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Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and representative surveys thereby overcoming crucial weaknesses of both approaches. One of the major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integration of experiments, which require interaction among the participants, with a survey of non-interacting respondents in a smooth and inexpensive way. We illustrate the power of our approach with the analysis of trust and trustworthiness in Germany by combining representative survey data with representative behavioral data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to elicit people�s trust correlate well with behaviorally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly skilled workers and people living in bigger households exhibit less trusting behavior. Foreign citizens, Catholics and people favoring the Social Democratic Party or the Christian Democratic Party exhibit more trust. People above the age of 65 and those in good health behave more trustworthy or more altruistically, respectively. People below the age of 35, the unemployed and people who say they are in favor of none of the political parties behave less trustworthy or less altruistically, respectively.

Although cooperation can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, cooperative actions only pay off for the individual if others can be trusted to cooperate as well. Identifying trustworthy interaction partners is therefore a central challenge in human social life. How do people navigate this challenge? Prior work suggests that people rely on facial appearance to judge the trustworthiness of strangers. However, the question of whether these judgments are actually accurate remains debated. The present research examines accuracy in trustworthiness detection from faces and three moderators proposed by previous research. We investigate whether people show above-chance accuracy (a) when they make trust decisions and when they provide explicit trustworthiness ratings, (b) when judging male and female counterparts, and (c) when rating cropped images (with non-facial features removed) and uncropped images. Two studies showed that incentivized trust decisions (Study 1, n = 131 university students) and incentivized trustworthiness predictions (Study 2, n = 266 university students) were unrelated to the actual trustworthiness of counterparts. Accuracy was not moderated by stimulus type (cropped vs. uncropped faces) or counterparts' gender. Overall, these findings suggest that people are unable to detect the trustworthiness of strangers based on their facial appearance, when this is the only information available to them.

We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Each subject had to choose an action as first mover and a conditional action as second mover. All subjects also had to state their beliefs about others’ second-mover choices. Using these elicited beliefs, we apply the transparent Selten–Krischker approach to compare the explanatory power of a few current models of social and moral preferences. We find clear differences in explanatory power between the preference models, both without and with control for the number of free parameters. The best-performing models explain about 80% of the observed behavior. We compare our results with those obtained from a conventional maximum-likelihood approach, and find that the results by and large agree. We also present a structural model of belief formation. We find a consensus bias—whereby subjects believe others behave like themselves—and payoff-salience driven optimism—whereby subjects overestimate the probabilities for favorable outcomes.

Background Activation of D1 receptors has been related to successful goal-directed behavior, but it remains unclear whether D1 receptor activation causally tips the balance of weighing costs and benefits in humans. Here, we tested the impact of pharmacologically stimulated D1 receptors on sensitivity to risk, delay, and effort costs in economic choice and investigated whether D1 receptor stimulation would bias preferences toward options with increased costs in a cost-specific manner. Methods In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group phase 1 study, 120 healthy young volunteers received either placebo or 1 of 3 doses (6 mg, 15 mg, or 30 mg) of a novel, selective D1 agonist (PF-06412562). After drug administration, participants performed decision tasks measuring their preferences for risky, delayed, and effortful outcomes. Results Higher doses of the D1 agonist increased the willingness to exert physical effort for reward as well as reduced the preference for risky outcomes. We observed no effects on preferences for delayed rewards. Conclusions The current results provide evidence that D1 receptor stimulation causally affects core aspects of cost-benefit decision making in humans.

Recent studies have suggested close functional links between overt visual attention and decision making. This suggests that the corresponding mechanisms may interface in brain regions known to be crucial for guiding visual attention – such as the frontal eye field (FEF). Here, we combined brain stimulation, eye tracking, and computational approaches to explore this possibility. We show that inhibitory transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the right FEF has a causal impact on decision making, reducing the effect of gaze dwell time on choice while also increasing reaction times. We computationally characterize this putative mechanism by using the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDM), which reveals that FEF inhibition reduces the relative discounting of the non-fixated option in the comparison process. Our findings establish an important causal role of the right FEF in choice, elucidate the underlying mechanism, and provide support for one of the key causal hypotheses associated with the aDDM., eLife, 10, ISSN:2050-084X

Children's self-regulation abilities are key predictors of educational success and other life outcomes such as income and health. However, self-regulation is not a school subject, and knowledge about how to generate lasting improvements in self-regulation and academic achievements with easily scalable, low-cost interventions is still limited. Here we report the results of a randomized controlled field study that integrates a short self-regulation teaching unit based on the concept of mental contrasting with implementation intentions into the school curriculum of first graders. We demonstrate that the treatment increases children's skills in terms of impulse control and self-regulation while also generating lasting improvements in academic skills such as reading and monitoring careless mistakes. Moreover, it has a substantial effect on children's long-term school career by increasing the likelihood of enroling in an advanced secondary school track three years later. Thus, self-regulation teaching can be integrated into the regular school curriculum at low cost, is easily scalable, and can substantially improve important abilities and children's educational career path.

Significance In recent years, models have played an increasingly important role for understanding the brain in cognitive, behavioral, and systems neuroscience. Decision neuroscience in particular has benefitted greatly from the application of economic models of choice preferences to neural data. However, an often-overlooked aspect is that many models of preferences have a generic problem—they make extremely similar behavioral predictions. Here, we demonstrate that to understand the mechanisms of valuation in the brain, it is useful to compare models of choice preferences not only at the behavioral but also at the neural level., Decisions are based on the subjective values of choice options. However, subjective value is a theoretical construct and not directly observable. Strikingly, distinct theoretical models competing to explain how subjective values are assigned to choice options often make very similar behavioral predictions, which poses a major difficulty for establishing a mechanistic, biologically plausible explanation of decision-making based on behavior alone. Here, we demonstrate that model comparison at the neural level provides insights into model implementation during subjective value computation even though the distinct models parametrically identify common brain regions as computing subjective value. We show that frontal cortical regions implement a model based on the statistical distributions of available rewards, whereas intraparietal cortex and striatum compute subjective value signals according to a model based on distortions in the representations of probabilities. Thus, better mechanistic understanding of how cognitive processes are implemented arises from model comparisons at the neural level, over and above the traditional approach of comparing models at the behavioral level alone.

Research over the past decades has demonstrated the explanatory power of emotions, feelings, motivations, moods, and other affective processes when trying to understand and predict how we think and behave. In this consensus article, we ask: has the increasingly recognized impact of affective phenomena ushered in a new era, the era of affectivism? ispartof: Nature Human Behaviour vol:5 issue:7 pages:816-820 ispartof: location:England status: published

Increasing inequality and associated egalitarian sentiments have again put redistribution on the political agenda. Support for redistribution may also be affected by altruistic and egalitarian preferences, but knowledge about the distribution of these preferences in the broader population and how they relate to political support for redistributive policies is still scarce. In this paper, we take advantage of Swiss direct democracy, where people voted several times in national plebiscites on strongly redistributive policies, to study the link between other-regarding preferences and support for redistribution in a broad sample of the Swiss population. Based on a recently developed non-parametric clustering procedure, we identify three disjunct groups of individuals with fundamentally different other-regarding preferences: (i) a large share of inequality averse people, (ii) a somewhat smaller yet still large share of people with an altruistic concern for social welfare and the worse off, and (iii) a considerable minority of primarily selfish individuals. Controlling for a large number of determinants of support for redistribution, we document that inequality aversion and altruistic concerns play an important role for redistributive voting that is particularly pronounced for above-median income earners. However, the role of these motives differs depending on the nature of redistributive proposals. Inequality aversion has large and robust effects in plebiscites that demand income reductions for the rich, while altruistic concerns play no significant role in these plebiscites.

The benefits and mechanistic effects of working memory training in children are the subject of much research and debate. The cumulative evidence indicates that training can alter brain structure and function in the short term and have lasting effects on behaviour. We show that five weeks of working memory training led to greater activity in prefrontal and striatal brain regions, better accuracy, and reduced intra-individual variability in response times. The reduction in intra-individual variability can be explained by changes to the evidence accumulation rates and thresholds in a sequential sampling decision model. Critically, intra-individual variability was more closely associated with academic skills and mental health 6-12 months after the end of training than task accuracy. These results indicate that intra-individual variability may be a useful way to quantify the immediate impact of cognitive training interventions and predict the future emergence of academic and socioemotional skills.

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration, have severe behavioral constraints because the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed behavioral patterns and helps us develop a new mechanism that is more robust and achieves high rates of truth-telling and efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of tailoring implementation mechanisms to the underlying behavioral environment. (JEL C92, D44, D82, D86, D91)

People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N = 3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people’s actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image., People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. Here the authors show how distortions in memory might resolve this tension by demonstrating that people tend to remember being more generous in the past than they actually were.

Reward-predicting cues motivate goal-directed behavior, but in unstable environments humans must also be able to flexibly update cue-reward associations. While the capacity of reward cues to trigger motivation ('reactivity') as well as flexibility in cue-reward associations have been linked to the neurotransmitter dopamine in humans, the specific contribution of the dopamine D1 receptor family to these behaviors remained elusive. To fill this gap, we conducted a randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind pharmacological study testing the impact of three different doses of a novel D1 agonist (relative to placebo) on reactivity to reward-predicting cues (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer) and flexibility of cue-outcome associations (reversal learning). We observed that the impact of the D1 agonist crucially depended on baseline working memory functioning, which has been identified as a proxy for baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. Specifically, increasing D1 receptor stimulation strengthened Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer in individuals with high baseline working memory capacity. In contrast, higher doses of the D1 agonist improved reversal learning only in individuals with low baseline working memory functioning. Our findings suggest a crucial and baseline-dependent role of D1 receptor activation in controlling both cue reactivity and the flexibility of cue-reward associations.

An influential 2005 study by Kosfeld et al. suggested that oxytocin increases trust in strangers. This registered replication study by some of the original authors found no effect of oxytocin on trusting behaviour under the same conditions. In an influential paper, Kosfeld et al. (2005) showed that intranasal administration of oxytocin (OT) increases the transfers made by investors in the trust game-suggesting that OT increases trust in strangers. Subsequent studies investigating the role of OT in the trust game found inconclusive effects on the trusting behaviour of investors but these studies deviated from the Kosfeld et al. study in an important way-they did not implement minimal social contact (MSC) between the investors and the trustees in the trust game. Here, we performed a large double-blind and placebo-controlled replication study of the effects of OT on trusting behaviour that yields a power of more than 95% and implements an MSC condition as well as a no-social-contact (NoC) condition. We find no effect of OT on trusting behaviour in the MSC condition. Exploratory post hoc analyses suggest that OT may increase trust in individuals with a low disposition to trust in the NoC condition, but this finding requires confirmation in future research.

The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. An encompassing understanding of the virtues and vices of markets, including their possible impact on moral values, is necessary to make informed decisions on the spheres in society where the allocation and incentive functions of markets should exercise their power, and where this may not be desirable. In a seminal and highly influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that "market interaction erodes moral values." Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These treatments, however, reveal that repeated play and not market interaction causes the erosion of moral values. Our paper thus shows that neither Falk and Szech's data nor our data support the claim that market interaction erodes moral values.

Why do people sometimes hold unjustified beliefs and make harmful choices? Three hypotheses include (a) contemporary incentives in which some errors cost more than others, (b) cognitive biases evolved to manage ancestral incentives with variation in error costs and (c) social learning based on choice frequencies. With both modelling and a behavioural experiment, we examined all three mechanisms. The model and experiment support the conclusion that contemporary cost asymmetries affect choices by increasing the rate of cheap errors to reduce the rate of expensive errors. Our model shows that a cognitive bias can distort the evolution of beliefs and in turn behaviour. Unless the bias is strong, however, beliefs often evolve in the correct direction. This suggests limitations on how cognitive biases shape choices, which further indicates that detecting the behavioural consequences of biased cognition may sometimes be challenging. Our experiment used a prime intended to activate a bias called ‘hyperactive agency detection’, and the prime had no detectable effect on choices. Finally, both the model and experiment show that frequency-dependent social learning can generate choice dynamics in which some populations converge on widespread errors, but this outcome hinges on the other two mechanisms being neutral with respect to choice.

The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. In an influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These treatments reveal that playing repeatedly, and not market interaction, causes the erosion of moral values. Our paper thus shows that neither Falk and Szech’s data nor our data support the claim that markets erode morals.

For a policy-maker promoting the end of a harmful tradition, conformist social influence is a compelling mechanism. If an intervention convinces enough people to abandon the tradition, this can spill over and induce others to follow. A key objective is thus to activate such spillovers and amplify an intervention’s effects. With female genital cutting as a motivating example, we develop empirically informed analytical and simulation models to examine this idea. Even if conformity pervades decision-making, spillovers can range from irrelevant to indispensable. Our analysis highlights three considerations. First, ordinary forms of individual heterogeneity can severely limit spillovers, and understanding the heterogeneity in a population is essential. Second, although interventions often target samples of the population biased towards ending the harmful tradition, targeting a representative sample is a more robust way to achieve spillovers. Finally, if the harmful tradition contributes to group identity, the success of spillovers can depend critically on disrupting the link between identity and tradition. Efferson et al. use models to examine the reversal of traditions such as female genital cutting. They find that interventions should avoid targeting agents amenable to change and should disrupt any link between cultural identity and traditional practice.

Working memory capacity is thought to play an important role for a wide range of cognitive and noncognitive skills such as fluid intelligence, math, reading, the inhibition of pre-potent impulses or more general self-regulation abilities. Because these abilities substantially affect individuals' life trajectories in terms of health, education, and earnings, the question of whether working memory (WM) training can improve them is of considerable importance. However, whether WM training leads to improvements in these far-transfer skills is contested. Here, we examine the causal impact of WM training embedded in regular school teaching by a randomized educational intervention involving a sample of 6–7 years old first graders. We find substantial immediate and lasting gains in working memory capacity. In addition, we document relatively large positive effects on geometry skills, reading skills, Raven's fluid IQ measure, the ability to inhibit pre-potent impulses and self-regulation abilities. Moreover, these far-transfer effects emerge over time and only become fully visible after 12-13 months. Finally, we document that 3–4 years after the intervention, the children who received training have a roughly 16 percentage points higher probability of entering the academic track in secondary school.

A growing literature at the intersection of personality psychology and behavioral economics investigates the interplay between personality and decision making in social dilemmas (1, 2). Engelmann et al. (3) extend prior research in this area by investigating the role of antisocial personality in the context of a trust game with and without punishment. Previous research suggested that the possibility to punish individuals who fail to reciprocate trust causes an increase in trust and trustworthiness (4, 5) but remained silent about how antisocial personality affects the causal influence of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Some older work in personality psychology reviewed in ref. 6 relied on deception and used hypothetical payments and scenarios. This methodological approach … [↵][1]1To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: j.b.engelmann{at}uva.nl. [1]: #xref-corresp-1-1

There is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others' interests in decision making. This heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other-regarding behaviors, and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations. We tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome-based and reciprocity-based social preferences. We find that non-selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception. Neither at the level of the representative agent nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge. Instead, three temporally stable and qualitatively different other-regarding types emerge endogenously, i.e., without pre-specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types. When ahead, all three types value others' payoffs significantly more than when behind. The first type, which we denote as strongly altruistic type, is characterized by a relatively large weight on others' payoffs - even when behind - and moderate levels of reciprocity. The second type, denoted as moderately altruistic type, also puts positive weight on others' payoff, yet at a considerable lower level, and displays no positive reciprocity while the third type is behindness averse, i.e., puts a large negative weight on others' payoffs when behind and behaves selfishly otherwise. We also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment of individuals to types. Moreover, the three-type model substantially improves the (out-of-sample) predictions of individuals' behavior across additional games while the information contained in subject-specific parameter estimates leads to no or only minor additional predictive power. This suggests that a parsimonious model with three types captures the bulk of the predictive power contained in the preference estimates.

How do fundamental concepts from economics, such as individuals’ preferences and beliefs, relate to equally fundamental concepts from psychology, such as relatively stable personality traits? Can personality traits help us better understand economic behavior across strategic contexts? We identify an antisocial personality profile and examine the role of strategic context (the “situation”), personality traits (the “person”), and their interaction on beliefs and behaviors in trust games. Antisocial individuals exhibit a specific combination of beliefs and preferences that is difficult to reconcile with a rational choice approach that assumes that beliefs about others’ behaviors are formed rationally and therefore, independently from preferences. Variations in antisocial personality are associated with effect sizes that are as large as strong variations in strategic context. Antisocial individuals have lower trust in others unless they know that they can punish them. They are also substantially less trustworthy, believe that others are like themselves, and respond to the possibility of being sanctioned more strongly, suggesting that they anticipate severe punishment if they betray their partner’s trust. Antisocial individuals are not simply acting in their economic self-interest, because they harshly punish those who do not reciprocate their trust, although that reduces their economic payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calculated manner. Antisocial individuals honor others’ trust significantly less (if they cannot be punished) but also, harshly punish those who betray their trust. Overall, it seems that antisocial individuals have beliefs and behaviors based on a view of the world that assumes that most others are as antisocial as they themselves are., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 116 (26), ISSN:0027-8424, ISSN:1091-6490

Activation of DIn a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group phase 1 study, 120 healthy young volunteers received either placebo or 1 of 3 doses (6 mg, 15 mg, or 30 mg) of a novel, selective DHigher doses of the DThe current results provide evidence that D

Incidental aversive affect distorts trust decisions and changes activity and connectivity in social cognitive neural circuitry., Aversive affect is likely a key source of irrational human decision-making, but still, little is known about the neural circuitry underlying emotion-cognition interactions during social behavior. We induced incidental aversive affect via prolonged periods of threat of shock, while 41 healthy participants made investment decisions concerning another person or a lottery. Negative affect reduced trust, suppressed trust-specific activity in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and reduced functional connectivity between the TPJ and emotion-related regions such as the amygdala. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seems to play a key role in mediating the impact of affect on behavior: Functional connectivity of this brain area with left TPJ was associated with trust in the absence of negative affect, but aversive affect disrupted this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral trust. Our findings may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective distortions in healthy and pathological populations.

This paper documents a large association between individuals’ time discounting in incentivized experiments and their positions in the real-life wealth distribution derived from Danish high-quality administrative data for a large sample of middle-aged individuals. The association is stable over time, exists through the wealth distribution and remains large after controlling for education, income profile, school grades, initial wealth, parental wealth, credit constraints, demographics, risk preferences and additional behavioral parameters. Our results suggest that savings behavior is a driver of the observed association between patience and wealth inequality as predicted by standard savings theory.

Brain activity shows underlying motives In humans, two completely different motives may nevertheless lead to exactly the same behavior. Because we can't directly observe motives, modern economists often completely disregard them. However, Hein et al. , using fMRI, show that different human motives can yield observable responses in the brain (see the Perspective by Gluth and Fontanesi). In empathy-based and reciprocity-based altruistic behavior, the direction and the strength of functional connectivity between specific brain regions were different for each motive. Moreover, the connectivity patterns were independent of the behavioral implications of the motives. Science , this issue p. 1074 ; see also p. 1028

Talking about corporate culture has become quite popular in the business world. But why should companies care about corporate culture at all? Why do “soft” concepts like culture matter? Can’t companies simply rely on “hard” facts – the value of clear and efficient institutional rules and incentives? In this Public Paper, we argue that corporate culture is important because human behavior is always co-determined by the prevailing social norms. It is in the company’s interest to shape these norms through a cooperative culture that mobilizes employees’ voluntary cooperation in the pursuit of the firm’s performance goals. Our research provides behavioral foundations for cooperative cultures, based on important scientific insights from contract economics as well as from experimental and behavioral economics.

A large literature shares the view that social norms shape human cooperation, but without a clean empirical identification of the relevant norms almost every behaviour can be rationalized as norm driven, thus rendering norms useless as an explanatory construct. This raises the question of whether social norms are indeed causal drivers of behaviour and can convincingly explain major cooperation-related regularities. Here, we show that the norm of conditional cooperation provides such an explanation, that powerful methods for its empirical identification exist and that social norms have causal effects. Norm compliance rests on fundamental human motives (‘social preferences’) that also imply a willingness to punish free-riders, but normative constraints on peer punishment are important for its effectiveness and welfare properties. If given the chance, a large majority of people favour the imposition of such constraints through the migration to institutional environments that enable the normative guidance of cooperation and norm enforcement behaviours. Fehr and Schurtenberger show that the prevailing evidence supports the view that social norms are causal drivers of human cooperation and explain major cooperation-related regularities. Norms also guide peer punishment and people have strong preferences for institutions that support norm formation.

The evolution of cooperation is a frequently debated topic. A study assessing scenarios in which people judge each other shows that a simple moral rule suffices to drive the evolution of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is a frequently debated topic. A study assessing scenarios in which people judge each other shows that a simple moral rule suffices to drive the evolution of cooperation.

Humans vary substantially in their willingness to take risks. In a combined sample of over one million individuals, we conducted genome-wide association studies (GWAS) of general risk tolerance, adventurousness, and risky behaviors in the driving, drinking, smoking, and sexual domains. We identified 611 approximately independent genetic loci associated with at least one of our phenotypes, including 124 with general risk tolerance. We report evidence of substantial shared genetic influences across general risk tolerance and risky behaviors: 72 of the 124 general risk tolerance loci contain a lead SNP for at least one of our other GWAS, and general risk tolerance is moderately to strongly genetically correlated (to 0.50) with a range of risky behaviors. Bioinformatics analyses imply that genes near general-risk-tolerance-associated SNPs are highly expressed in brain tissues and point to a role for glutamatergic and GABAergic neurotransmission. We find no evidence of enrichment for genes previously hypothesized to relate to risk tolerance.