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Corrections are a frequently used and effective tool for countering misinformation. However, concerns have been raised that corrections may introduce false claims to new audiences when the misinformation is novel. This is because boosting the familiarity of a claim can increase belief in that claim, and thus exposing new audiences to novel misinformation--even as part of a correction--may inadvertently increase misinformation belief. Such an outcome could be conceptualized as a "familiarity backfire effect," whereby a familiarity boost increases false-claim endorsement above a control-condition or pre-correction baseline. Here, we examined whether standalone corrections--that is, corrections presented without initial misinformation exposure--can backfire and increase participants' reliance on the misinformation in their subsequent inferential reasoning, relative to a no-misinformation, no-correction control condition. Across three experiments (total N = 1156) we found that standalone corrections did not backfire immediately (Experiment 1) or after a one-week delay (Experiment 2). However, there was some mixed evidence suggesting corrections may backfire when there is skepticism regarding the correction (Experiment 3). Specifically, in Experiment 3, we found the standalone correction to backfire in open-ended responses, but only when there was skepticism towards the correction. However, this did not replicate with the rating scales measure. Future research should further examine whether skepticism towards the correction is the first replicable mechanism for backfire effects to occur.

Misinformation about climate change is a consequential societal issue, causing polarization and reduced support for climate action. However, the seriousness of the problem does not preclude non-serious solutions. There are numerous potential benefits to humor as a strategy to counter misinformation, such as attracting attention and engaging disengaged audiences. This paper describes a humorous serious game--"Cranky Uncle"--developed in the U.S. to inoculate players against climate misinformation. The game combines psychological research into active inoculation, critical-thinking work on misleading rhetorical techniques, communication research into cartoon debunking, and gamification. The game's cartoon humor and the creative potential of active inoculation lends it to classroom applications; educators have thus used classroom activities to complement the game in order to improve students' climate literacy and critical-thinking abilities. We present several qualitative U.S.-based case studies, in formal English-speaking tertiary classrooms and informal public education settings, to illustrate the utility of a humorous, game-based approach to building resilience against climate misinformation. The approaches adopted in our case studies are offered as a model for other educators looking to use interactive games to teach critical thinking.

People frequently continue to use inaccurate information in their reasoning even after a credible retraction has been presented. This phenomenon is often referred to as the continued influence effect of misinformation. The repetition of the original misconception within a retraction could contribute to this phenomenon, as it could inadvertently make the "myth" more familiar--and familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. From a dual-process perspective, familiarity-based acceptance of myths is most likely to occur in the absence of strategic memory processes. Thus, we examined factors known to affect whether strategic memory processes can be utilized: age, detail, and time. Participants rated their belief in various statements of unclear veracity, and facts were subsequently affirmed and myths were retracted. Participants then rerated their belief either immediately or after a delay. We compared groups of young and older participants, and we manipulated the amount of detail presented in the affirmative or corrective explanations, as well as the retention interval between encoding and a retrieval attempt. We found that (a) older adults over the age of 65 were worse at sustaining their postcorrection belief that myths were inaccurate, (b) a greater level of explanatory detail promoted more sustained belief change, and (c) fact affirmations promoted more sustained belief change in comparison with myth retractions over the course of 1 week (but not over 3 weeks), This supports the notion that familiarity is indeed a driver of continued influence effects.

People increasingly rely on social‐media platforms to access information; thus, understanding how platform characteristics influence belief in misinformation is important. Recent findings indicate perceived social endorsement of information (e.g., number of likes) can influence misinformation belief and correction acceptance. However, how the influence of endorsement may be modulated by concurrent disendorsement information (e.g., dislikes) is unclear. Across two experiments, we assessed the influence of relative endorsement on misinformation belief and correction acceptance. Experiment 1 exposed participants to claims and fact‐checks with a high or low likes‐to‐dislikes ratio. Experiment 2 simplified the relative‐endorsement information into a single value (i.e., a percentage). Results suggest high relative social endorsement of misinformation significantly increases misinformation belief, particularly when the endorsement information is presented as a single value. Conversely, relative endorsement had a negligible impact on correction effectiveness. This suggests perceived relative endorsement may influence belief primarily when other cues of information veracity are unavailable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the seasonal effects that working outdoors had on various parameters in mining industry workers over the course of a work-shift. Workers (n = 27) were assessed in summer (33.3 ± 4.2°C, 38 ± 18% RH; n = 13, age = 46 ± 14 y, BMI = 29.1 ± 5.7 kg/m2) and winter (23.6 ± 5.1°C, 39 ± 20% RH; n = 14, age = 44 ± 12 y, BMI = 31.2 ± 4.1 kg/m2). Core temperature and heart-rate were measured continuously (analyzed at five time points), while perceptual measures, cognitive and manual dexterity performance were assessed at various times over an 11-h shift at the start of a 14-day swing. Hydration was assessed (urine specific gravity) pre- and post-shift. Working memory was impaired in summer compared to winter (−10%; p = 0.039), however did not change throughout the shift. Processing efficiency was significantly reduced at 12 pm (−12%; p = 0.005) and 5 pm (−21%; p < 0.001) compared to 9 am, irrespective of season (p > 0.05). Manual dexterity (dominant-hand) improved over the shift (+13%, p = 0.002), but was not different between seasons. Perceived fatigue had no main effect of season or shift. Core temperature, heart-rate, thermal sensation and rating of perceived exertion increased throughout the shift, with only core temperature and thermal sensation showing a seasonal effect (summer: +0.33°C, +18%, respectively; p < 0.002). Notably, 23% of workers in summer and 64% in winter started work significantly dehydrated, with 54% and 64% in summer and winter, respectively, finishing work with significant to serious dehydration. Impairment in working memory in summer combined with high levels of dehydration over the work-shift reinforces the need for workplace education on the importance of hydration and risk of occupation heat stress. Abbreviations: Core temperature: Tc; Fly-in fly-out: FIFO; Ratings of perceived exertion: RPE; Relative humidity: RH; Urinary specific gravity: USG; Wet bulb globe temperature: WBGT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is consolidation needed to account for retroactive interference in free recall? Interfering mental activity during the retention interval of a memory task impairs performance, in particular if the interference occurs in temporal proximity to the encoding of the to-be-remembered (TBR) information. There are at least two rival theoretical accounts of this temporal gradient of retroactive interference. The cognitive neuroscience literature has suggested neural consolidation is a pivotal factor determining item recall. According to this account, interfering activity interrupts consolidation processes that would otherwise stabilize the memory representations of TBR items post-encoding. Temporal distinctiveness theory, by contrast, proposes that the retrievability of items depends on their isolation in psychological time. According to this theory, information processed after the encoding of TBR material will reduce the temporal distinctiveness of the TBR information. To test between these accounts, implementations of consolidation were added to the SIMPLE model of memory and learning. We report data from two experiments utilizing a two-list free recall paradigm. Modeling results imply that SIMPLE was able to model the data and did not benefit from the addition of consolidation. It is concluded that the temporal gradient of retroactive interference cannot be taken as evidence for memory consolidation.

Reliance on misinformation often persists in the face of corrections. However, the role of social factors on people's reliance on corrected misinformation has received little attention. In two experiments, we investigated the extent to which social endorsement of misinformation and corrections influences belief updating. In both experiments misinformation and fact-checks were presented as social media posts, and social endorsement was manipulated via the number of "likes." In Experiment 1, social endorsement of the initial misinformation had a significant influence on belief; participants believed misinformation with high social endorsement more than misinformation with low endorsement. This effect was observed pre-fact-check and post-fact-check. High social endorsement of the fact-checks was associated with reduced misinformation belief; however, evidence for the persistence of this effect was mixed. These findings were replicated in Experiment 2. Our findings indicate that social endorsement can moderate our beliefs in misinformation and the fact-checks designed to correct these beliefs. General Audience Summary: Misinformation can be created and spread on social media platforms with relative ease. Additionally, unlike traditional media, common cues of information credibility, such as source expertise and trustworthiness, are often unavailable on social media platforms. As such, determining what to believe versus what to disregard can be difficult. To reduce the effort required to assess information credibility, people may rely on mental shortcuts (or heuristics). Specifically, it is well established that people often look to others, or the majority, when making decisions about what to believe and how to behave. As such, people may rely on engagement metrics on social media (e.g., the number of "likes" or "shares" a post has) to gauge information credibility. Across two experiments, we investigated how level of social endorsement (specifically, whether a social media post has a high or low number of "likes") influenced the extent to which people believed misinformation, and updated their belief based on subsequent fact-checks. We found that people had greater belief in misinformation with a high versus low level of likes, even after they received a fact-check. Further, fact-checks with a high number of likes reduced belief in misinformation more than fact-checks with a low number of likes. However, evidence for the persistence of the effect of fact-check endorsement on belief updating was mixed. These findings suggest that people may rely on engagement metrics, specifically number of likes, when appraising misinformation on social media. This influence of endorsement information may be reason for concern, particularly given that engagement information can be maliciously manipulated, and misleading and conspiratorial claims often have characteristics designed to enhance their level of endorsement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is ongoing debate concerning the mechanisms of feature binding in working memory. In particular, there is controversy regarding the extent to which these binding processes are automatic. The present article demonstrates that binding mechanisms differ depending on whether the to-be-integrated features are perceived as forming a coherent object. We presented a series of experiments that investigated the binding of color and shape, whereby color was either an intrinsic feature of the shape or an extrinsic feature of the shape's background. Results show that intrinsic color affected shape recognition, even when it was incidentally studied and irrelevant for the recognition task. In contrast, extrinsic color did not affect shape recognition, even when the association of color and shape was encoded and retrievable on demand. This strongly suggests that binding of intrinsic intra-item information but not extrinsic contextual information is obligatory in visual working memory. We highlight links to perception as well as implicit and explicit long-term memory, which suggest that the intrinsic-extrinsic dimension is a principle relevant to multiple domains of human cognition. (Contains 7 figures, 4 tables and 5 footnotes.)