Search

The report is part of a series of learning products with limited objectives geared towards synthesizing existing knowledge as well as learning and gaining new insights into the factors that influence design, policy implementation, and performance of development policy loans. It aims to provide fresh insights and build on previous evaluations of Bank investment projects and research and analytical work (for example, recent independent evaluation group (IEG) work on development policy operations (DPOs) includes the evaluation of poverty reduction support credits (PRSCs), first and second financial crisis evaluations (which examined crisis DPOs), recent operations policy and country services (OPCS) DPO retrospectives, and new research presented in this report on aspects of DPOs using a combination of approaches). The quality of macro frameworks in DPOs alone has not been subject of in-depth study. This report aims to contribute to filling that gap with a: (i) preliminary analysis of the quality of macro-fiscal frameworks in DPOs, and (ii) a comprehensive database of project level DPOs and related country and economic policy and statistical information, which is a byproduct of the study.

This study presents an evaluation of the National Expenditure Program for 2013. First, this paper projects that the fiscal targets set out in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) for 2013 are likely to be met. Specifically, fiscal deficit is projected to be PHP 9.6 billion lower than the BESF at PHP 231 billion, while government revenue is estimated to be equal to PHP 1.8 trillion in 2013 which is also higher than the BESF projection. This is despite the expectation that the BOC collections and nontax revenues will be just equal to the 2011 and 2012 levels. Additional revenues is thus sourced from the BIR collections, which is estimated to reach PHP 1.26 trillion in 2013, exceeding the President's Budget's estimate of PHP 1.24 trillion. Second, although a more balanced distribution of the budget between the social services and economic services sectors is emphasized in the 2013 National Expenditure Program, the services sector still accounts for more than half of the increase in expenditure program in 2013. Finally, the improving debt profile of the country will continue in 2013. National government borrowing will continue to be biased in favor of domestic borrowings.

Benin experienced a long period of political instability and economic challenges after achieving its independence in August 1960. In 1991 a new government initiated far-reaching reforms aimed at the creation of a market-based economy, resulting in significant liberalization of Benin's political and economic system. Growth fluctuated in the range of 4-6 percent until 2000, after which it began to trend downwards, fluctuating largely in response to variation in the exchange rate as well as to movement in the prices of cotton, Benin's main export, and oil, a major import. Benin benefited from support under the Environmental and Social Assessment Framework (ESAF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth (PRGF) facilities, the latter continuously since 1993. According to an independent ex-post review (International Monetary Fund 2004), program implementation during 1993-2003 was broadly successful. Real economic growth averaged 5 percent and fiscal consolidation improved as key initial challenges arising from the Government's low revenue collection and high wage bill were addressed. But overall progress in structural reform was mixed. Initial efforts to liberalize the economy and reduce government intervention were successful, and there was progress in introducing far-reaching reforms in the cotton sector. A new poverty reduction growth facility was approved in August 2005.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is an extremely complex, multidisciplinary and skill intensive endeavor. Government-wide M&E is even more so because it requires detailed knowledge across and within sectors, as well as of interactions among planning, budgeting, and implementation functions in the public sector. The situation is complicated even further when the machinery of government is decentralized, with powers and functions distributed across three spheres of government. This paper outlines the process of implementing a government-wide monitoring and evaluation (GWM&E) system in South Africa. The first section sketches the context that created the impetus for establishing such a system. This context is clearly shaping the evolution of the system and influencing its longer-term sustainability. The second section outlines the various stages of conceptualizing and implementing the GWM&E system, which is currently very much a 'work in progress.' The third section reviews international experiences for lessons learned, which may also be germane to the South African context, noting similarities and differences in approach. Some of the critical implementation factors relate to the role of political leadership and championing of M&E, incentives for promoting usage of M&E findings, dealing with information and data constraints, capacity building, "ownership" of the M&E system by line ministries and other agencies, and managing the challenges of change. The fourth section examines a range of challenges and difficulties encountered in South Africa. The final section reflects on lessons distilled from the South African experience to date.

This paper covers selective aspects of Spain's experience in evaluating government performance and public policies. Rather than a cohesive evaluation system, there is instead a constellation of organizations, with evaluation mandates and/or practices, which are not interrelated. These organizations and their respective practices have been evolving without coordination over the past three decades. An evaluation culture is slowly emerging, amid different conceptual approaches used by different organizations that are managing and/or conducting evaluations. Evaluation activity has been taking place in Spain for years, with a marked acceleration and qualitative shift since 2005. Despite Spain's standing as an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country as well as a European Union (EU) country, it still has not developed a consolidated evaluation system. This fact points out how long-term and complex is the task of institutionalizing an evaluation system. Finally, this paper contains several website addresses where readers can obtain additional information on aspects of the paper that most interest them and to follow the Spanish experience as it unfolds.

This study presents an evaluation of the President’s Budget for 2003. First, it shows that the fiscal targets set out in the administration’s Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) for 2003 are not likely to be met. In particular, the fiscal deficit target of P130 billion (or 3.3% of GDP) for 2002 will be exceeded by P93 billion (or 2.4% of GDP). Thus, the paper projects that the national government’s fiscal position will weaken from a deficit of 4.1% of GDP in 2001 to a deficit of 5.6% of GDP in 2002. In like manner, the fiscal deficit target of P142.1 billion (or 3.3% of GDP) in 2003 will also be exceeded by P34 billion – P64 billion (or 0.8% - 1.5% of GDP). While the government was able to run high deficits in the last three years without hurting macroeconomic stability, danger signs have begun to emerge. On the one hand, outstanding debt of the national government has been rising rapidly, from 65.5% of GDP as of December 2001 to 68.2% as of August 2003. On the other hand, while interest rates have remained low, the yield curve on government securities is steep indicating that inflationary expectations are high. Second, the problem with the fiscal deficit stems largely from the continuous slide in tax effort. Undoubtedly, evasion continues to be a major source of the leakage in revenues and the situation appears to have worsened in 2001. However, closer analysis indicates that weaknesses in tax structure (nonindexation of excise taxes and proliferation of tax incentives) also need to be addressed. Third, in the near term, fiscal consolidation cannot be achieved unless corrections on the revenue side are effected as government expenditures have already been cut to the bone. Although the expenditure program for 2003 is P34.4 billion (or 4.5%) larger than the obligation program for the previous year, national government services in 2003 are expected to be severely constrained as non-mandatory expenditures (i.e., total national government expenditures net debt service, transfers to LGUs and pensions/retirement gratuity) are programmed to decline by 1.4% relative to the 2002 level. This means that many government agencies, including those in the social service sectors, will have to work with smaller budgets in 2003.