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This paper discusses the distinction between disability and handicap as it is proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in their publication International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (WHO, 1993 (first published, 1980)). Following criticism of this an attempt to salvage the distinction by Nordenfelt (1993, 1983) is discussed. It is argued that neither the WHO nor Nordenfelt are successful in their attempts to preserve the distinction between disability and handicap in a theoretically well-motivated manner. Contrary to the WHO, it is argued that what they term 'disabilities' and 'handicaps' both have external causes. And contrary to Nordenfelt's position it is shown that 'basic actions' do not provide a firm theoretical foundation for the concept of disability. Moreover, the criticisms of these two sets of views reveal that attempts to describe the phenomenon of disablement which focus on the individual suffer from a serious methodological shortcoming. Key Words: disability, handicap, Nordenfelt, World Health Organization.

The moral status accorded to an individual (or class of individuals) helps to account for the weight of the moral obligations considered due to an individual (or class of individuals). Strong arguments can be given to indicate that the moral status accorded, justly or unjustly, to individuals with intellectual disabilities is less than that accorded to those considered intellectually able. This paper suggests that such a view of the moral status of intellectually disabled individuals derives from individualism. Ontological and normative components of individualism are identified. It is shown that individualistic, ontological criteria for personhood compromise the integrity of 'dependent' individuals. And it is shown that the normative component of individualism further compromises the integrity of intellectually disabled individuals. An alternative view of the self is outlined in which dependence features centrally. It is tentatively suggested that such a view of the self may prove more congenial to enhancing the moral status of individuals with intellectual disabilities. Key Words: intellectual disability, moral status, persons, the human self.