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While Mexico made great gains in consolidating democracy in 1997 and 2000, these advances risk being severely undermined by doubts surrounding the 2006 election. This article contends that the 2006 pre-electoral environment is, if for different reasons, at least as fragile as that in 2000. If proper measures are not taken to improve electoral playing field transparency and levelness and to help ensure the winner’s selection through a process accepted by all and with broad participation, post-electoral mobilization and short-term ingovernability are possible outcomes. We focus on emerging challenges posed by profligate campaign spending and the lack of disclosure which threaten to delimit the presidential election outcome months ahead of the race. We conclude that greater international attention should be paid to these elections, and suggest that Mexico’s voters and international observers should heed important experimental civil society, media, and academic initiatives to systematically monitor “playing field” levelness.

Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when 'authoritarian-aspiring' presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on a survey of more than 4,000 respondents, this article argues that contrary to claims by the 1994 Zapatista insurgency, indigenous and nonindigenous respondents in southern Mexico have been united more by socioeconomic and land tenure institution variables than by ethnic identity. Based on statistical models, it concludes that in rural southern Mexico, ethnicity alone is less important in shaping peoples' attitudes than whether the dominant land tenure institutions are the 'communitarian' state-penetrated ejidos (communitarian collective farms) of Chiapas or the more 'individualist' so-called communal lands of Oaxaca. It concludes by affirming that--contrary to many analysts of Chiapas's 1994 indigenous rebellion--external influences (here state-established land tenure institutions) can trump ideology in framing social movements. Rural Chiapas's prevalent communitarian attitudes seem to have resulted partly from exogenous land tenure institutions (ejidos) rather than from endogenous indigenous identities alone, as claimed by Zapatistas and scholars. Keywords: indigenous: ethnic identity; social movement; institutions; rural, economic development; property rights: agrarian; land tenure: communitarian; individual rights: corporatism; public opinion; Mexico; Zapatista; Chiapas; Oaxaca