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Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

Our ability to understand how to interact with familiar objects is supported by conceptual tool knowledge. Conceptual tool knowledge includes action tool and semantic tool knowledge which are supported by the ventro-dorsal and the ventral pathways, respectively. This apparent functional segregation has been recently called into question. In a block-design fMRI study, 35 participants were asked to complete manipulation, function, and association judgment tasks about pairs of familiar objects. Our results showed that lateral occipitotemporal cortex in the ventral pathway was more sensitive to manipulation and function judgment tasks compared with association judgment tasks. Functional connectivity analyses revealed distinct coupling patterns between inferior parietal lobule, lateral occipitotemporal cortex, and fusiform gyrus. Taken together, these data indicate that action tool and semantic tool knowledge are both supported by ventral and ventro-dorsal pathways. Moreover, the explicit retrieval of these representations is supported by the functional coupling of common and distinct brain regions of the posterior tool processing network varying according to the kind of relations to be retrieved.

Humans and their predecessors have modified the surface of Earth in an unparalleled way, raising the question of the neurocognitive origins of technical cognition. Surprisingly, cognitive scientists do not seem to pay attention to this topic and address it marginally, as if human technical skills did not reflect the existence of cognitive skills specifically directed toward the physical world. This chapter introduces a diametrically opposite approach: The technical reasoning hypothesis, which has initially received support from findings in neuropsychology and cognitive science. This hypothesis posits that technical cognition originates in technical reasoning skills, which involve notably the area PF within the left inferior parietal lobe. These skills are critical to enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve tools and techniques over generations. Recent advances indicated that this hypothesis could also be extended to explain how technical reasoning, in concert with social learning mechanisms, can favor the emergence of cumulative technological culture. The technical reasoning hypothesis offers a unified neurocognitive approach to how humans and their predecessors have modified their physical world by making and using tools as well as building constructions.

Human technology has evolved in an unparalleled way, allowing us to expand across the globe. One fascinating question is, how do we understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon, which is known as cumulative technological culture (CTC)? The dominant view posits that CTC results from our unique ability to learn from each other. The cultural niche hypothesis even minimizes the involvement of non-social cognitive skills in the emergence of CTC, claiming that technologies can be optimized without us understanding how they work, but simply through the retention of small improvements over generations. Here we conduct a partial replication of the experimental study of Derex et al. (Nature Human Behaviour, 2019) and show that the improvement of a physical system over generations is accompanied by an increased understanding of it. These findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills (non-social cognitive skills) are important in the acquisition, understanding and improvement of technical content-that is, specific to the technological form of cumulative culture-thereby making social learning a salient source of technical inspiration.

People are ambivalently enthusiastic and anxious about how far technology can go. Therefore, understanding the neurocognitive bases of the human technical mind should be a major topic of the cognitive sciences. Surprisingly, however, scientists are not interested in this topic or address it only marginally in other mainstream domains (e.g., motor control, action observation, social cognition). In fact, this lack of interest may hinder our understanding of the necessary neurocognitive skills underlying our appetence for transforming our physical environment. Here, we develop the thesis that our technical mind originates in perhaps uniquely human neurocognitive skills, namely, technical-reasoning skills involving the area PF within the left inferior parietal lobe. This thesis creates an epistemological rupture with the state of the art that justifies the emergence of a new field in the cognitive sciences (i.e., technition) dedicated to the intelligence hidden behind tools and other forms of technologies, including constructions.

Understanding the evolution of human technology is key to solving the mystery of our origins. Current theories propose that technology evolved through the accumulation of modifications that were mostly transmitted between individuals by blind copying and the selective retention of advantageous variations. An alternative account is that high-fidelity transmission in the context of cumulative technological culture is supported by technical reasoning, which is a reconstruction mechanism that allows individuals to converge to optimal solutions. We tested these two competing hypotheses with a microsociety experiment, in which participants had to optimize a physical system in partial- and degraded-information transmission conditions. Our results indicated an improvement of the system over generations, which was accompanied by an increased understanding of it. The solutions produced tended to progressively converge over generations. These findings show that technical reasoning can bolster high-fidelity transmission through convergent transformations, which highlights its role in the cultural evolution of technology.

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Cumulative technological culture is an intriguing phenomenon whose cognitive bases remain a matter of debate. For the influential shared-intentionality theory, this phenomenon originates in theory-of-mind skills. Evidence challenges it, stressing the role of learners' technical-reasoning skills. This discrepancy might be explained by a more specific role of theory-of-mind skills, notably in situations where the teacher communicates with the learner without visual access to what the latter is doing. We tested this hypothesis using a microsociety paradigm where participants (n = 200) had to build the highest possible tower in 2 conditions: Monitoring (communication with visual access) and Blind (communication without visual access). We also assessed participants' theory-of-mind and technical-reasoning skills. Results indicated that learners' technical-reasoning skills predicted cumulative performance in both conditions, whereas teachers' theory-of-mind skills were involved only in the Blind condition. These findings confirm the distinct but complementary roles of theory-of-mind and technical-reasoning skills in cumulative technological culture. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Cumulative technological culture can be defined as the progressive diversification, complexification, and enhancement of technological traits through generations. An outstanding issue is to specify the cognitive bases of this phenomenon. Based on the literature, we identified four potential cognitive factors: namely, theory-of-mind, technical-reasoning, creativity, and fluid-cognitive skills. The goal of the present study was to test which of these factors-or a combination thereof-best predicted the cumulative performance in two experimental, micro-society conditions (Communication and Observation conditions; n = 100 each) differing in the nature of the interaction (verbal, visual) allowed between participants. The task was to build the highest possible tower. Participants were also assessed on the four aforementioned cognitive factors in order to predict cumulative performance (tower height) and attractiveness. Our findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills are the best predictor of cumulative performance (tower height), even if their role may be restricted to the specific technological domain. Theory-of-mind skills may have a facilitator role, particularly in the Communication condition. Creativity can also help in the generation of novel ideas, but it is not sufficient to support innovation. Finally, fluid cognition is not involved in cumulative technological culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that domain-specific knowledge (i.e., technical-reasoning skills) remains critical for explaining cumulative technological culture.

Pantomime has a long tradition in clinical neuropsychology of apraxia. It has been much more used by researchers and clinicians to assess tool-use disorders than real tool use. Nevertheless, it remains incompletely understood and has given rise to controversies, such as the involvement of the left inferior parietal lobe or the nature of the underlying cognitive processes. The present article offers a comprehensive framework, with the aim of specifying the neural and cognitive bases of pantomime. To do so, we conducted a series of meta-analyses of brain-lesion, neuroimaging and behavioural studies about pantomime and other related tasks (i.e. real tool use, imitation of meaningless postures and semantic knowledge). The first key finding is that the area PF (Area PF complex) within the left inferior parietal lobe is crucially involved in both pantomime and real tool use as well as in the kinematics component of pantomime. The second key finding is the absence of a well-defined neural substrate for the posture component of pantomime (both grip errors and body-part-as-tool responses). The third key finding is the role played by the intraparietal sulcus in both pantomime and imitation of meaningless postures. The fourth key finding is that the left angular gyrus seems to be critical in the production of motor actions directed towards the body. The fifth key finding is that performance on pantomime is strongly correlated with the severity of semantic deficits. Taken together, these findings invite us to offer a neurocognitive model of pantomime, which provides an integrated alternative to the two hypotheses that dominate the field: The gesture-engram hypothesis and the communicative hypothesis. More specifically, this model assumes that technical reasoning (notably the left area PF), the motor-control system (notably the intraparietal sulcus), body structural description (notably the left angular gyrus), semantic knowledge (notably the polar temporal lobes) and potentially theory of mind (notably the middle prefrontal cortex) work in concert to produce pantomime. The original features of this model open new avenues for understanding the neurocognitive bases of pantomime, emphasizing that pantomime is a communicative task that nevertheless originates in specific tool-use (not motor-related) cognitive processes.Please insert Graphical abstract here.

Most recent research on human tool use highlighted how people might integrate multiple sources of information through different neurocognitive systems to exploit the environment for action. This mechanism of integration is known as “action reappraisal”. In the present eye-tracking study, we further tested the action reappraisal idea by devising a word-priming paradigm to investigate how semantically congruent (e.g., “nail”) vs. semantically incongruent words (e.g., “jacket”) that preceded the vision of tools (e.g., a hammer) may affect participants' visual exploration of them. We found an implicit modulation of participants' temporal allocation of visuospatial attention as a function of the object-word consistency. Indeed, participants tended to increase over time their fixations on tools' manipulation areas under semantically congruent conditions. Conversely, participants tended to concentrate their visual-spatial attention on tools’ functional areas when inconsistent object-word pairs were presented. These results support and extend the information-integrated perspective of the action reappraisal approach. Also, these findings provide further evidence about how higher-level semantic information may influence tools' visual exploration.

It is known that drivers often listen to music when they are in their vehicle. Listening to music while driving can impact drivers’ behaviours in several ways, through emotion induction or arousal changes for instance. It has already been shown that various musical tracks with different tempos (i.e. the music pace) can impair drivers’ performances (Brodsky, 2002). The current study focused on the impact of music tempo on vehicular control by using the same music track played at different tempos. Four experimental conditions associated with four different versions of the same track, differing only by their tempos, have been used while participants had to follow a lead vehicle and then drive with no particular constraints. Participants had to drive in a simulated environment without music, with the music track of their choice, with the music of their choice but with a modified tempo (+10% of the regular tempo and -10% of the regular tempo). Results indicated that the music tempo slightly changed the level of arousal of participants as observed through heart rate and subjective questionnaires data. However these changes in the arousal level did not translate into driving behaviours modifications (i.e. inter-vehicle time while following a lead vehicle and speed in free driving context).

Most cognitive models of apraxia assume that impaired tool use results from a deficit occurring at the conceptual level, which contains dedicated information about tool use, namely, semantic and action tool knowledge. Semantic tool knowledge contains information about the prototypical use of familiar tools, such as function (e.g., a hammer and a mallet share the same purpose) and associative relations (e.g., a hammer goes with a nail). Action tool knowledge contains information about how to manipulate tools, such as hand posture and kinematics. The present review aimed to better understand the neural correlates of action and semantic tool knowledge, by focusing on activation, stimulation and patients' studies (left brain-damaged patients). We found that action and semantic tool knowledge rely upon a large brain network including temporal and parietal regions. Yet, while action tool knowledge calls into play the intraparietal sulcus, function relations mostly involve the anterior and posterior temporal lobe. Associative relations engaged the angular and the posterior middle temporal gyrus. Moreover, we found that hand posture and kinematics both tapped into the inferior parietal lobe and the lateral occipital temporal cortex, but no region specificity was found for one or the other representation. Our results point out the major role of both posterior middle temporal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe for action and semantic tool knowledge. They highlight the common and distinct brain networks involved in action and semantic tool networks and spur future directions on this topic.

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models' characteristics (i.e., who-strategies). The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models' psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue (a model with high theory-of-mind skills), copy the engineer (a model with high technical-reasoning skills), and copy the friend (a model with high level of prosocialness). We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant (the more an individual was copied in a group, the greater the attraction score). We also assessed participants' theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants' attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers (high technical-reasoning skills) because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy (theory-of-mind skills) or friendliness (prosocialness). These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture.

The issue of tool adoption has been the subject of many investigations, which focus either on acceptability (evaluating intention to use, a priori) or acceptance (evaluating real tool use, a posteriori). There are many criteria in the literature explaining why a tool is accepted or rejected by users, but behavioral observations are rare. This work aims to study the relationship between acceptability and acceptance and to find out if there is a hierarchy between the criteria that lead a user to use a particular tool. We exposed participants to eight xylophones varying according to three criteria: Ease of use, Utility, and Aesthetics. We assessed acceptability and judgment of participants about xylophones with questionnaires, based on tool use observation in a video session, and after a short-term use (Experiment 1); we also measured acceptance after long-term use of five sessions during which participants learned to play xylophone (Experiment 2). The results suggested that previous exposure to the tool influenced the judgment of the user, indicating a difference between acceptability and acceptance and between observation and use of a tool. The results also indicate differences in the hierarchy of criteria. In the acceptability phase, user judgments are guided by Ease of use. However, during the acceptance phase, the Utility criterion has the greatest influence, whether in terms of tool preference, or time spent using tools.

The question of whether tools erase cognitive and physical interindividual differences has been surprisingly overlooked in the literature. Yet if technology is profusely available in a near or far future, will we be equal in our capacity to use it? We sought to address this unexplored, fundamental issue, asking 200 participants to perform 3 physical (e.g., fine manipulation) and 3 cognitive tasks (e.g., calculation) in both non-tool-use and tool-use conditions. Here we show that tools do not erase but rather extend our intrinsic physical and cognitive skills. Moreover, this phenomenon of extension is task specific because we found no evidence for superusers, benefitting from the use of a tool irrespective of the task concerned. These results challenge the possibility that technical solutions could always be found to make people equal. Rather, technical innovation might be systematically limited by the user's initial degree of knowledge or skills for a given task. (PsycINFO Database Record

Humans might have a “tool-related bias” consisting of using tools, even when they do not provide benefits compared with natural abilities. Here, we report evidence for this tool-related bias with a cognitive tool (i.e., a calculator). The task was to make series of six additions. Some series were faster to complete by mental calculation and others with the calculator. In five experiments, participants had to actually perform these additions by mental calculation or with the calculator, to estimate the time spent to perform the series with each option, and to choose which option was faster to compute the series. Our main finding is that people overestimate the time benefits provided by the calculator, confirming the existence of a tool-related bias for cognitive tools. This finding opens a promising avenue for understanding the cognitive bases of this bias.

Resume La culture est un ensemble d’informations acquises grâce a la transmission sociale. Les cultures developpees chez l’etre humain sont plus complexes que chez toutes les autres especes animales. On attribue cela au processus d’evolution culturelle qui, chez l’humain, est cumulatif : tous les traits culturels qui sont acquis ou dont la performance est amelioree par les individus d’une generation accumulent ces modifications sans qu’elles soient perdues. De nombreuses etudes experimentales portent sur l’origine de ce phenomene, en particulier les facteurs sociocognitifs qui favorisent son emergence dans un groupe. Les premiers travaux menes en psychologie l’ont attribue a la capacite a transmettre fidelement des informations au sein d’un groupe, facilitant ainsi le maintien des traits culturels au fil des generations. Des etudes recentes montrent toutefois que l’evolution culturelle peut survenir chez d’autres especes – parfois de facon quasi-cumulative –, que la fidelite de la transmission sociale n’est pas une aptitude reservee a l’etre humain et que d’autres facteurs psychologiques (intelligence physique, flexibilite mentale) et sociaux (communication, enseignement) sont a considerer.

The commentaries have both revealed the implications of and challenged our approach. In this response, we reply to these concerns, discuss why the technical-reasoning hypothesis does not minimize the role of social-learning mechanisms – nor assume that technical-reasoning skills make individuals omniscient technically – and make suggestions for overcoming the classical opposition between the cultural versus cognitive niche hypothesis of cumulative technological culture.

International audience; Since the discovery ofmirror neurons in the 1990s, many neuroimaging studies have tackled the issue ofaction observation with the aim ofunravelling a putative homolog human system. However, these studies do not distinguish between non-tool-use versus tool-use actions, implying that a common brain network is systematically involved in the observation of any action. Here we provide evidence for a brain network dedicated to tool-use action observation, called the tool-use observation network, mostly situated in the left hemisphere, and distinct from the non-tool-use action observation network. Areas specific for tool-use action observation are the left cytoarchitectonic area PF within the left inferior parietal lobe and the left inferior frontal gyrus. The neural correlates associated with the observation of tool-use reported here offer new insights into the neurocognitive bases of action observation and tool use, as well as addressing more fundamental issues on the origins ofspecifically human phenomena such as cumulative technological evolution.Keywords

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy.

Highlights • We review neuroimaging, TMS, and patients studies on numerical cognition. • We focused on the predictions derived from the Triple Code Model (TCM). • Our findings generally agree with TCM predictions. • Our results open avenues for the study of the neural bases of numerical cognition., This article offers the first comprehensive review examining the neurocognitive bases of numerical cognition from neuroimaging, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and brain-damaged patients studies. We focused on the predictions derived from the Triple Code Model (TCM), particularly the assumption that the representation of numerical quantities rests on a single format-independent representation (i.e., the analogical code) involving both intraparietal sulci (IPS). To do so, we conducted a meta-analysis based on 28 neuroimaging, 12 TMS and 12 brain-damaged patients studies, including arithmetic and magnitude tasks in symbolic and non-symbolic formats. Our findings generally agree with the TCM predictions indicating that both IPS are engaged in all tasks. Nonetheless, the results of brain-damaged patients studies conflicted with neuroimaging and TMS studies, suggesting a right hemisphere lateralization for non-symbolic formats. Our findings also led us to discuss the involvement of brain regions other than IPS in the processing of the analogical code as well as the neural substrate of other codes underlying numerical cognition (i.e., the auditory-verbal code).