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The ongoing turbulence in global politics has been accompanied by calls to shift the current order of international relations from a rules-based world towards a multipolar system rooted in international law. Political leaders and commentators, primarily of Russian origin, have often referred to those initiatives as a moral revolution in the current world order. This paper examines the theological and philosophical background behind the ideas that support such a change. The discussion argues that these proposals, though they sound revolutionary, echo the Abrahamic principles of international dialogue drafted by medieval Christian theologians, Reformation thinkers, and Jewish and Islamic religious philosophers. The account stresses that contemporary adherents of the replacement of the rules-based world do not openly refer to religious doctrines. However, the core tenets of the suggested reforms align well with those earlier ethical principles. This conclusion is purely scholarly and contributes to the history of ideas.

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century ended the pre-existing bipolar Cold War system and resulted in a unipolar moment in which the United States enjoyed a position of almost unchallenged global and civilizational leadership [Krauthammer 1991; Waltz 1993; Wohlforth 1999]. However, despite the initial elation of some Western politicians and analysts [Fukuyama 1992; Brooks, Wohlforth 2008; Kagan 2008], who hoped to see the triumph of the Western idea universally, this situation was relatively short-lived. Global dialogue soon moved beyond this moment of unipolarity toward its more conventional form, in which states struggle for power and influence and search for areas of mutually beneficial co-operation. At the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century, we see a qualitatively different world. There have been profound political changes since the post-Cold War unipolarity. In this world, the idea of civilization has become a virtual currency of international relations and global dialogue. Many analysts [Coker 2019; Acharya 2020; Stuenkel 2016; Higgott 2019] discuss the rise of civilizations in world affairs as the new sociopolitical reality. Countries such as Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Brazil are often considered civilizational states – challengers to the West. Historically, philosophers have oscillated between the idea of multiple civilizations, with the West being one civilization of many (Spengler, Huntington, Danilevsky), and a single and universal Western civilization (Hayek, Kant). The former approach became a cardinal frame of reference of the global discourse during the past decade.

This paper examines the origins, nature, and potential outcomes of the global crisis induced by the Covid-19 pandemic. The authors argue that the crisis has been animated by the two most important groups of factors that have been simmering in the world‘s economic and political system during the past six decades and have been accelerated by the pandemic. First, the dynamic of the Covid-19 crisis illuminated the existing challenges of the contemporary capitalist system, which is generally legitimated via the instruments of moral panic and media manipulation. Each consecutive crisis of capitalism ends with the redistribution of power resources to some groups of participants. Second, the Covid-19 crisis has been taking place within the conditions of a systemic and ideological struggle between two global elite factions that harbour drastically different approaches to the changing world order and have different politico-economic goals and intentions. The authors will argue that the crisis will not change the world drastically, yet it will amplify these ongoing tensions, illuminate them to many general observers, and deepen the already-existing systemic instability.

The intellectual discourse of any state can function within two broad paradigms: consensual and pluralistic. In the first case, political elites, intellectuals, and the public agree on the base parameters of what constitutes “the good life” and argue about the methods of application. In the second case, participants hold radically different, incommensurable views, which coexist in society. This essay argues that the Western political system broadly rests on the politics of liberal consensus, formed throughout the period of capitalist modernization. But Russia's history took a different turn, following a path of alternative modernization. This engendered the politics of paradigmatic pluralism, in which a number of radically different politico-intellectual frameworks struggle for the dominant discourse. This essay examines these paradigms and argues that, due to the nature and substance of these models, fundamental change of Russia's dominant discourse, along with its main politico-institutional parameters, is unlikely.

Contemporary international relations are rife with the ideological struggle over the potential nature of the rapidly changing world order. Two distinct paradigmatic positions have surfaced. One champions economic, cultural, and political globalization conducted under the leadership of the Western world. The other advocates a more particularistic approach that fends for a balance of interests, multiplicity of politico-cultural forms and multiple centers of international influence. The latter doctrine, often referred to as the multipolar world theory, is the subject of this paper. The discussion argues that the idea of a multipolar world order has emerged as Russia’s main ethical and ideological position advanced in the international arena. Its philosophical tenets buttress Russian society intellectually at home, providing the expedients to pursue the country’s foreign policy goals abroad. The paper examines a substantial value package with roots in both Russian and Western philosophy that sustains ...

Feminism emerged as an important ideological trend in contemporary Russia. Different strands of this thought focus on divergent problems experienced by Russian women. Some researchers consider the experience of women representing Russia’s growing middle class. Others tend to focus on the problems of dispossessed and less privileged layers of the Russian society. The difference in the focus of attention is reminiscent of the pre-existing Western division of the feminist thought on the feminism of equality and feminism of difference. This paper will consider the main directions of these debates in Russia focusing on key aspects pondered by feminism in general. It will also argue that the state deploys both strands of feminist thought selectively in situations that suits its ideological and political purposes.

This article analyzes contemporary Russian conservatism through the prism of ideational and positionist ideological perspectives. The author argues that Russian conservatism proposes a distinct value package through its anthropocentric nature, its plans for modernization of Russia, and its future outlook that must rest on the best elements of tradition. The author compares these trends with the Western conservative tradition, making distinct parallels between the two strands of conservative thought. The author also explores the attitude of Russian conservatism toward the post-modern world. This is intrinsically linked to the discussion of Russia's attempts to develop a political and ideational alternative to the West, introduce a distinct model for the architecture of international relations, and find Russia's position in the global world.

Many analysts and public opinion makers in the West conflate the notions of Russia’s non-systemic liberal opposition and the country’s civil society. Indeed, despite garnering the support of a minority of Russia’s population, non-systemic liberal opposition represents a well-organized civic group with a clearly articulated agenda and the ability to take action. Yet, does Russia’s civil society end there? A closer look at the country’s politics shows that Russia has a substantial conservative-traditionalist faction that has also developed agenda for action and formulated opinions. This group is anti-liberal rather than illiberal ideologically and pro-strong state/pro a geopolitically independent Russia rather than pro-Kremlin politically. The interaction between liberal and conservative civic groups represents the battle of meanings, ideas, and ethics, and ultimately determines the future trajectory of Russia’s evolution. Thus, the analysis of Russia’s civil society must represent a rather more nuanced picture than a mere study of the liberal non-systemic opposition. This article will examine the complexity of Russia’s civil society scene with reference to the interplay between the liberal opposition and conservative majority factions. The paper will argue that such complexity stems from ideological value pluralism that falls far beyond the boundaries of the liberal consensus, often skewing our understanding of political practice in Russia.

This article analyzes contemporary Russian liberalism through the prism of competing trends of moderate pluralist and monistic radical thought. The author focuses particularly on the pluralist trend, less well known in the West, arguing that its prospects are more promising over the long term. Ideological and tactical differences within the liberal camp in Russia are compared with those in the West, both for the purpose of emphasizing that such differences are not unique to Russia and to show the connections between Russian and Western strands of liberal political thought.

A UK-based political scientist presents a systematic analysis of the basic philosophical arguments and intellectual origins of fundamental conservative thought in Russia. Positing that fundamental conservatism seeks to displace interpretations of Western modernity in Russia with a culturally specific Russian version, she then probes more deeply into the methods and tasks of fundamental conservatism, before examining its main theoretical arguments. The fact that such thinking is increasingly prominent in Russia, including within political circles, is noted as a basis for the need to better understand it as a search for new forms of rationality and new forms of citizenship rooted in the Russian sociohistoric context.

Which theoretical paradigm should we use to discuss the relationship between the state and civil society in Russia? Academic literature distinguishes two principal approaches to this problem: the East European political tradition, which treats the state and civil society in antagonistic terms; and the West European and Anglo-American strand, which focuses on co-operation between the two entities. A nuanced study of modern Russia indicates that there are areas of successful state–civil society co-operation, as well as intense struggles between the two entities for political and cultural hegemony. Thus, both of these approaches are reasonable, and one should not be deployed at the expense of the other.

A political scientist examines contemporary Russian debates about multiculturalism. A categorization of procedural and substantive approaches in Western theory and practice is presented. Russian approaches are contrasted with Western ones along both procedural and substantive dimensions. Special attention is paid to discussions of the concept of "tolerance." Evidence is drawn largely from debates among contemporary Russian academics, journalists, and politicians.

What roles do society and public opinion play in state policy-making? Following the philosophical-political literature, this article adopts a theoretical framework examining two phases of public activity: public and private. Viewing public opinion as a significant factor in the evolution of Russian politics, the article traces development of public and private phases during the Putin presidency. Causal factors driving the oscillations between public and private phases, and attitudinal and behavioral features of each phase, are discussed. These dynamics are also traced in the regions. Questions about the possibilities for and nature of changes in Russian society are raised and analyzed.

By the end of Putin's first term in office, Russia's regional authorities and representatives of large corporations had established effective non-institutional relationships. In response to these dynamics, the Kremlin launched a range of policy initiatives aimed at formalizing the political dialogue between the two sides and making their unofficial interactions less mutually beneficial. With the exception of changes that took place in the regional electoral systems, such policies have been predominantly borrowed from well-functioning Western models. However, it is clear that the political style and the context within which such ideas have been implemented have subverted the initial intentions and led to the emergence of alternative, and at times more sophisticated, forms of relational informality. The relationship between business and the Russian state continues to evolve, and depends on the intangible factors of culture and style as much as on institutional structures and rules.

This article discusses the evolution of Russia's civil society during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The paper utilises a complex definitional prism that views civil society in terms of three independent but inextricably interconnected pillars. It examines civil society as a kind of society, a part of society, and as a distinct public sphere as seen in the set of institutional norms and forms. The paper empirically challenges the existing conclusions in that the three spheres must develop in concert and cannot exist without a permanent fully-fledged interaction. The discussion reveals the unbalanced evolution of the three spheres in Russia and the potential problems that this situation might cause in the longer term. The paper also claims that, while the development of some of these spheres gives grounds for concern, others provide hopes for cautious optimism.

The paper discusses Russia's theological political tradition and its influence of the development of federalism.

The article discusses the results of eight years of Putin's reforms of Russia's federation.

This paper examines the impact of regional standardization and immigration policies on the evolution of inter-ethnic relations in Russia. The paper argues that these initiatives resulted in the emergence of a simmering ethnic discontent among Russia's indigenous nationalities and gave rise to Russian ethnic majority nationalism. The arrival of such policies was predetermined by multifarious fears of Russia's political elites. These primarily concerned domestic factors, such as the country's potential disintegration along ethnic lines, and international concerns, related primarily to the revolutionary developments in Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, such initiatives had been executed in accordance with the logic of a ‘political market place’, without seriously considering the particularities of Russia's nationality structure and the history of her inter-ethnic relations. This work concludes that, from theoretical and comparative angles, such policies could lead to a range of unanticipated negative o...

This article provides an analysis of the institutional mechanisms that are required to ensure the effective functioning of federalism in Russian politics. A common contention in the literature on federalism is that, in addition to fundamental requirements such as the constitutionally defined division of powers between the federation and its constituent units, and the supremacy of the federal constitution, some ancillary structures are necessary. Of particular importance are institutions of inter-governmental co-operation, transparent means for the mobility of officials between the centre and the regions, and integrated systems of national parties. The functioning of these institutions must also reflect the culture and ethic of federalism. This article examines how well these three factors have been implemented in Russia in the course of Putin's reforms. It is shown that a preliminary network of such institutions has been created. However, their operational ethic, and in particular the lack of com...

The cancellation of gubernatorial elections in Russia was aimed at tightening the central grip over the regions and checking the influence of regional elites at the sub-national level. These policies represented a logical continuation to centralizing reforms launched by President Putin upon his accession to power in March 2000. However, the results of the enactment of the new system were rather different, inadvertently leading to the emergence of decentralizing trends and changing the political dynamics at the regional level. These unexpected trends may disrupt the previous relationship between the centre and the regions and create more problems for the Kremlin in the longer term than it can resolve.

The article discusses the limited reach of federal reforms conducted by Vladimir Putin during 2000-4 in the regions of Russia.

Unlike other books on civil society in Russia which argue that Russia’s civil society is relatively weak, and that democratisation in Russia went into reverse following Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, this book contends that civil society in Russia is developing in a distinctive way. It shows that government and elite-led drives to encourage civil society have indeed been limited, and that the impact of external promotion of civil society has also not been very successful. It demonstrates, however, that independent domestic grassroots movements are beginning to flourish, despite difficulties and adverse circumstances, and that this development fits well into the changing nature of contemporary Russian society.