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Henry Purcell's opera, Dido and Aeneas, has a complex history due to a lack of contemporary sources. Robert Shay's new edition of the opera offers a clear and comprehensive understanding of its origins and musical score. Shay examines the earliest documents related to the opera's premiere and explores its revivals from 1700 to 1787. He also analyzes the three primary music manuscripts and makes editorial choices based on their historical significance. Shay's edition provides a clean and accurate representation of the surviving music of Dido and Aeneas. [Extracted from the article]

We estimate the short run effects of Brexit border disruption on the UK economy. We estimate a structural VAR for the UK, where Brexit effects are identified by the dates of Brexit events, the referendum, and the exit from the single market. We find evidence of short run effects of Brexit: temporary effects on GDP, exports and imports (slightly negative), and on inflation and interest rates (slightly positive). These effects are consistent with modest disruption from introducing a border with the EU--a border due to be made barrier-free and seamless by the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Previous work using other countries as comparators is vulnerable to identification difficulties. We also survey earlier modeling work on the long run effects of evolving policies of free trade, UK-sourced regulation, and liberalized immigration. Models of long run trade suggest the emergence of substantial gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Inside the deal: how the EU got Brexit done" is a book that offers a behind-the-scenes view of the Brexit negotiations from the perspective of the European Union. The author, a former senior advisor to Michel Barnier, the EU's chief negotiator, highlights the challenges and complexities faced by both sides during the four-year negotiation period. The book contrasts the composed and rational approach of the EU with the erratic and emotional approach of the British negotiators. It also explores the enhanced unity within the EU following the UK referendum and debunks misconceptions about the EU's stance and negotiating approach. The author concludes that the outcome of the negotiations was unexpected. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the importance of breadth in teaching and research in the field of modern British history. The author emphasizes the value of interdisciplinary approaches and the need for researchers to have a strong understanding of both Britain and the wider world. The article also highlights the importance of research skills in navigating breadth and encourages a pluralistic approach to teaching and research. The author argues that a broader understanding of history can lead to a deeper understanding of modern Britain and its relationship with the world. [Extracted from the article]

In recent years, we have witnessed a significant turn towards commercial protectionism as a response to what some perceive as clear discontent provoked by the current process of globalization. Our work will focus on two of the most emblematic events symbolizing this trend: the presidency of Donald J. Trump (2017-2021) in the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. Trump marked a turning point in U.S. trade policy, advocating an "America First" approach that included imposing tariffs and renegotiating international trade agreements. On the other hand, the 2016 Brexit referendum and the subsequent UK's departure from the European Union in 2020 represented a paradigmatic case of regional protectionism. Therefore, we will explore how Brexit affected trade relations between the UK and the EU, as well as its position on the international stage. Along these lines, we will discuss the broader implications of these two dynamics in the context of the globalization crisis: Do these movements pose a sustainable challenge to the existing global economic order, or are they temporary responses to specific issues? What lessons can be drawn from these experiences for the future management of trade conflicts?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to study the evolution of Britain's involvement in the EU's foreign and security policy in order to highlight the reasons that led the issue to be left out of talks on the post-Brexit future relation. The paper argues Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation largely depends on the degree of politicisation of issues both in the EU, the EU-27 and in the UK. As long as foreign and security issues remained relatively low key, the UK was able to enjoy the magnifying effect of its participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and contributed to the decision-making process in order to successfully influence EU policies. Politicisation of foreign and security issues was due both to developments in EU-led or national initiatives and to the reaction they provoked in the UK. The EU insisted the UK was to be considered as a 'third country' and stressed the need for future cooperation to be institutionalised. On the contrary, in the UK, public distrust against a putative European 'super state', led successive governments to avoid any formal commitment to new EU initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has seen the United Kingdom (UK) abandon membership of and formal influence over policy making in the EU and pursue a policy of disintegration from and minimal commitments towards the EU. Although the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement is strikingly lacking in ambition, it does involve a dense and complex institutional framework to manage relations. Moreover, the post‐Brexit UK–EU relationship includes a unique set of arrangements that keep Northern Ireland in the EU's customs territory and internal market for goods. These arrangements involve dynamic regulatory alignment and are managed by a dedicated institutional set‐up that has the potential at least to provide the UK 'in respect of Northern Ireland' with a particular decision‐shaping role with regard to applicable areas of the EU acquis. This article considers the initial operation of these sets of institutional frameworks and their potential for UK influence over the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 23 June 2016, a referendum was held in the United Kingdom (UK) to decide whether the country should leave or remain a member of the European Union (EU). The 'Leave' vote won by 52 per cent to 48 per cent of voters, leading to the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement that came into force in 2020 and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement that came into force in 2021. Brexit is not exclusively a European matter; it affects third parties as well. In this article we examine the presence of Japanese affiliates in Europe during 2000–21 by analysing data obtained from the Toyo Keizai's Overseas Japanese Companies database. While the UK has been a major beneficiary of Japanese investments in Europe, its share of Japanese affiliates in Europe has decreased, especially during 2000–10. Brexit has had no negative impact on direct employment created by Japanese affiliates in the UK in the short term, but its impact in the long term could be exacerbated by any further policy divergence between the UK and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effect of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the United Kingdom and the EU in December 2020 on UK–EU trade in goods up to December 2021. The 2016 referendum introduced uncertainty, but new trade barriers between the United Kingdom and the EU were not put in place until the new agreement, the TCA, entered into force in January 2021. Using a set of different econometric techniques, and looking up to the end of the first year of the implementation of the TCA, we find no evidence that the 2016 referendum had any impact on aggregate UK–EU trade relative to comparator trade flows. On the other hand, our results show that the TCA reduced UK trade with the EU, but asymmetrically for exports and imports. After a sharp drop of around 41% in January 2021, UK exports to the EU quickly recovered in the following months. This pattern of recovery was not the case for UK imports from the EU, which were negatively impacted throughout 2021, with a cumulative loss over the first year of implementation between −24% and −28%. Asymmetric effects between exports and imports do not appear to be driven by difference in product composition of the two flows. Instead, we find evidence that a plausible explanation for these differential effects is the relative importance of the EU market for UK firms, in comparison to the importance of the UK market for EU firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Europarecht (05312485) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The latter Bill seeks to sunset all remaining EU law in operation in the UK by the end of 2023, as an extension of the idea that the UK is no longer a Member State. The compromise reached in the 2020 Withdrawal Agreement's Northern Ireland Protocol was that the region would remain inside the EU's single market, while all sides worked to minimise checks for trade with the rest of the UK. The unveiling in February 2023 of the Windsor Framework marked an important (and positive) step in the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU). [Extracted from the article]

The United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union was supposed to be definitively settled several times during the past decade - yet it was not. The 2016 referendum brought about a surge in interest in legal questions, especially of EU law and international economic law. This presented scholars with a questionable gift: on the one hand, countless new opportunities for research, publications, and public visibility; on the other, the curse of chasing a rapidly and at times erratically moving target. Therefore, this essay reflects on the continued relevance of Brexit scholarship and different strategies for extending its shelf-life. It argues that the relevance of this scholarship may indeed extend into the future when foresighted and innovative approaches are being put forward. Looking ahead, the essay observes that the Windsor Framework to overhaul the Northern Ireland Protocol likely marks the end point of the frenzied and fraught EU-UK relationship between 2016 and 2023. The essay concludes that, while disagreements will continue, the EU-UK relationship as a topic is entering a period of normalization. Rigorous legal and innovative interdisciplinary scholarship will remain necessary both to develop EU-UK relations as a sub-topic of its own and to embed it into wider discourses of EU and international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northern Ireland hardly featured as an issue in the historic 2016 Brexit referendum campaign in the UK. Subsequently, however, it became the main zone of contention between the EU and UK. This article examines Northern Ireland's experience since the Brexit vote through the theoretical lens of liminality. It does so, specifically, by focusing on the three strands of relationships at the heart of Northern Ireland's 1998 peace agreement, and how Brexit impacted on each of these relationships. It argues that Brexit proved profoundly unsettling to the existing political order and triggered significant angst and fear in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is the start of a new relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU). As the consequences of Brexit unfold, there will be pressure to change the TCA, either in a "softer" or "harder" direction. To determine the potential medium-term direction of the EU–UK relationship, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with a sample of British voters, where we asked them to choose between different hypothetical package deals. When faced with such choices, British citizens overall mostly support a softer relationship in which the UK applies EU regulatory standards in return for greater access to the single market. However, Leave voters most often support a much harder trade-off of full regulatory sovereignty but continued restrictions on UK exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is the largest natural gas supplier to the European Union (EU). The invasion of Ukraine was followed by a cutoff of gas supplies from Russia to many EU countries, and the EU is planning to ban or drastically reduce its dependence on Russia. We provide a dataset of daily gas consumption in five sectors (household and public building heating, power, industry, and other sectors) with supply source shares in the EU27 (27 EU member countries) and UK from 2016 to 2022. The datasets are available at Zenodo platform: 10.5281/zenodo.7549233 (Zhou et al., 2022). The dataset separates the contributions of Russian imports, liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, and other supply sources to both direct supply and storage supply for gas consumption estimations. The dataset was developed with a gas network flow simulation model based on mass flow balance by combining data from multiple datasets including daily ENTSOG (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas) pipeline gas transport and storage, ENTSOE (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) daily power production from gas, and Eurostat monthly gas consumption statistics per sector. The annual consumption data were validated against the BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Eurostat datasets. We secondly analyzed the share of gas supplied by Russia in each country to quantify the "gap" that would result from a cessation of all Russian exports to Europe. Thirdly, we collected multiple data sources to assess how national gaps could be alleviated by (1) reducing the demand for heating in a plausible way using the lower envelope of gas empirical consumption – temperature functions, (2) increasing power generation from sources other than gas, (3) transferring gas savings from countries with surplus to those with deficits, and (4) increasing imports from other countries like Norway, the USA, Australia, and northern African countries from either pipelines or LNG imports, accounting for existing capacities. Our results indicate that it should be theoretically possible for the EU to collectively make up for a sudden shortfall of Russian gas by combining the four solutions together, provided a perfect collaboration between EU countries and the UK to redistribute gas from countries with surplus to those with deficits. Further analyses are required to investigate the implications with respect to the costs, including social, economic, and institutional dimensions; political barriers; and negative impacts on climate policies, with inevitable increases in CO2 emissions if the use of coal is ramped up in the power sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ways in which third countries can engage with, and respond to, European Union policy-making processes. A novel analytical framework based on the concept of network resilience which consists of an institutional, political and policy dimension is operationalised to understand third country access to European Union policy-making. Empirically, the article examines the experiences of three non-European Union countries, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Norway in the context of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. The article concludes by presenting a research agenda based on an in-depth analysis of network resilience and reflects on what the findings mean for future research, particularly within the context of understanding the development of UK–EU post-Brexit relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluating supply chain system improvements and international economic integration patterns to changes in expenditure requires urgent attention from short to long-term supply chain disruption review. Following the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, the UK and the global economies have been affected. Brexit has affected sectors that rely on cross-border commerce with EU countries, while services that require face-to-face interaction have been negatively impacted by Covid 19. For example, the Roll on Roll off (RoRo) ferry sector has suffered tremendously from the Covid 19 pandemic, which restricts people's travel, and Brexit, which results in the UK having a geographical barrier with the rest of the EU continent. The study examines the ferry RoRo market, maritime links, and its viability in the face of Brexit and the Covid issue between the United Kingdom and short-sea shipping connections with Ireland and continental Europe. Understanding the market is critical since roll-on roll-off (Ro-Ro) traffic plays a significant part in the movement of products between the UK and the EU. Adopting a method mapping provided a defined research paradigm for this study. Mixed-method design technique, a branch of multiple methods research, was employed, resulting in a better understanding of the research topic. The findings demonstrate that nations and the RoRo freight supply chain network have been significantly impacted. However, continuous measures are implemented to ensure continuous freight movement. The study obtained data from 14 respondents and was statistically analysed. The results demonstrate that an organisation's capacity to manage these disturbances significantly impacts its survivability. It also indicates that the government's awareness of the implications of Brexit and Covid 19 significantly determines the impact on organisations. This research concludes that the impact on organisations is minimal, notwithstanding the effects of Brexit and Covid. However, owing to uncertainties, continuous methods for continuous freight transit should be implemented, together with an adequate flow of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to examine the new cooperation model accepted between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom after Brexit to Turkey-EU relations, applicability through the modernization of the Customs Union. Two basic questions are asked in this study. The first one is "What were the effects of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed between the EU and the UK after Brexit on the imports and exports of the parties?" Secondly, "Can the Customs Union Decision accepted between Turkey and the EU in 1996, which had a negative impact on Turkish exporters and businesses, be transformed into the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed between the EU and the United Kingdom?" Basically, mixed (qualitative-quantitative) research method is used in the study and an evaluation is made on secondary data. In this context, with the modernization of the Customs Union within the scope of the "Trade and Cooperation Agreement", it is estimated that Turkey's exports to the EU from 41% to 70%, and its imports from the EU will increase from 31% to 40%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The TCA (EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement) establishes a very comprehensive institutional framework with Partnership Council and diverse Committees having partly substantial decision-making powers for the development of the TCA. These considerable public functions prompt legitimacy concerns as to their democratic control, which this article explores in detail. It will be shown that the exercise of public powers by TCA treaty bodies meets with a sobering legal situation regarding democratic control mechanisms over treaty body decision-making at different levels. Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the legal and legitimate transfer of powers requires additional safeguards as to their democratic legitimacy. Solutions for better control of treaty body decisions by parliaments must be developed at several levels simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the UK left the EU internal market and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) started to be applied in the mutual trade between the UK and the EU. Although under this agreement trade without tariffs and quantitative restrictions has been maintained, costs in mutual trade increased due to introducing non-tariff barriers to trade. The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether these changes led in the short term to the diversion of trade flows towards other trading partners from both the EU and the UK points of view. To meet this goal, an analysis of trade flows was carried out from the point of view of the EU, as well as the UK. In the case of the EU, changes in trade with the UK were compared with changes in trade with the remaining countries of the world. In the case of the UK, changes in trade with the EU were compared with changes in trade with the rest of the world. The main finding is that since the TCA started to be applied, neither from the point of view of the UK nor from the point of view of the EU, there has been a diversion of trade to other trading partners. Thanks to the TCA, which goes beyond traditional free trade agreements, it was possible to avert the expected negative trade effects of the UK's withdrawal from the EU in the short term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the idea that 'Brexit means Brexit', the article demonstrates that, in spite of leaving the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the UK is not automatically seeking to distance itself from the EU's activities and approaches to these policy fields. Using the concepts of disengagement, continued engagement and re-engagement and drawing from historical institutionalism, the article further clarifies that present and future trajectories of UK positions in respect of the EU action are conditioned by a path dependence created by the evolution of UK opt-ins and opt-outs in this field, by the politicisation of the Brexit negotiations in the context of the UK–EU relations and by domestic UK politics. We explore this argument across three policy areas: (1) police and judicial cooperation, (2) immigration, borders and asylum, and (3) cybersecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Brexit's promise of restoring UK sovereignty and retrieving regulatory autonomy from the EU from the perspective of the UK Parliament. It argues that while the prospects of post-Brexit regulatory alignment remain high, they are to some extent counterbalanced by those of targeted divergence. A twofold argument is put forward to demonstrate this. The first argument builds on the literature on the Brussels effect and argues that the strength of economic interdependence between the UK and the EU and the size and influence of the latter's market generate significant pressures for UK regulatory alignment with EU standards. This is demonstrated through a qualitative empirical examination of the contents of UK parliamentary scrutiny of the projected impact of Brexit on the key UK export industry sectors: automotive, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and financial services. It is shown that select committees in both Houses of Parliament, including the Eurosceptic ones, have consistently advocated close alignment with EU regulatory standards across the export-intensive economic sectors. As such, these findings relativise the prospects of taking back control to the extent that the substance of Westminster's post-Brexit legislative activity may continue to be significantly influenced by EU regulation and policy. This is reinforced by the sanctioning mechanism foreseen in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the economic benefits of adhering to the EU's adequacy and equivalence regimes. These factors therefore facilitate the future Europeanisation of UK law after Brexit. The second argument nuances the first argument by showing that UK legislative and regulatory divergence is not an abstract possibility, but rather a political reality grounded in strong government majority following the 2019 election, the scrutiny approaches that favour assessment of regulatory impacts, and the UK's willingness to take unilateral action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A primary goal of Brexit supporters was the end of EU supervision of UK laws and the re-establishment of full UK sovereignty over all aspects of its legislative and administrative capacity. National sovereignty may, however, be compromised by international treaties in which the UK agrees to constrain the exercise of its sovereignty to gain benefits from its treaty partners and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement governing the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and EU is no exception. In particular, the Agreement appeared to impose four constraints on UK sovereignty in respect of its income tax system. A closer examination of the restrictive articles, however, suggests that three of the measures may have negligible practical impact on UK law-making powers. In contrast, the fourth measure preventing the UK from adopting concessionary tax measures that would amount to ‘state aid’ in EU terminology appears to have a direct impact on UK tax sovereignty. Its impact may be blunted, however, from seemingly incomplete or ineffective enforcement remedies. The final result may be a treaty that appears to constrain UK tax sovereignty and provides the EU with continuing authority to monitor UK tax law and administration, but which has little scope for practical impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Northern Ireland Protocol creates this East-West divide by providing for the continued application of many EU rules in Northern Ireland - but not in the rest of the UK. 24 'EU-UK relations: solutions found to help implementation of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland' European Commission (30 June 2021) < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP%5f21%5f3324> accessed 12 October 2022. For all the difficulties Brexit has created, those concerning Northern Ireland are agreed to be "significant and unique".[6] Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK which has, as a result of Brexit, acquired a land border with an EU member state. 1. The terms of the UK's withdrawal from the EU were agreed on 17 October 2019. [Extracted from the article]

This article seeks to map the evolution of intra-party dissent over Brexit in the parliamentary Conservative Party between July 2016 and January 2020. It shows that dissent was primarily due to the relentless intra-party disputes over the fact that the Conservative Government failed to deliver Brexit during Theresa May's premiership. Brexit could not have been settled if Boris Johnson had not managed to reunite the party through the 2019 general election. This article gauges the intensity of intra-party dissent by drawing on three representative indicators, including the number of Conservative MPs quitting the party, the number of ministerial resignations and parliamentary voting records of the Conservative MPs over Brexit. Three dominant factional groups, namely hard Brexiteers, soft Brexiteers and Bremainers, competed to shape the government's handling of Brexit. They diverged over issues of sovereignty, economic implication of Brexit, and the UK–EU future relationship. The research also finds that the hard Brexiteers and the Bremainers appeared less compromising over Brexit, while the soft Brexiteers with a pragmatic mindset were relatively flexible and ready for concessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Northern Ireland left the EU with the rest of the UK, it remained de facto in the EU's customs union and single market for goods. The Protocol The alternative negotiated by David Frost, on behalf of Prime Minister Johnson in October 2019, was the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland as part of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement. Graph: © CLODAGH KILCOYNE / Alamy Stock Photo Northern Ireland has been the defining issue in post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU. [Extracted from the article]

Russia is the largest natural gas supplier to the EU. The invasion of Ukraine was followed by a cut-off of gas supplies from Russia to many EU countries, and the EU is planning to ban or dramatically reduce its dependence from Russia. We provide a dataset of daily gas consumption in five sectors (household and public buildings heating, power, industry, and other sectors) with supply source shares in the EU27 & UK from 2016 to 2022. The dataset separates the contributions of Russian gas imports, and other supply sources, and accounts for storage to estimate consumption. The dataset was developed with a gas network flow simulation model based on mass flow balance by combining data from multiple datasets including daily ENTSO-G pipelines gas transport and storage, ENTSO-E daily power production from gas, and Eurostat monthly gas consumption statistics per sector. The annual consumption data was validated against BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Eurostat datasets. We secondly analysed the share of gas supplied by Russia in each country to quantify the 'gap' that would result from a cessation of all Russian exports to Europe. Thirdly, we collected multiple data sources to assess how national gaps could be alleviated by 1) reducing the demand for heating in a plausible way using the lower envelope of gas empirical consumption - temperature functions, 2) increasing power generation from sources other than gas, 3) transferring gas savings from countries with surplus to those with deficits, and 4) increasing imports from other countries like Norway, the US, and Australia from either pipelines or LNG imports, accounting for existing capacities. Our results indicate that it should be theoretically possible for the EU to make up collectively for a sudden shortfall of Russian gas if combining the four solutions together, provided a perfect collaboration between EU countries and with the UK to redistribute gas from countries with surplus to those with deficits. Further analyses are required to investigate the implications for the costs including social, economic, and institutional dimensions, political barriers, and negative impacts on climate policies with inevitable increases of CO2 emissions if the use of coal is ramped up in the power sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Beyond Great Britain, Brexit could also have ripple effects on the electricity systems of certain other EU member states. This paper investigates the possible effects of reduced growth in interconnectivity between Great Britain and mainland Europe by 2030 on the electricity system in GB and across other EU member states in addition to the effects of Pound depreciation. Effects are analyzed across a "Green Scenario" and "Blue Scenario" in 2030, based on the ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators-Electricity) 10-year development plans. There is a greater expansion of nuclear and renewables in Green than in Blue and, in Blue, the British CO2 price is higher than in the EU. Within each scenario, there are four variants: full vs. reduced expansion of interconnection capacity, in combination with no devaluation and 10% depreciation of the British Pound. The EMME (Electricity Market Model for Europe) is used to model these impacts across the different scenario variants. Results: Interconnector utilization is more volatile in the Green Scenario variants, leading to concerns about investor incentives, especially given the increased uncertainty under Brexit. In terms of electricity prices, GB consumers lose out across both Blue and Green scenario variants, whereas EU and GB producers both gain and lose in different variants. Across the Green Scenario variants, EU neighbors' trade balances with GB deteriorate slightly, but the impact is far stronger in Blue due to a loss of opportunities to export power. GB sees significant increases in electricity costs across scenario variants. Green scenario variants offer potential for modest emission reductions in certain EU nations, whereas Blue Scenario variants lead to greater emission reductions in the EU neighbors which contrasts with a sharp rise in GB emissions. Conclusions: There is a significant link between NTC expansion and wholesale prices. Delayed or cancelled NTC expansion could negatively affect the GB power system's low-carbon transition. Pound depreciation and reduced expansion of NTCs lead to shifts in generation-related CO2 emissions. A higher cost burden for electricity is a risk for GB, whereas, for EU neighbors, their trade position with the UK risks deteriorating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2022 witnessed significant changes to the region's political balance. For the first time, a nationalist party became the largest, with Sinn Féin's new leading position allowing the party to provide the First Minister. The main party of unionism, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was relegated to second place. This runner-up position entitled the party to nominate the Deputy First Minister. However, in the immediate aftermath of the election, the DUP declined to do so, amid a crisis for the political institutions established under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. According to the DUP, it would return to power sharing with nationalists only upon removal of the European Union Protocol, agreed between the EU and UK government in 2019. The Protocol uniquely aligns Northern Ireland with EU rules and requires checks on goods travelling between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Alongside unionist versus nationalist rivalries, however, the election was also marked by the best-ever performance by a party of the centre ground subscribing to neither ideology, as Alliance more than doubled its Assembly seat tally. It was now possible to speak of three big pillars in Northern Irish politics: unionist, nationalist and non-aligned, each dominated by a single party. This article examines what happened at the election, assessing the key issues and party fortunes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of preferential trade agreements, Rules of Origin have attracted negative attention for their propensity to serve protectionist objectives. Against this background, the author seeks to shed light on several conceptual and practical challenges in connection with the Rules of Origin negotiated in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The discussion proceeds from two basic propositions: first, the Rules of Origin included in this agreement resemble, in essential terms, those included in other modern EU trade agreements with advanced-economy partners; and second, preferential Rules of Origin, such as those agreed between the EU and the UK, embody the outcome of reconciling the divergent interests of import-competing and export industries by the negotiating partners. The author has identified and analysed the following specific challenges posed by the Rules of Origin in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: (1) limited possibilities for origin cumulation; (2) protectionist potential of transitional origin requirements and origin quotas; (3) trade-hindering effect with respect to Northern Ireland; and (4) chilling effect of the potential review of inward processing schemes on trade. Based on the analysis conducted, the author concludes that these challenges negatively affect trade because they operate to foreclose the expansion of legitimate trade opportunities under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Footnotes 1 Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (signed 24 January 2020, entered into force 1 February 2020) (Withdrawal Agreement). The Withdrawal Agreement sets out the terms on which the United Kingdom left the European Union on 1 February 2020. The UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement: A Commentary, edited by Manuel Kellerbauer, Eugenia Dumitriu-Segnana, and Thomas Liefländer. [Extracted from the article]

Joint Institutional Frameworks governing the EU's relations with third countries often fail to address important issues of sectoral governance. Non‐EU countries benefit from access to EU sectoral bodies, but this is limited, and alternative avenues of co‐operation are therefore needed. This article contributes to existing research on EU bilateral relations, which has thus far not paid sufficient attention to the external face of sectoral governance. The qualitative case comparison studies the well‐established, yet increasingly politicized bilateral co‐operation with Switzerland in order to draw insights for UK–EU relations, and contrasts two strategically important areas of market integration, namely electricity and financial markets. The findings show that politicization and (external) disintegration have repercussions for allegedly 'technical' areas of co‐operation where formalized requirements for EU sectoral bodies, public and private, become more stringent and less permissive to accommodate informal modes of co‐operation that in the past facilitated external participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inthis review, I reflect on first-hand accounts from both sides of the Brexit negotiations, as well as academic work on the past, present, and future of the Ireland/Northern Ireland border and the UK–EU relationship. What emerges is a key question: if the dispute around the future of the border can be resolved through additional forms of UK–EU integration and co-operation, then a new settlement short of membership can be imagined; if the Protocol collapses, then a series of further destabilisations are inevitable. Either way, the two deals agreed between the UK and the EU in 2019 and 2020 mark just the next stage in the Brexit process rather than a new equilibrium in UK–EU relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit has brought tensions in European and (especially) British politics. This article illustrates the rationale, scope and research questions of the special issue, which investigates the first Brexit effects in the five years following the 2016 referendum. Taking the distribution of political power as our primary focus and analysing mainly – though not exclusively – British politics, we trace the first developments in the three domains of politics, polity and policy since the UK's decision to leave the EU. In the politics domain, after the political uncertainties surrounding the referendum period, we detect a return to the power-hoarding dynamics typical of the Westminster model. However, the territorial and constitutional architectures of the British polity are under considerable strain, with Brexit strengthening the nationalistic movements in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the policy domain, despite strong common interests, Brexit has failed to produce cooperative EU–UK arrangements in finance and foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have significant incentives for close collaboration in foreign, security and defence policies, given their shared strategic interests, the clear potential for efficiency savings in working together, and the intensity of prior working relations. That the recently negotiated EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains no provisions in this area is thus puzzling for followers of European security, who predicted prompt agreement, and for theories of international cooperation, which emphasise the importance of shared threats, absolute gains and prior interaction. We argue the failure to reach such an agreement stemmed from the politics of the withdrawal process itself, which resulted in acute problems of institutional selectivity, negotiating dynamics that polarised the relationship, institutional change that made an agreement less likely, and distributional scrabbling to supplant the UK. Our findings show that the dynamics of moving away from existing forms of cooperation are highly distinct from those motivating cooperation in normal times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extraordinary mission of Lord Fauconberg to some of the Italian states in 1669–1671 took place at a pivotal moment in early modern diplomatic relations, and is a most evocative case-study of the relationship between Restoration England and Europe in the last decades of the seventeenth century. This article will provide a close analysis of the mission and its protagonists, aiming to re-evaluate English diplomacy through cross-referencing English and Italian documentary evidence, but with a special attention to the Italian side of the story. By analysing how the Republic of Venice and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany—the major Italian trade partners of England––perceived and interpreted English trade policy, it provides an original analysis of Caroline diplomacy and trade in the early Restoration era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement as a 'flexible and imaginative' response to the problems that Brexit has created for the island of Ireland. It looks at the purpose of the Protocol and its origins, noting the reasons why flexibility was required from both sides. It then considers the ways in which precariousness from its conception has been demonstrated in its first year of operation. This focuses upon four main areas: implementation, dynamic alignment, the democratic consent vote, and the UK–EU relationship. Its core argument is the 'flexibility' that the Protocol requires also means a certain degree of ambiguity. In the absence of a stable UK–EU relationship, this precariousness could exacerbate the difficulties of meeting the policy challenges that surround the Protocol for Northern Ireland, the UK, Ireland and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The initial stage of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout has been slow-moving and marred by supply disruptions in the EU. These problems have triggered severe criticism toward the institutions and highlighted a stark contrast compared to Britain's vaccination campaign, which, at the beginning of 2021, was one of the fastest in the continent. In the ensuing debate between the EU and the UK on their uneven vaccination rates, the Brexit argument has been repeatedly invoked: Some political commentators have argued that the reason why COVID-19 vaccination campaign could run so smoothly in Britain is that the country was not held back by the EU's slow approval process. This paper observes the way in which Britain emphasized its blistering vaccination pace to deflect criticism against Brexit. From a discursive perspective, Britain's vaccine success was used to vindicate the Brexit project, providing a new argument in favour of its indispensable and timely nature. At the other end of a binary rhetoric, the EU officials attempted to shatter confidence in the 'British vaccine', while also depositing blame on other factors triggering the EU's delay, such as the shortage of pharmaceutical supplies. The analytical part of this paper foregrounds strategies of discursive legitimation to observe how, and to what extent, the Brexit debate is being reshaped in UK and EU media by looking at a corpus of political tweets. The rhetorical strategies adopted by UK political leaders and EU officials to (de)legitimise national and supranational choices with reference to the COVID-19 vaccination campaign are observed through the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis as it embraces the idea that discursive acts are in dialectical relation to the social and institutional structures in which they are framed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the triangle of relations between major EU powers, the relationship between Germany and the UK remains historically under-examined. Its implications for the future of European defence cooperation are, however, vital and gradually more decisive. The article examines indices on the direction of this relationship to model the shape and impact of this missing link among the more thoroughly investigated relations of Germany-France and UK-France. As both the UK and Germany were forced to formulate clear positions during the Brexit process, their pronounced interactions offer a unique insight into the development of their bilateral defence cooperation, both present and future, and its impact on multilateral UK-EU defence relations. The central question that arises is whether sufficient progress has been made towards a stronger bilateral defence relationship between these two actors to warrant the designation of a trend towards new bilateralism. The article explores this within three major sectors: (1) official defence cooperation; (2) military cooperation; (3) defence industrial cooperation and finds that overtures and initiatives launched in the examined period are insufficient to alter the relationship toward new bilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]