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This paper aims to shed light on the field of European defense policy. The final objectives are to address on the legal instruments that are in the hands of the Treaty of Lisbon relating to defense policy, as well as due to the gap in legislation where it is capable through a logistical mechanism of the blockchain to find suitable solutions to protect the European people of the member states of the European Union. In parallel, European defense through an important industry at a global level should evaluate, control the system of the blockchain even in an experimental stage and play an active role towards the approach for European armies of integration, paths that follow the defense policy not to bring greater security to the European system but as a "mandatory" necessity to address war crises and not only. The method used in the present work is based both on the doctrine in question as well as on the relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU. The doctrine is updated and makes use of the latest binding and not acts of the institutions of the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed divisions in European strategic culture and threat perception. The search for a lowest-common-denominator response to the threat has hampered the European reply to the Russian aggression, often forcing the EU to move at the speed of its slowest member, whether in supplying ammunition and equipment to Ukraine or setting up the defence industry needed to accelerate such a supply in the future. Notwithstanding the importance of keeping a broad coalition together, this article argues that it is now time to create a vanguard of like-minded European nations, led by France, Poland and, though not an EU member, the UK, but open to other states, which can force the creation of a new strategic culture able to meet the Russian threat. This 'Beowulf Group', named after the Danish hero from the Anglo-Saxon epic who stood up to the marauding monster Grendel, could establish a Strategic College for Europe, a joint Elite European Reserve Legion and a strategic communications centre, to move European policy in a more active direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Etter den russiske invasjonen av Ukraina 24. februar 2022 har flere europeiske land måttet revurdere sin sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk. Dette gjelder også Frankrike. Selv om endringen i fransk sikkerhet- og forsvarspolitikk ikke representere et regelrett brudd med tidligere politikk, har trusselen fra øst nå fått økt betydning også for fransk forsvarsplanlegging. De viktigste endringene i fransk sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk er knyttet til en omlegging av Russlandspolitikken, økning i støtten til Ukraina, og sist, men ikke minst en endret trusselvurdering og en betydelig økning i forsvarsbudsjettene. Med Russland aggresjon og usikkerhet rundt amerikansk langsiktig forpliktelse til europeisk sikkerhet, har Frankrikes fokus på strategisk autonomi også fått bredere støtte blant de europeiske allierte. Abstract in English: War in Europe and French Contributions to European Security Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, several European countries have had to reconsider their security and defense policies. This also applies to France. Although the changes in French security and defense policy do not represent a complete break with previous policy, the threat from the East has now gained increased significance for French defense planning as well. The most important changes in French security and defense policy are related to a shift in its policy towards Russia, increased support for Ukraine, and last but not least, a revised threat assessment and a considerable increase in defense budgets. With Russian aggression and uncertainty regarding the long-term U.S. commitment to European security, France’s focus on strategic autonomy has also gained broader support among European allies.

This study set out to examine if a potential crash of the virtual currencies market could cause the next global financial crisis, given its continuous growth and popularity and the risks associated with their use, and at the same time what would be the impact on European Defence and the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), by making a parallel with the effect that the 2008 financial crisis had. A series of methods, techniques and tools have been adapted to the research objectives, specifically: gathering sources, data collection, analysis method, descriptive method, deductive, inductive, and comparative methods. As the financial institutions started to invest in the new currencies seeking high returns, the market finds itself in an uncanny similar position as it was before the Great Recession. A new recession may represent an opportunity for the EU defence sector considering that lower budgets allocated for defence would put an increased pressure on the states to have better cooperation and solve the exiting issues related to the capability development and at the same time would force them to restructure the defence industry and markets. Nevertheless, a financial crisis could represent a risk for the member states to be forced to cut their budgets allocated to the military in an uncoordinated manner which could lead to even bigger gaps related to capability development which could be translated into diminished opportunities to implement the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a new impetus towards an enhanced European defence pillar, while many EU members have announced significant increases in their respective defence budgets over the coming years. Expectedly, a large percentage of the capital and technological inputs required to support the efforts towards a common European defence and the increased defence needs of many EU members will be procured from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The European defence companies are among the major suppliers of conventional arms in the world. Their cumulative share of world arms exports is the second largest globally. This paper uses a Benefit-of-the-Doubt (BoD) model via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to comparatively evaluate the sales performance of major European defence industries vis-à-vis other major international arms producers. The sample used in the analysis contains 72 firms and spans the period 2016–2020. The findings indicate that on the whole US defence manufacturers have a dominant presence among the biggest global producers and outrank many major European companies. These findings offer valuable policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France and Germany agree on the need to further European defence-industrial cooperation, but boast radically different preferences on how to structure such cooperation. Why? To answer this question, we introduce the distinction between the two faces of market size – the first exclusively related to defence, the second including the broader commercial-industrial base. Since Germany is, overall, more competitive than France in the commercial sector but less competitive in the defence one, it will advocate for a full-fledged integration of the European defence market but seek to protect its less competitive defence industry from France by championing autonomy in ad-hoc arms programmes. In turn, France would prefer to leverage its defence-industrial advantage by injecting efficiency on arms programmes but resist pan-EU initiatives to integrate the defence market, which would benefit Germany more over the long-term. To test our argument, we examine French and German preferences towards the European Defence Fund and the Future Combat Air System. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(2), 765-777 | European Forum Insight of 21 November 2023 | (Table of Contents) I. Crises and threats, incentives for a stronger EU defence - I.1. The initiatives stemming from the EUGS - I.2. The spill-over effect phenomenon applied to the current geopolitical situation - II. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - III. Consequences of the conflict on PESCO - III.1. Consequences on the more binding commitments - III.2. Consequences on the projects - IV. PESCO: an innovative and useful tool, not yet unleashed to the full potential. | (Abstract) The history of a unified European defence has persistently shaped the European Union's foreign policy, evolving over time. The EU has worked on a robust and coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly boosted by the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, which was issued after external shocks threatened Europe, necessitating strategic priorities to adapt to the evolving geo-political landscape. This pursuit mirrored the historic "spill-over effect", wherein threats led to coordi-nated integration. The subsequent development saw the launch of initiatives, including the European Defence Fund (EDF), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and Permanent Structured Coop-eration (PESCO) aiming at aligning national defence planning, promoting collaboration, and reinforcing European defence. The Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 triggered a renewed need for integration and cooperation, Member States sought enhanced defence measures, including strengthening PESCO and NATO, and establishing the European Political Community (EPC). In this In-sight, we will explore how the shifting geopolitical landscape impacts European defence, especially fo-cusing on PESCO, a framework defined in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and introduced via the EUGS. After analysing PESCO's structure and key elements, we will assess whether the current situ-ation can drive greater integration and address conflict-related challenges. We will also examine potential future scenarios resulting from these changes.

The war in Ukraine, coupled with a more turbulent international system characterized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China, is leading to a simultaneous change in the demand and supply side of the European defence market. On the demand side, European countries are adapting their procurement plans to move from a crisis management phase dominated by asymmetric warfare against small states or non-state actors to an era of strategic competition and potential conflict against peer adversaries. On the supply side, European defence industries are preparing to meet the increased demand for major equipment from national governments in the short term, while at the same time trying to be ready to invest in long-term innovation, in order to anticipate future government requirements for the new era. This paper investigates the interactions between demand and supply in the European defence market and provides a first illustration of the trade-off between prioritizing short-term readiness over long-term innovation and vice versa [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union defence sector is not only crucial for the EU's security, but it is also a major industrial asset for EU member states, as it may foster innovation and greater integration among member states, as well as facilitate technology transfer. The understanding of and inferences about the sector, however, are laborious since data on the defence industry in Europe is often contradictory and confused and it is mostly compared at the national not at the European level. As a contribution to address such shortcomings and as opening piece for this Special Issue, this article focuses on the finding, collecting, cleaning, and organizing data on the geographical concentration/location of EU defence industries. This is a fully original descriptive analysis of the current situation, and it provides a reliable basis on the concentration/location of defence companies. This paper represents a firm basis from which to explore (in future research) how defence companies contribute to the technological integration of the EU and it should help the reader to better understand the following articles in this Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Critical Appraisal draws a picture of the current state of the EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by building on the 7 Papers included in the Defence Studies Special Issue dedicated to "European Defence". The authors assess the EU defence industry consolidation process, describing the trends that shape it and the variety of actors involved. In the complex European defence market, opposite – but not mutually exclusive – trends of consolidation and fragmentation coexist. The authors conclude that the EDTIB is likely to continue developing along these apparently contradictory lines, where the variety of public and private actors involved cooperate and compete simultaneously, according to a plethora of interests. The Appraisal suggests several areas for future research and touches upon new EU defence initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and it's precursor programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fragmentation of the European defence market hampers the establishment of a unified European defence. The European Union (EU) has implemented initiatives like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF) to address this issue. However, a comprehensive understanding of the European defence market and its consolidation, which is essential for evaluating these programs, remains insufficient. This article aims to observe the configuration of the European defence market and its evolution over time, exploring potential trends towards consolidation. The authors contend that despite the fragmented nature of the European defence market, a few larger companies from four countries hold significant positions. They also identify a positive trend towards consolidation, although institutional incentives perpetuate market fragmentation. To delve deeper, the authors analyze the funding allocation for defence companies through the preparatory programs of the European Defence Fund. Their analysis encompasses 65 projects awarded to 430 companies between 2016 and 2020, supplemented by insights from three focus groups and an expert survey conducted in the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden. This article suggests avenues for future research on the EDF, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive understanding of market consolidation and the efficacy of current initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article retraces and reconstructs the process of developing and launching the European Union's Military Mobility project. Situated in the agenda-setting and policy-transfer literature, this article explicates the establishment and implementation of the Military Mobility project and helps to explain the entire policy and development process around the Military Mobility initiative to date. By drawing on process tracing, this article methodologically unpacks the process surrounding this policy development at the EU level. The results show that the European Commission has expanded its competences within the defence field by purposefully and politically acting upon the worsened security situation in and around Europe, while actively building coalitions and managing good working relations with the actors involved in the project. Moreover, the findings show that the EU services have learned from NATO in the defence domain. Thus, this analysis contributes to a greater understanding of the new role of the European Commission in the field of EU security and defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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European strategic autonomy has become a common motto since the EU's Global Security Strategy (2016). France and Germany have for several years been playing a leading role in promoting the concept even though they share quite different views on what such autonomy should aim for, especially in a context of multipolarity and power re-configurations. This article analyzes the role of French-German input in European strategic autonomy relying on two criteria: input legitimacy (procedures) and output legitimacy (efficiency). Based on three concrete examples (the MPCC, PESCO, and the European Strategic Compact), the article explores the French-German input in developing European autonomous military tools and capabilities and seeks to explain the legitimacy of this input based on factors such as the historical legacy of French-German military cooperation and the use of political symbolism. Then the article focuses on the question of the efficiency (output) of this bilateral input in European strategic autonomy. The main advantage of this approach is its explanatory power to capture the hiatus between the strong output legitimacy that Paris and Berlin bring into European strategic autonomy and its rather limited empirical output produced. This hiatus can be explained by strategic cultural divergences between Paris and Berlin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The February 2022 military aggression on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across European capitals as well as across the Atlantic. This "new normal", namely a conventional war in twenty-first century Europe, is both hard to process and inherently ominous as to the future of the European security architecture and strategic stability on the continent. The aim of the article is to analyse the combined effects of technological advances in information/computing technologies and human cognition on strategic choices such as nuclear deterrence strategies. The paper is looking to address the proposed research questions through a cognitive psychology lens, with a particular focus on perception and cognitive dissonance. The plasticity of both the geopolitical environment and the information space present the optimal conditions for propagation of cognitive errors in human decision-making. The article is taking a closer look at what said vulnerability means for the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, most specifically for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications of a potential outbreak of high-intensity violent conflict between the United States and China in Pacific for the defence of NATO’s eastern flank. It identifies limits of American ability to simultaneously project force to two distant regions as potentially critical weakness in case of concurrent conflict in Asia and threat to the eastern flank.

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Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Populism is establishing itself as one of the ideas with the most potential of influencing modern-day international relations and defense initiatives, both inside conference rooms and outside of them. Positioned firmly within the realm of liberal democracy, its general image is that of a discourse that is not only critical of society's elites1 and demands that power be given back to the people, but also as a volatile and "thin-centered" ideology. Considering the EU's new Strategic Compass and aims to become a reliable security provider, this paper looks to prove the negative impact that populism can have on the Union's security and defense initiatives, and on international military cooperation as a whole. With approximately 40% of current European populist parties being against increased defence cooperation within the EU's framework3, this is a risk that must be carefully managed. This paper doesn't solely take into account the discourse of populist political parties, but also the general feeling of the population in regard to these issues. As a result, any defence initiatives that rely on consensus and public acceptance are at risk. Using data gathered from academic sources and documents regarding the political use of social media, I will use the EU's Strategic Compass as a case study, postulating potential scenarios. The aim is to emphasize how both populist actors and tendencies can constrain European defence cooperation. They can use it as an issue through which to mobilize the electorate and win votes, particularly since both left-wing and right-wing populist parties emphasize ideas that can challenge European cooperation in this field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union's long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission's European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission's new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The increasing cost of weapons, decreasing defence budgets and globalization of armaments supply-chain have made defence-industrial cooperation a priority in the European context. However, despite strong systemic incentives, European cooperation in defence-industrial activities remains very discontinuous. Why do European countries decide to cooperate with their partners in some instances and refrain from acting cooperatively in others? The present article introduces market size as a variable to elucidate different first and second-tier states' approaches towards European defence-industrial cooperation. While firms settled in larger domestic markets lobby to maintain existing technological capabilities, firms in smaller domestic markets prefer to be competitive in limited sectors of the defence-industrial supply-chain in order to preserve export market niches. The article tests the plausibility of this argument by way of in-depth case studies of the French, German and Italian approaches towards two collaborative armaments projects: the Eurofighter and the A400M. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2003, the EU decided to develop the operational tempo by launching its very first military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Known as "Operation Artemis", this represented an essential stage within the process of developing the EU autonomous profile in crisis management. By using the case study of Artemis Operation as a research method, I intended to highlight the development of the main parameters of the future EU operational design. Within this approach, I also followed the process of setting-up the conceptual framework related to rapid reaction capabilities, especially Battle Groups. In this respect, Artemis had an essential role in adapting European cooperation to the challenges of planning and executing tasks in a demanding operational environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a growing "momentum" on European Union (EU) security and defence, there are no academic analyses that aim to systematically assess the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in these strategic domains. This is surprising given that the HR/VP is one of the central actors in the complex institutional architecture of EU security and defence. To fill this gap in the scholarly literature and to contribute to a more fine-grained analysis of the two post-Lisbon Treaty HR/VPs, the article assesses Ashton and Mogherini's mandates in these fields. This study is particularly relevant because the HR/VP's hybrid institutional role may represent a unique analytical angle to investigate a formally intergovernmental sector, strongly shaped also by EU institutions' authority over defence-industrial policy. Following these considerations, the article looks at how the two HR/VPs managed to navigate both the military and the defence-industrial dimensions of EU security and defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relaciones Internacionales (1699-3950) is the property of Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, International Relations Studies Group (GERI) Law Faculty and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyses how crises may open policy windows which, when properly seized by policy entrepreneurs, made European defence policy a priority on the EU's agenda. The article compares two periods which can be considered as critical junctures for European defence: the periods of its birth in 1998-1999, and its relaunch in 2016-2019. The analysis is based on the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) and considers European defence as a public policy shaped by policy actors. More precisely, the main hypothesis is that in both contexts policy actors from France and Germany took advantage of focusing events - the Kosovo War in 1998-1999, and Brexit extended by the election of Trump introducing turmoil within the transatlantic partnership in 2016-2019 - to advocate a policy solution to answer security challenges faced by the EU. The article also assesses how British policy actors played decisive yet inverse roles in both contexts. The first part of the article explains how the MSF is used and why it is a stimulating agenda to study European defence policy. The second part of the article analyses the policy entrepreneurs taking advantage of the policy windows opened in both cases, and how they coupled the three streams underlying European defence by exploiting the British variable. The last part of the article focuses on the means used by the policy entrepreneurs to make it a policy priority on the European policy agenda in both the late 1990s and 2016-2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time constitutes social life and time management is central to the everyday conduct of international politics. For some reason, however, the practice turn in International Relations (IR) has produced knowledge about how past practices constitute international politics but not about how the future is also a constitutive feature in and on social life. Introducing a novel perspective on practice and temporality, the article argues that intersubjectively situated representations of the future by practitioners in international politics contribute substantially to our understanding of political processes and the making of international politics. To develop what appears a contradiction in terms – that 'future-practices' are driven by tacit know-how and conscious reflection simultaneously – the article develops the concept of doxic futures: representations of the future rooted in practical knowledge and tacit assumptions about the self-evident nature of the social world. The argument is illustrated with a case study of European security and defence diplomacy after the UK voted to leave the EU. Through the envisioning of two concrete doxic futures, a 'Europe of buying together' and the UK as a third country in EU defence, diplomats effectively tried to save European security and defence cooperation from the potentially disintegrating effects of Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European cooperation in the field of defence is not a new topic, being a constant feature in the last decades. The entry into force of the new EU Treaty (Lisbon Treaty - 2009) made it possible for the cooperation in the field of defence to be upgraded to a more integrated approach, under the institutional auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The key features are centred on a more practical approach in the field of capabilities development with real industrial output. Equally, this process was incentivised through the EU Security Strategy, which made defence cooperation a top priority. Within this framework, several concepts and ideas were put forward, which generated practical initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Coordinated Annual Defence Review (CARD), European Defence Fund (EDF). However, there are certain questions to be answered on the future of this European project, considering the level of maturity reached in a very short time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the study of European defence has been dominated by a 'Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-centric' approach, while largely neglecting the comparative analysis of national defence policies. This article makes a conceptual and empirical case for turning the dominant research prism of European defence studies upside down by returning the analytical precedence to the national level. This approach privileges the comparative analysis of national defence policies and armed forces, before focusing on the trans-/supra-national level. The case for this analytical turn is made in three steps. Firstly, it addresses the different historical stages in European defence integration and the transformation of national armed forces and thereby brings to light the recent renationalization of defence in Europe. Secondly, it questions the predominance of the CSDP in the scholarly literature on European defence. Finally, it seeks to demonstrate the fruitfulness of such a démarche by empirically substantiating common patterns and intra-European divergences in the evolution of national defence policies and armed forces since the end of the Cold War. After having shown the need and added benefit of turning the analytical lense of European defence studies on its head, the conclusion suggests future avenues of research on national defence policies and armed forces in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU defence policy has been extremely popular over the past three decades, averaging around 75% public support. In fact, no other policy domain is as popular and robust as the idea of pooling national sovereignty over defence. However, public support for EU defence has been dismissed as mere "permissive consensus", rather than genuine support. Scholars have often assumed that public opinion towards European integration is passive and shallow, especially over foreign policy issues, where the public has limited understanding of the complexity of issues. Consistent with contemporary findings about the complexity of comparative foreign policy attitudes, the authors contest the permissive consensus logic and demonstrate that European publics have held coherent preferences over the use of force at the European level. The authors conclude that the slow progress of integration in this area is due to the reluctance of elites rather than to the reticence of Europe's citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years there have been important initiatives to favour greater harmonization among EU member states' defence-industrial policies. However, EU countries sometimes decide to cooperate in the development of defence-industrial projects, to maintain defence procurement on a national basis or to import extra-EU armaments. To investigate the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition, focusing on how the process of differentiated integration shapes European defence-industrial governance, this paper assesses Italian participation in two major European armaments organizations (OCCAR and the European Defence Agency), as well in two new EU initiatives in this sector (PeSCo and the European Defence Fund). Specifically, this analysis focuses on national state-arms industry relations as a crucial explanatory variable in the formation of Italy's preferences towards defence-industrial cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a case study of the potential application of serious gaming in the area of European Defence. In the last years game technology has been successfully applied to enhance capabilities in many areas, including in the training of peacekeeping personnel. The role of serious game technology for EU Defence has not been sufficiently explored. The research hypothesis is that serious gaming could serve as a tool for an in-depth study and foresight of alternative scenarios for the future development of EU Defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The defence planning process has been one of the main areas where the European defence project progress has been substantially reflected. The evolution towards defining a European profile in managing the planning dimension associated with defence has been carried out in a short but very consistent timeframe, consistency deriving from the successively assumed transformations and innovations. The comprehensive character is the fundamental feature of the matrix in which planning aspects tend to be managed at the EU level. Overall, we talk about the coexistence of traditional aspects of force planning with prospective elements in the use of security and defence capabilities. Considering these coordinates, the profile of the planning process is an evolutionary approach, with a relevant conceptually-strategic foundation, through the Lisbon Treaty and the Global Security Strategy. The present study aims at highlighting, on the one hand, the particular nature of the developments in the definition of planning procedures and, on the other hand, the specificities developed in this context. An important role is also given to valuing the elements of the future European defence planning model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, defence policy, across Europe, has traditionally been the preserve of the nation state. That remains the default situation today, despite over two decades of movement towards a common EU security and defence policy. European leaders, ever since the 1980s, have insisted that the EU level is the most appropriate for this policy area, and public opinion appears to agree with them. Yet, despite many developments in the direction of a 'European army', and despite the launch of dozens of EU overseas missions, defence planning and procurement, as well as the deployment of forces, remain the preserve of the EU's national governments. Since 2016 we have witnessed an intensification of the move towards the EU level. This article argues that it is still too soon to determine whether a genuine shift away from the nation-state level is now in progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission's proposal for the €13 bn European Defence Fund (EDF) to incentivise collaborative defence research and capability development projects with EU funding was an ambitious statement of policy intent to drive forward European defence cooperation. However, the summer 2020 EU budget negotiations left it with only about 60% of that amount over the 2021-2027 period. This debate contribution argues that despite this curtailment in resource and ambition, the European Commission can still maximise the EDF's impact to benefit European defence industry by ensuring that the various defence industrial policy activities it is already leading are achieving their full potential, incentivising EU governments to acquire and use the capabilities developed through the Fund, and maintaining coherence amongst existing research projects, capability development projects, and joint capability requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the defence component of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been revisited over the last few years. It argues that while the CSDP has grown predominantly as a security - rather than defence - policy, the latest developments that include the creation of a military headquarter, the launching of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the new role for the European Commission in defence funding, attest to an evolution towards a more central EU defence policy. In the meantime, the article points to some structural impediments to the materialisation of European defence. The momentum says little about the form and finality of military operations that EU states will have to conduct so as to give a meaning to defence in a European context. Moreover, persisting divergences in the EU member states’ respective strategic cultures and institutional preferences - notably vis-à-vis NATO - are likely to continue to constrain European defence self-assertion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many have noted that EU member states have different preferences over the prospect of an integrated EU defence, analyses that specifically explore state–industry relations in the definition of EU defence-industrial issues, and in the evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy in general, are lacking. This is surprising, given that different configurations of government–industry relations have represented a persistent impediment to European defence-industrial cross-border collaboration. This article investigates how state–defence industry relations impact on member states’ preferences towards the EU defence-industrial framework. Based on the case studies of the interaction of France and the UK with the European Defence Agency, this analysis focuses on the difference between public and private defence firms’ governance settings as the crucial explanatory variable accounting for diverging member states’ preferences in this domain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The re-launch of the EU’s security and defence project in the wake of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump has focused the spotlight on the relationship between NATO and the EU. This article reviews the detailed aspects of that relationship as studied in the various contributions to this special issue. It argues that, over and above cooperation on the ground, the key issue to be addressed, which is usually skated over in the “big picture” literature on this question, is: where is all this heading? Is there a move towards a clear EU–NATO division of labour (if so, will it be geographic or functional?); or are the allies seeking a radical new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans for the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood? The paper argues that EU “strategic autonomy”, as called for in theGlobal Strategydocument of 2016, can only be achieved through the Europeanisation of NATO itself. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On September 1973, the Weu Assembly reintroduced the debate on aeronautical cooperation between the European countries highlighting the benefits engendered by industrial harmonization. Alessandro Pagni, director of external relations of Aeritalia, agreed with the proactive approach of the Weu and the European aeronautical industries, with a caveat: Italian industry did not want to compete against the American one, but to cooperate with and to benefit from, its leading position in the global market. Thus, the Italian Parliament enacted the so-called "Legge Crociani" which funded the aeronautical production in cooperation with Boeing. This essay surveys the role of the Italian delegates and their link with the Italian foreign policy choices. Specifically, it analyses the technician's attitude towards the debate on European cooperation in the aeronautic industry field aiming to illustrate the influence that experts have in shaping foreign and industrial policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]