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This article comments on how values relate to sociological theory and sociological research. One of the well-worn clichés of sociology asserts that science is concerned with what is, not with what ought to be. Like other statements purporting to deal with the problem of values, however, this proposition has faced vigorous challenge from those who regard it as too glib or facile for adequate handling of a complex and intricate problem. It is, no doubt, entirely unnecessary to point out that such questions as whether or not there is a body of social science thought which can be called Catholic sociology as distinguished from sociology hinges on whether or not the values--i.e., the standards of worth--avowed by sociologists affect or, possibly, control their activities as sociologists--and, if so, how. It will be recalled that Talcott Parsons, E. A. Shils, and others in Toward a General Theory of Action, have argued that evaluation (reference to standards of worth) is present in every orientation to action--analytically separable but inevitably and invariably present. It is difficult to conceive of any action, including research, which is devoid of implied value-commitment. It is almost equally difficult to conceive of any statement about action that would be utterly divested of evaluative elements, since even the language of description often bears the imprint of value-commitments of some sort.