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The European Union is increasingly resorting to a decentralised enforcement strategy in which it relies less on the Commission-initiated infringement procedure, and more on domestic litigation by particularly NGOs. In order to better understand whether this is a suitable strategy to tackle the compliance deficit, we need more insight into NGOs as decentralised enforcers of EU law. What do NGOs do to stimulate domestic compliance, and is this a potentially effective alternative to the centralised enforcement strategies? Analysing the actions by the German NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe in relation to the Ambient Air Quality Directive, reveals high potential for the role to be played by NGOs. This exploratory case illustrates that particularly the strategy of flooding the country with a wave of legal proceedings was effective in increasing the salience of the topic, thereby indirectly releasing those capacities that the authorities had still lacked to comply.

Funding: This work was supported by the project ‘Contested Global Governance, Transformed Global Governors? International Organisations and “Weak” States’ of the French National Research Agency [grant number ANR-16-ACHN-0034]; and the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) [grant number 12B9422N]. By shifting the study of European Union (EU)–Central Asian relations from its fixed category of black-boxing both the EU and Central Asia, this article advances the case for the approach of examining multi-level and multi-actor interactions that identify the dynamic processes of reciprocal action and meaning-making that characterize the mutual cooperation. It distinguishes perceptions, interests and practices, pointing to the rationales and modes of behaviour of multiple EU and Central Asian actors. The article also advances five reasons why EU studies should take more interest in Central Asia, given that the EU’s larger external relations and security agenda extends to this region. Similarly, it shows that Central Asian studies can benefit from the analysis of the region’s interactions with external actors, including the EU, given that external actors contribute to reshaping national policy agendas and influence everyday life. Publisher PDF

Interest groups seek to influence parliamentarians’ actions by establishing exchange relationships. We scrutinize the role of exchange by investigating how interest groups impact parliamentarians’ use of individual parliamentary instruments such as questions, motions, and bills. We utilize a new longitudinal dataset (2000–2015) with 524 Swiss parliamentarians, their 6342 formal ties to interest groups (i.e., board seats), and a variety of 23,750 parliamentary instruments across 15 policy areas. This enables us to show that interest groups systematically relate to parliamentarians’ use of parliamentary instruments in the respective policy areas in which they operate—even when parliamentarians’ time-invariant (fixed effects) and time-variant personal affinities (occupation, committee membership) to the policy area are accounted for. Personal affinities heavily moderate interest groups’ impact on their board members’ parliamentary activities. Moreover, once formal ties end, the impact of interest groups also wanes. These findings have implications for our understanding of how interest groups foster representation in legislatures.

Understandings of different policy learning types have matured over recent decades. However, relatively little is known about their nonlinear and interactive nature, particularly within crisis contexts. In this article, we explore how two of the most prominent learning types (instrumental and social) shifted and interacted during the COVID‐19 crisis. To do so, we created a policy learning storyboard of the Belgian COVID‐19 policy response over 2 years (from early 2020 to late 2021). Our analysis highlights the relationships between different epochs of instrumental and social learning throughout the crisis and their implications for policy change. Furthermore, while extant policy learning literature often posits that social learning unfolds over relatively long periods (spanning a decade or more), our empirical account shows that within certain conditions, creeping crises can lead to the creation of long‐term crisis policy‐making paradigms and goals. At this level, accelerated social learning can take place and lead to paradigmatic shifts within relatively shorter periods than in noncrisis conditions. Theoretically, our findings enhance our understanding of policy learning types and their relationships with policy change, particularly within crisis contexts.

This article examines the provisions of the Directive 2016/343 related to the right to remain silent with special emphasis on pre-trial proceedings and police interrogations. It focuses on the inherent contradictions and unclarities of the respective provisions, particularly when interpreted in light of the respective ECtHR case law. The article also identifies areas, relevant to regulation of suspect interrogations and the right to silence, which are not addressed in the Directive or the ECtHR jurisprudence. It concludes by critically assessing the likely effectiveness of the Directive provisions in ensuring the right to silence in criminal proceedings.

Although it is acknowledged that NGOs play an important role in the EU’s policymaking, their role in external action is less studied due to the often closed-off character of foreign policymaking. This study helps to fill this gap by analysing the role of NGOs in the EU’s external human rights policy towards China regarding the Xinjiang crisis. It is based on a content analysis of EU and NGO documents, as well as interviews with EU and NGO representatives. We find that NGOs act not just as policy entrepreneurs, but as moral policy entrepreneurs: they combine expertise with moral arguments about the EU’s responsibility as a human rights leader to push the Xinjiang crisis higher on the EU’s agenda and guide its response.

PurposeThe aim of this scoping review is to understand the motivations for the creation of global medical curricula, summarize methods that have been used to create these curricula, and understand the perceived premises for the creation of these curricula.MethodIn 2018, the authors used a comprehensive search strategy to identify papers on existing efforts to create global medical curricula published from 1998 to March 29, 2018, in the following databases: MEDLINE; MEDLINE Epub Ahead of Print, In-Process, and Other Non-Indexed Citations; Embase; Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials; Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews; PsycINFO; CINAHL; ERIC; Scopus; African Index Medicus; and LILACS. There were no language restrictions. Two independent researchers applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Demographic data were abstracted from publications and summarized. The stated purposes, methods used for the development, stated motivations, and reported challenges of curricula were coded.ResultsOf the 18,684 publications initially identified, 137 met inclusion criteria. The most common stated purposes for creating curricula were to define speciality-specific standards (50, 30%), to harmonize training standards (38, 23%), and to improve the quality or safety of training (31, 19%). The most common challenges were intercountry variation (including differences in health care systems, the operationalization of medical training, and sociocultural differences; 27, 20%), curricular implementation (20, 15%), and the need for a multistakeholder approach (6, 4%). Most curricula were developed by a social group (e.g., committee; 30, 45%) or Delphi or modified Delphi process (22, 33%).ConclusionsThe challenges of intercountry variation, the need for a multistakeholder approach, and curricular implementation need to be considered if concerns about curricular relevance are to be addressed. These challenges undoubtedly impact the uptake of global medical curricula and can only be addressed by explicit efforts to make curricula applicable to the realities of diverse health care settings.

This article takes issue with the legitimacy of EU soft law instruments issued to deal with the COVID-19 crisis. Up to August 2020, we identified a total of 197 such instruments, and analysed the procedures for their adoption. We found little evidence of parliamentary involvement or stakeholder consultation, with COVID-19 soft law replicating decision-making patterns which have been constantly criticised in the literature as illegitimate and opaque. Giving due consideration to the exceptional nature of these measures, the article suggests some quick fixes which might increase, ex post factum, the legitimacy of these instruments.

Over the past few years, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has been one of the most divisive issues in EU politics, with some member states opposing the project, others supporting it, and a third group adopting a neutral stance. Which conditions explain these varying national positions? Our study offers the first systematic attempt to examine preference formation with regard to Nord Stream 2 across the entire EU membership. Drawing on elite surveys, we compile an original dataset to position EU member states in the Nord Stream 2 debate. We then perform a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to uncover the determinants of the differing positions taken by member states. The Nord Stream 2 controversy is employed as a testing ground for new intergovernmentalist theory, which argues that preference formation is not just shaped by material and (geo)political conditions, but also by the preferences of other member states. Our study finds that material benefits and the role of Russia are relevant conditions for position formation on Nord Stream 2. However, in this case, we did not find evidence for the importance of other member states' preferences.

This article draws upon poststructuralist and postcolonial theories to examine the European Union’s (EU’s) policies of human rights promotion in the South Caucasus – notably, the EU’s engagement with local human rights activists and organisations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Contrary to most literature, which has been concerned with policy (in)effectiveness, this article is interested in problematising the discursive foundations of this EU-civil society ‘partnership’ in the realm of human rights promotion, as well as in retrieving the agency of actors who are ‘at the receiving end’ of EU policies. It is argued that the discursive construction of ‘civil’ society as a ‘good-Other’ of the EU-Self serves as a means to depoliticise the EU’s interventions, aiming at the approximation of ‘transitioning’ countries to the EU’s human rights standards. Although the hegemonic relation requires subaltern actors to perform the ‘civil’ society identity, processes of hybridisation and subversion arise as external interventions interact with local realities and meanings. Building on in-depth interviews and ethnographic observations, the article shows how the hegemonic identity of ‘civil’ society is negotiated by South Caucasus ‘not-quite-civil’ actors striving for local legitimacy, financial survival or ownership of their human rights work.

© 2018 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd This article lays out a framework for the conditions under which a civil society organization lobbies the state and when it turns to the market. This strategic choice cannot be understood solely from within current frameworks of lobbying strategies; insights from interest group studies must be complemented with the social movement literature's understanding of market-based strategies. We build an overarching framework by extending the inside and outside lobbying dichotomy to include strategies that target the market. We also argue that it is crucial to understand the relations between both lobbying venues, as their relative power affects the choice not only between inside or outside lobbying, but also between the state or the market. The result is a richer framework more suited to capture the breadth of contemporary civil society organization lobbying behavior and, more importantly, to facilitate the comparative assessment of different strategic choices in future empirical research. ispartof: Regulation & Governance vol:14 issue:3 pages:1-13 status: Published online

Supplemental Digital Content is available in the text., Purpose The aim of this scoping review is to understand the motivations for the creation of global medical curricula, summarize methods that have been used to create these curricula, and understand the perceived premises for the creation of these curricula. Method In 2018, the authors used a comprehensive search strategy to identify papers on existing efforts to create global medical curricula published from 1998 to March 29, 2018, in the following databases: MEDLINE; MEDLINE Epub Ahead of Print, In-Process, and Other Non-Indexed Citations; Embase; Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials; Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews; PsycINFO; CINAHL; ERIC; Scopus; African Index Medicus; and LILACS. There were no language restrictions. Two independent researchers applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Demographic data were abstracted from publications and summarized. The stated purposes, methods used for the development, stated motivations, and reported challenges of curricula were coded. Results Of the 18,684 publications initially identified, 137 met inclusion criteria. The most common stated purposes for creating curricula were to define speciality-specific standards (50, 30%), to harmonize training standards (38, 23%), and to improve the quality or safety of training (31, 19%). The most common challenges were intercountry variation (including differences in health care systems, the operationalization of medical training, and sociocultural differences; 27, 20%), curricular implementation (20, 15%), and the need for a multistakeholder approach (6, 4%). Most curricula were developed by a social group (e.g., committee; 30, 45%) or Delphi or modified Delphi process (22, 33%). Conclusions The challenges of intercountry variation, the need for a multistakeholder approach, and curricular implementation need to be considered if concerns about curricular relevance are to be addressed. These challenges undoubtedly impact the uptake of global medical curricula and can only be addressed by explicit efforts to make curricula applicable to the realities of diverse health care settings.

What accounts for the variation in EU actorness in cases of contested statehood in the European Neighbourhood? A comparative analysis of the EU’s policies vis-à-vis three territorial conflicts – Kosovo, Abkhazia and Western Sahara – demonstrates the intricate relationship between external conditions and internal EU capability leading to substantial involvement, partial involvement or non-involvement in conflict management. Using insights from the EU actorness debate and the literatures on contested statehood and EU external governance, the paper offers a conceptualisation of the EU’s conflict management role and a contingent explanation of the EU’s varying commitment to managing conflicts in three cases of contested statehood. The paper finds that external determinants have a considerable weight in EU’s policies which existing research tends to overlook owing to its predominant focus on EU’s internal institutional procedures and instruments. It teases out the external action-enabling and action-hindering factors, in particular the external structural constraints arising from the nature of statehood contestation and the agency of other international and local players in the three conflicts in the European Neighbourhood.

Supplementary materials files: online appendix; replication data Research on differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union has burgeoned in recent years. However, we still know little about citizens’ attitudes towards the phenomenon. In this article, we argue that at the level of individual citizens, liberal economic values increase support for DI. Stronger preferences for equality, in contrast, make opposition to the concept more likely. Similarly, concerns about discriminatory differentiation at the member state level lead citizens to oppose DI. We test the theoretical claims by analysing survey data on citizens’ attitudes towards a ‘multi-speed Europe’. Supporters of DI, indeed, are marked by liberal economic attitudes. In contrast to general EU support, we do not find robust correlations with socio-demographic variables. Moreover, the data reveal striking differences amongst macro-regions: support for DI has become much lower in Southern European states. We attribute this opposition to negative repercussions of the Eurozone crisis. Work on this article was generously supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement 822419.

BackgroundIn the Euregio-Meuse-Rhine (EMR), cross-border collaboration is essential for resource-saving and needs-based patient care within the emergency medical service (EMS) systems and interhospital transport (IHT). However, at the onset of the novel coronavirus SARS-COV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic, differing national measures highlighted the fragmentation within the European Union (EU) in its various approaches to combating the pandemic. To assess the consequences of the pandemic in the EMR border area, the aim of this study was to analyze the effects and “lessons learned” regarding cross-border collaboration in EMS and IHT.MethodA qualitative study with 22 semi-structured interviews was carried out. Experts from across the EMR area, including the City of Aachen, the City region of Aachen, the District of Heinsberg (Germany), South Limburg (The Netherlands), and the Province of Limburg, as well as Liège (Belgium), took part. The interviews were coded and analyzed according to changes in cross-border collaboration before and during the pandemic, as well as lessons learned and recommendations.ResultsEach EU member country within the EMR area, addressed the pandemic individually with national measures. Cross-border collaboration between regional actors was hardly or not at all addressed at the national level during political decision- or policymaking. Previous direct communication at the personal level was replaced by national procedures, which made regular cross-border collaboration significantly more difficult. The cross-border transfer regulations of patients with COVID-19 proved to be complex and led, among other things, to patients being transported to hospitals far outside the border region. Collaboration continues to be seen as valuable and Euregional emergency services including hospitals work well together, albeit to different degrees. The information and data exchange should, however, be more transparent to use resources more efficiently.ConclusionEffective Euregional collaboration of emergency services is imperative for public safety in a multi-border region with strong economic, cultural, and social cross-border links. Our findings indicate that existing (pre-pandemic) structures which included regular meetings of senior managerial staff in the region and a number of thematic working groups were helpful to deal with and to compensate for the disruptions during the crisis. Regional cross-border agreements that are currently based on mutual but more or less informal arrangements need to be formalized and better promoted and recognized also at the national and EU level to increase resilience. The continuous determination of synergies and good and best practices are further approaches to support cross-border collaboration especially in preparation for future crises.

This work was supported by the project ‘Contested Global Governance, Transformed Global Governors? International Organisations and “Weak” States’ of the French National Research Agency [grant number ANR-16-ACHN-0034] and Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) [grant number 12B9422N]. Examining the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Central Asia since the early 1990s, we see an increased commitment to context sensitivity. Arguably, in order to design ‘better’ interventions, the EU needs to know more about this region. This article explores three means of EU learning: in the field – through EU officials’ first-hand experience of working at EU Delegations in Central Asia; about the field – through programmed channels of external expert knowledge, and in particular think tanks; and from the field – during institutionalized consultations with multiple local actors, such as academics, journalists and non-governmental organizations. It is argued that despite this complex learning infrastructure, EU knowledge production on Central Asia has a predominantly performative character. Rather than leading to changes in its relations with Central Asia, new knowledge produced by the EU aims at legitimizing this organization’s pre-existing frameworks of engagement and practices of interactions with the region, and substantiating existing policy priorities. Publisher PDF

Although experimentalist governance - presented as a novel alternative to conventional hierarchical governance - has attracted attention over the past 15 years, we still know little about its real spread and scope conditions. Examining the application of competition policy to the digital sector, the article reveals that the European Competition Network and the procedures modernized in the early 2000s actually host a variety of governance processes, ranging from hierarchical development and enforcement of stable solutions at one extreme to experimentalist discretion of local actors, review of their implementation experiences, and central revisions in their light at the other. Futher, shifts from hierarchy to experimentalism might reverse. As for explanations, variation in governance processes cannot be explained by formal distributions of power, which were the same. Instead, the greater the uncertainty about solutions and the weaker the readily available coalitions in their support, the more actors favored experimentalist governance, and vice versa. The broader implications thus caution against general claims, challenge the influence of legal factors, and suggest that far from being necessarily antitethical, functional and political factors may bear together on the spread of distinct forms of governance.

This article assesses the impact of administrative capacity and political governance factors on the absorption of structural and cohesion funds (SCF). We drew on EU‐27 country level data and developed a dynamic panel data model for the 2007–15 implementation period. By using a tobit estimation technique, the results indicated that government effectiveness and public diversion of funds significantly affect the recipient countries ability to absorb EU funds. The results revealed that increasing government effectiveness and combating corruption had significant stronger boosting effects on the absorption of SCF, especially in the new member states (NMS). This might explain why bottlenecks of administrative capacity and political governance are highly relevant for NMS and why these countries generally faced lower absorption rates, as compared to EU‐15. Moreover, the results also underlined that the recent great recession reduced the ability of countries to absorb SCF. Against our expectations, domestic financial capacity and political decentralization were not shown to be decisive for EU funds absorption. In policy terms, our study suggests a focus on administrative capacity‐building and fighting corruption in NMS and across lagging regions of older member states in order to improve absorption rates, while also focusing more on the efficiency and effectiveness of European cohesion policy. Finally, several suggestions are made on how our analysis can be replicated and taken forward by analysts of the European Union's internal development cohesion policy.

Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multi‐faceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a ground‐breaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five well‐established models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the Union: the EEA model; the Danish model of (quasi‐)permanent differentiation; the Swedish model of de facto differentiation; the instrumental model; and the British model of differentiated disintegration. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article further introduces the contributions to this Symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit.

IntroductionWhile studies have been undertaken to understand the adoption of outdoor and indoor smoking bans, not much is known about why implementation of smoke-free (SF) environments differs at local levels. As most European countries remain at the level of indoor bans, we aim to translate existing evidence into practical recommendations on how to improve SF (outdoor) implementation within European municipalities.MethodsWe applied six methodological steps of a realist review consistent with the RAMESES publication standards for realist syntheses. Literature search was conducted in PubMed/MEDLINE and Web of Science. In total, 3829 references were screened, of which 43 were synthesized. Studies dating from 2004 to 2015 with rigor evidence of SF implementation at the local level were selected. Implementation outcomes were SF enforcement, monitoring, nonsmoking compliance, and public support in cities.ResultsThe explanatory realist framework links four innovation stages with three context-mechanism-outcome (CMO)configurations. We identified “triggering trust,” “increasing priorities,” and “limiting opposing interests” as underlying mechanisms, when (1) establishing, (2) developing, (3) contesting, and (4) implementing local smoking bans. The CMO propositions (CMOs) support practical recommendations, such as (1) providing authorities with local data when establishing and developing bans, (2) developing long-term strategies and implementing state-funded SF programs to prioritize sustained enforcement, and (3) limiting opposing interests through the use of the child protection frame.ConclusionsThis is the first realist review on the implementation of SF enviroments at the local level. The process-oriented theory explains how and why CMOs determine SF development in cities and municipalities from planning until implementation.ImplicationsIn 2015, only 16% of the world’s population lived under the jurisdiction of comprehensive SF laws. The findings of this realist review are useful to implement WHO goals of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and specifically SF environments at more local levels and to adjust them to specific contextual circumstances. This paper unpacks three mechanisms that could be triggered by SF strategies developed at local levels and that can result in improved policy implementation. Such evidence is needed to enhance SF strategies at the level of cities and municipalities and to achieve WHO “Healthy Cities Network” objectives.

Developed and developing countries are increasingly cooperating on migration management, and human rights NGOs have harshly criticised these instruments for cooperation. This article asks how and to what extent parliaments are challenging policies for international cooperation on migration management. On the one hand parliaments have traditionally been described as ?moral tribunes? in international relations, due to their principled support for human rights. On the other hand, parliaments are increasingly operating in political systems marked by anti-immigrant sentiment and increased support for right-wing populist parties. How do parliaments navigate between these two poles when it comes to international cooperation on migration management? Based on examples from Australia, the EU and Israel, this article shows that the use of non-legally binding instruments for cooperation limits the formal role of parliaments, but also and more importantly that there is a lack of political will to scrutinise these instruments and hold executives to account (notwithstanding attempts by some members of parliament or some political groupings to challenge policies through informal means). The lack of political contestation implies that, as far as migration management is concerned, ?politics stop at the water's edge?.

There has been increased interest in trade policy following the UK’s EU membership referendum. However, relatively little scholarly analysis has been produced on how Brexit will affect EU trade policy. Instead, the received wisdom has been that Brexit will shift the EU’s trade policy position in a less liberal direction. This is based on a ‘static’ analysis where the UK variable is simply removed from the figurative ‘function’ determining EU trade policy. We argue that this neglects the potential role of more ‘dynamic’ effects. First, the negotiations to determine the nature of the EU–UK future economic partnership are likely to involve a lengthy process with a still uncertain, and possibly evolving, destination. The outcome and process of arriving there will influence how economic operators and policymakers adapt their preferences and behaviour, including through possible relocation and the formation of new alliances. This will shape EU trade policy in potentially counterintuitive ways. Second, the absence of clear material structures from which actors can ‘read’ their interests highlights the importance of considering the role of ideas and political framing. How the vote for and consequences of Brexit are interpreted will likely shape what is considered an appropriate policy response. Examining EU trade policy since the Brexit vote, the article finds that rather than push the EU in a more illiberal direction, the referendum result has been used to reinforce the European Commission’s external liberalisation agenda. The Commission’s discursive response to Brexit and Donald Trump has been to portray the EU as a champion of free trade in an era of global populism.

Advocacy is typically conceived of as an activity where advocacy groups seek and policymakers grant influence. In this paper, we turn the classic approach to advocacy upside down and ask under what conditions policymakers seek to exert influence on the positions adopted by opposing or allied advocacy groups. Two strategies that policymakers can use in their interactions with advocacy groups are proposed: amplification and persuasion. We build on resource exchange theory and the concept of political opportunity structures to explain which strategy a policymaker uses. The analysis relies on a unique database, which draws from 297 interviews with policymakers from 107 different countries at global climate change and trade conferences. Our results demonstrate that, overall, policymakers seek out advocacy groups more when they are faced with increased levels of political pressures. Namely, elected politicians are more prone to seek out opposing societal interests than non-elected policymakers. Moreover, policymakers from democratically accountable countries, who work on salient issues, are more inclined to mobilize their advocacy group allies.

Radiotherapy interventions are rapidly evolving and improving, holding promise for better patient outcomes, yet at the possible detriment of higher societal costs. The ESTRO-HERO value-based radiotherapy project aims to develop a framework defining and assessing the value of radiotherapy innovations, to support clinical implementation and equitable access, within a sustainable healthcare system. (c) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Radiotherapy and Oncology 160 (2021) 236-239 This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Can voters be persuaded by referendum campaigns? This article develops a theoretical model that synthesises the existing literature on campaign effects and issue-voting by arguing that the strength of pre-existing attitudes conditions voter receptivity to campaign arguments, thereby also determining their eventual vote choice. Using original panel data for the 2015 Danish opt-out referendum, there is evidence that attitude strength matters for whether voters are responsive to persuasion during campaigns. The article finds that voters with the most strongly-held attitudes felt well informed and certain about the consequences of the vote even before the start of the campaign, whereas voters with moderately-held attitudes are found to be more prone to believe those campaign arguments that are consistent with their EU attitudes, changing their vote intentions accordingly. Finally, voters with weakly-held attitudes were equally persuadable for the No and the Yes side of the campaign, but they are also the least pre-disposed to pay attention to campaign messages. The conclusions discuss the broader implications of the findings for our understanding of EU referendum campaigns.

While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) used to be considered obsolete tools for governmental intervention in the economy, in recent years governmental intervention in the business sector has re-emerged as a topic of debate. However, scholarship on the changes in and the modernisation of the SOE model is limited. In this article, we examine how the Finnish state's ownership policy adapted to the requirements of economic globalisation between the 1970s and the 2010s. We show that the attitude towards globalisation was pragmatic and aimed at safeguarding the competitiveness of domestic companies. The state-owned company system was gradually adapted to meet new needs, losing most of its original industrial policy significance. SOEs had to be made competitive and profitable, but company-specific targets depended on the ownership criteria associated with the companies. At the same time, the government paid more attention to supporting research and development in the private sector.

The COVID‐19 emergency has had a dramatic impact on market incomes and income support policies. The lack of timely available data constrains the estimation of the scale and direction of recent changes in the income distribution, which in turn constrain policymakers seeking to monitor such developments. We overcome the lack of data by proposing a dynamic calibrated microsimulation approach to generate counterfactual income distributions as a function of more timely external data than is available in dated income surveys. We combine nowcasting methods using publicly available data and a household income generation model to perform the first calibrated simulation based upon actual data aiming to assess the distributional implications of the COVID‐19 crisis in Ireland. Overall, we find that the crisis had an equalizing real‐time effect for both gross and disposable incomes, notwithstanding the significant hardship experienced by many households. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

The agri-food sector is under increased pressure from consumers to improve on the sustainability of production processes. Policies that incentivise farmers to improve environmental performance, such as agri-environment schemes (AES), are increasingly important. Understanding the choice to participate in these programmes aids policymakers in designing schemes that meet participation and environmental goals. While a number of studies have investigated the decision using cross-sectional data on one or multiple locations, very few have used longitudinal data to investigate the impact of institutional changes over time. Using Ireland as a case study, this paper uses a nationally representative panel of data spanning 23 years to model the impact of scheme and policy changes on the type of farms participating in AES. This paper argues that environmental issues surrounding intensive farms (such as the loss of nutrients and sediment to water and greenhouse gas emissions) are not being optimally addressed in scheme design and further development of such programmes is needed to reduce negative environmental impacts.

While policy and academic discourses point to important shifts in EU development policy, it remains difficult to ascertain the level of these changes. The main aim of this article is to propose a research agenda on change and continuity in EU development policy. Drawing on the literatures on paradigm change and post-development, this involves four key questions for future research: (1) How can we map the EU's current paradigm? (2) How can we map changes and continuities in this regard? (3) How can we explain changes and continuities? (4) What role do policy experiments play in this regard? In addressing these four questions, the article pays particular attention to what we already know from existing literature and to what issues could guide future research. We highlight that ostensibly significant changes are often 'merely' second order changes that do not challenge underlying philosophical ideas of the Eurocentric, modernist and colonial paradigm. Specifically, we point at the importance of studying whether policy experiments 'reinvent' this paradigm or induce paradigmatic change. In the conclusions, we summarize the research agenda and reflect on the need of a better acknowledgement of the 'PIEUriverse' of alternatives to 'development' within Europe.

In the aftermath of the EU's diplomatic mission to resolve the Orange Revolution in 2004, several Russian policy makers perceived the EU as an aggressive actor which sought to undermine Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. About a decade later, Russian policy makers are mocking the EU's limited abilities in the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The purpose of this article is to explain the reasons for this change of the EU's abilities by focusing on its state-building in Ukraine. The article examines the EU's state-building initiatives in Ukraine between November 2013 and July 2015. The article assesses the factors which shape the EU's state-building in Ukraine. It argues that the EU's state-building was hampered by two interrelated factors. First, the EU did not possess the policy tools to counter-balance Russia's affirmative foreign policy towards Ukraine which was reflected in Crimea's annexation to Russia. Second, as a consequence, this annexation turned Ukraine into a case of contested statehood.

Even though EU agencies are poorly embedded in the EU’s constitutional framework their proliferation continues. If and when these agencies establish relations with international counterparts, they sometimes also conclude arrangements or agreement with those counterparts. This brings together two constitutionally problematic issues: the EU’s external action and the limits to the empowerment of EU agencies. This article aims to identify the constitutional and positive law frameworks applying to EU agencies’ external action, and looks at a number of examples. It is shown how the positive law framework does not properly reflect the requirements of EU constitutional law, resulting in legal ambiguity and accountability problems. Some EU agencies seem to go beyond what is allowed under the positive and constitutional law frameworks.

Understanding where (ineffective) organizational rules come from is of vital importance for both public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms that explain why external rules may cause organizational rule breeding and, as a by-product, red tape. Using a combination of archival and interview data, the authors empirically study rule-breeding processes in the case of Gasunie, which is a heavily regulated Dutch gas transport organization. The archival findings indicate that rule stocks have increased substantially over time at every policy level. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that policymakers at different levels are jointly responsible for excessive rule breeding and, ultimately, organizational red tape.

This article investigates the drivers of the parliamentarisation of war powers. Building on recent findings in the study of war deployments, we argue that the existing literature has predominantly focused on parliamentary drivers of parliamentarisation, leaving potential executive interests untouched. To fill this gap, we propose a rational-choice institutionalist based framework for identifying the motivations and strategies of both parliamentary and executive actors in episodes of parliamentarisation. We apply this novel heuristic device to the case of Belgium, and the parliamentary approval of the military interventions in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014-) more in particular. Building upon data from interviews and document analysis, we show that stronger parliamentary involvement in the decision about military deployment is not just the result of increased parliamentary pressure, but equally, and perhaps most importantly, of the willingness and strategy of the executive to seek legitimacy or support. free access to article via: https://academic.oup.com/pa/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pa/gsx081/4797534?guestAccessKey=4e570ea3-0ed9-495d-9a49-acdbb5544ca8 ispartof: Parliamentary Affairs vol:71 issue:3 pages:674-696 status: published

While progress has been made in reducing external nutrient inputs to the Baltic Sea, further actions are needed to meet the goals of the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), especially for the Baltic Proper, Gulf of Finland, and Gulf of Riga sub-basins. We used the net anthropogenic nitrogen and phosphorus inputs (NANI and NAPI, respectively) nutrient accounting approach to construct three scenarios of reduced NANI-NAPI. Reductions assumed that manure nutrients were redistributed from areas with intense animal production to areas that focus on crop production and would otherwise import synthetic and mineral fertilizers. We also used the Simple as Necessary Baltic Long Term Large Scale (SANBALTS) model to compare eutrophication conditions for the scenarios to current and BSAP-target conditions. The scenarios suggest that reducing NANI-NAPI by redistributing manure nutrients, together with improving agronomic practices, could meet 54-82% of the N reductions targets (28-43 kt N reduction) and 38-64% P reduction targets (4-6.6 kt P reduction), depending on scenario. SANBALTS output showed that even partial fulfillment of nutrient reduction targets could have ameliorating effects on eutrophication conditions. Meeting BSAP targets will require addressing additional sources, such as sewage. A common approach to apportioning sources to external nutrients loads could enable further assessment of the feasibility of eutrophication management targets.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a core policy of the European Union (EU), representing 40 per cent of the EU budget and a cornerstone of the integration process. Due to the path dependency that defined its evolution, it had always been a rather homogeneous and centralized policy. For the first time, the 2014–20 reform endowed Member States with the possibility to tailor the direct payments of the CAP along different fields of flexibility and thereby better address their national needs. This article examines these national choices in terms of the discontinuity they impose on the centralized policy model, showing that they reduced the policy inertia associated to the historical processes in place at the EU level, along a new national path dependency re-shaping the CAP implementation. The flexibility introduced by the 2014–20 reform was particularly embraced by Member States that had been penalized by the ‘one-size-fits-all’ historical archetype.

The promise that ecosystem service assessments will contribute to better decision-making is not yet proven. We analyse how knowledge on ecosystem services is actually used to inform land and water management in 22 case studies covering different social-ecological systems in European and Latin American countries. None of the case studies reported instrumental use of knowledge in a sense that ecosystem service knowledge would have served as an impartial arbiter between policy options. Yet, in most cases, there was some evidence of conceptual learning as a result of close interaction between researchers, practitioners and stakeholders. We observed several factors that constrained knowledge uptake, including competing interests and political agendas, scientific disputes, professional norms and competencies, and lack of vertical and horizontal integration. Ecosystem knowledge played a small role particularly in those planning and policy-making situations where it challenged established interests and the current distribution of benefits from ecosystems. The factors that facilitated knowledge use included application of transparent participatory methods, social capital, policy champions and clear synergies between ecosystem services and human well-being. The results are aligned with previous studies which have emphasized the importance of building local capacity, ownership and trust for the long-term success of ecosystem service research. EEA Santa Cruz Fil: Saarikoski, Heli. Finnish Environment Institute; Finlandia Fil: Primmer, Eeva. Finnish Environment Institute; Finlandia Fil: Saarela, Sanna-Riikka. Finnish Environment Institute; Finlandia Fil: Antunes, Paula. Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia. Centre for Environmental and Sustainability Research; Portugal Fil: Baró, Francesc. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institute of Environmental Science and Technology; España. Hospital del Mar Medical Research Institute; España Fil: Berry, Pam. University of Oxford. Environmental Change Institute; Gran Bretaña Fil: Garcia Blanko, Gemma. Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation. Energy and Environment Division. Parque Tecnológico de Bizkaia; España Fil: Gómez-Baggethun, Erik. Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Department of International Environment and Development Studies; Noruega. Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA); Noruega Fil: Carvalho, Lawrence. Center for Ecology and Hydrology; Gran Bretaña Fil: Dick, Jan. Center for Ecology and Hydrology; Gran Bretaña Fil: Dunford, Robert. University of Oxford. Environmental Change Institute; Gran Bretaña. Lancaster Environment Centre. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology; Gran Bretaña Fil: Hanzu, Mihail. Romanian National Institute for Research and Development in Silviculture; Rumania Fil: Harrison, Paula A. Lancaster Environment Centre. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology; Gran Bretaña Fil: Izakovicova, Zita. Slovak Academy of Science. Institute of Landscape Ecology; Eslovaquia Fil: Kertész, Miklós. Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Centre for Ecological Research. Institute of Ecology and Botany; Hungría Fil: Kopperoinen, Leena. Finnish Environment Institute; Finlandia Fil: Köhler, Berit. Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA); Noruega Fil: Langemeyer, Johannes. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institute of Environmental Science and Technology; España. Hospital del Mar Medical Research Institute. Barcelona Lab for Urban Environmental Justice and Sustainability; España Fil: Lapola, David. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Center for Meteorological and Climatic Studies Applied to Agriculture (CEPAGRI); Brasil Fil: Liquete, Camino. Joint Research Centre (JRC). European Commission; Italia Fil: Luque, Sandra. National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture; Francia Fil: Mederly, Peter. Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. Department of Ecology and Environmental Sciences; Eslovaquia Fil: Niemelä, Jari. University of Helsinki. Department of Environmental Sciences; Finlandia Fil: Palomo, Ignacio. University of the Basque Country. Basque Centre for Climate Change; España. Fil: Martínez Pastur, Guillermo José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Austral de Investigaciones Cientificas; Argentina Fil: Peri, Pablo Luis. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Santa Cruz; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de la Patagonia Austral; Argentina. Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica; Argentina Fil: Preda, Elena. University of Bucharest. Research Center in Systems Ecology and Sustainability; Rumania Fil: Priess, Joerg A. Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research; Alemania Fil: Santos, Rui Ferreira Dos. Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia. Centre for Environmental and Sustainability Research; Portugal Fil: Schleyer, Christian. Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt. Institute of Social Ecology; Austria. University of Kassel. Section of International Agricultural Policy and Environmental Governance; Alemania Fil: Turkelboom, Francis. Research Institute for Nature and Forest; Bélgica Fil: Vadineanu, Angheluta. University of Bucharest. Research Center in Systems Ecology and Sustainability; Rumania Fil: Verheyden, Wim. Research Institute for Nature and Forest; Bélgica Fil: Vikström, Suvi. Finnish Environment Institute; Finlandia Fil: Young, Juliette. Center for Ecology and Hydrology; Gran Bretaña Fil: Aszalós, Réka. Institute of Ecology and Botany, MTA Centre for Ecological Research; Hungría

One of the main objectives of EU trade policy is to establish wider protection for its regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). In spite of US opposition, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red line in recent trade agreements. A key piece to the puzzle of this success is that whereas the literature has typically treated trade and non-trade issues as a dichotomy, GI protection encompasses both trade and non-trade aspects. In the EU, trade agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval. Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article develops and tests a theory of GI protection using new data on GIs listed for protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic, cultural and political factors shape and enable EU policy exports through trade agreements.

Many EU Member States are using management plans to ensure the sustainable conservation and management of Natura 2000 sites. The decision about whether to use management plans lies with the Member States. Although management planning systems differ, in most countries the management plan is developed at local level in close consultation with relevant stakeholders. This article explores to what extent national decisions on the management planning system have influenced the content of the local plans. The comparison of French and Dutch Natura 2000 management plans shows that the plans mostly propose conservation measures that can be implemented by individual owners or users of the site and for which funding is available. The individual measures in the French plans reflect the national decision that the management plans should work primarily as a funding tool. The individual measures in the Dutch plans however do not reflect the national decision that management plans should act as a legislative tool to regulate land use activities in and around the site. In the Netherlands, the focus has shifted towards a tool for the coordination of funding. The analysis shows that in both countries the selection of particular measures in the management plans is connected to other policies and funding mechanisms that deal with the problems perceived by involved actors, such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Dutch National Programme for Nitrogen Deposition.

This article explores the conception of law that underlies the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), building on Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a topical example. Joxerramon Bengoetxea’s metaphor of the CJEU being a ‘Dworkinian court’ fails to explain fundamental aspects of the Court’s case law which are incompatible with Dworkin’s theory of law. Instead, the CJEU is committed to an EU legal system which conforms to Joseph Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for legal systems: comprehensiveness, openness and a claim of supremacy. Within this paradigm, the supremacy claim of EU law is in need of demystification because it is inherent to any legal system. Paradoxically, while Opinion 2/13 suggests that the EU should be given special treatment in its accession to the ECHR, the Court’s underlying conception of the EU legal system is essentially mimetic of the typical characteristics of national legal systems. This mimetic nature of the EU legal system entails a dissociation between the political and the legal nature of the EU: while the EU is certainly not a state, its legal system is no different from national legal systems.

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups' activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups' activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.

Over the past 15 years, three new classes of drugs, glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists, dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP-4) inhibitors and sodium glucose cotransporter-2 (SGLT-2) inhibitors have been approved to treat type 2 diabetes based on effects on glycemic control. Although large randomized controlled trials have played an important role in characterizing the efficacy and safety of these agents on a population level, questions remain about how best to individualize therapy and target the "right" medicine to the "right" patient. In contrast, few medicines have been approved to treat diabetic kidney disease and initiatives have been launched on both sides of the Atlantic to facilitate the development of effective personalized medicines for the treatment of diabetic kidney disease. Increasingly, "omics," imaging and other biomarkers will be used to match patients with therapies to which they are likely to respond best. This review addresses regulatory considerations related to precision medicine, draws lessons learned from other therapeutic areas and discusses efforts undertaken by the European (EMA) and United States (FDA) to facilitate the development of such therapies. Moving forward, an integrated approach that makes use of predictive preclinical models, innovative trial designs, observational "real-world" data and novel statistical methodologies will likely be needed to complement inherently smaller RCTs conducted in more selected populations. Patient involvement will also be critical. Regulatory agencies are ready to engage in such approaches.

First published: 27 October 2017 Why do governments include parliamentarians in the delegations to international negotiations? Conduct of the diplomatic negotiations is among the most tightly controlled prerogatives of the executive, and executives have been historically dominant in the conduct of foreign policy. This article draws on the participation of members of parliaments in national delegations to the Review Conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the past 40 years. The emerging patterns show that legitimation through oversight is unlikely to be the reason for participation. Drawing on literature on institutional variation in legislative-executive relations, the data indicate that executives are more interested in co-opting the parliamentarians, in order to make them less opposed to the government's policy. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project

In the 20 years after its introduction, the principal-agent model has seen increasing use to study political processes in virtually all policy domains in which the EU is active. Relaxing the strict assumptions that guided the original economic applications has greatly widened the scope for potential applications. This very phenomenon has also created an existential challenge to the model’s contemporary use, which is combining the reductionist aims of the model (from which it derives its strength) with the complex empirical settings to which it is increasingly applied. To facilitate this balancing exercise, we propose a two-step approach to principal-agent analysis, in which the mapping of the principal-agent proof relation is separated from the effective analysis that examines the reasons, modalities and consequences of delegation and control in the EU. In doing so, we show how the principal-agent model can continue to provide new insights at the various stages of the research process.

Capacity assessment has become a popular measure in the health sector to assess the ability of various stakeholders to pursue agreed activities. The European Commission (EC) is increasingly dealing with a variety of health issues to coordinate and complement national health policies. This study analyses the functional capacity of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) between 1999 and 2004. It applies the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework and uses a literature review, a document review of EU policy documents and expert interviews to assess the capacity of DG SANCO to fulfill its mandate for public health and health systems. Our results suggest that DG SANCO has established capacities to engage with stakeholders; to assess various health issues, to define issue specific health policies and to collect information for evaluative purposes. In contrast, capacities tend to be less established for defining a clear strategy for the overall sector, for setting priorities and for budgeting, managing and implementing policies. We conclude that improvements to the effectiveness of DG SANTE's (the successor of DG SANCO) policies can be made within the existing mandate. A priority setting exercise may be conducted to limit the number of pursued actions to those with the greatest European added value within DG SANTE's responsibilities. (C) 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.