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Este artigo é composto por uma breve apresentação da obra hoje conhecida por Altercatio Hadriani Augusti et Epicteti philosophi, de autoria desconhecida, a que se segue uma proposta de tradução do seu texto latino para o Português de Portugal.

Ancient Greece knows a term to designate childhood fear: μορμολύκεια. They were witches or dark creatures evoked by mothers and nurses to discipline children who didn't behave. This article intends to understand how the term 'μορμολύκεια' is used by Plato in the Phaedo, and how Epictetus uses it to conceive the position that the philosopher must have in the face of death and the fear of death. Thus, the fear of death can be understood as a childhood fear of something that should not worry. The somber face of the dreadful μορμολύκεια translates ontological absence and fertile imagination that interfere with the pursuit of knowledge and philosophical life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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According to BL. Hijmans, in face of the question about the philosophical character of Epictetus' thought it is possible to state that it doesn't constitutes, in fact, a philosophy. For Hijmans, Epictetian stoicism is built from an unquestionable set of beliefs that are based on a relationship of submission to a divine principle that is responsible for creating and commanding the cosmos. For that reason, Hijmans affirms that two things are missing in Epictetus' thought to characterize it as philosophy, namely: the sense of perplexity or wonder typical of a philosophical reflection and the self-criticism. In this sense, our article will propose two objections to Hijmans' arguments in order to demonstrate that Epictetus' stoicism has the necessary characteristics to be considered, in fact, philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I talk about the conception of the Stoic sage as simultaneously courageous and devoid of anger. To do so, I will follow the path below: I will talk about stoicism, individuality and multiculturalism; about why Stoics seek to understand and not judge; about ingrained beliefs; on courage rather than rage in the ideal of the Stoic sage; about the always imperfect character of humanity. After that, I will exemplify what was said with the example of Musonius Rufus when trying to peacefully stop the troops of Mark Antony Primus who were about to invade Rome at the end of the year 169. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attention that Foucault devotes to Hellenistic philosophy and its excerpts within the stoicism presented throughout the course The Hermeneutics of the Subject between the years 1981 and 1982, given at the college de France, on the problem of the subject's constitution, raises a look specific towards the constitution of an ethos based on techniques from which the subject sees himself under the eyes of the other and attentive to his directions. This relationship established between master and disciple throughout ancient philosophy, from the Greeks to the Hellenists, being accentuated in stoicism, draws the attention of the French philosopher, who, in turn, delves into the texts and letters of several philosophers of the School of the Portico. In this work, specifically, I try to make a small cut of Foucault's look for some notes made about Epictetus, one of the great names of stoicism. It is a brief reflection because the proposed theme is undoubtedly vast and inexhaustible, both on the part of the French philosopher and on the part of the Stoic philosopher in question. In this line, I will seek, in addition to suggesting a reflection, to problematize with Foucault the issues related to the constitution of the self, from the epictetian perspective, trying to open the way to think the subject of the present day that is constituted by the same ways as the Greco-Roman subject, that is, from the other. But the question is: who would be this other and even more, how to know and how to recognize this other as a subject that is constituted from practices and techniques of oneself? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Na parte da ética e dos preceitos para um bom desenvolvimento ético a filosofia do estoico Epicteto tem muitas convergências com as práticas e os ensinamentos de filosofias orientais, a ponto de algumas pesquisas sobre essas concordâncias terem sido levadas a cabo em algumas escolas. No entanto, apesar dessas convergências, nosso estudo preliminar pretende mostrar que há diferenças substanciais e importantes entre as metafísicas de ambas as filosofias que apoiam essas práticas e princípios éticos. Além de algumas diferenças nos fundamentos metafísicos entre essas filosofias, a que nos chama atenção é sobre o fim último que ambas declaram e o qual dá sentido e significado tanto às práticas éticas quanto seus princípios. Aquele que pratica ou estuda esses princípios metafísicos de ambas as filosofias, embora tenham práticas convergentes, têm um direcionamento de fim último completamente diferenciados, o que influencia em suas justificativas morais e naquilo que chamamos hoje de sentido da vida. O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar essas diferenças para um melhor entendimento das idiossincrasias de cada filosofia e assim, para estudos posteriores de suas éticas, considerar essas diferenças como caraterísticas fundamentais e irrevogáveis de cada escola filosófica para evitar aproximações metafísicas em função das práticas éticas convergentes.

O presente artigo aborda a dimensão psicológica da filosofia de Epicteto. Para tal, exploramos inicialmente a distinção epictetiana entre as coisas que dependem de nós e as que não dependem, visto que é por meio dela que o filósofo separa o que é interno do que é externo. Ao fazer isso, ele foca a abordagem ética naquilo que é interno, pois afirma que é isso que depende de nós (ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν). Dentre as ações que são ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν, o desejo parece possuir uma relevância específica, uma vez que condiciona os demais âmbitos de ação. Além disso, outro aspecto psicológico importante para a compreensão da filosofia epictetiana é a sua concepção de προαίρεσις, dada a identificação desta com o “eu”.

The present article has two goals: the first is to present, even if in general lines, the thought expressed in Laozi's work, Dao De Jing, considered one of the greatest classics of the chinese thought. The second goal is to engage in a initial dialogue between the assumptions presented by Laozi's daoism and Epictetus's stoicism and, from here, establish a discursive space between these two traditions of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epícteto, el filósofo estoico del siglo II de la e.c., nos presenta su visión ética en este discurso Sobre el embellecimiento. Se apoya en los preceptos socráticos del “Conócete a ti mismo” y “Cuídate a ti mismo”, pero los complementa maravillosamente con el “Ordénate a ti mismo”. Es una visión en la que la ética y la estética son embellecidas por la cosmética.

In the present article, I will argue that, for Epictetus, (1) the human being who puts his good in things beyond his burden (aprohairetic things) will accuse God when these things are removed from him; therefore, you will not be grateful to God; (2) the human being will be grateful to God who puts his good in things at his charge, things that cannot be suppressed in any way and for which we have full responsibility; (3) the human being will be grateful to God who recognizes that God has granted all humans the ability to choose unimpeded; (4) A human being will be able to recognize divine providence in the things that have been given to him for the supply of his own life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Stylos is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

this paper explores some thesis about the use of the word prohairesis by Epictetus. We try to explain why a stoic philosopher uses an Aristotelian notion in order to express the most important concept of his philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este capítulo se pretende trazar un arco histórico desde Sócrates a Foucault, pasando por Epicteto, según el cual el hilo conductor de la Filosofía es una forma integral de vida y/o arte de vivir y no una simple actividad especulativa académica. El abordaje se realiza a la luz de los autores Pierre Hadot y Alexander Nehamas. Finalmente, se resalta el influjo de Epicteto y su Arte de vivir en el último Foucault, que constituyó todo un hallazgo filosófico praxeológico: una ‘estética de la existencia’ plenificada en la Parresía o veridicción neocínica. Transcribimos como aporte vivencial un acápite epictetiano reasumido por Foucault en sus últimos días.

Apresentamos aqui a tradução comentada de duas diatribes de Epicteto que tocam o tema da lógica, que lançam luz sobre a questão da importância prática dos estudos lógicos para os estoicos, já que, de acordo com o pensamento epicteteano, o homem, para bem agir, precisa deliberar, e a deliberação humana não pode prescindir da razão.

It is uncontroversial that the criterion of correction for actions according to the Stoics was due to some form of rationality. What is not uncontroversial is the form of this rationality. This article seeks to answer this question on the basis of Epictetus' Diatribes. Two theses - on which arguments for the best actions are built - are central to this contention. The first is that our rational capacity allows us to understand the relation of part/whole and this relation attributes rationality to our actions. It is because the rational agent understands her actions as belonging to a whole that they acquire intelligibility as good. Actions are good and should be done to the extent that they are parts of the whole that is good. The second thesis is that we have duties insofar as we are part of this whole. This stems from a notion of the function of the part regarding the whole as well as between the parts in their relation to the whole. We may add a third thesis which is fundamental to stoicism. Since the whole determines all the results obtained by the part, these results will depend only partially on the agency of the parts taken in isolation. So, the results no longer guarantee intelligibility to human action. That is why the goodness of an action is derived entirely from the part-whole relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The correct use of phantasiai is a central theme for Epictetus' ethics of well-being. Usually they are translated as impressions or representations. But it seems that in the texts of Diatribes and Encheiridion we can see a dual use of phantasia: one in the sense of what appears (outside the individual) that is the phenomenon and another in the sense of what we do with them (interior to the individual) that is the representation (presenting again to / in itself). What we do with them is part of Epictetus's ethic of well-being, but what appears before we make use of it is what we will treat as a phenomenon (which many authors translate by impression). This is where we will discuss in this text: what is the quality or characteristics of this phenomenon in Epictetus ethics. How does he present himself before the individual before he makes use of phantasiai and what relation does he have with the exercise of representations. As a basis of phenomenology for this research we will use the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the ethics pronounced by Epictetus relates to a philosophical stance, more precisely with a philosophical attitude. This attitude is not a prior requirement to think about ethics philosophically, since it is not a mandatory requirement to begin philosophizing, but it is the manifestation of authenticity of the one who calls himself a philosopher, because it shows the real assimilation of opinions and theories he advocates. For Epictetus, the progress of the philosopher is necessarily bound up with his progress in the field of ethics, and it is impossible to untie them. By understanding philosophy as a way of life, he warns so that the theory is always put into practice, thus establishing the well-known ascetic character of his teachings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We will present in general terms the educational principles of Epictetus and his conception of philosophy. We use Pierre Hadot's notion of spiritual exercises to highlight the existential dimension and practicality of his philosophical education. The main pedagogical characteristic of his teaching is undoubtedly the education of the will through training in the three topoi of the capacity of choice (προαίρεσις), according to the ontological theorem. However, there seems to be another important characteristic, namely the development of attention (προσοχή). Although the term is infrequent in the Diatribes of Epictetus and in the Enchiridion of Epictetus, attention is presupposed in the study of oneself and in the preparation of oneself for the good use of representations. Epictetus discusses having at hand (πρόχειρον) the philosophical principles and the rule of life, in order not to accept the representations without first examining them, that is, on the readiness (προχειρότης) necessary to observe them with detachment, avoiding the rapture of reason. In the chapter entitled On Attention (Περὶ προσοχῆς) Epictetus explicitly states that the worst habit among all is not paying attention and then the habit of deferring attention. According to him, if one does not relax one's attention one can constantly tend to not commit mistakes; in fact, we infer that the expressions most used to indicate readiness, such as "having at hand" and "remember!" indicate an attitude of self-vigilance. The training of attention seems to be as important as that of the will, since the voluntary operations of proaíresis do not occur isolated from attention, on the contrary, they need it. The present article will attempt to demonstrate that there is in Epictetus' teaching an education of attention as fundamental and urgent as the learning of the ability to choose according to nature (κατὰφύσις). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with Epictetus' thought through the exercise bias (áskēsis), that is, through the perfectioning practices of those who choose the office of philosophy. In order to do so, we first clarified what exercises in ancient philosophy mean, based on the theses of Pierre Hadot. Continuing, we explore six exercises considered central to the philosopher of Nicopolis, contextualizing with the teachings involved and describing the main characteristics of his method. Finally, we argue that the importance of this article lies in clarifying the áskēsis in Epictetus in order to avoid possible anachronisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethic of well living in Epictetus is considered an eudaimonist ethic, i.e., having as purpose (telos) happiness. I argue here that although it has this strong characteristic, Epictetus puts as an end to his ethics of well living the euroia, or the smooth flow of life, or simply serenity. To do so, I will show the relationship between euroia and the main concepts of his ethics of well living, such as proairesis, the correct use of phantasiai and the virtues linked to the good, which finally work to bring about this state of smooth flow of life. I also consider that the euroia is a constant internal activity of the individual before the manifestations and external activities of life and not an internal state reached by a detachment of the questions of external life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents two interpretative scripts of the epictetian theorem. On the hadotian line: the eighth Enchiridion chapter would be the expression of the desire's discipline, in which it's appropriation through exercise leads to the blooming of the eurôia flower in its practitioner's life - the serene course. Another interpretative path of the theorem - inextinguishable source of wisdom - is to understand it through the guise of practical teaching towards the abolition of all slavery. The poetic theorem or theoretic poem doesn't resume itself to either one of the interpretative courses, for them being too narrow to embrace and contain the ocean of meanings hidden in its simple and modest face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Les émotions (páthos) chez Epictet et chez Evagre sont considerée comme des consequences des malentendu de l'âme humaine devant les objects qui nous sont présentés. Dans les deux, il y a des téchniques et des exercices ascétiques dont le but est de surmonter les émotions. C'est évident pour ceux qui s'approchent de ces penseurs que les continuités et les ruptures entre les deux sont très riches et délicates. Dans cet horizon, l'objectif de ce projet est d'étudier et de décrire certains éléments qui configurent la théorie des émotions dans les stoiciens en général et dans Epictet en particulier et de les comparer avec la théorie des (mauvaises) pensées (logismoi) à Evagre. Ainsi, nous avons trois parties principales du projet: analyser et décrire la théorie des émotions (1) dans les stoiciens et dans Epictet, aprés (2) dans Evagre et, enfin, (3) établir des parallèles, des ruptures et des continuités dans ces théories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After presenting a summary of Stoic doctrines, we will reflect on Deleuze's reflections concerning the notion of happening and Stoicism, showing that, in the Stoics, and, in particular, in Epictetus, there is an ontology of surface, that epistemically valorizes the flow of sensibly things and ethically is an invitation to wonder before the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The habit for stoics must be treated differently from the manner described by Plato or Aristotle. Given that for the latter the formation of character is considered from a psychology that approaches the soul through distinct parts, such an interpretation led them to describe habit as a fundamental element for education of the irrational part of the soul, while the rational part is educated through reason. For the Stoics, however, habit is important for the soul as a whole, without distinction between rational and irrational. Following this perspective, Epictetus does not discourse about the habituation of any irrational element. When the philosopher speaks of "becoming accustomed" to certain actions, he does not refer to a repetitive activity that conditions distinctly irrational aspects, but instead refers to an autonomously philosophical activity involving reason, with special attention to the care with representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most common stereotypes ascribed to Stoics is that they would be apologists for suicide. In fact, there is no prohibition against suicide in Stoicism, especially in Epictetus; however, this article intends to show that there is also no apology for suicide. From the reading of Foucault's The Hermeneutics of the Subject and the analysis of Epictetus Diatribes, I intend to problematize the topic of suicide in Epictetian philosophy, presenting the criteria by which suicide can be performed to be virtuous. Then, it is possible to answer the question: in the Epictetian philosophy, the suicide is an escape or a liberation? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Michel Foucault's reading on the Stoicism, particularly the treatise concerning Epictetus' philosophy, to explore his thematic approach of the "care of the self" in the Greek-Roman antiquity. In this sense, the paper analyses what Foucault means by "care of the self" in the general context of his ethical genealogy and the replacement of the issue of power from a paradigm of subjugation to one of self-constitution. Thus, the main place destined to Stoic philosophy in Foucault's late works should be understood as an effort to relate the subject of action to the principle of ethical immanence which grounds Foucault's critique on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with Epictetus and Musônio, noting their approximations and distances regarding their political opinions, as a result of a paper presented at the Second Colloquium on Epictetus held at the Federal Fluminense University. We end up stating that Epictetus does not seem to care much about good government, but rather about the proper attitude towards a tyrannical government, while Musônio devises a good ruler. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By the end of the XVth century, the anonymous text Cebetis Tabula was published for the first time in the West. Initially attributed to Cebes of Thebas, who is mentioned more than once in Plato's dialogues, the text had its authorship questioned in the XVIth century by Hieronymus Wolf. The work - an ekphrastic text - had a major success with its use in youth education, having been repeatedly published throughout the following centuries with the Handbook of Epictetus. The aim of the present paper is to analyze pragmatic and doctrinal possible reasons that would explain this phaenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That the Stoicism is a philosophy which has compliance and callousness as its foundational principles it's common sense, both inside and outside of the philosophical academic ambit. In this presentation we are aiming at exhibiting a diametrically opposite point of view to this preconception, clarifying what the Stoic Epictetus has in mind when scoring both bravery and friendship as basics in their doctrine. After that, we will present the translation of Epictetus' discourses 1.11 and 1.23 which deal with this subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to strengthen the concept of philosophy as practice focused on living well and hence the philosopher as one who acts toward that goal. To do so, I will be considering the art of good living of a specific philosopher, Epictetus (55 B.C. - 135 A.D.) and his development of a practical philosophy to the question of the good life, that is, as a way of life. The substantiality of a good life occurs within some structure and the definition of this structure, as a model for an art (techné), is important to define what choices and actions are possible and valued within a conception of the good life. You can define structures or models who accept a living, but not all the structure model accepts a substantial living well, even in the design of Epictetus. The differentiation between living and living well does not happen only in the quality or content of moral choices and teleological but also the appropriate framework for both positions. Once defined the structure or model of a good life in the design of Epictetus, it opens the possibility of the way to fix this good life and also the appropriate choices to accomplish this substantiality through that structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) mentions many times the stoic philosophy, especially that of Epictetus (55-135?) and even that defended in the Enchiridion, or Manual, and perhaps the best example of the importance that the Manual takes to the German is the many references made to the Theodicy; however, among many others, there is a letter to the Lutheran theologian the abbot Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633-1722), dated from about 1679, in which not only the "incomparable Epictetus Manual" is mentioned as are set the terms in which it is preferable with respect to what Leibniz called the art of patience, supposedly defended by the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), art harshly criticized by the German in favor of a platonic Christianity or a truly Christian morality. Having said so, our intention is to discuss some of the reasons of the many references to the Stoic Epictetus and hence especially his Manual, and the terms in which Leibniz criticized Descartes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it possible not to fear death? For Epictetus, the answer is: yes. It is not only possible, but it is the philosopher's task to overcome the fear of death. To understand how Epictetus supports this thesis, we will focus on the Discourse II.1, in which the philosopher presents the image of death as a bugey (mormolýkeia), the same image Plato uses in Pheado 77e. Next, this paper will summarize some exercises (áskesis) proposed by Epictetus to eliminate the fear of death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conception of stoic's world is supported by a causal network of relations determined by nature. The fate is part of these relations, problematizing the issue of freedom in a deterministic environment. Taking into consideration this theoretical legacy, Epictetus puts freedom in the individual choices regarding these determinations which he attributes to divine providence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La presencia socrática en las Disertaciones de Epicteto es notoria, aunque no es del mismo modo claro qué es lo que reconoce como propiamente "socrático" de su propio pensamiento o qué ingredientes incorporó y desarrolló en el marco de su teoría moral y de su teoría de la acción. El propósito de este ensayo es mostrar cómo, a partir de un motivo "socrático" ("una vida sin examen no es vivible para el ser humano"; Platón, Apología de Sócrates 38a5-6), Epicteto desarrolla algunos aspectos cruciales de su ética y de su teoría de la acción, al traducir el dictum socrático como "hacer un uso correcto de las representaciones", lo único que garantizaría evitar tanto el error teórico como el práctico.A presença socrática nas Dissertações de Epicteto é notória, ainda que não é do mesmo modo claro o que é que ele reconhece como propiamente "socrático" em seu própio pensamento ou qual ingredientes incorporou e desenvolveu no marco de sua teoria moral e de sua teoria da ação. O propósito deste ensaio é o de mostrar como, a partir de un motivo "socrático" ("uma vida sem exame não é vivível para o ser humano"; Platão, Apologia de Sócrates 38a5-6), Epicteto desenvolve alguns aspectos cruciais de sua ética e de sua teoria da ação, ao traduzir o dictum socrático como "fazer um uso correto das representações", o único que garantiria evitar tanto o erro teórico como o prático.

El objetivo central del presente trabajo consistirá en poner en cuestión la validez de la interpretación ofrecida por Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault y John Sellars de la noción de áskesis en Epicteto. Si bien dicho cuestionamiento ha sido sugerido ya por John Cooper, mi objetivo será mostrar en qué sentido específico los ‘ejercicios espirituales’ de Epicteto no constituyen (contra lo sugerido por Hadot, Foucault y Sellars) otra cosa que procesos estrictamente cognitivos. Con este objetivo en mente recurriré al concepto de preconcepciones (prolépseis) desarrollado por Epicteto, a fin de dotar de contenido a la distinción, ya presente en el estoicismo antiguo, entre asentimiento débil y asentimiento firme.

La argumentación en contra de la posibilidad de akrasia (“Veo lo mejor y, sin embargo, hago lo peor”, según la clásica formulación de Ovidio) que encontramos en las Disertaciones de Epicteto (Arriano) ha sido frecuentemente desatendida en los desarrollos modernos y contemporáneos de la problemática de la incontinencia. Esto se ha debido fundamentalmente al hecho de que las reflexiones de Epicteto suelen ser reducidas a una mera reelaboración de motivos socráticos bajo ejes dogmáticos estoicos. Por el contrario, será nuestro objetivo poner de manifiesto la singular riqueza teórica que subyace bajo la argumentación de nuestro esclavo estoico destinada a comprender en forma sistemática la conducta del incontinente. Esto exigirá contrastar el modelo de análisis de Epicteto con otras alternativas interpretativas del fenómeno de la akrasia.

The article examines how the poetic voice operates in one of the odes dedicated by Fray Luis to his friend Pedro Portocarrero. It focuses on three aspects. First, the structure of the reasoned argument that the voice presents. Second, the combination in the voice of two literary traditions, one classical, the other biblical, and how this synthesis influences the definition of true virtue that the poem celebrates. Third, the biographical context of the voice and the question of its tone, which here, as in many poems by Fray Luis, is not easy to gauge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tradução do texto "L’Entretien de Pascal et Sacy", de Blaise Pascal, realizada com base na edição das OEuvres completes de Pascal, estabelecida e anotada por Jacques Chevalier, da Bibliothèque de la Plêiade, Paris, 1954, p. 560-574. [Tradução de Jaimir Conte. Prof. adjunto do Departamento de Filosofia da UFRN]

It is the purpose of this essay to inquire into the understanding of technê which Epictetus links with the expression technê peri bion ("art of living") used by him to determine both the (subject-) "matter" with which philosophy deals and the kind of activity to be duly applied to such matter. Based upon this inquiry, the essay upholds the thesis that Epictetus' philosophy bares an individualist spirit close to well-known modern versions of philosophy as an art of living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus' specific usage of the concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus' intellectualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are best interpreted as rhetorical or, better, pedagogical expressions of Epictetus' strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus' intellectualism concerning the psychology of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Often in the philosophical work has dominated the idea that it is an activity absolutely disinterested and not profaniza in worldly affairs. However, there is a legacy Socratic reason and anthropological ethical action that has endured through the Hellenistic schools, where the attitude and temper life goes hand in hand with the intellectual guiding factor. This way of taking the philosophy as a therapeutic inquiry can look in the Stoic school, and Epictetus, is a representative of the examination for improvement of human life. In his little treatise we are warned of cognitive errors or "ambush adversaries" that obscure freedom, peace ataraxia or personal autarky. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]