holding such beliefs. [Extracted from the article]

Taking as a point of departure the long-standing debate on the forms and function of description in realist writing, I reflect on the status accorded to details within literary descriptions in early nineteenth-century fiction. I argue that, in the movement towards realism, details—especially in character descriptions—acquire a new evidential function. They act as clues to be deciphered or symptoms to be interpreted by the reader within a system of signification that can be associated with the evidential paradigm, as defined by Carlo Ginzburg. The first section of the essay focuses on the changing function of details within literary descriptions between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and discusses, from different disciplinary perspectives, three examples of the epistemic shift that was brought about by the rise of the evidential paradigm. The second section of the essay takes Manzoni as a case study and focuses on the evidential function of details in I Promessi Sposi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that the judge must reach certitude and then proceed to issue a judgment is a truth acknowledged in the law of proof of claim. Acquiring certitude is subject to a set of norms and rules called "ethics of certitude". Not all certitudes, with different bases, could be considered valid. Regardless of the philosophical and epistemological issues regarding the nature of certitude, how to achieve it is also very important. Relativists believe that the criterion of acceptability and validity of certitudes is their reliance on reason. A valid certitude is a certitude that is justified by sufficient evidence and reasons. A certitude that is not supported by reason lacks epistemological value and validity and cannot be used as a basis for action. The necessity of the judge's compliance with the rules related to the ethics of certitude is higher because judicial certitudes involve important social and practical consequences. The certitude of the judge seriously affects the rights and social affairs of the people; therefore, achieving the certitude is extremely important to the judge. In a descriptive-analytical way, the present article examined and compared the rights of proof of litigation with the criteria of certitude ethics. Whether the judge has the authority to evaluate the evidence freely or whether he has to agree to the provisions of the evidence and issue a verdict based on them are among the most critical challenges of proving a claim. The current study examined proving a lawsuit in the courts from the perspective of ethics of certitude. According to al-Qaida, a judge must follow all the moral rules and knowledge frameworks to gain certitude, and only then can he make his certitude the basis for issuing a verdict. The basic question is whether it is possible to pay attention to these criteria in the court according to the rules governing the rights of proof of litigation and the criteria raised regarding the validity of certitudes. Is it possible that the rules related to proof of litigation conflict with the principles of certitude ethics? One of the most important challenges ahead is the concept of imposing proof on the judge. Some reasons, such as confessions, regardless of whether they convince the judge or not, "must" be the basis for a verdict. Such a concept strengthens the hypothesis that it is basically not important for the legislator to believe in the judge, and contrary to the initial idea, the judge, without certitude and knowledge about the subject of the lawsuit, must also make his decision. On the other hand, the free assessment and the granting of absolute discretionary powers concerning the evidence in the case give rise to the fear of judicial tyranny and disregard for reasons. It seems that a correct understanding of how the judge acquires certitude is related to the fundamental positions in the ethics of certitude. Without paying attention to these original foundations, getting a clear and comprehensive picture of the relationship between reason and the judge's certitude is impossible. Although the prevailing approach in the domestic and international legal systems is that the judge is free to evaluate and accept reason, epistemological investigations and attention to the foundations of moral certitude clarify that certitude gets its value and validity from reason and not vice versa. On this basis, it is not acceptable for the judge to hear (consider) the reason and pass it by without gaining certitude. Either one should argue against the reason, or as long as the light of the reason is clear, one should stick to its implication and believe its contents. In this sense, the imposition of evidence and their priority on the judge's certitude is more defensible than arbitrary freedom in accepting and rejecting evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can epistemic paternalistic practices make us better epistemic agents? While a satisfying answer to this question will ultimately rest at least partly on empirical findings, considering the epistemological discussion on evidence, knowledge, and epistemic virtues can be insightful. In this paper, Giada Fratantonio argues that we have theoretical reasons to believe that strong epistemic paternalistic practices may be effective at mitigating some evidential mistakes, in fostering true belief, and even for allowing the subject of the intervention to gain knowledge. However, we have reasons to expect that these practices will not be able to make the subject of the intervention an overall better epistemic agent at the dispositional level. She then considers weak epistemic paternalistic practices, e.g., epistemic nudging, and provides some reasons for optimism. Finally, Fratantonio considers the implications that these theoretical considerations have for education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to recently popular pragmatist views, it may be rational for one to believe p when one's evidence doesn't favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper, I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic control in purported cases of epistemic akrasia by appealing to the more comprehensive and distinct phenomenon of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the 20th century, Richard Feldman's and Earl Conee's evidentialism attracted many interests as it is seen as an interesting theory of epistemic justification. Feldman and Conee explains evidentialism as a theory of justification which posits that every knowledge claim must be justified only by evidence. That is, for a proposition to be epistemically justified, there must be a fitting evidence that qualifies it to be justified. It is the quality of the believer's evidence that is prerequisite for any epistemic justification, and this evidence must internal to the person. Put differently, one's evidence for a belief must be available to the person and not just a hearsay or an unverified testimony. Over the years, many critiques have been developed by different philosophers against this view of justification. In the same manner, Feldman and Conee, together with some evidentialists have rebutted to these critiques with counter-argument, in order to prove that evidentialism is the most plausible theory of justification. Against this background, this work adopts a hermeneutic methodological approach to examine Feldman's and Conee's evidentialism as a theory of justification. By exposing, discussing, and examining their thoughts, it argues that evidentialism although being a plausible theory of justification, lays much emphasis on evidences available to the believers, leading them to a quagmire of skepticism. It therefore recommends that evidentialism could be modified to address its limitation if it adopts critical methods to examine individual evidences irrespective of the degree of evidences, in order to establish a more fitting evidence that would be unquestionable for epistemic justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new wave of evidentialist theorizing concedes that evidentialism may be extensionally incorrect as an account of all-things-considered rational belief. Nevertheless, these newer evidentialists maintain that there is an importantly distinct type of epistemic rationality about which evidentialism may be the correct account. I argue that natural ways of developing the newer evidentialist position face opposite problems. One version, due to Christensen (Philos Phenomenol Res 103:501–517, 2021), may correctly describe what rationality requires, but does not entail the existence of a distinctively epistemic type of rationality. Another version, due to Maguire and Woods (Philos Rev 129:211–249, 2020), characterizes a normative concept that is both distinct and epistemic, but struggles to explain why this concept should be classified as a type of rationality. I conclude that the newer evidentialist strategy of extensional compromise may be less favorable to evidentialism than previously supposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines pantheism within the framework of the 'faith and reason' field in the philosophy of religion, with an emphasis on the question of the relationship between pantheism and empirical–scientific rationality. I address this question from what I call the Wittgensteinian Nonoverlapping Magisteria (WNOMA) approach to religion and science. WNOMA affirms a categorial difference between religious and scientific language and attitudes. This difference is interpreted with the help of Wittgenstein's distinction between religious and scientific beliefs and van Fraassen's distinction between religious and empiricist stances. This means that WNOMA is antievidentialist regarding religious beliefs and sees the experiential and instinctive aspects of religion as more fundamental than the systematic–intellectual aspect. Part of the variety in contemporary pantheism relates to the question of whether the emphasis is on the experiential–spiritual side of pantheism or its intellectual side, i.e., whether pantheism is 'hot' or 'cold'. I examine a few telling examples: Spinoza, Einstein, the World Pantheism Movement and a recent awe-some argument for pantheism by Ryan Byerly. The main contribution of this paper is a critical reading of these versions of pantheism from a WNOMA perspective, through which I hope to establish the plausibility and show some of the persuasive force of the WNOMA approach to pantheism, focusing on the relation of pantheism to scientific rationality on the one hand and felt experience on the other. I argue that hotter kinds of pantheism can be intellectually virtuous if they find a way to combine the empiricist stance and pantheist religious stance, even without a developed philosophical or theological system. I also argue that colder and philosophically rigorous pantheism can be problematic if it assumes religious evidentialism, neglects the experiential part of pantheism in favor of intellectualism or/and confuses the spheres of science and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most salient objections against paternalism is that it is motivated by a negative judgment about other people's capacity to advance their own goals and interests. Such a negative judgment, according to this objection, is morally wrong because it denies others the status of moral equals who can rationally set and pursue their own conception of the good. Despite the popularity of this objection, I argue that it misfires because rendering a negative judgment about others' capacities does not deny them equal moral status when there is sufficient evidence for that judgment. However, I argue that in order to determine if there is sufficient evidence of the agent's incapacity, we must understand the agent's reasons for action through a rational discursive exchange with them, instead of taking perceived facts about their behavior as sufficient grounds for a negative (or positive) judgment of their capacities. In fact, I argue that if the outcome of the discursive exchange supports a negative judgment of the agent's capacities, there is a pro tanto case in favor of paternalistic interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For scholars that are working with epistemology and the importance thereof within the context of the ongoing bickering (fighting/mudslinging) between theist and atheists, or rather between rationality and irrationality of epistemology in theology and religion, may come to view epistemology of religion and theology as a monument from where a better belief system (as an incentive) can have a better effect on the current faith systems. Therefore, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic language games should be able to form this massive, sovereign metaphysical game. This affirmation should follow the historical fact of any metaphysical promise so that such a religious custom, should suggest that not only the Judo-Christian-Islamic language games, yet, all relevant creative queries should also be evaluated as components of the single game, with a solitary position of a decree and therefore all seven headings used in this article are relevant. The author is in a short discussion with Peter Forrest regarding his article Epistemology of Religion (2021) in establishing a positive outlook on how different views on the epistemology of religion and theology may surpass scholars which can expand and then better the current integrity-base epistemology of theology and religions.

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, I support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced choice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much – needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there epistemic duties to inquire? The idea enjoys intuitive support. However, prominent evidentialists argue that our only epistemic duty is to believe well (i.e. to have doxastically justified beliefs), and doing so does not require inquiry. Against this, I argue that evidentialists are plausibly committed to the idea that if we have epistemic duties to believe well, then we have epistemic duties to inquire. This is because on plausible evidentialist views of evidence possession (i.e. views that result in plausible theories of evidentialist justification), inquiry is sometimes a necessary constitutive means of forming doxastically justified beliefs—beliefs that are proportioned to and based on one's evidence. So, either evidentialist views of evidence possession commit them to epistemic duties to inquire or they lead to independently implausible theories of evidentialist justification. My discussion also has important implications for the zetetic turn in epistemology, since I argue that evidentialists who are staunchly opposed to epistemic norms on inquiry have reason to reconsider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidentialism as an account of epistemic justification is the position that a doxastic attitude, D, towards a proposition, p, is justified for an intentional agent, S, at a time, t, iff having D towards p fits S's evidence at t, where the fittingness of an attitude on one's evidence is typically analyzed in terms of evidential support for the propositional contents of the attitude. Evidentialism is a popular and well-defended account of justification. In this paper, I raise a problem for evidentialism on the grounds that there can be epistemic circumstances in which a proposition is manifestly and nonmisleadingly supported by an agent's total evidence, and yet believing the proposition is not justified for the agent. As I argue, in order for an agent to have justification to believe a proposition, it needs to be the case that the belief as possessed by the agent could exhibit certain epistemic good making features, e.g., the propositional content of the belief as possessed by the agent would be supported by the agent's evidence. As I demonstrate, the fact that a proposition, p, is supported by an agent's total evidence at a time, t, doesn't guarantee that a belief in p as possessed by the agent at t could exhibit any epistemic good making features, including having propositional contents (i.e., p) that would be supported by the agent's evidence. Thus, the fact that a proposition is supported by an agent's evidence doesn't guarantee that the agent has justification to believe the proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I raise two challenges for the primary argument of Adam Carter's Autonomous Knowledge. The first is that his argument for thinking that internalist theories of epistemic justification face problems from TrueTemp-style examples is unsound. The second is that the autonomy condition that Carter argues for is not new as it seems to be already implicit in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman's account of well-founded belief. Ultimately, I do not see these challenges as undermining the value of Carter's project. Rather, these challenges help illuminate that what Autonomous Knowledge does is provide a powerful argument for Evidentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explain why we should be structurally rational – or mentally coherent – is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena – positive illusions – are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist stance would imply that we are caught in unsolvable dilemmas arising from positive illusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the speech code of American evangelicalism, the symbolic term "Christian worldview" and its companion term "biblical worldview" are ubiquitous. Speech codes theory (SCT) holds that symbolic terms simply and quickly communicate complex ideas, values, and meanings that are taken for granted in the shared culture of a speech community. Symbolic terms accomplish this work by activating community members' cognitive schemata or shared mental organization of cultural knowledge. The present study elaborates the historical and contemporary ideas, values, and meanings tacitly conveyed by "Christian worldview," reports field observations of a one-year "worldview" small group Bible study and interprets this symbolic term as a defining marker of American evangelical culture. SCT holds that a distinctive culture manifests a distinctive speech code of socially constructed meanings that shape its cultural life. The study argues that the symbolic terms "Christian worldview" and "biblical worldview" shape American evangelical culture life according to meanings essential for interpreting that culture and for the discursive constitution of evangelical subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the epistemological trajectory of the philosophy of Religion, contemporary religious epistemologists seem to have undertaken the task of attestation of religious beliefs, their defence, ascertainment and justification, resorting to sanctioned methods of epistemic justification. The models of epistemic justification of religious beliefs they have adopted were intended to bring in a kind of objectivity into the religious realm and make meaningful assertions on shared experiences. The acclamation of such esteemed epistemic attempts should be viewed as feverish attempts made by religious epistemologists to subject religious beliefs to standard epistemic treatment. In this paper, three contemporary models of justification of religious beliefs by three outstanding religious epistemologists, namely, Alvin Plantinga, whose theory of proper basicality and the warrant, the epistemological holism with the application of Lakatosian principle in Philosophy of Science by Nancey Murphy and the cumulative case evidentialism by Richard Swinburne are critically analysed using the parameters of logical consistency, methodological acumen, norms of belief formation, the role of subjectivity, features of religious language and the hermeneutic dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractIn Reason and the Heart, William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category.

As public discourse moves online, Singapore's Government has increasingly begun to regulate online speech via the use of Targeted Speech Directions, which are issued against statements or communications deemed to amount to fake news or foreign interference. This article maps the law on Targeted Speech Directions in Singapore, touching on three issues – the consistency of these Directions with constitutional theories of free speech, the extent of judicial oversight available and the applicable evidential rules in challenges brought to these Directions – which bear materially on how these Directions are used and their influence on the future Singaporean public discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article contests the widely received view that Peirce and James are irreconcilably opposed on the issue of evidentialism. Whereas it is typically supposed that Peirce endorses an evidentialist position opposed to the anti-evidentialism of James's important essay "The Will to Believe," it is argued here that Peirce's own commitment to the spirit of the scientific enterprise involves a limited anti-evidentialist stance. Much like James, Peirce maintains that there can be no evidence to support one's initial faith that the pursuit of scientific inquiry is capable of yielding knowledge of reality, and that such a commitment to the communal activity of science rests ultimately upon certain hopes and sentiments. It is also acknowledged, however, that James admits counterexamples to evidentialism which Peirce would not endorse, insofar as Peirce's anti-evidentialism is strictly limited to those beliefs necessary to motivate the pursuit of the scientific enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition) that I call ' the Paradigm-case Thesis '. In Section 4, I respond to some concerns that McCain and Lemos raise in connection with my discussion of the rationality of seemings. Lastly, Section 5 covers a few remaining objections from McCain and Lemos having to do with Chisholm's "Problem of the Criterion," the comparative strength of seemings, and the challenge of identifying which seemings count as epistemic intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a piece of common sense that we can be mean-spirited, cruel, and unfair in the ways that we form beliefs. That is, we can wrong others through our doxastic activity. This fact shows that, contrary to an increasingly widespread view in the ethics of belief literature, morality has a role to play in guiding doxastic deliberation, and evidence is therefore not the only 'right kind of reason' for belief. But the mere existence of doxastic wronging does not tell us anything about how, exactly, morality enters into doxastic deliberation. These two lessons are crucial for getting debates in the ethics of belief back on the right track. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The philosophical school of Evidentialism holds that people should form, amend, and relinquish a belief wholly in accordance with the available evidence for that belief. This paper reviews the extent to which believers in paranormal phenomena respect Evidentialism’s so-called “ethics of belief.” The analysis focuses on several common violations of evidentialist principles, namely, those pertaining to belief formation as a moral issue, belief inflexibility, belief inconsistency, confirmation bias, and disconfirmation effects. Despite some gaps and methodological shortcomings in the available data, the empirical literature documents an association between paranormal beliefs and a broad lack of sympathy with evidentialist ethics, although the effect sizes of these relations typically are small. The possible basis of this characteristic is briefly explored.

In a recent article, William C. Roach (2019) offers a presuppositional critique, which is inspired by Carl F. H. Henry, of Michael R. Licona’s (2010) so-called New Historiographical Approach (NHA) to defending the resurrection. More precisely, Roach attempts to defend six key theses, namely, that (1) the NHA is an evidentialist approach, (2) the NHA is a deductive argument, (3) the NHA is an insufficient approach, (4) believers and unbelievers share no common ground, (5) the NHA does not embrace a correspondence theory of truth, and (6) the presupposition of divine revelation is necessary for apologetics. We respond to each of Roach’s arguments, respectively.