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According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or "distant" to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision--such as those related to being an object, background or detail--constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or “distant” to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision—such as those related to being an object, background or detail—constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

Raftopoulos’s most recent book argues, among other things, for the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Before we can assess any such claims, we need to know what’s meant by “early vision” and by “cognitive penetration”. In this contribution to this book symposium, I explore several different things that one might mean – indeed, that Raftopoulos might mean – by these terms. I argue that whatever criterion we choose for delineating early vision, we need a single criterion, not a mishmash of distinct criteria. And I argue against defining cognitive penetration in partly epistemological terms, although it is fine to offer epistemological considerations in defending some definitions as capturing something of independent interest. Finally, I raise some questions about how we are to understand the “directness” of certain putative cognitive influences on perception and about whether there’s a decent rationale for restricting directness in the way that Raftopoulos apparently does.

Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual (NCC) and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties and at some stage of visual processing it must interface with cognition and its conceptual capacities for the visual objects to be individuated. Or, they will have to hold that the imagistic, NCC of (or, a stage of) perception, allows for object individuation. I opt for the second thesis because I think there is strong empirical evidence that objects are individuated during early vision. I also think that early vision individuates objects by means of, what I had previously called nonconceptual perceptual demonstrative reference. I argue, first, why Fodor’s view that iconic NCC does not enable object individuation is false. I also argue, contra Fodor, that early vision allows the perception of the cardinality of sets of objects.

We developed an image-computable observer model of the initial visual encoding that operates on natural image input, based on the framework of Bayesian image reconstruction from the excitations of the retinal cone mosaic. Our model extends previous work on ideal observer analysis and evaluation of performance beyond psychophysical discrimination, takes into account the statistical regularities of the visual environment, and provides a unifying framework for answering a wide range of questions regarding the visual front end. Using the error in the reconstructions as a metric, we analyzed variations of the number of different photoreceptor types on human retina as an optimal design problem. In addition, the reconstructions allow both visualization and quantification of information loss due to physiological optics and cone mosaic sampling, and how these vary with eccentricity. Furthermore, in simulations of color deficiencies and interferometric experiments, we found that the reconstructed images provide a reasonable proxy for modeling subjects’ percepts. Lastly, we used the reconstruction-based observer for the analysis of psychophysical threshold, and found notable interactions between spatial frequency and chromatic direction in the resulting spatial contrast sensitivity function. Our method is widely applicable to experiments and applications in which the initial visual encoding plays an important role.

This paper, I discuss the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability (CPs), to wit, th at the perceptual states (P) of a subject (S) are pervasively influenced, affected, or caused by cognitive factors (C) as expectations, memories, thoughts, goals, and so on, at all levels of perceptual processing. I argue that following the predictive coding models of perception (PC), the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability is to be expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has revealed the significant capability of neural computing in many challenging applications. Although DNNs are derived from emulating biological neurons, there still exist doubts over whether or not DNNs are the final and best model to emulate the mechanism of human intelligence. In particular, there are two discrepancies between computational DNN models and the observed facts of biological neurons. First, human neurons are interconnected randomly, while DNNs need carefully-designed architectures to work properly. Second, human neurons usually have a long spiking latency (~100ms) which implies that not many layers can be involved in making a decision, while DNNs could have hundreds of layers to guarantee high accuracy. In this paper, we propose a new computational model, namely shallow unorganized neural networks (SUNNs), in contrast to ANNs/DNNs. The proposed SUNNs differ from standard ANNs or DNNs in three fundamental aspects: 1) SUNNs are based on an adaptive neuron cell model, Smart Neurons, that allows each artificial neuron cell to adaptively respond to its inputs rather than carrying out a fixed weighted-sum operation like the classic neuron model in ANNs/DNNs; 2) SUNNs can cope with computational tasks with very shallow architectures; 3) SUNNs have a natural topology with random interconnections, as the human brain does, and as proposed by Turing's B-type unorganized machines. We implemented the proposed SUNN architecture and tested it on a number of unsupervised early stage visual perception tasks. Surprisingly, such simple shallow architectures achieved very good results in our experiments. The success of our new computational model makes it the first workable example of Turing's B-Type unorganized machine that can achieve comparable or better performance against the state-of-the-art algorithms.

The problem of the cognitive penetrability of perception pertains to whether perceptual processing may be impacted by higher-order cognitive processes. It may be understood in a twofold sense: 1) whether what a perceptual system computes may be altered in a way that is semantically coherent to one’s cognitive states; 2) whether perceptual experience may be influenced by cognitive processes. It has been argued that the cognitive penetrability problem is not scientifically tractable since we have no direct access to other persons’ subjective experiences and, therefore, we have to rely on their reports, which are mediated by higher-order processes (e.g., judgments). In this paper, I analyze the scope of methods harnessed in contemporary work on the penetrability of perception, focusing particularly on methods from experimental psychology and neuroscience. Among them, I indicate the most promising techniques and paradigms, as well as those that are inadequate to successfully tackling the problem. I also discuss experimental results which unequivocally suggest direct influences on perception which have not been addressed to date by supporters of the view that perception is impenetrable. I also describe the predictive processing theory of cognition, focusing on how it contributes to our understanding of cognitive penetrability, and discuss scientific results validating the theory. In conclusion, converging empirical evidence seems to suggest that perception is cognitively penetrable and we seem to be at the dawn of the ultimate solution of the problem.

Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are characterized by multifaceted alterations in visual perception and mental imagery. However, the interaction between early-stage visual perception and imagery has not been explored. We recruited 40 individuals with ASC and 20 neurotypical control volunteers to participate in a lateral masking task. Participants detected a luminance-contrast target pattern (Gabor patch) flanked by two collinear masks. The flanking masks inhibit target detection at small target-mask distances and facilitate target detection at intermediate target-mask distances. In the perceptual task, the masks appeared adjacent to the target. In the imagery task, participants imagined the masks immediately after seeing them. Results revealed that individuals with ASC characterized by exceptional visuoconstructional abilities (enhanced Block Design performance; n = 20) showed weaker inhibition at small target-mask distances and stronger facilitation at intermediate target-mask distances relative to the controls. Visual imagery was markedly dampened in ASC regardless of the visuoconstructional abilities. At the behavioral level, these results indicate increased facilitation via lateral connections in the primary visual cortex (V1) of individuals with ASC who exhibit exceptional visuoconstructional abilities, together with less efficient mental imagery.

Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are characterized by multifaceted alterations in visual perception and mental imagery. However, the interaction between early-stage visual perception and imagery has not been explored. We recruited 40 individuals with ASC and 20 neurotypical control volunteers to participate in a lateral masking task. Participants detected a luminance-contrast target pattern (Gabor patch) flanked by two collinear masks. The flanking masks inhibit target detection at small target-mask distances and facilitate target detection at intermediate target-mask distances. In the perceptual task, the masks appeared adjacent to the target. In the imagery task, participants imagined the masks immediately after seeing them. Results revealed that individuals with ASC characterized by exceptional visuoconstructional abilities (enhanced Block Design performance; n = 20) showed weaker inhibition at small target-mask distances and stronger facilitation at intermediate target-mask distances relative to the controls. Visual imagery was markedly dampened in ASC regardless of the visuoconstructional abilities. At the behavioral level, these results indicate increased facilitation via lateral connections in the primary visual cortex (V1) of individuals with ASC who exhibit exceptional visuoconstructional abilities, together with less efficient mental imagery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrast-based early visual processing has largely been considered to involve autonomous processes that do not need the support of cognitive resources. However, as spatial attention is known to modulate early visual perceptual processing, we explored whether cognitive load could similarly impact contrast-based perception. We used a dual-task paradigm to assess the impact of a concurrent working memory task on the performance of three different early visual tasks. The results from Experiment 1 suggest that cognitive load can modulate early visual processing. No effects of cognitive load were seen in Experiments 2 or 3. Together, the findings provide evidence that under some circumstances cognitive load effects can penetrate the early stages of visual processing and that higher cognitive function and early perceptual processing may not be as independent as was once thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014) that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource; early vision processes do not operate over cognitive contents, which is the essence of the claim that perception is cognitively penetrated; early vision is cognitively impenetrable. Recently it has been argued that there are cognitive effects that affect early vision, such as the various pre-cueing effects guided by cognitively driven attention, which suggests that early vision is cognitively penetrated. In addition, since the signatures of these effects are found in early vision it seems that early vision is directly affected by cognition since its processes seem to use cognitive information. I defend the cognitive impenetrability of early vision in three steps. First, I discuss the problems the cognitively penetrability of perception causes for the epistemic role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. Second, I argue that whether a set of perceptual processes is cognitively penetrated hinges on whether there are cognitive effects that undermine the justificatory role of these processes in grounding empirical beliefs, and I examine the epistemic role of early vision. I argue, third, that the cognitive effects that act through pre-cueing do not undermine this role and, thus, do not render early vision cognitively penetrable. In addition, they do not entail that early vision uses cognitive information.

According to a widely held view, psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia are characterized by a vague boundary between the perception of the external world and the inner imagery of persons, objects, and events. In this study, we addressed the perception-imagery debate in schizotypal personality disorder (SPD). Thirty individuals with SPD and 30 matched healthy subjects completed a lateral masking task. Participants were asked to detect a low-contrast Gabor patch flanked by two collinear Gabor masks. In the perceptual task, the masks were physically present, whereas in the imagery task, participants only imagined the masks. By applying a binocular rivalry paradigm, we also measured the imagery priming effect. Results revealed that, in the perceptual task, collinear masks similarly decreased contrast threshold in SPD and controls. In the imagery task, contrast threshold reduction (facilitation by the imagined masks) was more pronounced in SPD relative to the controls. In the binocular rivalry paradigm, individuals with SPD showed higher imagery priming effects as compared to healthy controls. Enhanced imagery was not related to schizotypal traits. These results indicate intact early visual perception and heightened imagery in SPD, which may be a trait marker of unusual experiences without psychotic disorganization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]