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This paper considers the prospects for global economic governance from the perspective of classical realism. It explains why, from this perspective, the American-led liberal international order, is over—and is not coming back. Classical realism anticipates a US renunciation of the orchestration of global governance, one rooted principally in shifts in its purpose, rather than by changes to its relative capabilities. This transformation of American purpose is a consequence of its domestic politics—in particular, the rise in economic inequality, the emergence of plutocracy, and the dysfunctional political polarization stimulated by those trends—a predictable result of a tectonic shift in the culture of capitalism from one associated with the 'compromise of embedded liberalism' towards the exaltation of 'shareholder value'. This yields pessimistic conclusions not only about American foreign policy, which is likely to be more short-sighted, mercurial, and transactionalist, but also regarding the prospects for global economic governance. Realism sees international cooperation as challenging to establish and maintain, given the consequences of anarchy. In the coming years, episodes of cooperation will surely emerge, but they will likely be ad-hoc, mini-lateral, and fragile. Orchestrating ambitious schemes of global economic governance is less likely when a predominant power has lost interest in such things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critical scholarship often presents corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a reflection or embodiment of neoliberalism. Against this sort of sweeping political characterization we argue that CSR can indeed be considered a liberal concept but that it embodies a "varieties of liberalism." Building theoretically on the work of Michael Freeden on liberal languages, John Ruggie and Karl Polanyi on embedded forms of liberalism, and Michel Foucault on the distinction between classical liberalism and neoliberalism, we provide a conceptual treatment and mapping of the ideological positions that constitute the bulk of modern scholarly CSR debate. Thus, we distinguish between embedded liberalism, classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and re-embedded liberalism. We develop these four orientations in turn and show how they are engaged in "battles of ideas" over the meaning and scope of corporate responsibilities—and how they all remain relevant for an understanding of contemporary debates and developments in the field of CSR and corporate sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Analyses of embedded liberalism have focused overwhelmingly on trade in goods and capital, to the exclusion of migration. We argue that much as capital controls were essential components of the embedded liberal compromise, so too were restrictions on the democratic and social rights of labor migrants. Generous welfare programs in labor-receiving countries thrived alongside inclusionary immigration policies, but this balanced arrangement was only tenable if migrants were politically excluded in their destination countries. That is, embedded liberalism abroad rested on exclusionary political foundations at home. In bringing together the IPE literature on the “globalization trilemma” with the comparative politics of citizenship, we provide a novel account of how embedded liberalism worked politically, with implications for current debates about the fate of the liberal order in a time of populist resurgence.

The international investment regime is in crisis, nowhere more so than in regard to the investor–state dispute settlement system. While several developing countries have been critical of the system for some time, rich countries like the US and EU states—once the principal promoters of this regime—are now acknowledging problems and advancing reforms. This change of position has been fueled by the mobilization of civil society and the emergence of domestic populist movements on both the right and the left, reflecting widespread discontent with the past three decades of neoliberal globalization and its effects on job losses, lower wages, and increasing inequality. This article argues that this shift has opened up a unique opportunity for developing countries that want reform, as there is less pressure (real or imagined) from rich countries to continue with an old model that no longer serves. Two paths present a possible way forward: (a) Participating countries can disengage from investor–state dispute settlement and opt for the redomestication of international investment law, rekindling the Calvo doctrine, or (b) they can follow John G. Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism” to re-embed the international investment regime with values and social objectives that are now deemed politically indispensable. This article explores each of these paths, with a particular focus on Latin America. It argues that although populism creates pressures to change or abandon the regime, in developing countries it also generates constraints that may prolong the status quo.

In the last 75 years of international economic cooperation, we have witnessed tremendous changes. The global trade and investment regime is under pressure and undergoing a significant transformation. Supply chains are being restructured, new trade blocks are forming based on strategic and political considerations, support for trade among citizens is weak and inconsistent, and populist opposition to the global economic and political order is ascendant. In this time of uncertainty about the future of the world order, the articles for this thematic issue address how and if the global trade and investment regime can be re-embedded into society.

This article sets out to identify a constructionist framework for a new and expanded “embedded liberalism” and WTO reforms in the global trading system. Globalization and populism led the Trump administration to attack the WTO system by introducing unilateral protectionist measures and undermining its rules and norms. US populist trade policies have persisted under President Biden. Necessary steps to restore the WTO system include (a) domestic reforms by WTO members to improve economic adjustment, labor mobility, and social safety nets; (b) WTO reforms to allow for additional domestic policy space, new negotiated rules to address contentious issues, and a relaxation of the consensus rule; and (c) US restoration of its commitment to multilateral trade rules. Renewed global leadership will be required to pursue these steps. If the current WTO agreement proves to be incapable of resolving these issues, countries will turn increasingly to the alternative of regional trade agreements, which may be able to re-create the conditions for a return to a rules-based global trading system. Yet populism, anti-globalization pressures, and geopolitical tensions present the danger of a continued unwillingness to cooperate among major countries.

The standard embedded liberalism argument for increasing free trade after World War II is that countries have compensated those hurt by trade and, therefore, have reduced opposition to free trade policies. This argument relies on opposition to trade being motivated by personal economic effects of trade; however, recent work has increasingly found other motivations for protectionism, calling into question the sustainability of embedded liberalism. This article argues that this threat to embedded liberalism will grow worse as populism increases, which leads to both more nationalistic and more economic opposition to trade, which is only partially offset by other non-economic opposition (most notably, fair trade) decreasing. This article offers a conceptual framework for the different types of opposition to trade and how increasing populism influences its composition. The framework is supported by descriptive statistics of public opinion on trade policy in the US over the past two decades, encompassing trade opinions before and during the global financial crisis, as well as during the rise of global populist movements starting around 2016. We conclude the article with policy implications regarding the multi-sided threat to free trade and how policymakers can confront the evolving challenges to embedded liberalism.

The National Health Service (NHS), as a symbol of public health protection in the UK, was weaponised in pro-Brexit debates. It was suggested that European integration might inherently have undermined embedded liberalism and notably contributed to what Ruggie described as the “unbundling of sovereignty” (Ruggie, 1993). The manipulation of the NHS by right-wing populists has already been the focus of a number of articles, but calls to protect public health care from global threats have also come from left-wing politicians and activists. This article is particularly interested in socialist populist appeals to protect health care. It aims to show that for socialists the compromise between capital and labour and the protection of welfare systems, which is referred to as embedded liberalism, has not been achieved. In fact, furthering trade and investment is currently seen to be compromising the last remnants of a welfare state, which is embodied by the NHS in the UK. This conceptual article will thus start by presenting the theory of embedded liberalism. It will then establish the link between the breakdown of embedded liberalism in relation to health care systems. It will finally present populist and activist narratives on health and the UK’s national health service from an international perspective. It draws on secondary literature and a corpus of popular press articles and grey literature produced by civil society organisations.

The National Health Service (NHS), as a symbol of public health protection in the UK, was weaponised in pro-Brexit debates. It was suggested that European integration might inherently have undermined embedded liberalism and notably contributed to what Ruggie described as the "unbundling of sovereignty" (Ruggie, 1993). The manipulation of the NHS by right-wing populists has already been the focus of a number of articles, but calls to protect public health care from global threats have also come from left-wing politicians and activists. This article is particularly interested in socialist populist appeals to protect health care. It aims to show that for socialists the compromise between capital and labour and the protection of welfare systems, which is referred to as embedded liberalism, has not been achieved. In fact, furthering trade and investment is currently seen to be compromising the last remnants of a welfare state, which is embodied by the NHS in the UK. This conceptual article will thus start by presenting the theory of embedded liberalism. It will then establish the link between the breakdown of embedded liberalism in relation to health care systems. It will finally present populist and activist narratives on health and the UK's national health service from an international perspective. It draws on secondary literature and a corpus of popular press articles and grey literature produced by civil society organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The standard embedded liberalism argument for increasing free trade after World War II is that countries have compensated those hurt by trade and, therefore, have reduced opposition to free trade policies. This argument relies on opposition to trade being motivated by personal economic effects of trade; however, recent work has increasingly found other motivations for protectionism, calling into question the sustainability of embedded liberalism. This article argues that this threat to embedded liberalism will grow worse as populism increases, which leads to both more nationalistic and more economic opposition to trade, which is only partially offset by other non-economic opposition (most notably, fair trade) decreasing. This article offers a conceptual framework for the different types of opposition to trade and how increasing populism influences its composition. The framework is supported by descriptive statistics of public opinion on trade policy in the US over the past two decades, encompassing trade opinions before and during the global financial crisis, as well as during the rise of global populist movements starting around 2016. We conclude the article with policy implications regarding the multi-sided threat to free trade and how policymakers can confront the evolving challenges to embedded liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international investment regime is in crisis, nowhere more so than in regard to the investor--state dispute settlement system. While several developing countries have been critical of the system for some time, rich countries like the US and EU states--once the principal promoters of this regime--are now acknowledging problems and advancing reforms. This change of position has been fueled by the mobilization of civil society and the emergence of domestic populist movements on both the right and the left, reflecting widespread discontent with the past three decades of neoliberal globalization and its effects on job losses, lower wages, and increasing inequality. This article argues that this shift has opened up a unique opportunity for developing countries that want reform, as there is less pressure (real or imagined) from rich countries to continue with an old model that no longer serves. Two paths present a possible way forward: (a) Participating countries can disengage from investor--state dispute settlement and opt for the redomestication of international investment law, rekindling the Calvo doctrine, or (b) they can follow John G. Ruggie's "embedded liberalism" to re-embed the international investment regime with values and social objectives that are now deemed politically indispensable. This article explores each of these paths, with a particular focus on Latin America. It argues that although populism creates pressures to change or abandon the regime, in developing countries it also generates constraints that may prolong the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out to identify a constructionist framework for a new and expanded "embedded liberalism" and WTO reforms in the global trading system. Globalization and populism led the Trump administration to attack the WTO system by introducing unilateral protectionist measures and undermining its rules and norms. US populist trade policies have persisted under President Biden. Necessary steps to restore the WTO system include (a) domestic reforms by WTO members to improve economic adjustment, labor mobility, and social safety nets; (b) WTO reforms to allow for additional domestic policy space, new negotiated rules to address contentious issues, and a relaxation of the consensus rule; and (c) US restoration of its commitment to multilateral trade rules. Renewed global leadership will be required to pursue these steps. If the current WTO agreement proves to be incapable of resolving these issues, countries will turn increasingly to the alternative of regional trade agreements, which may be able to re-create the conditions for a return to a rules-based global trading system. Yet populism, anti-globalization pressures, and geopolitical tensions present the danger of a continued unwillingness to cooperate among major countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last 75 years of international economic cooperation, we have witnessed tremendous changes. The global trade and investment regime is under pressure and undergoing a significant transformation. Supply chains are being restructured, new trade blocks are forming based on strategic and political considerations, support for trade among citizens is weak and inconsistent, and populist opposition to the global economic and political order is ascendant. In this time of uncertainty about the future of the world order, the articles for this thematic issue address how and if the global trade and investment regime can be re-embedded into society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the United States (US) as the worldwide dominant power is an affair that needs to be investigated in light of some historical experiences. Afterward the Second World War, the US reestablished the world's deteriorating international monetary and financial system. Embedded liberalism reinforced and stabilized the US hegemony (as the form of economic, political, and institutional organization) by generating the requirements for consolidating the global economy in which the US takes a leading role. From the mid-1970s, after integrating the world economy into an accumulation regime characterized by finance capital-as, a natural consequence of the transition to neoliberal policies-it was understood that fragmented financial liberalism began to show its effect as a new strategy that would ensure the continuity of the US hegemony. The study has departed from the problematic of elucidating the change in the hegemonic strategy of the US from its birth to the present day. In this problematic context, the shift of the US hegemonic strategy from embedded liberalism to disembedded financial liberalism and the central dynamics determining this shift is examined in the axis of historical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The postwar deconcentration of IG Farben AG shows that the Allied military governments and their German counterparts were anything but united on the extent and form of sovereignty the Federal Republic of Germany should receive. The American plan to divide the corporate enterprise into a large number of individual companies aimed to establish a democratic state independent from the influence of domestic business. By contrast, West German government officials and the business community were convinced that the future sovereignty of the Federal Republic depended on the global competitiveness of large industrial conglomerates. To thwart the American deconcentration plans, they traded off one dimension of sovereignty against the other. Leading members of the West German government accepted delegating the negotiations over the future of IG Farben to business representatives, thereby sharing domestic sovereignty because the delegation promised to maintain a powerful German chemical industry that could support the trade balance of the future West German state. This development contributed to the emergence of a Federal Republic characterized by the close involvement of economic actors in political decision-making. It contained important elements of a post-democratic sovereignty, which is commonly used to describe the development of the late twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In industrialised democracies, welfare state provisions have offsetting implications for anti-globalisation nationalism, central to the position taking of populist radical-right parties. On the one hand, social protection has an 'embedded liberalism' effect, mitigating economic insecurities associated with globalisation and thereby dampening anti-globalisation nationalism. On the other hand, social protection has an 'embedded nationalism' effect, awakening worries that globalisation may undermine hard-won provisions, thereby deepening anti-globalisation. This paper argues and finds evidence that which of these dynamics predominates depends on the particular kind of anti-globalisation debated and on the particular party family doing the debating. Welfare effort does generally dampen anti-globalisation nationalism, but it can deepen more than dampen anti-globalisation with respect to immigration and EU-integration that more directly impact existing national welfare provisions. Welfare effort can also deepen more than dampen anti-globalisation among radical-right and radical-left parties taking issue-ownership of anti-globalisation and of protecting national welfare-state competencies from global pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program seeks to help workers transition away from jobs lost to import competition. By contrast, trade remedies like antidumping seek to directly reduce the effect of competition at the border. Though they have very different economic effects, we show that trade adjustment and protectionism act as substitutes. Using the first geo-coded measure of US trade protectionist demands, we show that controlling for trade shocks, counties with a history of successful TAA petitions see fewer calls for trade protection. This effect holds when we confine our analysis to the steel industry, a heavy user of antidumping duties. And though they are both means of addressing import exposure, the two policy options have distinct political effects: in particular, successful TAA petitions carry a significant electoral benefit for Democratic candidates. Greater recognition of the substitutability of trade compensation and protectionism would improve governments' response to import exposure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can European law legitimately influence or contain the socio-economic orientations of the Member States towards one particular model, and to what extent should it allow or even stimulate a diversity in socio-economic outcomes? This is a fundamental question that lies at the heart of the European Union’s (EU) economic integration project. Many have argued that the concept of the ‘social market economy’ could or should provide for normative guidance. This contribution reflects on the historical and current potential of the concept to provide such guidance. It proposes that the EU internal markets socio-economic diversity should be cherished and accommodated in the legal framework of the EU through a dialogue of mutual responsiveness.

This article historicizes social regionalism as a principled and pragmatic response to the breakdown of the embedded liberal bargain and the encasing of an international economic order that was designed to prevent, transnationally, the governance of the social in the economic. Seen in historical context, the first labour chapter Arbitral Panel report under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) illustrates the need to shift focus to social regionalism. The latter enables trade treaty interpretation to focus on shared objectives. It moves beyond treaty interpretation, to promote redistributive mechanisms and also international solidarity within trade agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Free trade generates macroeconomic gains but also creates winners and losers. Historically, to reconcile this tension, governments compensated globalization losers with social spending in exchange for support for free trade, known as the embedded liberalism compromise. In the neoliberal era, what other policies can governments pursue to strengthen support for globalization? We assess the effect of social standards in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on individual preferences for free trade. We analyze data from an original survey experiment and find that respondents in advanced industrialized countries have greater support for free trade when PTAs include social standards. Differences do exist in how these social standards are perceived: while we do find evidence of an embedded liberalism compromise recast, fair trade norms have the most salience. An external validity check using the PEW global attitudes survey confirms the hypothesis. Our analysis has serious implications for the legitimacy of the global trading system suffering from neo-mercantilist creep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1982, John Gerard Ruggie published a study of the international trade and monetary regimes in which he introduced the concept of “embedded liberalism”. This article describes how the concept of embedded liberalism has been altered or jeopardized after the 2007-2009 financial crisis.

In a widely cited 1982 article, John Ruggie identified the normative framework of Bretton Woods as 'embedded liberalism' and pointed to its enduring legacy in international economic governance through the 1970s. Revisiting Ruggie's analysis at the 75th anniversary of Bretton Woods, I advance three arguments about the content and legacy of embedded liberalism in the international monetary and financial system. First, the embedded liberalism of Bretton Woods was an even more innovative normative framework than Ruggie's important article suggested, involving a new commitment to a form of institutionalized liberal multilateralism that was compatible with various kinds of active public management of the economy. Second, in the 1944–1980 period, embedded liberalism was more contested and malleable than is often understood, as it coexisted with important alternative normative frameworks and as distinct varieties of embedded liberalism emerged in international monetary and financial governance. Third, in the post-1980 era, scholars have correctly highlighted a 'neoliberalization' trend in international monetary and financial governance, but assessments of the degree of the challenge posed to embedded liberalism by this trend need to be nuanced. They also risk overlooking different and newer kinds of challenges to embedded liberalism arising from growing opposition to institutionalized liberal multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The automobile industry plays a leading role in a country’s industrialization. Various countries have used different methods to identify a model of industrial development. For developing countries, establishing the automobile industry is crucial for promoting industrialization. After Southeast Asian countries achieved independent, their automobile industries underwent establishment and development stages. The domestic and overseas competiveness of the automobile industries in ASEAN have received global attention. How can the industrial development of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which are ASEAN countries, be understood? Researchers have proposed various views regarding the industrial development of these four ASEAN countries. We researched the political economy of these countries to understand the development of their automobile industries. Thailand’s automobile industry was successfully developed because of the government’s crucial role in implementing a coordinated market economy and national system of innovation. In Indonesia, government–business relations hampered the government’s efforts to meet society and market needs, thereby limiting the country’s industrialization. Malaysia must learn how to coordinate its industries with a market economy through liberalization and coordination. The Philippines has positioned its automobile industry on manufacturing automotive parts because of the country’s limited industrialization. Theoretically, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these ASEAN countries have adopted market economy-oriented policies; however, because of the historical context of political economy, the development of their automobile industries has varied. Under the context of globalization, the economic systems of various countries have exhibited low convergence. In this study, we show that embedded liberalism is the preferred interpretation in ASEAN automobile industry development. In other words, researchers should look beyond convergence theory and consider the political economy characteristics of various countries. Accordingly, further comparative research must be conducted to clarify the differences in the economic systems and policies in ASEAN studies.

Abstract This article analyses the trajectory of Benjamin J. Cohen's work by focusing on his ongoing concern with the nature and governance of world order. It does so by playing out his debt to realism and to Keynesianism. In a first moment, Cohen criticises the economic determinism of dependency scholarship, while turning to political realism, and then to possible Keynesian co-operation under anarchy: agents have the power to affect positive change. Later, Cohen the disillusioned Keynesian, watching how the possible reform of financial markets is marginalised by politicians and academics alike, shifts his analysis to more structural aspects of governance or rule that affect actors' preferences. I draw two conclusions. First, in this shift towards theorising the global political order away from steering capacity towards impersonal rule and bias, Cohen also questions the very setup of the theories with which we deal with that world - only to see that this very inspiration of original IPE is abandoned in the course of the ongoing 'professionalisation' of IPE as practised in the United States. Second, his analysis seems to incorporate a warning. The underlying grand question is nothing less than the bargain between capitalism and liberal democracy as we know it, since the present system undermines equality before the law - money trumps equal political rights - and undermines democratic accountability. One of the main achievements of the post-war Keynesian turn was the reappropriation of political space from anti-democratic forces. Therefore, the decline of Keynesianism could provoke a Polanyian nightmare in which the 'double movement' by which the laissez-faire is answered by moves to protect society does not strengthen democracies, as in earlier times of 'embedded liberalism', but undermines them instead.

This article compares how the strategy of the Trades Union Congress' (TUC) attempts to influence the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and implement a 'social clause' into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) changed between the Tokyo and the Uruguay rounds of negotiations. Based on internal TUC documents, this article specifically focuses on the UK textile industry. The article critiques and historicizes the TUC's strategies to influence GATT negotiations in a period of enormous economic and political change. In addition to the limitations of the TUC's own strategies, the economic shift from broadly embedded liberal to neo-liberal economic hegemony is cited as a crucial factor in the TUC's declining influence. By studying the TUC's strategies and alliances at the national, European, and transnational level, it is revealed that it was unprepared and slow to react to this structural shift and clung to idealized notions of the historic post-war 'consensus' that were fast becoming obsolete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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