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The article treats the problem of interpretation in its respect to reality by example of Umberto Eco’s moderate ‚realistic‘ position and his criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche, the “father” of postmodernism. Here the strongest arguments on both sides are evaluated: Eco’s “negative realism” pointing out the impossibility of some interpretations and Nietzsche’s thinking out the absolute absence of a privileged position proceeding from which it would be possible to unequivocally identify what is real. The article argues that the crucial point why some interpretations may prove to be stronger or weaker is best described in terms of the concept of power. One however should avoid misconceptions, since power itself is interpretation which nevertheless allows for the gradation of reality, the mobility of its horizons, their shifting and even their potential availability. A much-disputed question of prehistoric times as well as that of death as a limit of interpretability is inter alia included in the analysis. Both classical anti-realistic positions, such as that of Wittgenstein, and the argumentation of contemporary advocates of realism, such as Quentin Meillassoux, are taken into consideration.

This article deals with Dostoevsky’s (1821–1881) controversial concept of love and its relation to that of Nietzsche (1844–1900). Despite many parallels, Dostoevsky’s thought on love can be viewed as a criticism, avant la letter, of Nietzsche’s claim to having unmasked the Christian idea of neighbour-love ‘for God’s sake’ as an illusion. Yet, in addition to neighbour-love, Dostoevsky also entertains the idea of ‘furthest love’ (a phrase used both by Dostoevsky and by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra), love for the Ubermensch of the future. The article examines Dostoevsky’s experiments with love’s different forms and argues that the question underlying these explorations is whether Christian love can positively impact the world or whether it is doomed to be ineffectual, even destructive. It is argued that, while Dostoevsky’s novels often expose love’s fallibility and even its impotence, they nonetheless manifest the quest for a love capable of redeeming the world. It is shown how Dostoevsky considered one’s...

The concept of "intellectual conscience" is for Nietzsche the end product of European morality and exhibits that morality's paradoxial nature. Nietzsche's notion cannot however be regarded as an expression of an adoration of the old moral ideal. It should on the contrary show the impossibility that a single system of moral evaluation can be valid for all. In order to demonstrate this, the article deals with another notion - the notion of faith/belief-which is implied by the notion of conscience. Its Christian-protestant interpretation and its reinterpretation in Kantian moral philosophy reveal the tragedy of a desperate search for the guarantees of the holding-for-true. The task to discover a new courage for the unknown, the courage to side against the deepest wishes of "the heart" is presented by Nietzsche as a command of a new, joyful wisdom.

Dass Nietzsches Denken politische Implikationen besitzt und ihm politische Bedeutungen beigelegt wurden, beweisen die philosophische Reflexion und – zum Teil auf schlimmste Weise – die politische Ideologie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ob er deshalb als ‚politischer Denker‘ oder als ‚politischer Philosoph‘ definiert werden kann, ist eine ganz andere Frage. Jedem Versuch, Nietzsches Philosophie einen politischen Sinn zu entnehmen, muss sicher die Feststellung von Tamsin Shaw vorausgeschickt werden: Nietzsche „is a frustrating figure for political theorists“. Gesteht man ihm „Einsichten“ (insights) in die Moral, die Kultur und Religion zu, so muss man jedenfalls zugeben, dass er sich „abstains from developing these insights into a coeherent theory of politics“ und in seinem Denken folglich keine „unifying basis in some implicit and coeherent normative political theory“ ausfindig gemacht werden kann. Wenn Shaw sowohl Nietzsches Positionen zur Moral, zur Religion usw. wie diejenigen zur Politik mit dem Begriff „insights“ beschreibt, so legt dies nahe, dass Nietzsche in seiner politischen Reflexion keinen anderen Weg beschreitet als beim Nachdenken über andere Themen. Mit anderen Worten gibt es bei Nietzsche weder eine zusammenhängende politische Theorie noch eine zusammenhängende Morallehre.