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Software-defined networks (SDN) are a novel paradigm of networking which became an enabler technology for many modern applications such as network virtualization, policy-based access control and many others. Software can provide flexibility and fast-paced innovations in the networking; however, it has a complex nature. In this connection there is an increasing necessity of means for assuring its correctness and security. Abstract models for SDN can tackle these challenges. This paper addresses to confidentiality and some integrity properties of SDNs. These are critical properties for multi-tenant SDN environments, since the network management software must ensure that no confidential data of one tenant are leaked to other tenants in spite of using the same physical infrastructure. We define a notion of end-to-end security in context of software-defined networks and propose a semantic model where the reasoning is possible about confidentiality, and we can check that confidential information flows do not interfere with non-confidential ones. We show that the model can be extended in order to reason about networks with secure and insecure links which can arise, for example, in wireless environments.The article is published in the authors’ wording.

We consider while-language programs with variables of two security types: low and high. Security static analysis of information flows of such programs identifies insecure information flows which can cause leaks. Semantic rules of such an analysis which was proposed in [6] assign security types for expressions, operators and compositions of operators. We use these rules to propose an algorithm of security static analysis to discover a security type of the program under consideration. If such a type can be assigned, information flows of the program are secure; otherwise, it contains insecure information flows. We have used flex and bison [5] tools to implement a translator for a while-language into the MMIX computer [2] instruction sequence.