Search

A concept model of a measurement station for gamma-ray spectroscopy for safeguards verification of spent fuel from the future MYRRHA facility has been developed using MCNP6.2. The measurement station consists of a collimator and a lanthanum bromide detector which are placed adjacent to a cylindrical container with the fuel assembly submerged in lead–bismuth eutectic for cooling. The total count rate as well as the peak-area uncertainties for several gamma-ray peaks have been studied for a number of measurement geometries to determine the optimal collimator dimensions and assess how the performance depends on the lead–bismuth container geometry. Finally, the contribution from each fuel pin in the assembly to the detected signal has been determined as a function of gamma-ray energy to determine if the inner parts of the fuel assembly can be assayed with gamma-ray measurements. The results show that the dimensions of the lead–bismuth container will have a considerable effect on both the total count rate and the peak-area uncertainties, but that gamma-ray spectroscopy could be used for verification of spent fuel from MYRRHA.

The paper describes a data library containing material composition of spent nuclear fuel. The data is extracted from burnup and depletion calculations with the Serpent2 code. The simulations were done with a PWR fuel pin cell geometry, for both initial UO2 and MOX fuel load for a wide range of initial enrichments (IE) or initial plutonium content (IPC), discharge burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT). The fuel library contains the atomic density of 279 nuclides (fission products and actinides), the total spontaneous fission rate, total photon emission rate, activity and decay heat at 789,406 different BU, CT, IE configurations for UO2 fuel and at 531,991 different BU, CT, IPC configurations for MOX fuel. The fuel library is organized in a publicly available comma separated value file, thus its further analysis is possible and simple.

The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is a safeguards instrument available to international nuclear safeguards inspectors. It is frequently used to verify fuel on the gross defect level, and approved for partial defect verification, i.e. to assess that parts of a fuel assembly have not been diverted. The current limit for partial defect verification with the DCVD is on the 50% level. In the verification process, an analysis methodology is used where the inspector places a Region-Of-Interest (ROI) around the fuel assembly and assesses the total Cherenkov light intensity within this region. The intensity is then compared to a predicted value, and deviations from the predicted value are used to flag fuel assemblies for further investigations. In this work, we investigate a slightly different analysis approach, where the ROI is split into two or three segments to more accurately capture changes in light intensity in different regions of the captured image. The purpose is to increase the sensitivity of the DCVD to partial defects below the 50% level. Based on simulations of a Pressurised Water Reactor 17x17 fuel assembly, we conclude that a partial defect on the 30% level decreases the Cherenkov light intensity by at least 15% using one single ROI, by at least 20% using a ROI with two segments, and by at least 22% using a ROI with three segments. The analysis approach using two or three ROI segments instead of one thus appears to be more sensitive to partial defects, and can enable more accurate detection of partial defects on the 50% level as well as partial defect detection below the 50% level. Validation of the approach using a limited set of measurement data of intact fuel assemblies supports that detection of light intensity reductions by 20% and 22% is possible, while ensuring that the false positive rate is kept sufficiently low. However, an optimization of ROI segment splits as well as a more extended validation of the approach is required before the method can be considered reliable and applicable to all fuel assemblies that the DCVD can verify today.

The radionuclide composition of, and emitted radiation in, spent nuclear fuel from the future MYRRHA facility have been studied using depletion simulations to understand potential consequences for safeguards verification using non-destructive assay. The simulations show that both the gamma-ray and neutron emission rates in spent MYRRHA assemblies are lower than in spent PWR UO2 and MOX assemblies. In addition, gamma-ray emission rates from 134Cs and 154Eu are considerably lower, and the total neutron emission rate in MYRRHA fuel is much less sensitive to fuel burnup and cooling time. The main reason is that the fast neutron spectrum in MYRRHA affects the radionuclide production in the fuel. One result is that 244Cm, the main contributor to the neutron emission in spent light water reactor fuel, has a limited production in MYRRHA. Consequently, neutron-detection techniques could be used to more directly assay the plutonium content of spent MYRRHA fuel.

The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is a tool used to verify irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage by imaging the Cherenkov light produced by the radiation emitted from the assemblies. It is frequently used for partial defect verification, verifying that part of an assembly has not been removed and/or replaced. In one of the verification procedures used, the detected total Cherenkov light intensities from a set of assemblies are compared to predicted intensities, which are calculated using operator declarations for the assemblies. This work presents a new, time-efficient method to simulate DCVD images of fuel assemblies, allowing for estimations of the Cherenkov light production, transport and detection. Qualitatively, good agreement between simulated and measured images is demonstrated. Quantitatively, it is shown that relative intensity predictions based on simulated images are within 0.5% of corresponding predictions based solely on the production of Cherenkov light, neglecting light transport and detection. Consequently, in most cases it is sufficient to use predictions based on produced Cherenkov light, neglecting transport and detection, thus substantially reducing the time needed for simulations. In a verification campaign, assemblies are grouped according to their type, and the relative measured and predicted intensities are compared in a group. By determining transparency factors, describing the fraction of Cherenkov light that is blocked by the top plate of an assembly, it is possible to adjust predictions based on the production of Cherenkov light to take the effect of the top plate into account. This procedure allows assemblies of the same type bit with different top plates to be compared with increased accuracy. The effect of using predictions adjusted with transparency factors were assessed experimentally on a set of Pressurized Water Reactor 17x17 assemblies having five different top plate designs. As a result of the adjustment, the agreement between measured and predicted relative intensities for the whole data set was enhanced, resulting in a reduction of an RMSE from 14.1% to 10.7%. It is expected that further enhancements may be achieved by introducing more detailed top-plate and spacer descriptions.

Before encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository, the fuels need to be verified for safeguards purposes. This requirement applies to all spent fuel assemblies, including those with properties or designs that are especially challenging to verify. One such example are quivers, a new type of containers used to hold damaged spent fuel rods. After placing damaged rods inside the quivers, they are sealed with a thick lid and the water is removed. The lid is thick enough to significantly reduce the amount of the gamma radiation penetrating through it, which can make safeguards verification from the top using gamma techniques difficult. Considering that the number of quivers at storage facilities is foreseen to increase in near future, studying the feasibility of verification is timely. In this paper we make a feasibility study related to safeguards verification of quivers, aimed at investigating the gamma and neutron radiation field around a quiver designed by Westinghouse AB and filled with PWR fuel rods irradiated at the Swedish Ringhals site. A simplified geometry of the quiver and the detailed operational history of each rod are provided by Westinghouse and the reactor operator, respectively. The nuclide inventory of the rods placed in the quiver and the emission source terms are calculated with ORIGEN-ARP. The radiation transport is modeled with the Serpent2 Monte Carlo code. The first objective is to assess the capability of the spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT) to verify the content for nuclear safeguards purposes. The results show that the thick quiver lid attenuates the gamma radiation, thereby making gamma radiation based verification from above the quiver difficult.

Using a high-purity Germanium gamma-ray energy spectroscopic detector system, time-stamped list-mode data sets were acquired during axial scanning of 19 boiling water reactor (BWR) and 28 pressurized water reactor (PWR) type of nuclear fuel assemblies. The data sets were collected during two measurements campaigns in September 2016 and March 2019 at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear (Clab) in Sweden. A certified calibration source of 137Cs was positioned along the central line of sight between the measured fuel assembly and the detector. Data sets from measurements with only the calibration source and other background sources, i.e. without a nuclear fuel assembly present, are also included. The list-mode structure of the measured data allows for an axially-resolved as well as energy-spectral resolved intensity of nuclide-specific gamma lines emitted from the spent nuclear fuel. Data presented here can be used e.g. for validation of gamma-ray transport simulation tools or for development of methods to estimate parameters of the spent nuclear fuel based on data from gamma-ray spectroscopy.

The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is an imaging tool used by authority inspectors for partial defect verification of nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage, i.e. to verify that part of an assembly has not been diverted. One of the currently adopted verification procedures is based on quantitative measurements of the assembly's Cherenkov light emissions, and comparisons to an expected intensity, calculated based on operator declarations. A background subtraction of the intensity data in the recorded images is necessary for accurate quantitative measurements. The currently used background subtraction is aimed at removing an electronics-induced image-wide offset, but it is argued here that the currently adopted procedure may be insufficient. It is recommended that a standard dark-frame subtraction should be used, to remove systematic pixel-wise background due to the electronics, replacing the currently used offset procedure. Experimental analyses show that a dark-frame subtraction would further enhance the accuracy and reliability of DCVD measurements. Furthermore, should ageing of the CCD chip result in larger systematic pixel-wise deviations over time, a dark-frame subtraction can ensure reliable measurements regardless of the age of the CCD chip. It can also help in eliminating any adverse effects of malfunctioning pixels. In addition to the background from electronic noise, ways to compensate for background from neighbouring fuel assemblies and ambient light are also discussed.

Safeguards verification of irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage is frequently done by measuring the Cherenkov light in the surrounding water produced due to radioactive decays of fission products in the fuel. This paper accounts for the physical processes behind the Cherenkov light production caused by a single fuel rod in wet storage, and simulations are presented that investigate to what extent various properties of the rod affect the Cherenkov light production. The results show that the fuel properties has a noticeable effect on the Cherenkov light production, and thus that the prediction models for Cherenkov light production which are used in the safeguards verifications could potentially be improved by considering these properties.It is concluded that the dominating source of the Cherenkov light is gamma-ray interactions with electrons in the surrounding water. Electrons created from beta decay may also exit the fuel and produce Cherenkov light, and e.g. Y-90 was identified as a possible contributor to significant levels of the measurable Cherenkov light in long-cooled fuel. The results also show that the cylindrical, elongated fuel rod geometry results in a non-isotropic Cherenkov light production, and the light component parallel to the rod's axis exhibits a dependence on gamma-ray energy that differs from the total intensity, which is of importance since the typical safeguards measurement situation observes the vertical light component. It is also concluded that the radial distributions of the radiation sources in a fuel rod will affect the Cherenkov light production.

The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) [1] is a tool used by nuclear safeguards inspectors to verify irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage based on the Cherenkov light produced by the assembly. Verifying that no rods have been substituted in the fuel, so-called partial-defect verification, is done by comparing the intensity measured with a DCVD with a predicted intensity, based on operator fuel declaration. The prediction model currently used by inspectors is based on simulations of Cherenkov light production in a BWR 8x8 geometry. This work investigates prediction models based on simulated Cherenkov light production in a BWR 8x8 and a PWR 17x17 assembly, as well as a simplified model based on a single rod in water. Cherenkov light caused by both fission product gamma and beta decays was considered. The simulations reveal that there are systematic differences between the model used by safeguards inspectors and the models described in this publication, most noticeably with respect to the fuel assembly cooling time. Consequently, if the intensity predictions are based on another fuel type than the fuel type being measured, a systematic bias in intensity with respect to burnup and cooling time is introduced. While a simplified model may be accurate enough for a set of fuel assemblies with nearly identical cooling times, the prediction models may differ systematically by up to 18 % for fuels with more varied cooling times. Accordingly, these investigations indicate that the currently used model may need to be exchanged with a set of more detailed, fuel-type specific models, in order minimize the model dependent systematic deviations.