Search

For the last fifty years, every US Presidency has come to be defined by momentous events in the Arab world. This pattern also applies to Donald Trump, whose approach to the region is shaped by the preference for reduced military exposure and a break with his predecessor's policies as well as a general deference and even admiration for authoritarian personalities and systems. The result has been a policy mishmash which offers disruption where continuity is required and continuity where disruption is needed. Trump's policies are thus likely to exacerbate the region's security crises at the inter-state and intra-state levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent study commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development to assess the effectiveness of its spending on democracy in its programs worldwide found that such aid works—with the sole exception of programs in the Middle East. What explains this exception? I argue that previous studies on democracy aid pay insufficient attention to the fact that such programs often develop as negotiated deals. Because authoritarian regimes may choose how to accept assistance, democracy aid may reward economic interests tied to incumbent regimes. I explore these dynamics through case studies of US democracy programming in Egypt and Morocco. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues, with a focus on the final 10 years of the Mubarak regime, that the US policy of using economic interdependence to influence stability in Egypt failed. By assessing the formation of this US policy and the factors concerning US‒Egyptian ties, this paper also provides a better understanding of US policy towards Egypt in general. The argument is entrenched in the stability through economic interdependence literature and identifies how this case study disproves the positive correlation associated with these two variables. The paper achieves this aim by consulting primary source governmental and non-governmental material, media, analytical and scholarly work concerned with the topic. Consequently, the paper identifies how and why Egypt’s alignment to the ‘War on Terror’, suppression of political opposition and the run-up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, led to the US policy failure. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Civil society organizations are facing increasing political restrictions all over the world. Frequently, these restrictions apply to the foreign funding of NGOs and thus curtail the space for external civil society support, which, since the 1990s, has become a key element in international democracy and human rights promotion. This so-called ‘closing space’ phenomenon has received growing attention by civil society activists, policymakers and academics. Existing studies (and political responses), however, neglect the crucial normative dimension of the problem at hand: As we show, the political controversy over civil society support is characterized by norm contestation, and this contestation reveals competing perceptions of in/justice and touches upon core principles of contemporary world order. Taking this dimension into account is essential if we are to academically understand, and politically respond to, the ‘closing space’ challenge. It is also highly relevant with regard to current debates on how to conceptualize and construct order in a world that is plural in many regards and in which liberal norms are fundamentally contested. Empirically, the paper combines an assessment of the global debate about closing space in the UN Human Rights Council with an analysis of a specific controversy over the issue in US-Egyptian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the role of the United States of America in the failure of the democratic revolution in Egypt during the Arab Spring. While appreciating the role of internal actors and the domestic dynamics, it demonstrates that regime change in Egypt was largely a consequence and a reflection of the US’s interests in Egypt and the region in general. It argues that the seemingly successful removal of the Hosni Mubarak regime by popular uprisings and the rise of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood signalled the success of democracy. However, Morsi’s controversial overthrow and imprisonment, notwithstanding his weaknesses, led to the backfiring of the regime-change strategy. The subsequent rise to power of a former military man, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and his administration has, thus far, demonstrated a contradiction to all the promises of the Egyptian revolution. It concludes that the drivers of regime change should re-examine the merits of their strategy in an effort to establish lasting peace in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When the George W Bush administration announced the ‘freedom agenda’ in the Middle East, officials claimed it marked a major break in United States (US) foreign policy. In 2005, the administration intensified efforts pressuring Egypt, a client state, to democratize. However, the US continued pursuing security cooperation with and providing military aid to Egypt. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak repelled US reform efforts by exploiting the normative inconsistency between democratization and security in the war on terror. This paper reviews Mubarak's ‘balking’ strategy (Stephen Walt,Taming American power, New York: WW Norton, 2005), including feigning compliance through nominal legal changes and counter-arguments to buy time until the inconsistencies in US policy came to a head. By 2006, the US had abandoned the freedom agenda and the Egyptian regime had embarked on a repression campaign. As I argue, the implications of the contradictions in US policy towards Egypt demonstrate that weaker client states may enjoy increased agency vis-à-vis a weakly committed patron hegemon. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses aspects of U.S. President Jimmy Carter's administration's sale of advanced warplanes to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel in 1978. It argues that Carter had the strength to overcome domestic opposition to pursue his international agenda and that the strategy used to push the package through Congress stemmed from his political imperatives more than the need to meet Saudi Arabia's request. It also explores how Carter's Middle East policy became intertwined with his domestic polical standing.

This contribution is a translation of the opening chapter of Radwa Ashour’sThe Journey: An Egyptian Woman Student’s American Memoirs[Al-Rihla: Ayyam Talibah Misriyah fi Amrika] and a brief critical introduction to the author and her works. Never before published in English translation, this first chapter shows howThe Journeyis a memoir deeply engaged in politics, literature, and people’s struggles. The work charts Ashour’s years studying in the United States of the 1970s, where she would graduate from the W.E.B. Du Bois Department of Afro-American Studies and the English Department of the University of Massachusetts in 1975. A political progressive and leftist writer, critic, and activist, this memoir reflects not only on her own journey and struggles but those of the people she met and engaged with in the United States, especially Black Americans. Coming from an Egypt emerging from the Six Day War, Ashour links her generation in the Arab world to politically active people in America in a language and with a spirit that bring the 1960s and 1970s alive.  [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The introduction of American literature in departments of English at Egyptian state-funded universities in 1959 coincided with the rising role of the US as a global power post World War II, its overtly imperial interests in the Middle East and the Arab World, and its support for the State of Israel. It became necessary then to engage with the US. This essay examines the fledgling attempts to develop American literature curricula into programs of American studies. It examines the neo-imperialist setup that gave rise to these attempts, and shows how public diplomacy initiatives which used American studies to propagate for American exceptionalism negatively influenced the development of these programs into academic platforms that engage critically with the US. The essay focuses on the case of the English Department at Cairo University, and attempts to read its history with American studies within the framework of transnationalism. It questions the term transnational, the relationship between US. And non US-based Americanists, the nature of their scholarship, and their contribution to reshaping the field of American Studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers world news briefs as of September 1, 2015. Topics include U.S. President Barack Obama's signing of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act into law on May 22 which gives Congress the right to pass a joint resolution to disapprove and block the U.S.'s implementation of an agreement with Iran, the U.S. decision to resume its military aid to Egypt, and Russia's hosting of a meeting of the Palestinian Islamic organization Hamas to facilitate Palestinian national reconciliation.

Saudi Arabian foreign policy is often declared to be countering the possible democratic transitions of the Arab Spring. As such, Saudi Arabia has been cast as a “counter-revolutionary” force in the Middle East and North Africa. This article explores the extent to which this has been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, and the extent to which Saudi foreign policy has challenged United States and European Union democracy promotion efforts in those countries. The article highlights how the transatlantic democracy promotion strategy is complicated by a conflict of interests problem, which leads them to promote democracy on an ad hoc and incremental basis. As a result, their efforts and larger strategic thinking are undermined by Saudi Arabia in Egypt. However, in Bahrain, transatlantic democracy promotion is itself muted by the strategic interest in containing Iran. As a result, Saudi Arabia can be seen as a regional countervailing power but this is implicitly in line with transatlantic policy. Tensions with Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain are over how best to manage the uprisings and maintain the status quo, rather than a conflict over political transition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to examine the dynamics of counter-revolution in Egypt following the January 2011 revolution and their corresponding impact on the path of democratization in post-Mubarak Egypt. it argues that the popular calls for change that followed the Egyptian revolution have fallen repeatedly and quickly into the hands of a structural alliance of reactionary and constancy-oriented actors operating at the internal and external levels. these included the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood, and the united States with its intrusive global structure, all of which have emerged as agents of continuity and counter-revolution in post-Mubarak Egypt, in turn complicating any proposed genuine democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the aspects of Islam and the Islamic movement in Egypt after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981. Topics discussed include the religious radicalism in Egypt in the late 1970's, the U.S. government and Egypt government diplomatic dispatches to peace movement and the goals of the National Security Archive. Also emphasized is the historical development and evolution of Islam in Egypt.

The article discusses U.S. military aid to Egypt in relation to Egypt's military rivalry with Israel. Topics include factors in U.S. foreign relations with Egypt, the role of military aid to Egypt in the funding of the U.S. military industry, and the U.S. response to the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the military coup that overthrew Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi. Topics include criticism of U.S. President Barack Obama by the Egyptian political movement Tamarod (Rebellion), proposed suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt, and the views of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published annually, the Congressional Monitor summarizes the bills and resolutions pertinent to Palestine, Israel, or the broader Arab-Israeli conflict that were introduced during the previous session of Congress. The monitor identifies major legislative themes related to the Palestine issue as well as initiators of specific legislation, their priorities, the range of their concerns, and their attitudes toward regional actors. It is part of a wider project of the Institute for Palestine Studies that includes the Congressional Monitor Database at congressionalmonitor.org. The database contains all relevant legislation from 2001 to the p re s en t (the 107th through the 113th Congress) and is updated on an ongoing basis. Material in this compilation is drawn from thomas.loc.gov, the official legislative site o f the Library of Congress, which includes a detailed primer on the U.S. legislative process entitled "How Our Laws Are Made." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Egyptian military regime after the toppling of ex-president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. The author pays special attention to the involvement of Islamist organization Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the country's politics and the election of president Mohamed Morsi in 2012. Political demonstrations aimed against Morsi in 2013, the possible involvement of the U.S. government in them and the economic development of the country are reviewed as well.

The article discusses U.S. engagement in the Middle East during the early 21st century. The author argues that despite U.S. public opinion and the perspectives of many foreign policy professionals indicating a desire for U.S. disengagement, the U.S. must remain involved in the Middle East. The article discusses the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the election and subsequent ouster of the organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood, events in Libya concerning former Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi and the deaths of U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens and others during an attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, and U.S. policy concerning Syria, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and the terrorist organization known as the Nursa Front.

The author shares his insights about the violent resistance in Egypt. In the book "Why Muslims Rebel," Mohammed Hafez explains that the character and form of repression is a reason why violent resistance emerged in Egypt and Algeria but not in other parts of the Middle East. The author explains that the U.S. influences domestic politics in Egypt, providing military aid and helping the country secure major strategic interests.

An essay is presented regarding the significance of the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and the U.S. on the access to the Suez Canal in Egypt and the security of the Sinai Peninsula. Topics discussed include the importance of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula as trade routes, the role of economics as driver of instability in rebuilding the Egyptian economy, and the economic indicators for a weak economy.

The article presents information on Arab politics as of October 2012, with a focus on the political history of Egypt and the former Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, who was in power from 1970 to 1981. Topics include a historical analysis of Arab politics; Egyptian peace efforts under the administration Sadat, who sought U.S. support and ended Egypt's war against Israel in 1979; U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East as radical Islamism increases among political leaders in the region; and the attitudes of Middle Eastern leaders toward Western politics and democracy in 2012.