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Recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions that boards are self-interested in setting director compensation have focused scrutiny on the pay-setting process used by corporations. We examine the effect of peer benchmarking on director compensation decisions. Director pay relates positively to peer director pay, and firms paying their directors highly are selected as peers. Moreover, firm performance and board advising performance are positively related to the talent component and are generally unrelated to the self-serving component of the peer pay effect. The evidence indicates that firms use peer benchmarking to justify high compensation mainly to attract talented directors to enhance board quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Identifying executives' industry affiliation with categorical membership, this study examines how moving to a different industry impacts mobility-compensation outcomes. On the demand side, we propose that audience ambiguity and commitment concerns regarding cross-category moves limit the potential compensation of industry-changing executives. On the supply side, we argue that executives might accept smaller monetary rewards in exchange for acquiring experience in a new domain. Since category status also affects audience evaluations of candidates and candidates' desire to affiliate with a specific social category, we further hypothesize that both demand and supply mechanisms are moderated by status differences between an executive's origin and destination industries. Our analysis of voluntary mobility and compensation patterns of S&P 1500 executives supports these arguments: industry-changing executives realize lower compensation than closely matched within-industry movers. As expected, the compressing effect of changing industry on compensation is contingent upon status differences across industries. Executives who transition to higher-status industries face more stringent compensation discounts, while those moving to lower-status industries experience similar compensation variation as within-industry movers. Our study advances category and status-attainment research by incorporating the influence of industry prestige on career outcomes of cross-category moves, while casting light on the individual consequences of executive mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of fair value gains or losses related to Level 3 valuations in CEO cash compensation for U.S. financial firms. Our results show that Level 3 income is compensation-relevant. By separating Level 3 income into unrealized and realized Level 3 income, we find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to unrealized than realized Level 3 income, which indicates that compensation committees have a higher concern for the clawback problem associated with unrealized Level 3 income. A further analysis separating Level 3 income into positive and negative components shows that Level 3 losses are more compensation-relevant than Level 3 gains, thereby validating the argument that Level 3 losses are more credible than Level 3 gains. Overall, we find that Level 3 income is relevant for CEO cash compensation and that this phenomenon is mainly driven by its realized and loss components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The literature provides conflicting arguments and mixed results regarding whether capital markets punish managerial myopia. Using managers cutting research and development (R&D) investments to meet short-term earnings goals as a research setting, this study reveals that capital markets penalize managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Moreover, the negative market reactions to managerial myopia are weaker for firms with overinvestment problems than for those without such problems. Overall, the results support the notion that security markets are not shortsighted. In further analysis, we document that compensation, especially earnings-based compensation, may cause managers to behave myopically. Our study contributes to the literature, reconciling previously mixed findings by capturing managers' myopic behavior in a more targeted way and showing that markets punish myopic R&D cutting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We build a novel comprehensive data set of new product trademarks as an output measure of product development innovation. We show that risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation motivate this type of innovation and that this innovation improves firm performance. Using an exogenous shock to executive compensation, we find that reductions in stock option compensation cause reductions in new product development. We also find that firms undertaking new product development experience increases in future cash flow from operations and return on assets. These findings suggest the importance of product development innovation to firms and new trademarks as a novel innovation measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives affects managerial "playing it safe" behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Q, segments while closing the riskier ones, without significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document that firms that expect their CEOs' compensation to exceed the median CEO compensation of their Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) peers influence ISS to revise these peer sets. Controlling for changes in firm characteristics that ISS uses to select peers, we find that ISS applies an abnormally high turnover rate in the members of these peer sets and increases the representation of focal firms' chosen peers. This turnover results in increases in the medians of the ISS peers' CEO compensation and size. We find that these firms underperform and conclude that they attempt to camouflage high CEO pay to mitigate outrage costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We examine the relation between CEO pay components and aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures using CEO pay components as proxies for managers' short- versus long-term focus. Specifically, we explore the extent to which short-term bonus plan payouts and long-term incentive plan payouts are associated with: (1) Managers' propensity to exclude expense items in excess of those excluded by equity analysts; and, (2) The magnitude of those incremental exclusions. We find that long-term incentive plan payouts are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions. Our results are consistent with managers reporting non-GAAP information less aggressively when they are more focused on long-term, rather than short-term, value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although prior research suggests strict, fair value–based securities accounting rules cause banks to sell securities into negative liquidity shocks, a value-destroying behavior called "liquidity feedback trading," the mechanism is uncertain. We find the sooner chief executive officers (CEOs) are permitted to cash out of their stock and option grants, the more prone are their banks to feedback trading. Furthermore, the sooner CEOs can cash out, the more positive their banks' stock price reaction to news of accounting rule relaxation. We conclude incentives for managerial short-term focus are a mechanism by which stricter accounting rules cause feedback trading. We also find evidence that regulatory compliance concerns play a role. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance. Funding: A. Kolasinski is grateful for financial support from Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. N. Yang thanks the School of Accounting and Finance at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University for financial support. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03249. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the emerging capital market of China, this paper uses the data of Chinese listed companies to test the market value management behavior of CEOs under the incentive of industry tournaments. The empirical results show that the CEOs industry tournament improves the value of listed companies by attracting investor attention. In the test of the incentive mechanism of the industry tournament, we find that in the samples with lower industry mobility and state ownership and where the CEO is new, retiring, or a founder, the industry pay gap has a weaker incentive effect on the CEO. In the test of the CEOs' efforts to manage investor attention, this paper finds that CEOs are incentivized to disclose more financial and nonfinancial information, increase advertising spending, and hold more shareholder meetings. Discussed with other incentives, compensation incentives and equity incentives enhance the motivational role of industry championships for CEOs. This study explores in depth the possible impact of industry tournaments on CEO behavioral decisions and also provides a new perspective for corporate to manage investor attention. This provides important reference value for corporate CEO compensation, information disclosure supervision, and investor decision‐making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the impact mechanism of non‐state shareholder governance on technological innovation in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of executive compensation incentives, using listed manufacturing companies of SOEs from 2014 to 2020 as research samples. The research findings indicate that the mere ownership of shares by non‐state shareholders has no significant impact on technological innovation. However, the delegation of executives by non‐state shareholders contributes to enhancing technological innovation in SOEs. So Improving technological innovation in SOEs is a crucial objective in the ongoing deepening and enhancing actions of the new round of state‐owned enterprise reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates whether CEO initial tenure is essential in establishing CSR practices. In further analysis, we contemplate the consequences of CEO's initial service tenure CSR engagement. Our analysis is based on the sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2009 to 2019 periods—the research study used a fixed-effect panel approach for analyzing the dataset. A two-stage-least square test is then used to address the endogeneity problem. The study's findings manifest that CEO tenure is negatively and significantly associated with CSR practices. In an additional analysis, the study reveals that CEOs have more significant career concerns in the initial service period than afterward in their later service period. Therefore, CSR practices increase in CEO's initial service tenure. Moreover, the study documented that the CEO's CSR engagement in their initial tenure has a positive-and-significant association with their compensation package and lessens the risk of dismissals. Finally, we demonstrate that CEOs concentrate more on CSR practices in coastal regions of China. This research is helpful for policymakers in devising CSR policies and making corporate governance decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the performance target response to CEO overconfidence. Using unique handcollected data on the annual bonus targets of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, we find that boards ratchet targets more aggressively and apply greater ratcheting asymmetry for overconfident CEOs than for non-overconfident CEOs. These findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. We also provide evidence that the increase in target ratcheting for overconfident CEOs is particularly more pronounced in firms with strong monitoring environments. Collectively, our findings suggest that boards actively consider CEOs' overconfidence when setting performance targets, providing new insight into the importance of CEOs' personal traits with respect to the incentive effects of performance target revisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a variety of proxies to measure the variance of pay and find consistent evidence of economically small pay risk premiums. These results are consistent with recent findings suggesting that risk may have a more limited influence over the level of pay than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We formulate and test a theory explaining how local labor markets moderate the effects of pay comparisons on turnover among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members. Sampling S&P 1500 TMT members, we find that dense local labor markets for executives weaken the effects of social comparisons and CEO tournaments on TMT member turnover by providing more job alternatives and decreasing switching costs. We also find that pay comparisons with other TMT members in the local area are most salient in dense labor markets, increasing higher-paid TMT members' labor market visibility (signaling their worth externally) and their subsequent turnover. Our theory and findings thus identify local labor markets as a highly relevant boundary condition for TMT turnover decisions, as TMT members more readily quit when residing in communities where jobs are plentiful and offer higher pay than their current employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioral agency model (BAM) posits that executive risk preferences are influenced by losses to their current option wealth relative to gains from their prospective option wealth. Accordingly, current option wealth attenuates risk-taking while prospective option wealth amplifies risk-taking. In the context of corporate irresponsible behaviors, this study attempts to advance the BAM by theorizing how the presence of conditions that give rise to distributive and procedural injustice in CEO compensation can further amplify the positive effects of CEO prospective option wealth on risk-taking, thereby destroying stakeholder value. Our findings, based on a longitudinal cross-sectional sample of 8,669 firm-year observations for the period 2001 to 2018, support our theorization that CEO perceptions of unfairness in compensation amplify excessive risk-taking, thereby increasing the likelihood of corporate social irresponsibility. Our study has important implications for advancing the BAM and for the study and design of executive compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the association between stock price incentives (portfolio delta) and earnings management using tax expense, as well as whether this association varies with opportunities to manage earnings. Prior research suggests stock price incentives provide a positive "reward effect" and a negative "risk effect," causing managers to trade off these countervailing effects when managing earnings. We posit that greater opportunities to manage earnings alter the risk-reward tradeoff related to portfolio delta, potentially changing the association between stock price incentives and earnings management. We do not find a significant association between stock price incentives and earnings management using tax expense on average. However, the association is positive and significant when tax-related earnings management opportunities are sufficiently high, consistent with opportunities mitigating the risk effect of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that managers respond to stock price incentives differently depending on their opportunity sets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines how executive motivation and firm capability jointly influence corporate contribution to poverty alleviation. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms whose executives possess political connections or experienced poverty in childhood contribute more to poverty alleviation. Moreover, better-performing firms with politically connected executives make even more contributions, whereas firm performance does not affect the relationship between executives' childhood poverty experience and corporate contribution. We also document that the strength of political connections and the type of childhood poverty experience matter. Moreover, executive background and firm performance only affect corporations' cash contributions but do not influence their material contributions. Overall, our study reveals that corporate contribution to poverty alleviation is affected by both strategic and altruistic motives of executives and is subject to the influence of firm performance especially when executives are driven by political motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widening income inequality is a serious social concern in many countries. We examine the causal effect of a negative demand shock on executive compensation and worker wages using a quasi-natural experiment, considering Japanese firms that experienced a sudden and substantial export decline following the global financial crisis in the late 2000s. Worker wages tended to decline significantly more relative to executive compensation after the crisis in firms depending more on exports, causing a wider pay differential. We establish the robustness of our difference-in-difference results by considering selection into exporters, excluding sporadic exporters, and controlling for foreign ownership or liquidity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The imperative of gender diversity in corporate governance and the adoption of a human-centric governance paradigm are intensifying globally. The structure of board directors, key influencers to corporate decisions, notably shape policies, crucially in emerging markets like China where gender issues are still evolving. Therefore, employing a penal dataset comprising 8,973 firmyear observations from publicly A-share-listed Chinese firms spanning 2006 to 2021, this study empirically examines the impact of board gender diversity on the responsiveness to both employee monetary incentives and non-monetary rewards. The findings unveil a positive correlation, indicating an augmentation in per-employee compensation and an increased likelihood of implementing non-monetary programs, including stock-ownership plans, retirement benefits, and occupational safety certification, in the presence of higher board gender diversity. Notably, these positive associations are more accentuated in stateowned firms, as well as those with lower executive compensation and diminished institutional ownership. Our results remain consistent after considering robustness as well as endogeneity. This empirical evidence not only contributes robust statistical support to the ongoing global initiatives advocating for gender diversity in corporate governance but also underscores the efficacy of boards of directors in effectively managing stakeholder interests, particularly in fostering employee-friendly practices within emerging markets like China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between green finance and corporate debt financing in China. The study finds that green finance effectively reduces corporate debt financing levels and alleviates financing constraints. The impact of green finance is particularly pronounced in state-owned enterprises, regions with lower marketization levels, superior industrial structures, and lower carbon emissions. The research provides valuable insights for policymakers and enterprises looking to reduce corporate debt financing levels and offers a new perspective on the economic consequences of green finance. [Extracted from the article]

In the context of tightening resource and environmental constraints globally, it is urgent to promote enterprise's green technological innovation through environmental regulation. This paper uses the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 to empirically test the relationship between environmental regulation and green technological innovation, and it also explores the transmission mechanism of executive compensation between these two. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) environmental regulation can promote enterprise green technological innovation. (2) Environmental regulation negatively influences the enterprise green technological innovation by reducing executive compensation. (3) The effect of environmental regulation on the promotion of green technological innovation of enterprise is higher in coastal areas than inland areas of China; while the effect of environmental regulation on the promotion of green technological innovation of enterprise is higher in state-owned enterprises than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environmental protection tax (EPT) reform is a major strategic measure to further implement green development and is the most important environmental economic policy in China. Using data from 3339 companies listed on the A-shares in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2021, this paper evaluates the policy impact of the EPT on corporate carbon emissions and its internal mechanism from the perspective of green innovation by the DID method. The results show that EPT reform effectively promotes corporate carbon emission reduction, and the conclusion remains valid after robustness tests such as the DDD and DML method. The EPT reform mainly promotes carbon emission reduction in companies with high executive compensation levels and high environmental information disclosure, and mature companies. Furthermore, the EPT reform promotes enterprises to reduce carbon emissions by forcing them to adopt strategic and endpoint green innovation, and this "forcing" effect is mainly reflected in internal incentives and external pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hospital CEO salaries have grown quickly over the past two decades. We investigate correlates of rising nonprofit hospital CEO pay between 2012 and 2019 by merging compensation data from Candid's IRS 990 forms with hospital data from the National Academy for State Health Policy Hospital Cost Tool. Almost half of the measured increase in CEO compensation (44.5%) accrued to a "base case" CEO, who was leading a non-teaching hospital system or independent hospital with fewer than 100 beds that earned 0 profits and provided no charity care. Another 28.5% of the measured salary increase resulted from changes in the generosity with which observable metrics were rewarded, particularly the reward for heading a system with 500 or more beds. The remaining 27% resulted mostly from hospital systems or single hospitals that increased their profits or bed size over time. The increase in CEO compensation associated with leading larger healthcare systems and earning greater profits may explain the increase in healthcare system consolidation which has occurred over the last several years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although previous studies have extensively explored the relationship between corporate profitability and innovation, the specific impact of profitability sustainability on corporate innovation has not received sufficient attention. Furthermore, while Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been recognized as significantly influencing corporate innovation, its moderating role between profitability sustainability and innovation remains underexplored. This study fills these research gaps by empirically analyzing the impact of profitability sustainability on corporate innovation and examining in detail the multiple moderating effects of CSR. This paper employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables Two-Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) methods, using data from dairy companies listed on China's A-share and H-share markets from 2016 to 2021, to empirically analyze the impact of profitability sustainability on corporate innovation and to examine in detail the multiple moderating effects of CSR. The results indicate that profitability sustainability significantly promotes corporate innovation. CSR directly moderates this relationship, and along with other moderating variables (financing constraints, executive compensation), it plays a complex role in this interaction, potentially inhibiting the positive connection between profitability sustainability and innovation when acting alone, but significantly enhancing innovation when interacting with CSR. Heterogeneity analysis shows that non-state-owned and H-share listed dairy companies exhibit a more significant positive effect of profitability sustainability on innovation compared to state-owned and A-share listed companies. These findings highlight the key moderating role of CSR in promoting innovation within the dairy industry and offer new perspectives on how profitability sustainability can drive corporate innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Board members are critical in resolving agency conflicts. However, many are unable to perform their function due to their distance, as they are not present at board meetings. As of Instruction no. 561, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) regulated remote voting for Boards of Directors, allowing for greater attendance at meetings and, as a result, increased involvement. In this context, this research examines the effect of remote voting by Boards of Directors on executive compensation and financial performance of publicly traded firms in Brazil. Originality/value: This research is innovative in the sense that it examines the effect of the Board of Directors remote voting on the CEO compensation and financial performance of the firm, using an innovative methodology. Design/methodology/approach: We applied a quasi-experimental method (difference-in-differences) to assess the effects of a given group (treatment) before and after the event, significantly reducing endogeneity when considering an exogenous shock to the system. Findings: As a result, the estimation of the main model reveals statistically significant differences between the effects of treatment and control on profitability and executive remuneration, indicating that remote voting mitigated agency problems by generating a substitution effect for explicit incentives (as evidenced by the decrease in executive remuneration) and by providing greater accounting performance for companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The steady increase of chief executives' compensation in both public and private universities has long been at the centre of public debate and has received a lot of criticism in the UK. As higher education is considered as an industry, a pay for performance relationship is expected. This paper differs by demonstrating that UK Vice Chancellors consider incentives other than remuneration in their career progression. By constructing a comprehensive dataset of UK Vice Chancellors covering academic years 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, we demonstrate that UK university chief executives, especially if young, are willing to accept lower salaries when they interpret their role as a springboard for visible high‐profile positions in the public arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the cognitive and upper echelons theories, this study investigated the impact of executives' green cognition on corporate green innovation using panel data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021. The findings revealed that companies with executives who possess green cognition demonstrated a minimum increase of 12.5% in green innovation compared with companies without such cognition. The mechanism analysis suggested that executives' green cognition promotes green innovation by alleviating managerial myopia and attracting green investors. The heterogeneous effects analysis indicated that a positive effect is predominantly observed among non-heavy-polluting industries and regions with a lower intensity of environmental regulations. This study identified the positive role of executives' green psychological cognition, thereby providing insights into incorporating psychological cognitive factors in executive selection to enhance the level of corporate green innovation and promote the construction of corporate quality management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA. Design/methodology/approach: Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers' (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory. Findings: The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking. Practical implications: The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers. Originality/value: The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This literature review summarizes previous quantitative archival research on sustainability‐related executive compensation (SREC) as the overarching research method in this field. Based on stakeholder agency theory, we included 66 peer‐reviewed studies on the determinants (governance, financial, and sustainability drivers) and consequences of SREC on firm value (financial and sustainability consequences). Regarding SREC, we differentiated between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the total executive level. Although we note a lower attraction of SREC research on possible determinants, there are clear indications that SREC has a positive effect on sustainability performance. In contrast to the business case argument for sustainability, this is not true for financial performance. We find major limitations and research gaps in previous studies that should be recognized in future studies (e.g., differentiation between symbolic and substantive use of SREC). Our results are mainly important for researchers, business practice and regulatory bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aiming to shed light on the interplay of board‐related mechanisms and their influence on sustainable development, this study examines configurations of corporate governance conditions that are associated with high and low ESG performance. Fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis was used, resorting to a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing companies that are committed to contributing to solve the climate change societal challenge (i.e., SDG13). The configurational analysis was also extended to the all sample of S&P 500 companies to assure the generalizability of the findings and provide additional insights. The findings support the functional view of the role of the board, emphasising the notion that configurations (i.e., combinations of conditions) are more important to sustainable development than any single condition. Different from past research, this study emphasises the importance of defining and implementing a CSR strategy to achieve high ESG performance, which is always present in configurations leading to the outcome of interest. Furthermore, the results also suggest that a monitoring mechanism should always be present, while an incentive alignment mechanism is only required in some circumstances. Moreover, the results show that ESG‐related executive compensation should be complemented with other mechanisms, such as board monitoring, to be effective. This study contributes to the debate on whether sustainability‐related performance alignment incentives and monitoring mechanisms act as complements or substitutes. The findings show that linear approaches might not capture the all picture, suggesting that a more nuanced view should be used in future studies, and can inform companies' strategic decisions regarding sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulatory focus theory theorizes that there are two distinct dispositional foci of self-regulation (promotion focus and prevention focus) that impact individuals' motivational tendencies to achieve their decision-making processes. This study integrates regulatory focus theory with upper echelons theory to investigate how CEO regulatory focus (i.e., higher degrees of promotion focus relative to prevention focus) influences corporate strategic outcomes, particularly regarding the pursuit of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and firm performance. This study uses data collected from the annual reports of S&P 1500 firms in the US from 2000 to 2018. Results show a negative association between CEOs who are predominantly promotion-focused and CSR performance. This negative association is diminished in firms with better corporate governance (i.e., higher CEO equity compensation and greater institutional ownership). The results also show that CSR plays a mediating role in the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and firm performance. These findings not only contribute to the existing literature by highlighting the role of CEO regulatory focus in shaping CSR initiatives but also shed light on its implications for firm performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large Japanese corporations which have accumulated substantial reserves are now under pressure to spend them, but on what, or on whom? Should they increase their (domestic) capital and R&D expenditure, which languished between 2000 and 2020; or invest more in their employees, whose wages have stagnated; or increase their shareholder returns, which have already surged; or raise executive remuneration closer to overseas counterparts? This article examines tensions in recent developments in Japan's political economy, from Society 5.0 to Kishida's 'new form of capitalism' and Keidanren's 'rebuilding the middle class', from the perspective of these dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking the low‐carbon city pilot policy as a quasi‐natural experiment and using the data of Chinese listed companies, this paper examines the impact and mechanism of low‐carbon city pilot policy on the firms' executive‐employee pay gap. The results show that the implementation of low‐carbon city pilot policy significantly promotes the executive‐employee pay gap. Mechanism analysis results show that the low‐carbon city pilot policy promotes the executive‐employee pay gap mainly by enhancing the risks of enterprises' environmental violations and increasing management complexity. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the promoting effects of the pilot policy are more obvious in state‐owned enterprises, large‐scale enterprises, high‐carbon emission enterprises, and enterprises in labor‐intensive industries. The paper provides a decision‐making reference for coordinating common prosperity progress and corporate high‐quality development in the context of carbon reduction transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Question/Issue: We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties. Research Findings/Insights: Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two‐stage least squares and high‐dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the impact of the characteristics of sustainable boards and NGO directors on biodiversity disclosures. This research uses data from 481 US companies that are taken from Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P), ASSET4, for the period 2009–2020 (5616 company‐year observations). Data on NGO directors is provided by MSCI's GMI Rankings database. A panel data analysis with fixed effects models is used to estimate the results. The results also indicate that a sustainable board structure (proxied by Chief Sustainability Officers (CSOs) and Sustainability‐related executive compensation) is positively correlated with biodiversity disclosure. Our empirical results also show that the moderating role of NGO directors has a greater interaction effect with the characteristics of sustainable boards and biodiversity information disclosure initiatives. The results are also consistent for exploitative and nonexploitative industries, as well as for the pre‐ and post SDG (14–15) of the agenda 2030. In addition, the framework of SDG (14‐15) and the strategic plan of partnership with the Agenda of 2030 show a positive relationship with biodiversity disclosure. We then develop a causal relationship through the positive impact of NGO directors serving on the board of directors on a strategy of partnerships, onboarding, and increase/decrease of NGO directors—possible mechanisms by which NGO directors can influence biodiversity disclosure. Overall, our findings suggest that while NGO directors can potentially be appointed to a company's board of directors for legitimization reasons, these directors are associated with better biodiversity disclosure. The study has valuable implications for enduring board members, practitioners, and scholars. The results are supported by theories of legitimacy, stakeholders and resource dependence. However, evidence on this research question is still unknown and critical, especially in the context of stakeholder‐emphasized governance systems (continental Europe, Japan) and developing countries where there is a lack of knowledge application of regulations related to the disclosure of biodiversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines managers' explanations of firm performance (i.e., management attributions) in a large sample of the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports. We find that managers of poorly performing firms tend to attribute firm performance to external factors. We further propose a prediction model to decompose management external attributions into a credible part and a strategic part and find that both components are negatively related to firm performance. This evidence suggests that management external attributions partially reflect the actual impact of external conditions on firm performance and are not entirely subject to managerial opportunism. Additionally, we find that investors react more strongly to firm performance when managers provide credible external attributions, especially for firms without a bad reputation for strategic external attributions. We also show that executive compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when managers make more strategic external attributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say‐on‐pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has argued that companies in transition economies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to achieve political goals, such as building connections with the government. However, it is unclear why chief executive officers (CEOs) agree to make these politically driven CSR decisions that mainly benefit the controlling shareholders. We show that controlling shareholders may "bribe" the CEOs with greater compensation or perks—a form of economic rents extracted by the CEOs—to make CSR decisions, and such a pattern is more salient in local government-owned companies. We reason that these CSR activities reflect implicit contracting between the controlling shareholders and the CEOs. Through cross-section analyses, we find that the CEO's economic rents vary with local government fiscal needs, the firm's governance structure, and CEO power. Furthermore, we demonstrate that increases in CSR-linked compensation lead to a decline in shareholder value. Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: D72; M12; P26. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives' incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives' desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; J33; K22; M12; M16. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant literature highlights the significance of the corporate governance (CG) mechanism in mitigating agency conflict. Literature also confirms the instrumentality of the board structure (measured as size, diversity, independence and CEO duality) in overcoming the agency problem. In this context, the present study examines the impact of board structure on a firm's cash holding (CH) levels. Likewise, the study tests the role of cash‐holding (CH) in the association between board structure and a firm's performance. Secondary data from 262 PSX‐listed manufacturing and servicing sector firms have been taken for analysis. Panel regression and Generalized Methods of Movement (GMM) were employed to test the modelled relationships. Results show that most of the CG variables, that is, CEO duality, board size, executive compensation, and diversity, do not affect a firm's CH levels in the service and manufacturing sectors. However, the results display a negative and significant impact of block holders (BH), measured as the ratio of the top five shareholders, on cash holding in manufacturing. Likewise, the sector‐wise analysis shows that cash holding significantly mediates between board size and ROA. In contrast, its role between other dimensions of CG and RoA was insignificant. The findings also revealed that firms with frailer CG structures tend to have less CH and can be prone to external environmental risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between corporate ESG ratings and green innovation based on data from Chinese A‐share listed companies for the period between 2011 and 2022. The findings suggest a "U"‐ shaped relationship between ESG ratings and green innovation. Companies with lower ESG ratings (referred to as "bad" companies) tend to focus on improving their corporate governance and operational conditions, often at the expense of green innovation. However, as companies improve their ESG ratings, they increasingly view green innovation as a key growth area. This relationship is particularly evident in companies with low profitability and high operational risks. Additionally, we explore the impact of corporate ESG ratings on different types of green patents. The study finds that "bad" companies can mitigate the negative impact on green innovation through collaborative efforts, while non‐inventive green innovations, they benefit from independent research and development. Furthermore, the study examines the role of government subsidies and executive compensation in influencing this relationship. The results show that government subsidies can both positively and negatively affect green innovation, depending on the company's operational status and ESG rating. The results provide valuable insights for companies, investors, and policymakers regarding the significant role of ESG scores in promoting green innovation and suggest strategies to enhance corporate sustainability performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the impact of director experience in integrating social responsibility criteria into CEO compensation (corporate social responsibility [CSR] contracting) in other firms on the adoption and design of CSR contracting within focal firms and address the question of whether such experience brings information or pressure to focal firms. Using hand‐collected data of a sample from the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 index, we find that director experience is positively associated with the likelihood of CSR contracting adoption. This effect is particularly pronounced in challenging situations where firms require more information for the adoption, such as when they have diverse stakeholders with varying CSR interests and operate in unpredictable market environments. Additionally, director experience has a positive effect on the use of quantitative CSR targets in initial contract design, especially in these challenging scenarios. Interestingly, the positive effect of director experience on CSR contracting adoption does not vary with firms' peer legitimacy pressure. Our findings suggest that director CSR contracting experience provides valuable information that fosters learning rather than imposing institutional pressure that leads to isomorphism when firms make CSR contracting decisions. By disentangling the intertwined role of director experience, our research offers insights into how it influences the adoption and design of innovative management control practices within firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions across a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd et al. to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. We assess empirical performance across a wide spectrum of areas in corporate finance and indicate varying research opportunities for empiricists and theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]