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The Transformer Rectifier Unit (TRU) in aircraft is DC power supplies. Three-phase AC power supplies are available as long as they work. DC power distribution, on the other hand, provides DC power directly to all DC users, providing input power to the emergency AC distribution system so that the static inverter can generate AC power. To the voltages produced by TRUs to be less oscillating and of higher quality, multi-pulse ones are studied and recommended for aircraft systems. In this study, Zener diode filtered multi-pulse rectifier, which can further reduce the oscillations in the output voltage, is recommended for aircraft. Three-phase half-wave rectifier design and analysis are presented to better demonstrate the effectiveness of Zener diode regulation in multi-pulse TRUs. First, the parts of the power system, which includes the rectifier circuit of a two-engine aircraft and fed by this rectifier, are given. The circuit structure and working order of the rectifier are given with mathematical explanations. In the application phase, low oscillating output voltages and currents are obtained by creating currents and voltages on the load for different Zener voltages. Conventional rectifiers and the proposed rectifier are tested on the same loads, and comparisons are done. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic accountability requires that citizens accurately attribute credit and blame to leaders and institutions. However, citizens tend to simplify politics by personifying the state as its leader and directing credit and blame accordingly. Using an expert survey and a five-wave public panel survey spanning two administrations, we contrast public and expert perceptions of presidential power. We demonstrate that the public exaggerates the president's powers relative to scholarly experts and that people who exaggerate presidential powers most are more likely to attribute blame to the president. However, a change in partisan control of the presidency shifts perceptions of power among partisans. Finally, we find suggestive evidence of similar shifts in belief after salient policy failures. These results provide the most direct evidence to date that citizens generally exaggerate the president's influence and control but that these beliefs change over time in response to events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergency decision support techniques play an important role in complex and safety-critical systems such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). Emergency decision-making is not a single method but a framework comprising a combination of various technologies. This paper presents a review of various methods for emergency decision support systems in NPPs. We first discuss the theoretical foundations of nuclear power plant emergency decision support technologies. Based on this exposition, the key technologies of emergency decision support systems in NPPs are presented, including training operators in emergency management, risk assessment, fault detection and diagnosis, multi-criteria decision support, and accident consequence assessment. The principles, application, and comparative analysis of these methods are systematically described. Additionally, we present an overview of emergency decision support systems in NPPs across different countries and feature profiles of prominent systems like the Real-Time Online Decision Support System for Nuclear Emergencies (RODOS), the Accident Reporting and Guiding Operational System (ARGOS), and the Decision Support Tool for Severe Accidents (Severa). Then, the existing challenges and issues in this field are summarized, including the need for better integration of risk assessment, methods to enhance education and training, the acceleration of simulation calculations, the application of large language models, and international cooperation. Finally, we propose a new decision support system that integrates Level 1, 2, and 3 probabilistic safety assessment for emergency management in NPPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a synchrophasor measurement-assisted integrated scheme to enhance power grid stability via transient stability assessment and emergency control of power systems in real-time. The synchrophasor measurements are time-stamped network information available from Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). The Transient Stability Assessment (TSA) is based on measured generator bus angles obtained directly by PMUs at the control center. These synchronized angle measurements are utilized to construct features, and a Random Forest classifier is implemented to infer the TSA in real-time. The TSA results are determined within the first three cycles following the fault clearance. For operating scenarios that are unstable, an effective emergency control scheme is developed to avoid system degradation. The control strategy utilizes wide-area measurements to formulate a proportional sharing principle-based methodology in real-time. The composite scheme estimates the location and magnitude of the emergency measures to enhance grid stability. The performance of the proposed composite scheme is tested on an IEEE 39-bus test system. The results highlight that the scheme is computationally efficient and robust to topological changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study objects to lay out a lucid perspective on "how any securitizing move occurs successfully" an issue that was non-rigidly theorized in the Copenhagen version of securitization, in line with current debates. To this end, the vague criteria as follows, set by the classical cadre of the Copenhagen School are problematized: actors have to couch the issue as an existential threat requiring exceptional executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitizing move, the case is established as a security issue beyond the routine procedure of politics. Considering this conservative cycle, the first claim of this paper is that the politics of "audience acceptance" is not adequately determined in theory. The second is that the classical variants' persistence in the transition to "exceptional security policy" in the operation of securitization, ignoring its insecure nature, reduces the theory to a given and fixed understanding of security such as "security=exceptionalism." Premised on these arguments, the paper proposes an overarching systematized thought that empowers the audience's role; does not exclude "exceptional measures" but also inserts into "normalized exceptional" and even "routine responses" as actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article demonstrates for the first time how civil servants check and restrain presidential power through collective bargaining. The executive branch is typically depicted as a top-down hierarchy. The President, as chief executive, issues policy directives, and the tenured bureaucracy of civil servants below him follow them. This presumed top-down structure shapes many influential critiques of the modern administrative state. Proponents of a strong President decry civil servants as an unelected "deep state" usurping popular will. Skeptics of presidential power fear the growth of an imperial presidency, held in check by an impartial bureaucracy. Federal sector labor rights, which play an increasingly central role in structuring the modern executive branch, complicate each of these critiques. Under federal law, civil servants have the right to enter into binding contracts with administrative agencies governing the conditions of their employment. These agreements restrain and reshape the President's power to manage the federal bureaucracy and impact nearly every area of executive branch policymaking, from how administrative law judges decide cases to how immigration agents and prison guards enforce federal law. Bureaucratic power arrangements are neither imposed from above by an "imperial" presidency nor subverted from below by an "unaccountable" bureaucracy. Rather, the President and the civil service bargain over the contours of executive authority and litigate their disputes before arbitrators and courts. Bargaining thus encourages a form of government-wide civil servant "resistance" that is legalistic rather than lawless, and highly structured and transparent rather than opaque and inchoate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Florentino Pérez is the most successful president of soccer organizations in the world. His leadership in Real Madrid is uncontested. This paper explores his use of communication and power. It delves into how Pérez's use of communication parallels the one recommended by four great masters who wrote during the Renaissance and Baroque periods about using communication to project power: Nicolo Machiavelli, Baltasar Gracián, Francesco Guicciardini or Cardinal Mazarino. This paper is a content analysis of an exclusive interview Pérez gave on TV after the fiasco of the European Super League in 2021. This analysis shows how Pérez´s performance reflects the teachings of these masters in his deeds, appearance, the reconciliation of his public and private interests, and in the brevity with which he conveys his messages. The conclusion is that there are some atemporal principles in the strategic communication menu that work in the soccer industry when top executives try to gain popular support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do violent elections affect the willingness of citizens to defend democratic institutions? We argue that in the wake of violent elections, support for democratic constraints on the executive will diverge amongst ruling and opposition party supporters. To protect their position, ruling party supporters become more likely to endorse weakening constraints on executive power, even if it violates democratic principles. Opposition supporters, on the other hand, become more likely to reject democratic transgressions that de facto render them more vulnerable to political abuse. We examine these expectations using a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative 2019 post-election survey of 2400 Nigerians. Our findings suggest that incumbent supporters are overall more likely to endorse weaker constraints on the executive, but these attitudes are not reinforced by information about election violence. Opposition supporters, in contrast, become less likely to accept transgressions when informed about election violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court has constructed key parts of First Amendment law around two underlying assumptions. The first is that the press is a powerful actor capable of obtaining government information and checking government power. The second is that the executive branch is bound by various internal and external constraints that limit its ability to keep information secret. Judges and legislators have long assumed that these twin forces--an emboldened press and a constrained executive--maintain a rough balance between the press's desire to uncover secrets and the executive's desire to keep information hidden. Landmark First Amendment cases such as the Pentagon Papers decision embody this view. Professor Cass Sunstein has described these cases as establishing a "First Amendment equilibrium," one that arises out of the structural competition between the press and the executive. Today, judges and legislators continue to treat the press and the government as equal combatants in these disputes. Yet whatever equilibrium might once have existed between the press and executive branch has been destabilized. The institutional press has been eviscerated in recent years--hemorrhaging talent, expertise, resources, and legitimacy. Wide swaths of the country now qualify as "news deserts," lacking any local press presence at all. Public trust in the mainstream media has also plummeted. At the same time, many internal checks no longer constrain the ability of the executive branch to guard its secrets. This combination of a hollowed-out press and an insufficiently checked executive has given rise to a First Amendment disequilibrium, unsettling the foundations of this critical segment of constitutional law. This Article describes the causes and consequences of this disequilibrium and argues that recalibration is essential to fostering effective democratic self-governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In divided-executive patronal systems, legislatures have been sites of resistance to the centralization of power in a single patronal pyramid. Kyrgyzstan is an anomaly among divided-executive patronal systems when between 2010 to 2020, the Kyrgyz parliament was neither a site of opposition nor did it demonstrate legislative agency vis-à-vis the executive. Instead, following another uprising in 2020, a unified single patronal pyramid was re-established. Adopting an approach rooted in the semiotics of meaning making and drawing on a dataset of interviews with parliamentary deputies and a range of documentary sources, this article complements existing institutional approaches to explaining weak legislative agency by revealing a series of dialogical relationships between deputy meaning making and broader institutional and cultural constraints which shaped the Kyrgyz's parliament's overall quality and strength. These relationships pertain to legislative initiative, the protection of private interests and representation, with the interplay between the ascribed meaning and its constitution within broader institutional and cultural context contributing to the diminishment of legislative agency vis-à-vis the presidency. Kyrgyzstan illustrates the value of meaning making as an approach to understanding legislative-executive relations in non-democratic contexts, and its impact in conjunction with cultural and institutional constraints in shaping legislative agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern electrical power systems are characterized by a high rate of transient processes, the use of digital monitoring and control systems, and the accumulation of a large amount of technological information. The active integration of renewable energy sources contributes to reducing the inertia of power systems and changing the nature of transient processes. As a result, the effectiveness of emergency control systems decreases. Traditional emergency control systems operate based on the numerical analysis of power system dynamic models. This allows for finding the optimal set of preventive commands (solutions) in the form of disconnections of generating units, consumers, transmission lines, and other primary grid equipment. Thus, the steady-state or transient stability of a power system is provided. After the active integration of renewable sources into power systems, traditional emergency control algorithms became ineffective due to the time delay in finding the optimal set of control actions. Currently, machine learning algorithms are being developed that provide high performance and adaptability. This paper contains a meta-analysis of modern emergency control algorithms for power systems based on machine learning and synchronized phasor measurement data. It describes algorithms for determining disturbances in the power system, selecting control actions to maintain transient and steady-state stability, stability in voltage level, and limiting frequency. This study examines 53 studies piled on the development of a methodology for analyzing the stability of power systems based on ML algorithms. The analysis of the research is carried out in terms of accuracy, computational latency, and data used in training and testing. The most frequently used textual mathematical models of power systems are determined, and the most suitable ML algorithms for use in the operational control circuit of power systems in real time are determined. This paper also provides an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of existing algorithms, as well as identifies areas for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by recent studies about the effects of coups on future regime trajectories, the article examines the conduct of praetorian armies in electoral contests that occur in the aftermath of military coups. In some countries, putschist militaries refrain from interfering in post-coup elections and withdraw from executive power. In others, they rig elections in favour of their preferred candidate and become entrenched in executive power. In each outcome, coup makers play a different role in subsequent regime dynamics. To explain these different outcomes, the article designs an integrative framework and applies it to countries displaying different post-coup electoral outcomes over time. The findings reinforce skepticism about the democratisation potential of militaries and highlight the importance of intra-military factionalism on praetorian leaders. The article encourages scholars to engage in case-based and processual research linking coup makers to long-term regime dynamics and provides hypotheses guiding such research agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a very wide range of people who are involved in the execution of the laws. Some statutory provisions are also treated this way; consider the idea that the term "air pollutant" necessarily includes greenhouse gases. Those who draw extravagant inferences might be engaged in a form of motivated reasoning; their (unarticulated) values and preferences might be responsible for the particular inferences they draw. Alternatively, they might be engaged in an unacknowledged form of Dworkinian reasoning, in which they are attempting to make the best constructive sense out of a legal term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While studies have investigated why states contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations, little consideration has been given to how domestic political factors influence state contributions. We argue that changes in executive power that involve a shift in the domestic source of leadership support cause fluctuations in troop deployments, leading to inconsistent contribution behavior. However, we argue that this effect is attenuated in more democratic states since greater overlaps in the preferences of domestic groups are present and political institutions exist to constrain major policy shifts. Analysis of state troop commitments to UN peacekeeping from 1991 to 2018 supports this argument. This research highlights the often overlooked role of domestic policy processes in peacekeeping contributions while moving beyond considering why some states contribute relatively more personnel to address variation within countries. The findings indicate that while democracies typically contribute fewer peacekeepers, they tend to be more consistent contributors in the face of leadership turnover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergency declarations are important legal tools for the state to protect itself and its citizens during times of crisis. Such declarations permit the exercise of extraordinary powers to address an emergency or disaster. They present an opportunity to explore policy learning in crises, through the ability to examine emergency declaration instruments and the detail of post‐emergency inquiries and reviews. This paper briefly assesses Australian law that provides for emergency declarations and places it in the context of theories of policy learning and change. Two case studies reveal evidence of policy learning in emergency declaration practice in Australia. There is an emerging practice of using declarations primarily or purely as tools to communicate the seriousness of an emergency. This policy learning has occurred both within and between jurisdictions, including the federal government. This paper also probes opportunities for future research on policy learning and emergency legislation, especially in relation to the COVID‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the multilevel system of the European Union (EU), national governments have been empowered at the expense of parliaments. We study the executive power shift in EU politics in the formation of national preferences. This article shows that governments are more likely to integrate parliaments and external actors, such as other governments and EU institutions, when they advocate extreme bargaining positions in EU negotiations. We theoretically develop this argument and provide an empirical study of Eurozone politics, covering the preference formation of 27 EU member states. The analysis shows that the executives are overall the dominating power: most of the time, governments form national preferences on their own. When governments integrate additional actors, they mostly rely on external actors and do so to avoid blame and to shift responsibility. These findings question whether the integration of national parliaments in EU politics indeed addresses democratic accountability concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, a national strike was called in Colombia as a protest to the unpopular government's reforms. During the protests in Cali, the country's third‐largest city, there were high levels of violence and vandalism by the protestors, but also by the government and infiltrators. Nonetheless, La Primera Línea (The First Line) were blamed for the criminal acts, and up until today, with a left‐wing president now in power, they continue to be blamed, killed, and imprisoned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned natural resource asset planning is a new planning type that promotes the effective exercise of state ownership of natural resources based on the separation of ownership and regulation. Natural resource asset planning integrates ' resource protection' and ' asset utilization,' and presents new characteristics of the ownership objective oriented to value preservation and appreciation and running through the whole chain of ownership of ' resource-asset-resource.' This study finds that natural resource asset planning using ownership as a source of authority is not only different from administrative planning driven by administrative regulatory authority, but also difficult to apply the logic of the private exercise of ' ownership without planning' under the dichotomy of public and private law. As a result, it is faced with legislative challenges such as how to define its legal nature, the mode of exercising the planning rights, the compilation style, and the legal effects. The research results show that, to implement the unique requirements for the exercise of state ownership of natural resources in the context of public ownership, it is necessary to fully explain that the right to asset planning has the unique attribute of ' ownership management,' which transcends both public and private law. Furthermore, a legislative direction for asset planning should be established in the following ways: Firstly, in China's planning system, asset planning is positioned as a special plan for equity under the category of ownership, and the division of labor between it and territorial spatial planning under the category of supervisory authority is clearly defined as ' parallel and connected.' Secondly, in accordance with the hierarchy of executive power entrusted to the state-owned natural resources assets, a 'national, provincial, municipal, and (county)' hierarchical program has been adopted, and the implementation of provincial planning has been added to the coordination function. Thirdly, a ' master planning+catego-rized planning' preparation system has been applied, with the categorized planning measure implementing the principle of 'categorized adjustment' of natural resources, such as land, water, and forests. In addition, in accordance with the process of ' claiming ownership, exercising rights, fulfilling obligations, assuming responsibilities, and realizing rights and interests, ' the management matters and types of indicators for various types of planning have been set. Fourthly, oriented to the performance of asset management, relevant institutions should explore diversified legal effect forms of natural resource asset planning, such as vertical constraints from the provincial level to the municipal level, supervision and assessment from the principal to the agent, and flexible incentives arising from planning to the using subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study includes the analysis of the effects of different government systems on voter behavior by using a comparative method. In the comparative method used in the study, the effect of the different government systems applied in both countries on the voter behavior by using causality links is tried to be explained by conceptual abstraction through the structure of the executive bodies, election dates and election systems. Government systems are basically divided into three as presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary systems according to the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the executive, which are the main organs of the state. The government systems that are the subject of the study are the semi-presidential system applied in France and the presidential system applied in Turkey. In the study, the effect of different government systems applied in France and Turkey on voter behavior is examined under three main headings through strategic voting behavior. First of all, it is tried to reveal how the executive power is used in both countries and the effect of this power on the behavior of the voters, especially in the elections. Secondly, an evaluation is made on the behavior of voters based on the dates of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which are effective on the executive power. Finally, the effects of different government systems applied in both countries and different electoral systems applied on voter behaviors are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brushless power generation sets are a technology of choice for on‐board power generation in aerospace and marine applications, emergency and backup power systems, etc. Efficient modelling of these systems is necessary for various purposes such as design, analysis, control and specially condition monitoring. An accurate and efficient model of a diesel‐engine generator‐rectifier system consisting of a three stage brushless synchronous generator is presented. The constant parameter voltage‐behind‐reactance model of the pilot exciter (PE), main exciter (ME) and main generator are derived and integrated to form a unified model suitable for efficient simulation of a diesel‐engine brushless generation system. Simulation studies are carried out in MATLAB using PLECS toolbox and the results are compared to experimental results to verify the performance of the proposed integrated model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In England and Wales, a 'whole life order' (WLO) is a life sentence with no prospect of parole. At present, the WLO sentencing regime provides insufficient clarity about the assessment criteria for the release of prisoners, rendering these sentences unreviewable. Indeed, no WLO prisoner has ever been released. This article submits that it is the means by which the executive and courts preclude scrutiny of the WLO review mechanism, and so devalue the systemic health of our legal order by undermining rule of law principles of accountability and transparency, which form the most disquieting aspects of the regime. I set out my argument in two parts. Part One provides a historical assessment of the development of the WLO sentencing regime and its impact on wider human rights discourse. A critical evaluation of this history reveals that WLOs today are irreducible and underscored by the long-term accumulation of unaccountable executive power. Part Two considers WLOs from the position of the philosopher John Rawls' theory of 'political liberalism' as applied to understandings of European human rights constitutionalism. Adapting Rawls' emphasis on the importance of reciprocal deliberation between diverse citizens and institutions in maintaining a just and stable society, this article presents the deficiencies of the WLO regime as deriving from an inter-institutional failure to engage in meaningful deliberation about whether the WLO regime complies with the UK's human rights obligations. I propose reforms to the reviewability of WLO sentences to give prisoners the 'means' if not necessarily the 'result' of release. Rather, there remain outstanding questions about how many of the worst of the worst prisoners possess the capacity for rehabilitation, even if provided with the opportunities to do so. As such, these reforms can be justified, less on grounds of ensuring the actual release of prisoners, but more as part of restoring a broader functional human rights and rule of law framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article challenges recent Supreme Court decisions on the "unitary executive" theory. It argues that the Court misinterprets Myers v. United States, a 1926 case, suggesting it as a precedent for strong executive administration. It contend that Myers actually invented a new understanding of presidential power, contributing to the creation of the "Progressive Presidency."

A hidden facet of democratization in the world over the past two centuries has been the increased weight of people's voice in electing presidents. On the basis of new data on all presidential elections in the world since 1789, we show that they evolved from systems in which the final decision was made by someone other than voters, to systems in which the choice of voters was decisive only if it generated a majority, to systems in which the final decision is made by voters. This means that in countries where presidents have executive powers, elections may not be the mechanism by which the people, as a collectivity, always selects its rulers, thus violating the fundamental norm of democracy. We document the history of presidential election rules, offer some tentative explanations, and explore the consequences of particular systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan was initially dismissed as, yet another Central Asian transition of power that would ultimately change very little. In this instance however, analysts were proven quite wrong. Since taking the country's highest office, Mirziyoyev has liberalized the economy, improved relations with neighbors, increased accountability, and signaled willingness to release some executive powers to the people. However, in analyzing these welcomed reforms, we must ask ourselves whether they are genuine. Is Mirziyoyev a radical reformist willing to sacrifice the political order established by his predecessor for the sake of liberalization or are these changes instead part of a broader political agenda for the sake of legitimacy? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As currently conceived, executive power law and scholarship detach the identity of the President from the powers and duties of the presidency. Whether an official was properly dismissed without cause, whether a pardon was validly issued, whether a foreign policy debacle rose to the level of an impeachable offense--the answers to all these questions are not supposed to depend on the President's personal characteristics. I argue that this veil of ignorance is incompatible with a correct understanding of Article II. To properly empower good Presidents and constrain bad ones, constitutional actors must take into account the President's personal characteristics. Certain character traits--what I call the executive virtues--play an essential role in the proper functioning of Article II and the broader separation of powers. These virtues can and should be encouraged by courts, Congress, and other constitutional actors. In this Article, I describe the executive virtues, show how they capture the original understanding of Article II, and argue for their contemporary importance in light of the presidency's everincreasing power and discretion. I offer a preliminary list of the main executive virtues--loyalty, honesty, responsibility, justice, inclusiveness, and judgment--and describe how the constitutional requirement of executive virtue can be operationalized. For example, I show how questions of executive virtue were central in Trump v. Hawaii (the travel-ban case), offer a revisionist defense of the impeachment of Bill Clinton, and argue in favor of more control over presidential primaries by party elites. I conclude with the observation that, as recent history demonstrates, the lack of presidential virtue can constitute a full-blown constitutional crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries all around the world are increasingly coordinating their strategic responses to global health emergencies inside specialized new command centres called emergency operations centres (EOCs). Those bunker-like EOCs are meticulously designed to function as the global health equivalent of war rooms and are rapidly emerging as the internationally preferred sites for 'making' global health security in the 21st century. This article advances an in-depth site-ontological investigation into those burgeoning EOC sites. It develops a three-step methodological analytics to reveal the specific economy of prefigurative power that EOCs exude in international relations and names this oligoptical power. The article further shows how this oligoptical power is fundamentally different from the more familiar Foucauldian notion of panoptical power and has very different ramifications as it circulates throughout contemporary international relations. Yet, precisely because the EOC exemplifies this global operation of oligoptical power, the article concludes, it can be considered as one of its international signal institutions – similarly to how the prison was once a critical institutional site for revealing the circulation of disciplinary power, the laboratory for performing the sociological examination of science, and the concentration camp for deepening the analysis of biopower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"No Blank Check: The Origins and Consequences of Public Antipathy Towards Presidential Power" by Andrew Reeves and Jon Rogowski explores the American public's skepticism towards presidential power. The authors argue that Americans have a deep-seated skepticism about executive authority, which persists regardless of the political alignment of the president in office. They propose a model of the public based on "constitutional veneration" and a belief in checks and balances. The book presents empirical evidence, including polling, survey experiments, and longitudinal panel data, to support their argument. While partisanship does play a role, the authors emphasize that other factors also influence public attitudes towards executive power. [Extracted from the article]

The article analyzes U.S. President Joe Biden' prerogative over clemency for favored constituents in the prisoner swap between Brittney Griner, an American citizen and member of the Women's National Basketball Association, and international criminal arms merchant Victor Bout of Russia. Topics discussed include reasonableness and legitimacy of the exercise of the president's commutation power, Article II Pardon Clause authority of the president, and cost and benefits of the prisoner swap.

The article "Quo vadis Israel? History - current conflicts - directions for the future" deals with the political situation in Israel. After the elections in November 2022, Benjamin Netanyahu formed a government considered right-wing, which led to protests and a division in society. The article sheds light on Israel's history since its founding in 1948 and the Middle East conflict. The current government plans to reshape the legal system and redistribute the separation of powers in favor of the executive branch. The threat to democracy in Israel is described, and it is pointed out that anti-democratic laws have already been passed. The protest movement is mainly driven by liberal, secular, and Ashkenazi middle-class supporters. Various political options for Israel's future are discussed, emphasizing that the political debates demonstrate the vitality of Israeli civil society. [Extracted from the article]

Aliaksandr Lukashenka pushed through an overhaul of Belarus's constitution as a response to the protests against the official results of the 2020 presidential election. The goal was to address the desire for change among the population without reacting to the demand for snap elections. With the February 2022 constitutional plebiscite on the most far-ranging changes to Belarus's constitution since 1994, Lukashenka further entrenched himself in power. The results of our online survey suggest that the constitutional changes do not meet the broad societal demand for political change and, in particular, for constraints on presidential power. Despite the persistence of the political conflict, we also show that Lukashenka's supporters and opponents are not irreconcilably polarized in every policy domain. Finally, our results suggest that regime supporters have stronger anti-democratic preferences than opposition supporters when it comes to future political participation of the two camps, making the effects of affective polarization highly asymmetrical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The safe evacuation of residents near a nuclear power plant during a nuclear accident is vital for emergency response planning. To tackle this challenge, considering the dynamic dispersion of radioactive materials in the atmosphere and its impact on evacuation routes under different meteorological conditions is crucial. This paper develops a dynamic dose-based emergency evacuation model (DDEEM), which is an efficient and optimized nuclear accident evacuation model based on dynamic radiological dose calculation, utilizing an improved A* algorithm to determine optimal evacuation routes. The DDEEM takes into account the influence of radiological plume dispersion and path selection on evacuation effectiveness. This study employs the DDEEM to assess radiological consequences and evacuation strategies for students residing 5 k m from a Chinese nuclear power plant. Under various meteorological conditions, including the three typical meteorological conditions, random ordered and random unordered meteorological sequences, optimal routes obtained through the DDEEM effectively reduce radiological dose exposure and mitigate radiation hazards. The results indicate that all evacuation paths generated by the DDEEM have a maximum dose of less than 1   m S v . Through simulations, the model's effectiveness and reliability in dynamic radiological environments in terms of radiological consequences and evacuation analysis is verified. The research provides valuable insights and a practical tool for nuclear power plant emergency decision-making, enhancing emergency management capabilities during nuclear accidents. The DDEEM offers crucial technical support and a solid foundation for developing effective emergency response strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we argue that the story of Star Wars has much to tell us about perennial questions of constitutional design. The series offers a rich cinematic exploration of some of the most pressing real-life issues of politics and constitutionalism and is, we suggest, a fruitful source of insight for issues of constitutional design and regulation. This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we sketch the political context which grounds our analysis, outlining the key constitutional institutions of the Galactic Republic, and their rapid decline and fall as documented across the prequel trilogy. In Part II, we outline the existing contributions commentators have made in respect of Star Wars and its lessons for constitutional design and regulation—the problem with the concentration of government power in one person and the risks posed to political systems by excessive delegation of authority to the executive branch. We then introduce three more nuanced lessons that we think the films offer: the 'Publius paradox'; the hollowness of legalism; and the dangers of confusion at the apex of power. In Part III, with detailed analysis of the films, we show how the Star Wars saga clearly illustrates these lessons: that a constitutionally weak executive, rather than a strong one, can be a cause of democratic decay and autocracy, as it proves incapable of meeting the demands of governance; that commitment to and obsession with law is not per se any bulwark against autocracy; and that unclear lines of constitutional authority pose a huge risk at times of strain and crisis. We argue that the constitutional problem Star Wars illustrates is more subtle and more important than the dominant accounts suggest: that under concentration of power creates the risk of overconcentration of power. If we fear the decay of democracy into autocracy and wish to respond to it, we must be careful not to excessively limit or diffuse power. If we do, and begin to see constitutionalism as solely or primarily a means of restraining government, we may limit government so much that we cause the very problem we seek to prevent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much early public choice theory focused on alleged pathologies of democratic legislatures, portraying them as irrational, manipulable, or subject to capture. Recent years have seen the emergence of a new strand of argument, reaffirming the old skepticism of legislatures but suggesting that transferring power from legislatures to chief executives offers a solution. Just as the earlier prescriptions ignored the pathologies of the agencies empowered to check and constrain legislatures, so the new scholarship overlooks the pathologies of executive power. The primary sources of congressional dysfunction call for reforms that would strengthen Congress instead of hobbling it in new ways that exacerbate the drift toward authoritarian presidentialism in the American system. Executive aggrandizement is a consequence of decades of institutional malfunction, worsened by right-wing attacks on legislative capacity. This has been the enduring impact of the public choice movement since the 1950s, but its twenty-first century offshoot is especially malign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though presidents often criticize organized interests, presidents also expend considerable effort engaging them. Using original elite interviews, a survey of lobbyists, and administrative data, I consider how this engagement manifests, why presidents engage interests, and with which interests presidents engage. Unlike in other institutions, presidents exercise substantial control over engagement with interests, and they engage to mobilize interests' institutional resources in service of their goals. To optimize mobilization, presidents focus engagement on well-resourced interests and interests who share presidents' preferences. Pairing over seven million White House visitor log entries from two administrations with lobbying and campaign finance records, I demonstrate that presidential engagement is informed by interests' electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment, though these characteristics' substantive effects are modest. My findings highlight coalition building with interests as an underappreciated source of presidential power and elucidate the degree to which presidents amplify the political voice of well-resourced and copartisan interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mobile laser system is proposed for monitoring the atmosphere around the location of a NPP determining the concentration of molecular iodine at the level of 108 cm−3 and assessing the volumetric activity at the level of 1 MBq/m3. Due to the high mobility of the system, which is ensured by the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle, it can be used in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant or similar enterprise to assess the radioactive contamination of various parts of the adjacent territory including the upper hemisphere to a radius of 5–10 km, which limitation is due to the flight range of an unmanned aerial vehicle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A president's long-recognized discretion to pardon just about any offense for literally any reason at almost any time leaves little room to argue that such power can be constrained any further by law. Supreme Court decisions, scholarship, and presidential precedent over the last two centuries amply (though grudgingly) support a theory of nearly unilateral and "unfettered" authority, perhaps a last vestige of the British monarchy left in the hands of a democratically accountable chief executive-controversial, but nevertheless constitutional. But when it comes to a specific class of misconduct-war crimes-interpreting and applying this constitutional power requires a second look, for it invariably intersects with another Article II power-a president's role and authority as the military's commander-in-chief Rather than amplifying this other long-recognized discretionary power to wage war, the pardon power arguably weakens it under certain conditions. This intersection is not merely an academic puzzle on the nature of presidential power: it is a collision of a president's right with a series of quite specific presidential responsibilities and authorities over the military's criminal justice system that he has only because Congress believes that a commander-in-chief should wield them. The collateral damage .from this collision ironically harms the very institution and profession the President relies on for military action, advice, and ability. Whether this damage is historically contingent on particular presidents or is a predictable consequence of all such pardons is a question that cannot be answered yet. That is because President Trump's three war crime pardons in 2019 were historic first : Never before had a president pardoned any soldier for conduct incidental to combat action that violently victimized a noncombatant who was otherwise protected by the international laws of war from unlawful armed force. They were a proof of concept that a president could indeed go there : but they were also a proof of consequences not yet fully explored in the literature and not at all by the courts. In exercising his singular strength by pardoning war crimes, a president's power and credibility is paradoxically weakened for three reasons: He ignores or rejects the duties imposed on the very institution he relies on to achieve political objectives through armed force; head values the professional expertise of his military agents: and he delegitimizes the military criminal justice system that this institution relies on to promote, enforce, and signal its professional commitments to certain martial values, norms, and requirements-including adhering to the laws of war. Flexing muscle on one arm atrophies muscle on the other. The contrary view is that constitutionally required civilian control of the armed forces means he has discretion to flex or atrophy his credibility with the military whenever he wants. Trump's war crime pardons offer an opportunity to explore whether common arguments and conventional applications of the pardon power are entirely relevant to this class of offenses and this kind of offender. This Article suggests, because they lead to a self-defeating paradox (the collision between two independent and stout, express Article II powers), that they are categorically distinct. This Article sketches this new prudential argument for curtailing war crime pardons based on a president's "standing" or relationship he necessarily bears to the military as its commander-in-chief and to the conduct he absolves. Any .future case for judicially invalidating such a pardon for legislating a containment strategy to (at least) deter such a pardon, or for adopting a set of principles for presidential self-restraint, must account.for this challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governmental responses to the COVID‐19 global pandemic have generated numerous constitutionals, policy, legal, and political‐economic debates. Scholarly engagements with the sociolegal and policy consequences of the COVID‐19 pandemic have been dominated by discussion on the role of emergency powers, the suspension of individual civil liberties, the suspension of economic rules in order to guarantee economic survival, and social regulation of public spaces and of workplaces. This paper aims to explore how a critical sociolegal scholarship can contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the role of law in creating the unequal conditions that propitiated the COVID‐19 pandemic and that might enable further crises. This introduction offers a roadmap for theorizing the limits of law, the operationalization of emergency powers and the different policies implemented by global south and north countries in response to the pandemic. This introduction is structured as follow: (1) provides a general overview of the law and society tradition and its engagement with the COVID‐19 pandemic; (2) engages with three key consequences of the pandemic, labor, and the lockdown; colonial implications; and the limits of law; (3) introduces the papers in this special issue; (4) sketches a proposal for the critical sociolegal scholarship of law and crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how the use of emergency powers by the US and Puerto Rican governments exacerbated the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic and manufactured the conditions for furthering the multilayered economic, legal, political, and humanitarian crisis affecting Puerto Rico since 2006. The paper discusses three cases. First, it examines how the multiple declarations of the state of emergency, and its constant renewals, produced contradictory public health policies. Since the start of the COVID‐19 pandemic in March 2020, the Puerto Rican government has issued over 90 executive orders aimed at addressing the emergency, producing an unclear, contradictory, and unequal emergency management policy. Second, the paper focuses on the impact of the passing of Law 35 on April 5, 2020, which imposed severe penalties on those who disobeyed executive orders. As a result, hundreds of Puerto Ricans were arrested, fined, and incarcerated for violating the issued order. Third, the paper studies how, citing the presence of corruption, the Puerto Rican government implemented anti‐corruption and anti‐fraud policies that made it more difficult for those most in need of it—mainly poor and racialized individuals, as well as immigrants and working women—to access Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. Thus, the paper argues that emergency policies designed to address the pandemic, punitive governance, and anti‐corruption and anti‐fraud policies undermined Puerto Rico's capacity to handle the pandemic, exacerbated its impact, and created an unequal recovery scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers believe in lesser-evil justifications for doing harm: if the only way to stop a trolley from killing five is to divert it away onto one, then we may divert. But recently, Helen Frowe has argued that we do not only have the option to pursue the lesser evil: in most cases, we are so obligated. After critically assessing Frowe's argument, I develop three mutually compatible accounts of lesser-evil options, which permit, but do not obligate us to minimize harm. These are the Parity Account, the Prerogative Account, and the Permissible Moral Mistakes Account. Considerations of parity and prerogatives have arisen in this debate before, but in inchoate form. The Permissible Moral Mistakes Account introduces something new. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the evolving landscape of foreign interference in domestic affairs, particularly in the context of 'information operations' facilitated by the internet. The primary focus of the article is on the lawful authority to respond to external information operations, and how this authority may be shaped by international law. Specifically, the article explores the royal prerogative in two manifestations -- the war prerogative, and external affairs prerogative -- as a potential source of authority. In doing so, the article employs an analytical framework by Winterton, distinguishing between the 'breadth' and 'depth' of constitutional executive power. The article acknowledges the limited case law and debates surrounding these prerogatives' scope and triggers, and slight nuances between British and Australian jurisprudence. It discusses the relationship between the war prerogative and the existence of armed conflict and touches on how international law can support the exercise of the war prerogative through the 'public policy test'. Drawing from international legal perspectives, the article references United Nations resolutions from 1976 and 1981 that emphasise the importance of domestic legal remedies against information operations. It stresses the duty of states to combat the dissemination of false or distorted news that interferes with other states' internal affairs. In sum, the article concludes that, while countering IOs is a matter requiring domestic legal authority, international law can likely extend the ambit of the royal prerogative and should also, as a matter of public policy, apply to such campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions are presidents more likely to remove senior defense officials from office? Using a novel data set of all senior U.S. defense officials, both civilian and uniformed military from 1947 to 2021, this article explores whether anticipated support in Congress, partisan factors, or institutional protections for the military affect observed patterns of removal for defense officials. The results suggest that presidents are more likely to remove their own appointees (or their co-partisans' appointees), but provide little evidence that presidents premise removal on anticipated partisan support for a replacement nominee in Congress. Moreover, the results suggest that military officials may have some insulation from politicization by strong forms of removal, though that protection may weaken an important aspect of civilian control of the military, the threat of punishment by removal, raising profound questions for how civilian control endures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how parliamentary fragmentation, which has transformed the Spanish political system since the 2015 general elections, has impacted the capacities of the legislative and executive powers to fulfill their constitutional functions. For this, the political fragmentation built through the Effective Number of Parties is taken as a reference and it is combined with the performance of parliamentary activity as well as with the stability of the government teams, determining, effectively, if the new political actors have contributed to improve the position of parliament in Spanish democracy or government stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present work studies the political and constitutional problems that have arisen as a result of the relations between the Executive and Legislative Powers. To do this, it studies the first debates on the form of government that arose after independence, as well as the existing constitutional crises, especially when the President of the Republic has not had a parliamentary majority and, on the contrary, has had governance problems due to to the opposition that emerged from Congress. Following this historical review, the current regulation of the question of confidence, the dissolution of Parliament, the presidential vacancy, the impeachment of the President of the Republic and the presidential succession are analyzed, proposing reforms to the constitutional text and interpretations of the Constitution that avoid the abusive and discretionary use of these institutions by the powers of the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is no secret that since September 11, 2001, the Executive Branch has acted at variance with laws otherwise restraining its conduct under the guise of national security. Among other doctrines that make up the new national security canon, state secrets privilege assertions have narrowed the scope of redressability for parties alleging official misconduct in national security cases. For parties such as the Muslim American community surveilled by the FBI in Orange County, California, or Abu Zubaydah, who was subjected to confirmed torture tactics by the U.S. government, success in the courts hinges on the government's unbridled ability to assert this privilege. This trend is unsurprising given how courts evaluate national security issues, even where individual rights are at stake. Through the institutional process framework, illuminated by Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, federal courts are reluctant to invalidate unilateral executive action absent a congressional statute addressing the challenged national security conduct. Scholarship on the institutional process framework to date has primarily examined the judiciary's role. This Note shifts the spotlight to Congress's role in the institutional process framework. Congress should embrace its role in fostering interbranch institutional cooperation by speaking directly to courts regarding national security issues. Specific to the state secrets privilege in its post-Zubaydah and Fazaga form, Congress must provide an interbranch procedural framework by which courts can assess assertions of the privilege. As the best institution to incorporate valuable considerations about the purpose and flaws of the privilege, Congress can empower Article III courts to meaningfully review state secrets privilege assertions and restore executive accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]