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ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN SOCIETY AT LARGE, AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGIES AND METHODS HAVE CREATED THE NEED FOR NEW UNIVERSITY COURSES IN THE FIELD OF PEDAGOGY. TO HELP MEET THIS NEED, A ONE-YEAR COURSE ON EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY, WILL BE INTRODUCED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG, BEGINNING SPRING SEMESTER 1968. THE COURSE WILL GIVE THE STUDENTS AN INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATION IN RELATION TO THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, AND TEACH METHODS TO DETERMINE EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES, PLANNING AND DESIGN OF INSTRUCTIONAL CRITERIA AND METHODS, SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION. FINALLY, THE STUDENTS MUST PRACTICALLY APPLY AND INTEGRATE THE THEORETICAL CONTENT OF THE COURSE ON PROJECTS OF THEIR OWN. COURSE LITERATURE IS LISTED. (OH)

This article analyses third-party mediation of identity-based conflicts, which are notoriously difficult to resolve. It seeks to reconcile the contradiction in the mediation literature between the need for less coercive strategies to ensure ownership of a peace agreement and the need for more coercive strategies to reach a final agreement. Through an analysis of mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the article makes four contributions to existing literature. First, the article develops a theoretical ‘best fit’ model that proposes a u-shaped relationship between intensity of mediator coercion and transition through phases of negotiation. Second, it challenges the prevailing notion that pre-negotiation does not involve coercion. Third, it suggests that epistemological and ontological understandings of a conflict and the role of a mediator by both the mediator and the parties mean that mediators enjoy limited capacity to effectively shift from high- to low-coercive strategies. Multi-party mediation can provide the flexibility needed to execute the coercion u-curve effectively. Fourth, it challenges existing understandings of the US-mediated negotiations during the Annapolis process, 2007–08.

Additional file 1: Appendix 1. The Renault-Volvo Coeur project group 1993-1998.

On 30 October 2014, Sweden recognised the state of Palestine. This chapter analyses the reasons for this policy decision, how this has impacted upon relations with Israel, and whether or not this recognition has lead to any positive change for peace. Sweden has since the early 1970's advocated for the Palestinian right to self-determination in the context of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This chapter argues that recognition is thus simultaneously consistent and divergent with previous policy. The decision was intended to advance a peaceful solution to the conflict by trying to level the asymmetry between the two parties, and was based on principles of international law and human rights which have long guided Swedish foreign policy. Recognition has had little tangible positive effect on the peace process, but it has sharpened a long-held feeling in Israel that Sweden is pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli. However, the decision was not at all anti-Israel, as some have suggested, but has been seized upon by a number of Israeli actors for their own political purposes. Regrettably, anti-Semitism continues to exist in Sweden, but mainly among the far-right, and must not be conflated with government policy.