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Current theories of financial regulation suggest expanding rules-based formal state intervention to promote international banking stability. Such policy solutions should then be global in scope. This article instead argues that principles-based informal co- and self-regulation through domestic (gentlemen’s) agreements underpinned West German bank internationalisation until the 1980s. The analytic narrative approach allows the tracing of the social dynamics of the German politics of regulation, drawing on unused primary sources: Coalitions between the German regulating and regulated actors were bolstered by a liberal domestic framework and bespoke national policies. In contrast, regulatory harmonisation through international prudential standards came with high domestic adjustment costs for the German banking sector. Thus, domestic makeshift solutions to deal with and internalise cross-border financial risks proved most workable.

Global banks and interconnected national banking sectors have been a main characteristic of the modern international financial systems over the last half century. After a sluggish wake up in the early postwar years, international banking took off in the 1970s as the Euromarkets gained traction and strongly developed in the lead up to the international debt crisis of 1982. This article examines the birth of bank globalization in Latin America, a region of the developing world at the centre of global finance and Euromarket developments during this period. It shows that, like their counterparts in industrial countries, leading banking institutions from the region also went international, expanding their presence overseas and their participation in the Euromarkets. The world leading financial centres of London and New York were the main destinations, but they also settled in offshore centres in the Caribbean and other US financial districts from where they conducted international business on their own or in collaboration with other banks. The presence in Germany along with the joint business between Latin American and German banks in the Euromarkets are explored as well. While assessing the extent and scope of early Latin American bank globalization for the first time, the article also provides insights on the evolution and changing nature of this process over the following period.

This paper considers the question of how Brexit will affect the City of London from a long-term perspective, putting the changes induced by Brexit into the context of the City's historical evolution over the past century. This perspective permits us to see that the City has continued to thrive because of a series of radical adjustments necessitated by the UK's loss of its empire and by the emergence of global US financial power. Challenges to the global prominence of the City in Britain's post-empire period have required two separate 'reinventions': the first, in the 1960s, involved localizing the Eurodollar markets; the second, in the 1990s, involved making London the preferred hub for providing sophisticated financial services within the European Union (EU)'s single market. The Great Financial Crisis put in motion several economic and political dynamics that have, however, undercut the City's special global role. It is unclear whether maintaining the City's offshore focus via a third reinvention, in a period of prolonged stagnation and increasing inequality in UK regions outside London, will be possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shortcomings and potential dangers of international financial flows for the health and stability of domestic banking systems in developing countries have been copiously discussed over the last decades. While the importance of capital controls and regulation as determining factors has been widely emphasised, the extent to which these policies work in episodes of financial crisis is still a matter of debate. This article examines the relationship between supervisory frameworks and banking fragility in Mexico and Brazil in the wake of the international debt crisis of 1982. It shows that the model of international banking intermediation that evolved out of the stringent capital mobility system in Brazil was considerably less vulnerable to crisis than in Mexico, which had a more lightly regulated regime. These findings provide insights into historical debates about the implications of prudential regulation and capital controls for the development and expansion of foreign finance, and whether the risks underlying international banking are necessarily inherent in the process of financial globalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents commentary on the article "The Eurodollar Market and Monetary Theory," by Jürg Niehans and John Hewson from the February 1976 issue and their claims concerning liquidity distribution impacts on Euro currency markets. Criticisms are offered suggesting that their conclusions are only valid concerning specific financial periods and not without consideration of several variables such as interbank transactions. Conclusions are offered suggesting that liquidity creation should still be prominently addressed within the market considerations.

Increasing awareness of the potential risks involved in lending to heavily indebted governments focuses attention on credit pricing in the Eurodollar market. This paper utilizes a recent survey of country-by-country risk assessments as perceived by lenders to show that a systematic relationship exists between these assessments and interest rates in the Euromarket. The relationship is derived from an underlying model described in the paper. The estimated parameters verify a number of hypotheses, providing insights on the loss rates lenders expect to incur in case of default. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent article by S. Black on Eurodollar borrowing provides useful insights regarding this market. In particular, the two structural equations [denoted (1) and (2) in Black's study] incorporate many of the arguments that potential borrowers and lenders in this market must utilize in the decision-making process. Yet, two important qualifications emerge from a careful examination of this study. The object of this note is to examine these qualifications in detail and then to determine whether Black's results provide an adequate description of the Eurodollar market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the determinants of the supply of funds to international money markets, tracing the major suppliers and ownership structure of funds in individual market sectors. The author surveys the factors which affect suppliers' choice among available investment media in international money markets and looks at the implications for the international economy of Euro-currency deposit markets. Additionally, inter-connections of international deposit market sectors and their links to other money markets are examined.

The article comments on the article "Capital Market Phenomena," written by M. Larre. The author states that Larre was incorrect in his statement that the only motive for capital market improvement was the 1962 Dillon Report, the U.S. Treasury and other reports, citing American inspiration. The author discusses the motives in improving capital market and also examines the reasons for the lack of progress in the integration of capital market. The article also examines attempts to exchange integration by Euro-bond market.

Since April 2014 to March 2015, the European Central Bank expansionary monetary policy instigates a huge depreciation of the euro in terms of dollar. According to the mainstream monetary theory, these dynamics should make the exports cheaper and at the same time make the imports more expensive. Has real depreciation of the euro helped in the improvement of European countries’ trade balances? Following the main methodologies in the recent literature, our study analyses the effects of this depreciation both for Italy and Germany towards the US. We use industry-level data at monthly frequency. The results are different from each bilateral relationship. We find that 11 industries register a long-run improvement (8 for Italy and 3 for Germany). The J-curve effect is proven just in six cases, always for Italy. The inverted J-curve effect is proven in eight cases, four for Germany, and four for Italy. These results seem to be an indirect demonstration of the structural asymmetries between German and Italian economies: German economic system is more able to be competitive with a strong currency, than Italy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]