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This article discusses why EU economic (competition and internal market) law is hospitable to and can be enriched by socio-legal and critical insights about the instability of the economic/non-economic distinction, the unavoidable plurality of market arrangements as shaped by legal regulation, as well as the distributive effects of the said arrangements. The proneness of EU economic law to critical insights can be ascribed to: its subject matter, as law in this area maps upon everyday market experiences; the casuistic development of EU law; the wide scope of EU economic law, which interferes with arrangements understood as non-economic; the non-outcome-determinative character of EU law. Through discussion of two CJEU decisions - a competition decision dealing with selective distribution (Coty) and an internal market decision on the regulation of AirBnb (Cali Apartments) - I illustrate how more explicit deployments of socio-legal and critical approaches can enrich EU economic law and specifically its teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In U.S. antitrust, a level of implied immunity is afforded to matters governed by sector regulation, often referred to as the "Trinko-doctrine." In contrast, no such immunity is assumed in European Union competition law, where by contrast, there is only a very narrow regulatory defence if laws mandate a specific (anti-competitive) course of action. As always, matters are more nuanced in practice. Not only did the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Union's highest legal authority, recently suggest an obligation to halt competition law investigation if sector regulations are available, this has tacitly been practiced for years, indicating a more complex relationship and a possible European Union Trinko-doctrine. Following the adoption of the EU's Digital Market Act, this has relevance beyond the traditional regulated sector, warranting some considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional, price-focused antitrust tools for assessing dominance under Article 102 TFEU and merger control are challenged by the business models and features of multisided digital platforms. This article demonstrates the importance of data in digital markets and how data enable the utilization of network effects and economies of scale in a manner that challenges the traditional dominance evaluation. Based on this, the article systematizes the solutions to the challenges caused by decreased accuracy of price-based tools through an analysis of various approaches to the issue. It is argued that potential competition should be emphasized more strongly throughout the dominance assessment and that different approaches can be chosen based on the case at hand. Thus the article contributes to the development of the dominance analysis for digital markets with a thorough overview of possible solutions and ties it to the proposed renewal of the Market Definition Notice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Super League case has been widely discussed by EU regulators, football associations, clubs, players, supporters and legal practitioners. This article intends to explore the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice regarding the intervention of EU competition law in football governance in this case. This article accordingly analyses the interpretation of the rules and exemptions stipulated in Articles 101 (1) and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and gives comments on the antitrust assessment by the Court of Justice regarding the common rules of prior approval and sanctions. It follows that the Court of Justice stressed the importance of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory procedures in the rule-making of football associations and saw this as a significant condition for the enforcement of EU competition law and antitrust exemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the right to access one's file in competition proceedings, as part of the right to fair trial provided by European legal instruments, in relation to limitations of this access imposed by competition legislation in the European Union (EU) and Western Balkan (WB) countries. Pursuant to their aspirations to become Member States in the EU, they must align their legislation with the EU's Acquis while ensuring the protection of rights, as established by the ECHR. The methodology used to answer the research question combines desk review and two-level comparative study methodologies. The desk review is applied in this paper to answer the research question, focusing on a careful examination of the EU legal framework, while comparative approach, seeks to identify similarities and differences in the provisions related to the right to access the competition file in the EU, Albania, and other WB countries such as Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro. Additionally, the study presents the interpretations of the right to access the file, as part of the administrative and/or trial proceedings in the case law of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights from a human rights perspective. The findings of this study indicate that the right to access the file is restricted by public enforcement of competition law, only in specific cases where limitation pursues a legitimate aim, is proportionate and does not jeopardise the party's situation. The European human rights instruments mandate that the EU institutions, Member States and Candidate Member States must carefully regulate the clash between human rights and competition law. The WB countries have adopted the EU standards regulating access to the competition file. However, each jurisdiction has its own specifications, challenges and domestic factors shaping the national rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreement abounds on what exactly constitutes an 'abuse' within article 102 TFEU, EU competition law's prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. This situation is highly undesirable, given the important role this prohibition is expected to play in alleviating concerns about substantial market power and its use in important sectors, typified by actions against 'Big Tech'. This article responds to this problem by analysing and synthesising the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its evolution to establish the constituent elements of an exclusionary 'abuse'. The article corrects crucial legal misconceptions, including the putative dichotomy between violations 'by object' and 'by effect'; the assumed disparate legal tests for pricing and non-pricing conduct; and the lost distinction between the 'as efficient competitor test' and the 'as efficient competitor standard'. This critical inquiry allows one to draw concrete predictions on the future development of this challenging, yet vital, area of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the judgment of the Court of Justice and especially the Opinion of the Advocate General in the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide case, arbitration agreements on disputes concerning damages for infringements of the competition rules of the TFEU have been interpreted as being contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law by making the non-application of the competition rules more likely. Moreover, standard arbitration agreements, which are concluded ex ante (before the dispute arises) and delimit their objective scope in generic terms (referring, in one formulation or another, to any dispute arising out of or related to a specific contract), only cover disputes over contractual damages, but not those relating to damages in tort caused by a party’s participation in a cartel. Therefore, national judges should not decline jurisdiction over the standard arbitration agreements proposed by the main international arbitral institutions, making it impossible for arbitration to become a viable means of resolving disputes arising from cartel damages. However, although the principle of effectiveness limits the procedural autonomy of the Member States as regards the remedies for exercising the right to claim compensation for such damages, it does not prevent the holder from voluntarily waiving the right to exercise it before a court and submitting the dispute to arbitration. Moreover, in the absence of harmonization by EU law of the rules on commercial arbitration, any question relating to the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement is governed by the law of each Member State. Therefore, a standard arbitration clause may also cover disputes relating to non-contractual liability incurred by a contracting party as a result of its participation in an unlawful cartel if this was the will of the parties when concluding the contract, as interpreted by national courts or arbitrators in accordance with the law applicable to the dispute.

Combining historical, conceptual, and empirical approaches, this article studies one of the most fundamental, yet underexplored, questions surrounding Regulation 1/2003: What limits European Union (EU) competition law places on the adoption and application of national competition and other laws? The relationship between EU competition and national laws was supposedly settled with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. There are two exceptions to the rule in Article 3(1), under which national competition authorities and courts must apply EU competition law when applying their national competition laws, with primacy for EU provisions: Article 3(2) leaves room for 'stricter' national competition rules on unilateral conduct, and Article 3(3) for national rules pursuing a 'predominantly different objective'. The solution offered by Article 3 is not workable. Through a historical study of the political discussions preceding Article 3's adoption, a conceptual analysis of potential interpretations, and a systematic content analysis of French and German practice, this article reveals the lack of a dividing line between the notions of national competition laws and other laws. It calls for reform of Article 3 to ensure that conduct that should be governed by EU law is not assessed under national rules and standards that differ from one Member State to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of digitalization has bolstered the dominance of certain enterprises that hold sway over entire ecosystems, creating significant barriers for potential competitors to penetrate. To address these concerns and foster fair competition within the internal market, the European Union has enacted a regulation aimed at ensuring accessibility and fairness in the digital sector, particularly for both business users and end users of core platform services. This regulation diverges from traditional approach by streamlining procedures to tackle potential anti-competitive practices, with specific provisions tailored for platforms identified as gatekeepers. The objective is to supplement existing competition rules and address previously overlooked scenarios, drawing insights from past competition cases and challenges. Special emphasis will be placed on analyzing specific obligations to promote a competitive and equitable digital market. These obligations reflect precedents from familiar cases and are structured on a case-by-case basis to a varying extent. However, clarification will be necessary regarding the black and grey lists to facilitate regulators and undertakings in implementing the regulation effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should companies that have been fined for EU antitrust infringements be allowed to recover such fines from their (former) directors or employees? On the basis of an analysis of the EU Treaty provisions, legislation and case law on antitrust fines, as well as of the economic nature of antitrust infringements and the economic rationale of fines on undertakings/companies, this paper argues that it would appear contrary to EU law to allow undertakings/companies that have been fined by the European Commission or by a national competition authority(NCA) for infringements of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU to recover such fines from the companies’ (former) directors or employees, as such recovery would significantly impair the full effectiveness of those fines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1989, the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognised a privilege against self-incrimination for undertakings subject to public enforcement procedures on the basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. That privilege forms part of the fundamental rights of the defence. Over time, the privilege has been read into Article 6 ECHR and has gained ground in other domains of EU law as well. Against that background, the question arises as to whether the CJEU's original case law in the field of EU competition law needs to be updated. This paper revisits that case law by comparing it with developments in the context of the ECHR and in other domains of EU law. It argues that, in light of those developments, a case law update may indeed prove necessary. However, such an update alone would not sufficiently address the practical difficulties currently surrounding the application of the privilege in practice. For that, more coordinated legislative action would be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The settlement procedure in Slovakia stems from three sources of inspiration: top-to-bottom (European Union law), bottom-up (incentive of an undertaking’s lawyer) and horizontal sources (Czechia). After more than ten years of application of this feature of Slovak competition law, there are several cases which were settled. These cases show a certain variety from the point of view of the legal basis, the stage of procedure as well as the character or relevance of the case. This makes it possible to assess their features, practice, effects, and consequences of settlements from the empirical point of view. The present paper analyses the legal framework and practice from a historical point of view. It provides a qualitative overview with evaluation of the settlement procedure in the context of European law and the Slovak legal order as well as a quantitative overview based on data extracted from the decisions of the Slovak NCA (PMÚ) and court rulings. In its conclusions it brings forward fresh suggestions de lege ferenda.

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Copyright of Revista Română de Drept European is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The term ‘competition’ is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU’s very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations.

Book Review: Populism and Antitrust: The Illiberal Influence of Populist Government on the Competition Law System, Maciej Bernatt (Cambridge University Press 2022, ISBN: 9781108482837) 300 pp, £85,00.

The case commentary examines the recent ruling of the Court of Justice in the Nordzucker case. This judgment is important not only for the new approach to the ne bis in idem principle in competition law (which was first established in the Bpost case, issued the same day), but also for the clarification of the concept of “idem” with respect to the territorial effects of the infringement on the territories of two member states. The judgment thus provides guidance for the extraterritorial application of EU competition law.

The EU State Aid regulation is based on the premise that the market and the entities within it must operate independently without additional unnecessary intervention by the state. In other words, state intervention must be kept to a minimum. Unjustified aid to one or another entity may distort the situation in the market and lead to a number of undesirable consequences, including market advantage acquired by the aided entity. The willingness of the state and its institutions to help those who face difficulties may be understandable, but not always justified. However, the prohibition on a state and its institutions to grant aid is not unconditional and, in some cases, may cause serious undesired consequences. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19), which hit EU member states in the first half of 2020, led to a re-thinking of the rules in force and a broadening of the scope for state aid exemptions. However, there are a number of questions about the nature of the EU State Aid regulation and its correlation with COVID-19 outbreak-conditioned decisions. The article analyses the state aid granting practices across the EU (including the UK) related to COVID-19. It covers approximately two- year period—from the start of the pandemic in Europe to March 2022.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 627-639 | European Forum Insight of 17 October 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background. - II.1. The European Commission Decision. - II.2. The 2014 General Court judgment in Intel. - II.3. The Intel judgment of the Court of Justice. - III. The 2022 General Court decision in Intel. - IV. Critical analysis and further discussion. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The latest judgment of the General Court in the Intel case annulled the EU Commission's decision from 2009 imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing its dominant position by offering fidelity rebate schemes (case T‑286/09 Intel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2022:19). The judgment reaffirms the application of an "effects-based" approach which requires careful economic analysis in order to establish the abusive nature of fidelity rebates. The judgment demonstrates that the presumption that fidelity rebates are restrictions of competition by object can be rebutted by the dominant company. It also clarifies that the as efficient competitor (AEC) test is not an indispensable part of the assessment in examining the foreclosure capability of all rebate systems but can be a relevant factor where the Commission has carried it out as part of its assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the rebate schemes. This Insight seeks to examine how this clarification can be translated into concrete lessons not only for future cases but also for other cases dealing with similar issues (i.e. the Qualcomm and Google Shopping cases) and, in particular, the significance of the AEC test as a specific tool to evaluate the anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates. The Insight concludes that the recent judgment leaves more questions than answers regarding the application of the AEC test, and that it can be seen as signalling the demise of the application of this test for future cases.

The CK Telecoms judgement shed the light on the difficulties to apprehend unilateral effects, aka insufficient individual rivalry, in the context of a merger. This paper examines the overall European competition law framework applicable to these effects. After underlining the difficulties related to their apprehension by the competition authorities, the adequacy of the solely ex ante-based European competition regime will be assessed as well as the use of the New Competition Tool as an option to solve the identified drawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today many companies are collecting and extracting data from different sources to help them with their strategic decision-making. Big data is the basis of data-driven economy, bringing significant competitive advantage and market power to companies who are able to harness and exploit its potential. Digital transformation of markets and economy challenges the existing structures of consumer protection, data protection and competition law. Data is a commodity as well as a strategic asset. The term Big data refers to the amount of data that cannot be processed in a short time by traditional informatics devices. Undertakings possessing a large scale of different data have a competitive advantage. Possible application of the essential facility doctrine to Big data issues has not attracted much attention in competition assessment. This paper will try to fill the gap by providing some insights into competition and data issues. Also, the question whether data can be considered under the essential facility doctrine will be analysed. Furthermore, it will be shown that essential facility criteria are applicable, although there is room for some adjustments to data markets. The last part of the paper will scrutinize the Digital Markets Act that tries to shed some light and clear some possible problematic behaviour of the so-called gatekeepers. The regulation leaves the conventional approach and shortens the process of tackling possible anti-competition concerns. It regulates only those undertakings that have significant impact on market and the possibility to become an important gateway in the future. When the status of a gatekeeper is established in accordance with all prescribed criteria, there will be no need to show that the elements of the essential facility doctrine are fulfilled. The essential facility doctrine will still be relevant to undertakings that are not designated as gatekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the way in which the large football clubs are increasing their dominance, and whether this is compatible with EU competition law. Various insights from the economic and legal literature have been combined to give a new interpretation of EU competition law. The number of clubs with a realistic chance of winning important prizes has declined in many national markets. As a result, the economic competition has diminished and prices have increased to the detriment of welfare. This development has been reinforced by the joint actions of the top European clubs, such as threatening to start a Super League. Consequently, UEFA has implemented policies that have been particularly helpful for the top clubs. But, the clubs' actions are incompatible with EU competition law, as is the actual creation of a European Super League. If the EU were to enforce the law, the power of the big clubs would be reduced, and UEFA's policies could be based more on the old democratic principles, again. This would lead to more sporting successes for small clubs and to lower prices for the fans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Google Saga, the General Court (GC) has confirmed the Commission's decisions in Google Shopping and Google Android and dealt a severe blow to Google's strategy, which was aimed at strengthening its market power throughout its ecosystem. Although in both cases, Google was essentially favouring its own services in adjacent markets to the detriment of competitors, the Commission and the GC based their decisions on different theories of harm. In Google Shopping, the GC considered Google's conduct abusive pursuant to a novel category of abuse prohibiting self-preferencing conduct. In Google Android, instead, Google was held to have engaged in abusive forms of tying. Interestingly, in both cases Google's conduct resembles instances of constructive refusal to give access to an input, which require evidence that the input is indispensable in order to be considered abusive. However, the Commission managed to circumvent the application of the high threshold posed by the indispensability criterion. This might have the effect of inappropriately lowering the standard of proof in cases of refusal to access, paving the way for an over-enforcement of competition rules in digital markets. This article is aimed at evaluating the potential impact that the Google judgments may have on the scope of application of the indispensability requirement, and whether there is still life for the latter after the Google Saga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Rocznik Administracji Publicznej is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) in the European Union assumes that all large "core platform service" providers pose similar threats to competition and to fairness and thus imposes identical obligations on all of them. The alternative "New Competition Tool," that would have allowed the European Commission (EC) to conduct fact-intensive investigations of markets to design bespoke remedies, has been largely abandoned. The approach adopted contradicts the basic principle that competition policy should be concerned with evidence of adverse effects. The proponents of the adopted form of the DMA argue that ex ante action is required to forestall irreversible harm to competition, but that same logic also implies assessing the risk of harm from excessive regulation—and the DMA contains no mechanism to do so. Given the different underlying economics of different kinds of platform services, including the way some support digital ecosystems involving many firms, a different approach is needed. The EC missed the opportunity to introduce a market investigation tool. The rigid and static framework of the DMA seems like the wrong solution, given the economics of digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU sports law has conventionally been understood to involve the assembly of the several decisions of the Court of Justice and the Commission that apply free movement and competition law to the practices of governing bodies. The influence of these decisions has generated change in some aspects of sporting governance, in the EU, and beyond. But the EU does not set the terms according to which sport shall be organised. This article makes the case for the EU moving beyond its orthodox approach to sports law, which is rooted in the accidents of litigation, and also choosing to embrace a role as a regulator. This will diminish the autonomy that governing bodies in sport have long prized, but the article asserts the need for this in order to address the conflict of interest to which governing bodies fall prey when they perform regulatory functions while also making commercially significant choices. It is, however, unclear whether the political will needed to propel EU sports law beyond the application of internal market law to embrace also the establishment of mandatory ex ante standards can be assembled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article defends Block Exemption Regulations ('BERs') as a legitimate and effective tool for the consideration of public policy within Article 101 of the TFEU enforcement. Going against popular opinion, it argues that as the expression of a clearly defined EU-wide political consensus, BERs carry several advantages over the traditional balancing tools of Article 101(1) and (3) individual exceptions, guidelines, or balancing by the exercise of enforcement discretion. BERs offer pre-determined and transparent rules, safeguarding the independent competition authorities' political accountability and democratic legitimacy, promoting uniformity and legal certainty, reducing compliance and enforcement costs, inviting scrutiny and debate, and fostering experimentalism and flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EU competition law potentially has a role to play in the pursuit of sustainability goals and the fight against climate change. The need to interpret the EU competition law provisions in a manner consistent with the sustainability objectives that the EU is committed to - the sustainable development goals (SDGs), and the EU Green Deal and derived policies - is emphasised in this article. While agreements between competitors are generally prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, cooperation agreements among market actors pursuing sustainability objectives (sustainability agreements) might in certain situations fall under the cartel exception of Article 101(3) TFEU. In recent years, there have been numerous calls to clarify conditions under which sustainability agreements can be allowed under EU competition law, especially under Article 101(3) TFEU, and there is a heated debate among academics, national competition authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission. After questioning whether the objectives and measures of the agreements are being properly assessed with the current trends (for example, with the willingness-to-pay method), this article will add to the debate another possibility involving a broad interpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU under which the pursuit of sustainability agreements will be facilitated. Such a possibility will largely depend on the objectives of the agreements themselves and may allow a proper consideration of the objectives of a sustainability agreement for certain cases, by focusing on agreements that pursue pre-established objectives derived from international or national standards or concrete policy objectives that are not previously mandatory for the companies involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'competition' is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU's very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations. The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission's annual reports on competition (1971-2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in 'hard' contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in 'softer' contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent - selection of enforcement priorities). While the 'hard' contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the 'soft' contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories. Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1325-1337 | European Forum Insight of 11 February 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The economic entity's liability for damages under EU competition law. - II.1 The very existence of the economic unit as a basis for (civil) liability. - II.2. Conditions for determining the responsible economic unit. - II.3. Extension of liability to further companies of the same economic unit. - III. The subsidiary as defendant in damage claims for EU competition law infringements. - III.1. Framework for the exercise of the subsidiary's rights of defence. - III.2. Civil procedural implications of the EC's findings in administrative proceedings. - IV. Joint and several liability of the legal entities of the economic unit. - IV.1. Financial risks of the joint and several liability for shareholders. - IV.2. The internal allocation of the debt for the payment of damages. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The judgment of the Court of Justice in the Sumal ECLI:EU:C:2021:800 case charts new territory in the application of the concept of the "economic unit" in EU competition law. In addition to the established principles regarding the liability of the economic unit for fines imposed by the European Commission, the Court has found that the concept may also serve as a basis for damage claims against a subsidiary of a parent company that has been found to infringe EU competition law. The application of these principles regarding the liability of a subsidiary for its parent's conduct warrants an adjustment of the criteria that determine the existence of the single economic unit. In the case of downward liability, the exercise of decisive influence of the parent company over the subsidiary is not enough. Additionally, to establish a uniform market conduct the subsidiary needs to be involved in the specific economic activity of the economic unit. Based on this new judgment, victims of infringements of EU competition law will no longer be limited to bringing actions for damages against those companies punished by the Commission. They may also hold liable any subsidiary of the parent company belonging to same economic unit - even though it is not named in the Commission's decision - and may benefit from the binding effect of this decision, joint and several liability, and additional fora.

One of the defining features of EU competition provisions is that they are enforceable and applicable by the authorities and courts of the European Union and those of its Member States. The European Commission and national competition authorities participate in the application of EU competition law to differing degrees. Different legal mechanisms are adopted to apply Article 101 TFEU, including leniency programmes aimed at pursuing cartels, considered to be the greatest risk to free competition in the European Union. These programmes are implemented using non-binding mechanisms of soft law, which has generated a number of issues for the European Commission and the administrative competition authorities of the Member States when applying European and national competition laws.

Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the distribution of new cars really ceased to be a competition problem as the European Commission declared when it removed this part of the automotive business from the specific Block Exemption Regulation for the automotive sector in 2010? The purpose of the present analysis is first to inspect the car distribution cases that emerged in the EU after the year 2000 and, second, to speculate somewhat whether new forms of distribution, brought by the digitalization of marketing and sales, cannot bring about also new risks to cartel agreements and other types of distortions of competition in car sales.

Copyright of Selcuk Law Review / Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Selcuk Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Complying with the abstract rules of competition law has always been a challenge. The category of ‘restrictions of competition by object’ is precisely what facilitates compliance. However, parallel with the strengthening of compliance, much more complicated restrictions of competition cases have been dealt with by the competition authorities in the EU. In this context, the need for a precise delineation of the category of restrictions of competition by object has increased over the last ten years. The Hungarian cases have contributed signifi cantly to the development of the European Court of Justice’s case law on restrictions of competition by object. In the Hungarian cases referred for a preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice has confi rmed that the classical categories of restrictions of competition by object can be extended. However, until now, case law has not yet provided examples of this extension, only in cases where the classifi cation of the conduct in question as restriction by object was not clear, or where it was not possible to prove suffi cient harm to competition.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(2), 987-1013 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The road to the ECN+. - II.1. Regulation 1/2003. - II.2. Success and shortcomings of Regulation 1/2003. - II.3. Actions taken to address the shortcomings. - III. The ECN+ Directive. - III.1. Institutional security of NCAs. - III.2. Harmonised power to investigate and sanction. - III.3. Dissuasive fines. - III.4. Leniency pro-grams. - III.5. Mutual assistance. - IV. Decentralised cooperation as a role-model leading to an ever closer un-ion? - IV.1. Is the decentralised enforcement of competition law after the ECN+ to be considered as a well-functioning system? - IV.2. Can a decentralised enforcement system contribute to an ever closer union? - IV.3. Does the system under the ECN+ serve as a role-model for other areas, too? - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Present Article deals with Directive 1/2019 which intends to harmonise public enforcement regimes of EU competition law in the Member States. The Directive does so by harmonising and complementing the existing decentralised system of competition law enforcement and empowering the competition authorities in the Member States to be more effective enforcers. In light of the overall topic "Shaping the Future of Europe", the Directive will be tested regarding its possibilities to contribute to more effectiveness, acceptance and ultimately deeper integration. It is concluded that the system complemented by Directive 1/2019 can overall be considered a success, multiplying enforcers and thus strengthening enforcement. With the preconditions of uniform - and uniformly interpreted - substantive law, well-equipped expert authorities as well as close cooperation within a network, it could, furthermore, even contribute to an ever closer union and serve as a role-model for other areas, too.